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
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


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
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**THE  
HARVARD  
THEOLOGICAL REVIEW**

**VOLUME II**



**ISSUED QUARTERLY BY  
THE FACULTY OF DIVINITY IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY  
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The *Harvard Theological Review* has been partially endowed by a bequest of the late Miss Mildred Everett, "for the establishment and maintenance of an undenominational theological review, to be edited under the direction of the Faculty of the Divinity School of Harvard University. . . . I make this provision in order to carry out a plan suggested by my late father, the Rev. Charles Carroll Everett." During the continuance of *The New World*, Dr. Everett was on its editorial board, and many of his essays, now collected in the volume entitled *Essays, Theological and Literary*, appeared first in its pages. Sharing his belief in the value of such a theological review, and in devotion to his honored memory, the Faculty of the Harvard Divinity School, of which he was a member from 1869, and its Dean from 1878 until his death in 1900, has accepted the trust, and will strive to make the *Review* a worthy memorial of his comprehensive thought and catholic spirit.

The *Review* is edited by a Committee of the Faculty of the Harvard Divinity School consisting of Professors G. F. Moore, W. W. Fenn, and J. H. Ropes.

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# HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

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## *THE RECENT LITERATURE UPON THE RESURRECTION OF CHRIST*

WILLIAM H. RYDER

ANDOVER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

No other doctrine of Christian theology has been regarded as more important than the doctrine that Jesus Christ rose from the dead. It has often been affirmed that upon this doctrine the church was founded; that it is the one great fact which binds together the life of Jesus in the flesh and his eternal life at the right hand of God; which confirms his teaching and his high claims; which gives to men the right to love and worship him with a supreme devotion, to believe in his continued ministration to his people, to anticipate his return to perfect and govern his kingdom in the earth, and to rest in the assurance of their own immortal life with him. It is not strange, therefore, that in the flux of modern thought many should turn their attention to this significant doctrine. It is, moreover, not only an important article of the Christian faith, but it is also one in the support and interpretation of which various lines of investigation are involved. It is, first of all, a historical question, which demands a careful examination of witnesses and testing of evidence; it has come to be, of late at least, a psychological question, demanding careful analysis of the state of mind of the early witnesses, the accumulation and comparison of other cases in which men and women have believed that they saw the forms and heard the voices of the departed. The hypotheses suggested by the experiments of psychical research have been thought by some to throw at least a dim and uncertain light upon this doctrine; and, further, the question whether there is a vital

and necessary connection between a firm conviction of the bodily resurrection of Jesus and a confident and aggressive Christian faith has come to seem to some an open question, demanding careful and discriminating examination. It is not surprising, therefore, that the literature upon this subject should have much increased during the last fifteen or twenty years, nor that the methods of discussion and the conclusions reached by able and sincere men should differ widely. It is the purpose of this article to give some account of these recent discussions, without attempting to review or criticise in detail the individual books and monographs and the articles in various English and German periodicals which have been published in such large numbers.

There are three lines of evidence which are appealed to in support of the conviction that Jesus rose from the dead. The first is the testimony that, upon the Sunday morning which followed the placing of his body in the tomb, the body had disappeared; the second is the testimony that soon after this discovery certain persons and groups of persons affirmed that they had received evidence that Jesus was living, and had revealed himself to them and communicated with them; the third is that the impression which Jesus had made during his life before his crucifixion, the scheme of ministration which he outlined for himself, the assurances which he gave of his return to take up again and perfect his work, and the history of Christianity for the past centuries, confirm this testimony and establish this fact. Each of these arguments receives critical examination in the light of modern knowledge and convictions.

How much evidence is there that the tomb in which the body had been laid on Friday evening was empty on Sunday morning? There is no doubt that the four Evangelists when they wrote their Gospels believed this. But the earliest of these Evangelists wrote not less than thirty-five years after the event, and at least two of the others substantially repeat his statement, though with some modifications due perhaps to other traditions. Apparently we have at most but two reports which are in any sense independent. All these Gospels were written not only long after the events but far from the scene where it was believed they occurred. So far as the witnesses themselves are concerned, they were, according to these different statements, one, two, three, or more than three,

women, and, in one Gospel, two men. All these witnesses, with perhaps one exception, had disappeared before the records in their present form were made. Of Mary Magdalene and her companions we are told nothing after that eventful morning; none of the writers of the Gospels claim to have interrogated her, nor is it probable that more than one of them ever saw her or any one of the women who are associated with her. Moreover, according to the accounts given, Mary and her friends were not in a position nor in a state of mind to make careful observations or to correct hasty conclusions. They saw, as they thought, a vision of angels; according to one report there was a great earthquake; an angel rolled the stone away and sat upon it, from whom lightnings flashed and whose robe glistened like snow, while the tomb was surrounded by prostrate forms of panic-stricken soldiers. The other reports are not so graphic and startling, and these features are regarded by many as embellishments of the earlier and simpler tradition; but these features suggest the unfitness of these women to give testimony to the state of the grave, or the want of care and discrimination in the man who put their testimony on record. Indeed, in the First Gospel the women do not enter or even inspect the tomb.

The earlier and calmer report given in the Gospel of Mark affirms that they entered the tomb, and were invited by the young man to view the place where the body had been laid; but, strangely enough, the result of their inspection is not given. The Gospel of Luke tells the story in a way which implies still less excitement and more definite testimony. At the beginning of the scene the women enter the tomb, and find not the body of the Lord Jesus, after which "two men" appear and speak to them. In the Fourth Gospel, Mary comes to the tomb while it is yet dark, sees that the stone is removed, and without inspection infers at once that the body has been removed. She runs away, but returns later and looks into the tomb, and sees two angels, who address her. It is not strange that such records of testimony even to so simple a fact—a fact so easily tested as the vacant place in the tomb—should excite suspicion and doubt.

The other witnesses, according to the Fourth Gospel, are Simon Peter and the disciple whom Jesus loved. It is reported that they

both entered the tomb, saw the grave-clothes and took careful note of them, and then went away. This is plain and simple; and it is neither contradicted, reconstructed, nor confirmed in the other Gospels. Indeed, though we have in the New Testament one epistle which seems to have come from Peter, several discourses attributed to him, and two references to him as one who had seen the risen Lord, we have no confirmation of this inspection of the tomb, unless it be the quotation from a Psalm in Acts 2 24, which seems, indeed, to express a Christian's conviction rather than testimony to a fact observed; and, although we have several other writings which came at least from the circle to which the other disciple belonged, there is no further reference to the discovery at the open grave.

This is all the evidence, in the form of testimony to an observed fact, that has been preserved. It is said that Paul's statement in 1 Cor. 15 4 shows that he believed that the body must have disappeared from the grave. This inference seems probable, not only from the connection of the sentences, "he was buried," and "he hath been raised on the third day," but also from what we must believe to be Paul's idea of the resurrection. But that is his theory or explanation of a religious truth; it is not either direct or indirect testimony to a fact observed.

It is held by some that we have, in addition to these statements of the Gospels, the indirect evidence which comes from the silence of those who criticised and opposed the early proclamation of the resurrection. Latham affirms that "all Jerusalem was stirred by the empty tomb." He thinks that the story was told far and wide by the men who saw it.<sup>1</sup> Of this there is no evidence. According to the Acts, the first open proclamation of the resurrection of Jesus was on the day of Pentecost, fifty days after the burial—a period during which many things may have happened. Nor is there any evidence, or any reason to believe, that even then, or later, any systematic, careful effort was made to meet the claim that Jesus' dead body had revived. If the grave was examined by any one, friend or foe, no report of it has been preserved; and the accounts of controversies with the Jews and prosecutions by courts at Jerusalem in the days of the first preaching of the gospel are very meagre,

<sup>1</sup> The Risen Master, pp. 17, 76-86.

and were put in their present form many years after the events occurred. It is not surprising that such evidence as is preserved upon this point seems to some recent writers, including Harnack,<sup>2</sup> Briggs,<sup>3</sup> Loisy,<sup>4</sup> and Henson,<sup>5</sup> to be indecisive; while others equally sincere and independent—among them von Dobschütz,<sup>6</sup> Riggenbach,<sup>7</sup> Rohrbach,<sup>8</sup> Schwartzkopff,<sup>9</sup> Stapfer,<sup>10</sup> and Oscar Holtzmann<sup>11</sup>—regard the empty grave as an established fact.

But even if there be satisfactory evidence that the body was not in the tomb on that Sunday morning, does that fact go far towards proving that it had been restored to life? The Gospel of Matthew, the Gospel of Peter, and the Acts of Pilate, state that a guard was stationed to prevent the removal of the body. But there is no evidence that the other Evangelists knew of this tradition: if they did, they ignored or rejected it. The incidents at the tomb which they record would seem impossible if wakeful guards were keeping watch, or guards who, "as dead men," were lying on the ground. Moreover, according to the report in Matthew, the grave remained entirely unguarded for the first night after the burial. If either friends or foes desired to remove the body, they would most naturally do so during that first night. That this was done by the disciples, who subsequently proclaimed the resurrection of their Lord, as the stupid slander of their enemies afterwards affirmed, is hardly considered by any modern critic of serious mind. That the Jewish Sanhedrin, or some irresponsible persons, desiring to inflict indignity upon Jesus or pain upon his friends, desecrated the grave, seems to be forbidden by what we know of the state of mind of these officials and persons as well as by the subsequent history. But, excluding such impossible or improbable suggestions, there still remain several ways of accounting for the disappearance of the body. Some friend in Jerusalem—such a man as Nicodemus—perhaps not at all acquainted with the disciples and women from

<sup>2</sup> History of Dogma, I, 85.

<sup>3</sup> Expositor, April, 1905, p. 249.

<sup>4</sup> The Gospel and the Church, p. 131.

<sup>5</sup> Hibbert Journal, II, 489.

<sup>6</sup> Ostern und Pfingsten, p. 21.

<sup>7</sup> Die Auferstehung Jesu, p. 18.

<sup>8</sup> Die Berichte über die Auferstehung Jesu Christi, p. 83.

<sup>9</sup> Monist, October, 1900, p. 7.

<sup>10</sup> The Death and Resurrection of Jesus Christ, p. 189.

<sup>11</sup> Life of Jesus, p. 499.

Galilee, may have removed it to some less public place; or Pilate—perhaps with Herod's advice—may have ordered its removal; or, as Lake suggests,<sup>12</sup> the women, in the dim light of early morning and in an unfamiliar region, may have come to the wrong tomb; or perhaps the right explanation is preserved in Mary's suggestion of the gardener—evidently she or the Evangelist thought this entirely possible. Even so confident a believer in the resurrection as Latham does not hesitate to say: "There was, as has been said, nothing very surprising in the fact that the body should have been taken away; it might even have been removed by Joseph and Nicodemus themselves, for the place of interment close to the city had only been chosen because time pressed; and a less accessible spot might be thought preferable."<sup>13</sup>

So much may be said concerning the impression which the testimony to the disappearance of the body from the grave makes upon the minds of critics of our own day of various shades of conviction. The connection supposed to exist between the disappearance of the body and the subsequent revelation of the living Master will be considered later.

What is the real weight of the evidence that after his death and burial Jesus revealed himself to certain of his friends and disciples? Testimony to this is contained in three of our four canonical Gospels; and there can be no doubt that the author of the Gospel of Mark added, or intended to add, at the end of his Gospel, the report of one or more such appearances. The supplement to that Gospel, of early though uncertain origin, the fragments of the Gospel according to the Hebrews and of the Gospel of Peter, and other early documents, repeat or add to this testimony. Earliest and most weighty of all is the Apostle Paul's summary in 1 Cor. 15 3-8 of such appearances, supplemented by his own experience. In this paragraph we have very early tradition, put on record by a man of unusual intelligence who was personally acquainted with at least some of the witnesses; and this tradition is confirmed and interpreted by the scene in which the author himself participated. This more direct testimony is supported by many incidental refer-

<sup>12</sup> *The Historical Evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus Christ*, pp. 250-252.

<sup>13</sup> *The Risen Master*, p. 40.

ences to the resurrection in the Acts, the Epistles, and the Apocalypse, and in writings preserved from the earliest Christian literature. This evidence is so full and strong, and so well endures the severe tests to which modern historical investigation compels it to submit, that nearly all recent critics admit its conclusive force. That certain honest and intelligent persons believed that they had seen the Lord Jesus alive after his death and burial may be accepted as established for our generation. (See Schmiedel,<sup>14</sup> Turner,<sup>15</sup> O. Holtzmann,<sup>16</sup> Lake,<sup>17</sup> and many others.)

But, admitting and maintaining this, we are compelled to observe that we are dealing simply with the conviction of certain persons who lived and died in the distant past. We cannot claim that these witnesses were so enlightened that they could make no mistakes, or that those who received, transmitted, and recorded their testimony were preserved from errors in memory or inaccuracy in statement; and we know that neither they themselves nor any of their contemporaries tested their experiences in any careful, scientific way. We deal directly only with convictions, while we strive to ascertain the facts which lie behind them. We must hold, however, that there were certain facts, there were causes which produced these convictions; and the duty of every serious scholar is to seek for those facts, and to discover, if possible, the explanation or hypothesis which best accounts for these experiences.

Various explanations are presented in recent literature: *first*, the body of Jesus which was buried was, in some form, reanimated, and became again the dwelling-place of his spirit; or, *second*, Jesus, as a purely spiritual being—or his heavenly Father—produced in some extraordinary way upon the minds of chosen witnesses impressions which not only convinced them that he was alive, but assumed in their mental vision a form which they identified with his former bodily form; or, *third*, the deep impression which he had made upon their minds, the faith in himself which he had kindled, the belief that he was indeed the Messiah and would fulfil his promise to return and complete the work he had begun, so

<sup>14</sup> *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, IV, col. 4061.

<sup>15</sup> *Hibbert Journal*, IV, 382.

<sup>16</sup> *Life of Jesus*, p. 505.

<sup>17</sup> *The Historical Evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus Christ*, p. 227.



wrought in their souls that in moments of excitement, of strong desire and hope, they seemed to see the Master with them again as of old, encouraging and instructing them. No sharp lines of separation can be drawn between these three hypotheses—they shade into one another; but they may be roughly classified as the theory of a real bodily resurrection, the theory of objective visions, and the theory of subjective visions.

The great majority of Christians of ancient and modern times have doubtless believed that the body of Jesus was raised from the dead. The writers of the Gospels certainly thought so, and it is probable that Paul thought of the restored, or continued, life of Jesus in the same way. Many Christians have apparently supposed that the body was restored to its former condition; could be weighed and handled, could receive food, and wear clothing. This view appears even in the Gospels, though there it is blended or confused with another conception. Paul, however, seems to reject the idea that the body of the risen Jesus consisted in any sense or degree of the earthly matter which had been buried: it was not the body which was sown, not a body of flesh and blood; it was changed or transformed, or was a body or "habitation" from heaven. Paul, as we have seen, has no interest in the empty tomb, and never refers to the risen Jesus as walking or eating or being touched with hands of flesh. It does not follow from this, however, that he did not suppose that the risen Jesus had a body which was connected in some historical and genetic way with his earthly body. He carried over into his Christian doctrine the belief of his Pharisaic circle in the resurrection of the dead; he believed that all dead and buried Christians would be raised from the dead, and that the bodies of those who were alive in the great day would be changed, not annihilated.

Most modern scholars who accept the doctrine of a bodily resurrection adopt more or less fully what seems to be the view of Paul. The risen body was in a true sense identical with the body which was buried; but it was changed, transfigured, transubstantiated, spiritualized. The identity is explained in various ways. The late Doctor Hovey held that matter can be made a more supple and perfect organ of spirit than it now is, that is, may be made to move with the swiftness of light and the power of electricity at the

indwelling spirit's behest.<sup>18</sup> This is actual, material identity, though the matter has been sublimated.

Another view is that the material of the body disappeared, and in some way a spiritual body sprang out of it, in such a manner that it had the identity of genetic origin. Latham holds that "the body exhaled or evanesced,"<sup>19</sup> and says, if asked, "'How do you explain this vanishing from the tomb of the material flesh and bones of Christ? This change into something which has all the phenomena without the substance of a human body?' My answer is ready, and it is, to my mind, a triumphant one: 'I do not explain it at all.'"<sup>20</sup> David Smith<sup>21</sup> and Swete<sup>22</sup> seem to think that the power of the risen body to resist or ignore the ordinary conditions of bodily life was but the perfecting of the power revealed in his previous life when he passed suddenly from place to place (Luke 4 30, John 5 13, 8 59), and walked on the water, and was transfigured on the mountain. On the contrary, Bernhard Weiss says of the resurrection body: "There is a docetic trait in it of which Jesus' earlier earthly life does not show a trace."<sup>23</sup> Westcott, in an interesting personal letter printed in the *Hibbert Journal* for July, 1904, appeals to the doctrine of an idealistic philosophy, saying: "Matter is, so far as I can see, only the manifestation of force, life in the widest sense, under the conditions of time and space. It has in itself no existence." When Jesus "entered into another form of existence under new conditions His life found a new embodiment."<sup>24</sup>

This theory of a spiritual body, which sprang from or replaced the body of flesh that was laid in the grave, presents difficulties which its more cautious defenders frankly admit. In the first place, it decreases or destroys the significance of the empty tomb, if it does not actually turn it from an argument for the resurrection into a difficulty which demands explanation. It would require no great force of evidence to lead men to believe that the body of a vigorous young man, free from disease, which after suddenly

<sup>18</sup> American Journal of Theology, IV (1900), 548.

<sup>19</sup> The Risen Master, p. 36.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid. p. 18.

<sup>21</sup> The Days of His Flesh, pp. 239, 273.

<sup>22</sup> The Appearances of Our Lord after the Passion, p. 24.

<sup>23</sup> Life of Christ, III, 386.

<sup>24</sup> Hibbert Journal, II, 795.

ceasing to breathe had been taken from a cross upon which it had been fastened for a few hours, returned in a few hours more to life and a measure of vigor, left the tomb, and appeared to his friends and rekindled their hope and faith. We might attribute this to special, divine, restoring power—to a miracle, if we chose to apply that name to this conquest over pain and death. On the other hand, it may be beyond the range of our experience, but is not contrary to experience, to suppose that when Jesus' spirit left his body it clothed itself in some light, heavenly form, and through this form communicated with his disciples. The serious perplexity comes when we attempt to combine the two. We know more of the substance of human bodies and the laws which govern them than the ancients knew; we are more impressed with the uniform conditions to which such bodies submit. The human body is composed of certain well-known chemical substances, which pass through certain well-known processes after the vital force has departed. It is not, as it once was, a simple appeal to ignorance and mystery to say that one such body was taken in hand by a strange, heavenly chemistry, and converted into a spiritual body. To believe, not that God quickened and guided the forces which he has appointed and which he administers with such faithful uniformity, but that he destroyed the material which he had created or annulled the laws which he has appointed and administers, demands that we reject and ignore our knowledge. It is not a sufficient reply to such difficulties to say that God could do this. The question of what God can do is out of the range of our knowledge, and not a subject either of faith or rational speculation. The question is whether we can believe that he did it; whether this is the most reasonable explanation of the facts which we are trying to explain. It may be that difficulties of this kind have led some to hold that the risen body was the "individual ideal," or *Grundform*,<sup>28</sup> of the body laid in the grave. The same thought seems to find expression in the alternative view of a recent writer, who says, quoting Westcott, "We may suppose that the Lord took up into this Glorified Body the material elements of that human body which was laid in the grave, though . . . true personality lies in the preservation of the individual formula or law which rules the organization

<sup>28</sup> Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift, XIII (1902), 258.

in each case, and not in the actual but ever-changing organization which may exist at any moment.”<sup>26</sup> But faith in such identity is embarrassed, not aided, by the appeal to the empty grave. The identity must be in the undying spirit, and not in the transubstantiated flesh.

It is manifest, further, that the hypothesis that the body which was buried a material body was raised a spiritual body does not agree with all the phenomena described in the Gospels. The risen Lord suddenly appears and disappears; he is not always promptly recognized; his voice does not always reveal him; he enters doors which have been shut; and finally he disappears from view in the clouds. Here we have suggestions of a spiritual body, if we know how to apprehend such a body, but slight suggestion of identity with the body which was buried. On the other hand we are told that this body which appeared to the women and the disciples bore the wounds of the crucifixion, consisted of flesh and bones, and partook of food. Such a body may well have come from the grave, but we shrink from calling it a spiritual body. We seem to have two conceptions interwoven in the same accounts, but not harmonized or adjusted to any unifying idea. It is not strange that Paul ignored or rejected these grosser features, if, indeed, they were in the tradition which he had received or transmitted. Many who affirm their faith in a spiritual body which is in some way to be identified with the material body that was buried have boldly followed what seems to be his example, saying plainly that eating and the other physical acts and attributes are inconceivable, and that Luke 24 4-43 records “an unhistorical tradition,”<sup>27</sup> “a naïve error of tradition,”<sup>28</sup> an impossibility,<sup>29</sup> a secondary feature,<sup>30</sup> or, perhaps a “later idea.”<sup>31</sup>

Others (as Garvie<sup>32</sup> and Bernard<sup>33</sup>) regard these as mere signs:

<sup>26</sup> Church Quarterly Review, January, 1906, p. 341.

<sup>27</sup> David Smith, Expositor, Sixth Series, VIII, 359.

<sup>28</sup> W. Beysschlag, Studien und Kritiken, 1899, p. 532.

<sup>29</sup> E. G. Steude, Die Auferstehung Jesu Christi, p. 20.

<sup>30</sup> F. Loofs, Die Auferstehungsberichte und ihr Wert, p. 23.

<sup>31</sup> B. Weiss, Life of Christ, III, 391.

<sup>32</sup> Studies in the Inner Life of Jesus, p. 434.

<sup>33</sup> Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible, IV, 234.

eating was to prove identity, not to satisfy a need. The Lord assumed "a form which bore on it the marks of the Crucifixion. . . . The sign was only wanted for a temporary need."<sup>34</sup> But such explanations attribute to the acts a purpose hardly consistent with sincerity. Showing wounds and eating food must leave certain impressions which the theory implies were not in accordance with the real needs and conditions of the risen body.

Still others are content to affirm that this eating was simply a miracle which cannot be explained;<sup>35</sup> and which, it must be added, seems to demand the belief that "a piece of a broiled fish," as well as the body of the Lord, passed through this miraculous transmutation. Westcott,<sup>36</sup> Randolph,<sup>37</sup> and Weber<sup>38</sup> hold that the phrase "flesh and bones" in Luke 24 39 is not inconsistent with the conditions of a spiritual body, as "flesh and blood" (1 Cor. 15 50) would have been; as if flesh combined with blood would be material, but with bones spiritual! Flesh and bones are the constituent parts which would be in evidence in presenting such proof as the text contemplates.

The fact is that there are difficulties with this hypothesis of a spiritual body which are not removed by simply rejecting or skillfully explaining these more materialistic features of the Gospel narrative. If we are asked to believe that the risen Jesus appeared in a spiritual body, we must have some apprehension of the nature and constitution of such a body. Does it consist of matter—transubstantiated matter, we may call it, but nevertheless matter, and therefore still under the laws which govern matter? If the Galilean women and disciples, and even the Pharisee Paul, had been asked this question, and could have understood its import as we do, they would doubtless have answered: "Yes, it was matter, though greatly refined and etherealized. This body could do what other bodies cannot do; but whatever it did was done under the laws which rule organic matter. The body moved with unusual ease and rapidity, and, perhaps, passed through substances which check the movement of ordinary bodies, but it existed in a limited

<sup>34</sup> H. Latham, *The Risen Master*, p. 74.

<sup>35</sup> H. B. Swete, *The Appearances of Our Lord after the Passion*, p. 50.

<sup>36</sup> *The Gospel of the Resurrection*, p. 162.

<sup>37</sup> *The Empty Tomb*, pp. 15-16.

<sup>38</sup> *Monist*, April, 1901, p. 393.

space, it was not ubiquitous; it reflected sunlight or lamplight, and was visible to eyes of flesh; it had organs of speech, and uttered words which were projected through the vibrating air to ears of flesh." We speak of the grosser and finer features in the incidents described in the Gospels, and reject or carefully explain the former that we may hold consistently the latter; but if there is a difference, it is merely one of degree. If the disciples saw a body and heard it speak, they were not inconsistent in regarding it as a body of flesh and bones, at least of the substance of which flesh and bones are made; it was the body of one who had returned to a limited, circumscribed life, conditioned by the laws and forces which govern nature. Nor is there any radical difference between these revelations and those made later to Stephen, to Paul, and to the writer of the Apocalypse. There is nothing which we know of the possibilities of matter which either forbids or justifies the hypothesis that such a body once revealed itself to the eyes and ears of men. But this idea does not seem to reach to the conception which Christian faith holds of its eternal and exalted Saviour. If we accept it, we must hold to this view of a life limited by a refined, transcendent, but material, body. If it is suggested that the body was not refined matter, but something else, of which we know nothing, we may be tempted to say: That is out of the range of our knowledge and of an intelligent faith. But a better answer lies at hand: If we believe that the Lord, after his crucifixion, had a body at all, it is because we accept the testimony of the witnesses, which testimony points decidedly to a body that made the impression of a material organism, and because nothing we have learned since justifies us in substituting anything else for this.

Difficulties of this kind have led some recent scholars to conclude that the spirit of Jesus did not return to an organized body of any kind. His disembodied spirit was present with his disciples, though perhaps not confined to those places where they chanced to be present. His communion with them was that of a spirit with spirits, and there was no need of bodily organs and faculties to connect these kindred spirits or to intervene between them. Even ordinary human spirits dwelling in the flesh, it is thought by some, may sometimes communicate impressions and thoughts to others, without appealing to physical organs, even when their bodies are

too far separated to make such appeal possible. If that is possible, it is thought that the spirit of Jesus, freed from earthly, material limitations, may have enlightened the minds, quickened the memories, and kindled the faith and courage of his disciples by direct action upon their spirits. Some have even ventured to suggest the possibility that modern research into certain striking phenomena which arouse the suspicion that spirits not dwelling in earthly bodies can commune with men, may throw some light upon the question. Lake says, "Phenomena have certainly been registered by observers of high scientific and moral position, which may point to the conclusion that men who were known to them personally, and died recently, are still capable of communicating with them."<sup>39</sup> Horn says that Weisse, Hülsmann, and Fichte held to a spiritualistic power of the dead to recall themselves to the living.<sup>40</sup> Not many, however, have faith enough in this recent and occult science to appeal to it in support of what they term "the objective-vision hypothesis." This view was set forth in an able and impressive way by Keim<sup>41</sup> some years ago. This seems to be the view of Stapfer,<sup>42</sup> and of Lake,<sup>43</sup> Rolleston,<sup>44</sup> and E. A. Abbott.<sup>45</sup> The thought is that such deep and vivid impressions made upon the minds of the disciples by the spirit of Jesus would inevitably, in men of their ways of thinking, assume forms which would seem to be external to those who experienced them; the assurance of Jesus' presence would seem to be a vision of him appearing before the eyes, and the thoughts which he impressed upon their minds would express themselves in words uttered and heard. Even if experiences were not quite so vivid and realistic at the moment when they occurred, imaginative Orientals could not report them in any other than an objective way, which would inevitably become more graphic and detailed as it was repeated.

This view is, of course, rejected by those who hold that the empty grave furnishes essential witness to the fact of Jesus' re-

<sup>39</sup> The Historical Evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus Christ, p. 245.

<sup>40</sup> Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift, XIII, 475-476.

<sup>41</sup> Jesus of Nazara, VI, 360-365.

<sup>42</sup> The Death and Resurrection of Jesus Christ, p. 256.

<sup>43</sup> The Historical Evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus Christ, pp. 274-275.

<sup>44</sup> Hibbert Journal, IV, 637.

<sup>45</sup> Apologia, p. 75.

newed presence with his disciples; and some who do not regard that as a certainly established fact or as of vital doctrinal importance still regard this theory as a kind of makeshift, which does not fit well into the gospel stories. Bernhard Weiss <sup>46</sup> and Rhees, <sup>47</sup> while they do not accept the theory, think it not inconsistent with a true faith in the essential doctrine of the resurrection. The weight of any direct argument for it will best appear after we have considered the theory next presented and discussed.

The theory of subjective visions. This is founded upon the belief that, so far as objective realities are concerned, the disciples were in relations not radically different from those which surround other Christian men. God was, indeed, near them, as he is to all pious souls, and Jesus was the inspiration, the teacher and guide, that he is for all Christians; but he was no nearer to them than he is to all who love and follow him, and assumed no form through which to communicate with them which is not the means of communicating with others. The visions, then, were purely subjective; perfectly normal, in the sense that they sprang from those forces and were developed under those laws which pertain to the normal spiritual life of men. They can be explained without appeal to the miraculous, in the sense of that word which sets aside or interferes with the uniform action of God in the material or spiritual life of men. This is the view of Schmiedel, <sup>48</sup> and his pupil Arno Neumann, <sup>49</sup> and of Eck, <sup>50</sup> and is most fully and ably discussed and defended by Arnold Meyer. <sup>51</sup> Some who seem to decide for a spiritual body or an objective vision seem to regard this as a possible explanation of the phenomena. Stapfer asks, "What . . . is the use of asking whether the visions were exterior or interior?" <sup>52</sup> Edwin A. Abbott, though he has said, "The body of Christ did not leave the tomb. But the spirit of the Savior came (according to the testimony of Paul) in visible form and with audible

<sup>46</sup> *Life of Christ*, III, 390.

<sup>47</sup> *Jesus of Nazareth*, p. 213.

<sup>48</sup> *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, IV, cols. 4080 f.

<sup>49</sup> *Jesus* (English translation), pp. 164-170.

<sup>50</sup> *Über die Bedeutung der Auferstehung Jesu für die Urgemeinde und für uns*, p. 21.

<sup>51</sup> *Die Auferstehung Christi*, pp. 290-315.

<sup>52</sup> *The Death and the Resurrection of Jesus Christ*, p. 256.



voices not only to single persons—Peter, James, and Paul himself—but also to groups of disciples,” adds a few pages later: “As to the statement of my view, as being that ‘the belief in the resurrection of Christ was based on certain visions,’ it is correct, but I should prefer to state it differently: ‘*It was based on the personality of Christ, and on spiritual or psychological laws.*’” “When dead to the eyes of the flesh, He appeared to the eyes of their spirits and dwelt permanently in their hearts.”<sup>58</sup> One cannot doubt that one main argument which draws towards this conclusion is the modern shyness in accepting the miraculous; or—to put it more affirmatively and religiously, and really more justly and accurately—the disposition to believe that God’s ways in both the material and spiritual administration of the world are uniform. No age has ever been more ready than ours to recognize that strange and mysterious things happen—things not easily explained by our present knowledge of the forces active in the world. But when these things are recognized, it is not the habit of thoughtful men of this age to attribute them without further inquiry to some divine interposition, breaking in upon the established course of divine providence or grace. This is not an irreligious, nor even a sceptical state of mind; it is, at least in many cases, profoundly religious, based on faith, not on unbelief—faith in the infinite wisdom and power and the immutability of God. It is not due to a loss of faith in the uniqueness and the supremacy of Christ, but rather to confidence in him as truly the Son of God, who entered into God’s order, respected his laws, and from first to last illustrated in a supreme way the spirit and method in which the children of God should accept and interpret God’s ways with men. Now men who cultivate this spirit, when they read the records of the New Testament, cannot avoid the inquiry, Is there not at least some tentative, hypothetical way of explaining even the most wonderful parts of these records which recognizes them as illustrations and expressions of God’s uniform ways with men?

No one can attempt to explain eclipses, diseases, cures, striking historical events, religious movements and experiences, in this way, and then, when he studies the New Testament, neglect or

<sup>58</sup> *Apologia*, pp. 75, 79, 80.

reject his method. To do that would, sooner or later, throw the New Testament out of the realm of serious studies. It will not do, either, to begin by accepting its statements, literally interpreted, and then simply to attempt to justify them to modern ways of thinking. That would be only half serious. The student of the New Testament must, like every other student of history or ancient literature, strive to get behind the record, and discover, so far as possible, the underlying facts. It is this irresistible tendency which has forced some modern scholars to raise the question whether the conviction which arose in the minds of certain persons that they had seen the Lord Jesus alive after his death and burial, may not be accounted for by an appeal to forces and laws which are uniform in human life.

It is a well-known fact that seeing visions is a common experience among people who have active, imaginative minds, especially among those who have deep religious experiences and intense spiritual desires. The disciples of Jesus belonged to a race which was controlled by such experiences and desires. The Old Testament records many such visions, described in very vivid and realistic terms; and other literature of Jewish origin, especially the apocalypses, abound in such descriptions.

In some cases this may be simply a literary device; but even in those cases its literary value is due to the fact that it appeals to the imagination as real and objective. In many cases, moreover, the seer, or the writer who recorded his visions, must have thought of the scenes described as having some kind of objective reality. Whatever may have been the first impression which lies behind the story of the appearance of the dead Samuel to the woman of Endor, the vision of horses and chariots of fire seen by Elisha's servant, and Isaiah's magnificent vision in the sixth chapter of his prophecy, there can be no doubt that the descriptions given of these scenes were regarded as recording something that was real and objective. The same was doubtless true of the various accounts of the appearance of angels who were seen by men, and conversed and even ate with them. Nor are such scenes confined to the earlier records of the Old Testament. Three of the disciples are reported to have seen Moses and Elijah on a mountain, conversing with their Master; dead saints leave

their tombs and appear to many (Matt. 27 55); Peter sees a sheet laden with animals descend from heaven; Paul beholds a man from Macedonia appearing to him at Troas and inviting him to come to Macedonia; he also has interviews with Jesus, not only on the Damascus way but in other places and at other times. The dying Stephen beholds the Son of Man standing on the right hand of God; and the Lord converses with Ananias. Angels are often seen, sometimes acting on material substances, such as rolling a stone, opening prison doors, smiting a man with death, singing, and conversing with men. Some of these descriptions may be intended as graphic figures or metaphors; but even then the significance of such figures is due to the belief in a reality which suggests them. There can be no doubt that those who recorded such instances frequently believed that they were relating objective facts; and we have every reason to believe that those who had such experiences viewed them as due to the visible and audible presence of the beings to whom they ascribe them.

If there are cases, as in the apocalypses and elsewhere, where it was not the intention to describe in literal terms an objective reality, even such cases may aid in interpreting the sections of the New Testament now under discussion. There can be no question that in ancient and modern times men of glowing imaginations often relate their experiences and express their convictions in this form of poetic and imaginative description. Jeremiah *sees* two baskets of figs set before the temple; Jesus *sees* Satan as lightning fallen from heaven; and the author of the Apocalypse *sees* the scenes of the future which he describes. The feature appears even in modern religious writings. F. B. Meyer thus describes a decisive experience in his own religious life. He was walking among the hills at Keswick in the night, depressed over his religious state, when—to quote his own words—“A voice said to me: ‘As you took forgiveness from the hand of the dying Christ, take the Holy Ghost from the hand of the living Christ.’ I turned to Christ and said: ‘Lord, as I breathe in this whiff of warm night air, so I breathe into every part of me the blessed Spirit.’” A little later he says: “I turned to leave the mountain side, and as I went down the tempter said: ‘You have got nothing. It is moonshine.’ I

said: 'I have.' He said: 'Do you feel it?' 'I do not.' 'Then, if you do not feel it, you have not got it.' I said: 'I do not feel it, but I reckon that God is faithful, and he could not have brought a hungry soul to claim by faith, and then give a stone for bread, and a scorpion for a fish. I know I have got it because God led me to claim.'"<sup>44</sup> There is nothing more realistic or objective in the reports of conversations between the disciples and the risen Christ. Is it not possible that the experiences which lie behind the formal conversations recorded in the Gospels were somewhat like that which marked the crisis in the life of Mr. Meyer?

A still more striking illustration of this habit of describing what are believed to be real experiences may be found in Burkhardt's interesting and suggestive book upon the resurrection of the Lord. He does not hesitate to give lengthy accounts of the appearances of Jesus to Peter, James, and the mother of Jesus. These scenes are realistic in detail, as if they were reports from eye-witnesses. Those scenes which appear in the Gospels, and the words which are recorded there, are reconstructed; Jesus is made to say to the women, "Fear ye not; but only renew your trust in me. I am actually the same whom ye long ago had learned to know as your Saviour." Salome is reported as saying to Peter, "We have for thee an entirely special commission: when the angel showed us the empty grave he said," etc."<sup>45</sup> This is entirely honest and simple-minded; but if Herr Burkhardt had written his book in the first century, instead of at the end of the nineteenth, it would have opened up many interesting and perplexing questions for New Testament critics. But is this way of relating deep experiences, this habit of attributing to actors in significant events words and situations which spring from the imagination of the narrator, something new to story tellers? Is it reasonable to recognize this feature and make allowance for it in the discourse or writing of a modern Christian, but unscientific to expect to find and seek to detect the same characteristic in the writings of the Evangelists? Indeed, when we

<sup>44</sup> A Castaway, p. 96.

<sup>45</sup> Die Auferstehung des Herrn und seine Erscheinungen, pp. 99, 119, 120.

compare one Gospel with another and with the extant fragments of early uncanonical gospels, we see that the same spirit and method ruled in those days. Each writer felt at liberty to recast the tradition which came into his hands; to add from other sources, or, apparently, like the excellent Herr Burkhardt, from his own vivid imagination; to omit what he did not care to repeat, and to change words and sentences in what he retained. We cannot now dissect out of these stories that which was their original form, their primitive germ; we cannot know just what the first experience of those who saw the Lord was; but we can recognize the probability that it was something simpler, perhaps less objective, than appears in the stories which went from lip to lip for many a year before they were recorded in their present form, or which, if you please, lay in the brooding, fructifying memory of one or two intense, imaginative men, who finally wrote them down, not as dry annalists, but with the fervor of spiritual and poetic genius.

But there must have been a germ; there must have been real, primitive experiences, from which these narratives and the great spiritual movement which preserved them and gave them form, sprang. The scientific temper of our own age forbids us to believe that great convictions and great movements spring from nothing, or from vain superstition and foolish blunders. The men who said that they had seen the Lord, and retained this conviction through years of labor and persecution, and convinced others that they were right, and thus founded and inspired the church of Christ, could not have been mistaken in the real, spiritual substance of this conviction. They had a foundation for their belief quite as good as an empty tomb, a human form seen moving about, and words that set the air in vibration; better, perhaps, than a localized, limited, spiritual presence, which impressed itself upon their sensorium or upon their souls. What may that have been? It may have been the focalizing, or the bursting into life, of experiences and convictions which had found lodgement in their souls through many a day. They were Jews, accepting without doubt the Pharisaic belief in the immortality of souls and the resurrection of the dead; from their earliest youth they had believed that the Messiah was to come and redeem Israel;

they had come to a strong belief in Jesus as the promised Messiah; they thought that the time was near when he would reveal his power and establish his kingdom; they had heard him predict temporary disaster, perhaps death, for himself; but with these predictions there was the promise also that he would surely return to take up again his task and complete it. The words in which these predictions were recorded in the Gospels may be more definite than those which the Master spoke, but it is hardly to be doubted that he gave such assurances. The disciples were not prepared, indeed, for the dreadful catastrophe; when it fell, it shocked and stunned them. But what was more natural, more in accord with God's ways with men and the normal processes of human souls, than that first one and then another should react from this crushing blow, and should recover the faith which had been planted and nourished in their souls? They could not doubt that their Lord's spirit still lived, and that he would take up again and perfect the work to which he had given himself, and which he had often promised to carry to its perfection. Faith, not hopelessness, was normal for them, and they sprang back into their normal state. Moreover, their natural, perhaps their only, way of conceiving of the return of Jesus to his task was through his resurrection. "The Spirit was not yet," we are told by one of the Evangelists; the capacity to lay hold of their Lord as a purely incorporeal presence had not yet developed; they must think of him as in a body revealed to their eyes; the words which echoed in their hearts seemed to sound in their ears, and they could not report such experiences without putting them in this form. Furthermore, if one or more of those who had these experiences began to relate them in that way, not only the spiritual experience but the form of apprehending and relating it would be contagious. If Simon Peter or Mary Magdalene said, with glowing face and ardent tones, "I have seen the Lord, and he has spoken to me," others would almost inevitably have similar visions. One knows little of the history of religious ecstasies who objects that, while experiences of this kind might occur in a single soul, they could not be shared by a group of a dozen, or five hundred, people.<sup>66</sup>

<sup>66</sup> Arnold Meyer, *Die Auferstehung Christi*, pp. 217-272.

It was remarked in the Acts of the Apostles that Jesus appeared, "not to all the people, but unto witnesses who were chosen before of God," and many recent writers upon the resurrection have called attention to the fact that, with one notable exception to be considered later, there are no witnesses except those who had already become his disciples. Those who most confidently defend the doctrine of a bodily resurrection are impressed with this fact. Horn thinks it was due to the fact that the eyes of others "were holden";<sup>57</sup> David Smith holds that the risen body "was invisible to the natural eye," and could be seen only by those "endowed with spiritual vision";<sup>58</sup> Simpson observes, "If it be true that the eye sees precisely what it brings with it the power to see, perception will vary with receptivity";<sup>59</sup> and Skrine declares, "Only those who had love could be in the life-relation with Christ. Given this love, the sense-perception becomes possible."<sup>60</sup> Latham says, "This body was rendered cognizable by human senses—touch as well as sight—when He so would have it, and only then."<sup>61</sup>

These various views and conjectures all rest upon the conviction that the apprehension of the risen Master was, in some way, subjective and visionary: it was not simply the ordinary observation of an objective reality, but was due to a peculiar state of mind in the observers. Such explanations approximate the hypothesis of subjective visions, and raise the question whether it is not reasonable to attribute to the mental and spiritual condition of the witnesses even more than these scholars attribute.

The case of the Apostle Paul is, indeed, in some degree exceptional. He had not been a follower of Jesus; and we cannot suppose that, on his way to Damascus, his heart was controlled by faith in him and passionate desire to see him. But Paul had a genuine Pharisee's belief in the future life and the resurrection of the dead, and he had an intense longing for the redemption of his people; he doubtless fully believed in revelations from the

<sup>57</sup> *Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift*, XIII, 359.

<sup>58</sup> *The Days of His Flesh*, p. 524.

<sup>59</sup> *Our Lord's Resurrection*, p. 116.

<sup>60</sup> *Contemporary Review*, December, 1904, p. 865.

<sup>61</sup> *The Risen Master*, p. 22.

world beyond, and he was, as we know, a man predisposed to visionary experiences; his religious life did not satisfy his soul, and he had had for some months a contact with Christians which must have left deep impressions upon his mind, and kindled feelings of regret and restless longing; we are told that he stood by when the martyr Stephen cried aloud, "Behold, I see the heavens opened, and the Son of man standing on the right hand of God." He, too, had had his preparation for a vision of Christ; and the reaction and revulsion of feeling are quite as normal as the propulsion which acted upon other witnesses. (See Schmiedel,<sup>62</sup> von Dobschütz,<sup>63</sup> Schwartzkopff,<sup>64</sup> Eck.<sup>65</sup>)

The experience of Charles G. Finney in this, as in some other respects, closely resembles that of Paul. Until the time of his conversion, he seems to have been nearly as ignorant of Christ, if not as hostile to him, as was Saul of Tarsus. He thus describes his own experience at the time of his conversion:

There was no fire, and no light, in the room; nevertheless it appeared to me as if it were perfectly light. As I went in and shut the door after me, it seemed as if I met the Lord Jesus Christ face to face. It did not occur to me then, nor did it for some time afterward, that it was wholly a mental state. On the contrary it seemed to me that I saw him as I would see any other man. He said nothing, but looked at me in such a manner as to break me right down at his feet. . . . It seemed to me a reality, that he stood before me, and I fell down at his feet and poured out my soul to him.

Of a later experience he says:

The day was just beginning to dawn. But all at once a light perfectly ineffable shone in my soul, that almost prostrated me to the ground. . . . This light seemed to be like the brightness of the sun in every direction. It was too intense for my eyes. . . . I think I knew something then, by

<sup>62</sup> *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, IV, col. 4081.

<sup>63</sup> *Ostern und Pfingsten*, p. 25.

<sup>64</sup> *The Prophecies of Jesus Christ relating to His Death, Resurrection and Second Coming*, pp. 101-104.

<sup>65</sup> *Über die Bedeutung der Auferstehung Jesu für die Urgemeinde und für Uns*, pp. 13-17.



actual experience, of that light that prostrated Paul on his way to Damascus.<sup>66</sup>

The fact is, as one of the sturdy advocates of a bodily resurrection says: The "ultimate belief [of the disciples] did not rest upon outward or circumstantial evidence, but upon intuitive insight, upon the conviction that had grown up in them from their having lived with their Master." "The belief which our Lord wanted His followers to possess was to come mainly from within; the supports from without were only subordinate."<sup>67</sup> But if we find our confidence in those supports from without growing weak by reason of the conceptions of God's ways of dealing with his world and his children which we are forced to accept, must those evidences which come from within fail, or suffer serious loss? We should be poor indeed if our faith in Christ, in his doctrine and his scheme of life, in his purpose and his promise to redeem the souls of men, in his revelation of the heavenly Father's love and the Holy Spirit's constant ministry to men, rested upon such evidence as we possess that his grave was deserted on the third day, and his body, transmuted into some strange substance which both submitted to and transcended the laws which govern organic matter, was seen and heard to speak, and finally vanished in the clouds. These narratives have doubtless enlisted the attention and commanded and strengthened the faith of many people. But vital truth is not in the forms in which it expresses itself, but in the deep, irresistible response which spirit gives to spirit. The forms must change that the truth may live and continue to produce its fruit. Perhaps Christianity would not have gained its earliest conquests without the Easter message, "The Lord hath risen indeed, and hath appeared to Simon." But it does not follow from this that the faith which that message expressed may not survive and grow strong after the formal conception expressed by those who first uttered these words has been adjusted to other views of the relation of the eternal spirit of Christ to a bodily organism. It may be doubtful whether Jesus would have made his connections with the men of his time if his first disciples

<sup>66</sup> *Memoirs of Rev. Charles G. Finney*, pp. 19, 20, 34.

<sup>67</sup> H. Latham, *The Risen Master*, pp. 74, 75.

had not taken him as the Jewish Messiah. But for how long was that interpretation of him and his mission of real significance to his church? The name, in a Greek translation, was retained, but the nature and functions of the Jewish Messiah were obliterated in interpretations which came in part from Greek philosophy but in the main from his own moral and spiritual transcendence, so that, by a strange transmutation, even the term which described an anointed prince or leader has come to denote to many an eternal hypostasis in the divine being. It may be questioned whether Christianity would have so rapidly won its place and so fully inspired men if it had not proclaimed that Christ was soon to come again on the clouds of heaven, to raise those who were in their graves, to judge the world, and to establish his kingdom. But the years and centuries have passed without this stupendous catastrophe, and the church has lived on, adjusting its views to the demands of history; and, though the form of its apprehension has changed, it still lives by its faith in the triumph of Christ and his kingdom. There is no article of the Christian faith which rests upon the conviction that Jesus left the grave and revealed himself in visible and audible form to a few people during a few days or weeks. As several recent writers have acknowledged or affirmed, the doctrine of immortality does not rest upon the evidence that Jesus was seen alive after his burial. (See Rolleston,<sup>66</sup> Riggensbach,<sup>67</sup> Arnold Meyer,<sup>68</sup> Fenn,<sup>69</sup> and others.) The supremacy or divinity of the Lord Jesus is not dependent upon the establishment of this as a fact, nor is the hope of the ultimate triumph of his kingdom of righteousness in the earth. Our faith in these things rests in Jesus himself, in what he taught and what he did and what he showed himself to be, not in one experience through which he passed. Indeed, the belief that he was raised from the dead rests upon the impression which his life and teachings have made; and no one would be able, or would care, to defend the story of his resurrection, except from faith in his transcendent nature and worth. The question presses whether

<sup>66</sup> *Hibbert Journal*, IV, 631.

<sup>67</sup> *Die Auferstehung Jesu*, p. 36.

<sup>68</sup> *Die Auferstehung Christi*, p. 332.

<sup>69</sup> *American Journal of Theology*, XII (1908), 565.

the Christian faith gains anything in power to convince the mind or to inspire the soul by striving to make the evidence that Jesus' body was raised to life a connecting link between his own spiritual being and the spirits of believers.

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*THE INFLUENCE OF CHRISTIANITY UPON  
THE ROMAN EMPIRE*

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It has commonly been taken for granted that Christianity must have had a great and beneficent influence upon the Roman Empire, within which it had its origin and whose official religion it finally became. This not unnatural assumption is, however, very difficult to substantiate. One may recognize that the religion of Christ was a great advance upon the paganism of antiquity, and that its final victory was a blessing to the world, and yet find it far from easy to show how and to what extent the Roman world was benefited by it. It is simple enough to point to individual lives within the Christian church that were purified and helped. But to prove that the common level of life within the Empire was raised, that society at large was bettered, that the general moral standard was elevated, that political principles and civil institutions and economic ideals were improved by its influence, is altogether another matter. It is not enough to content ourselves with the assumption that Christianity being in itself a good thing must have been good for the Roman world; it is incumbent upon us to show that it actually proved so.

If this is to be done, it would seem necessary first of all to show that the Empire was better in its later days, after it had felt for centuries the leaven of Christianity, than it was before the new religion appeared upon the scene. It is notoriously difficult to compare the life of one age with that of another and determine with which the advantage lies. So much depends upon the temperament and point of view of those observers whose comments upon their own times have happened to come down to us that it is almost impossible to speak with assurance. And yet we know enough about the Roman Empire, early and late, to be rea-

sonably confident that no general and permanent improvement, political, economic, social, and moral, marked its history from the second century on; that is, from the earliest date when Christianity may be supposed to have exerted an influence upon its life. The notion that the Empire was steadily declining during all this period may be exaggerated, but it is in general true. Chrysostom and Jerome and Augustine and Orosius and Salvian may in their Christian zeal paint contemporary morals blacker than the facts warrant. But the Christian apologetic undertaken by Augustine in his *City of God* and by Orosius in his *History of the World* shows that there was general agreement both among Christians and pagans that the Empire was growing steadily worse instead of better; and no one can read Salvian's work on the *Government of God* and the poems *Conjugis ad Uxorem* and *De Providentia Divina* ascribed to Prosper of Aquitaine without realizing that, even though the pictures may be overdrawn, conditions were as bad as they had ever been, if not worse. All the evidence of the period goes to show that in the political world order was increasingly giving way to chaos, and that economically the Empire was on the down grade; while socially and morally there was at any rate no improvement sufficiently marked or general to leave any traces. Such writings as those of Symmachus, Ausonius, and Apollinaris Sidonius show that there was still domestic virtue in the world in the fourth and fifth centuries, as there was in the age of Pliny, and political honor, as in the days of Cato; but society at large seems to have been no better, if it was not worse, than in earlier times.

In certain respects it is true there was a difference easily observable. Christian monasticism, unknown in the first century, had spread far and near both in East and West before the fifth century, and society was unquestionably widely affected by it. Here we have a direct fruit of Christianity. It is true that monasticism has had a large development in other religions as well. It neither took its rise originally within the Christian church nor has Christianity had a monopoly of it, but Christian monasticism was a native development on Christian soil, the natural result of principles which existed within the church as early even as the time of Paul. Quite apart, however, from the question of its origin,

it may well be doubted whether its growing prevalence in the early centuries of the Christian era was really a benefit to the Roman Empire. It argued the wide-spread existence of a certain form of religious devotion and moral heroism, but it argued also an all too common moral weakness. The impulse to leave the world, to turn one's back upon its pleasures, its occupations, its responsibilities, and its opportunities, sometimes meant strength, sometimes the lack of it. It might be due to moral enthusiasm or to mere pessimism and thwarted desires. It did undoubtedly tend to promote the ideal of personal purity and sexual morality, though the influence even here was not always as uplifting as it might have been—witness for instance many of the letters of Jerome. The spectacle of the life of celibacy and chastity practised by an ever-increasing number of men and women must impress beholders with the importance of purity; but on the other hand the contempt, either tacit or avowed, thrown by the whole movement upon family life, and the notion that the highest thing a man could do was to separate himself from neighbors and friends, from the world and all its interests, rather than to devote himself to the service of his fellows and to the improvement of society and the state, could hardly fail to be pernicious. Instead of enlisting the religious and moral enthusiasm of the age for the betterment of society, monasticism turned much of that enthusiasm into an altogether different channel, and diminished rather than multiplied the forces making for the transformation of this world into the kingdom of God.

Another marked difference between the earlier and later Empire was the gradual decrease in the number of slaves and the diminishing importance of the slave class in the life of the Roman world. Whether Christianity had anything to do with this decline in the institution of slavery is doubtful. It is true that the overthrow of slavery is commonly attributed to the Christian church, but it was not overthrown in the Roman world. The institution was still firmly intrenched in the later Empire, even though the relative number of slaves was less than in earlier days. Christianity in the days of the Roman Empire made no protest against slavery. Christians accepted it without question, just as they accepted the state, the prevailing differences in social rank, and

the common inequalities in economic conditions. They preached the principle of Christian brotherhood, but they no more thought of putting an end to slavery than they thought of destroying private property. Attempts might be made—as they often were, by pagans as well as Christians—to ameliorate the suffering and distress which slavery often caused, but of a war upon the institution itself nobody thought. In Stoicism the principle of human brotherhood and equality was preached before Christianity and independently of it; and under its influence there were pagans here and there who freed their slaves, as there were Christians who did the same under the influence of the like Christian principle. As the idea and practice of penance grew within the church, the manumission of slaves took its place with the giving of alms and other forms of self-sacrifice as a means of making atonement for one's sins. Moreover, the general hostility of the more ascetic Christians to luxury and display voiced itself occasionally in denunciation of the practice of holding large numbers of slaves, as in attacks upon large possessions of any kind.<sup>1</sup> But the practice of manumission was not new, and it is by no means certain that it was more common in the Christian than in the pagan Empire. In any case it did not mean the condemnation of slavery or the destruction of it as an institution. As a matter of fact, the church itself, after it had become a legalized corporation within the Roman Empire, was a large holder of slaves, as of other kinds of property.

The attitude of the leaders of the church from Paul on was such as to confirm rather than to destroy slavery. Christians were not to desire a change in their earthly condition. They were to accept their lot in life, whether bond or free, without complaint, and were to realize that they were all at the same time freedmen of the Lord and bond-servants of Christ. There was inculcated the same indifference towards one's condition in this respect as in all respects. It was not for a change in their earthly lot or a betterment of their worldly state that Christians were to seek, but for righteousness and eternal salvation. The church, to be sure, preached the brotherhood of all Christians in Christ,

<sup>1</sup> See Chrysostom, Homily xl, 5, on First Corinthians, who thinks two or three slaves enough for anybody.



but this was not commonly interpreted to mean the abolition of slavery or even any criticism of it as an institution. Christian brotherhood was to manifest itself in mutual kindness, forgiveness, forbearance, and charity. Christian masters were to treat their slaves mercifully, and Christian slaves were to be faithful and dutiful to their masters. Thus the Christian spirit was to find expression both among bond and free, but an equality of condition or estate in this world it was not supposed to involve. How the idea of Christian brotherhood and the equality of all Christians before God could consist with the continuance of slavery is suggested, for instance, in Augustine's *City of God*, where the realization of the Christian ideal is put in heaven rather than on earth.<sup>2</sup>

The real secret of the growing decline of slavery in the Roman Empire—a decline which began already in its early days before the Gospel had gained a hearing and a following—is to be found not in the influence of Christianity but in changed economic conditions. The political revolution resulting in the establishment of the Empire was but one phase of a larger social revolution which expressed itself in the increasing power of the commercial and industrial classes of the community and the growing displacement of the old landed aristocracy. Slavery could not possibly flourish under the new social conditions as it had under the old, and the steady decline of the institution and the steady increase of free labor were inevitable. Then, too, as the conquests of Rome in the world outside ceased, the supply of slaves diminished; and later, as wealth decreased, and particularly as the great estates of earlier days fell into decay, the ability to hold slaves in large numbers was lessened, and manumission often became an economic necessity. To attribute to Christianity any controlling influence in this general and inevitable process is altogether to mistake the situation.<sup>3</sup>

One more notable change in the life of the later Empire is the

<sup>2</sup> See Book xix, chap. 10 ff; especially chapters 15 and 16.

<sup>3</sup> See the admirable essay by Overbeck, "Ueber die Verhältnisse der alten Kirche zur Sklaverei im Römischen Reiche," in his *Studien zur Geschichte der alten Kirche*, pp. 158 ff., and Dill's *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius*, p. 251 ff.

growing disrepute and final disappearance of the gladiatorial combats which formed so important a part of the public amusements of the Roman populace. This change, too, is commonly attributed to the influence of Christianity, and is said to be the fruit of the new emphasis which the Christians were laying upon the value of human life. In 325 the Emperor Constantine issued an edict prohibiting gladiatorial combats in time of peace (Theodosian Code, xv, 12, 1). Efforts had often been made by the government to regulate the sport and to reduce its dimensions, but this was apparently the first attempt to put a stop to it. That Constantine was led to issue his edict by the influence of Christianity is implied by Eusebius (*Vita Constantini*, iv, 25), and is commonly taken for granted by historians. But it should be noticed that it is not against gladiatorial combats in particular that the early Fathers directed their attacks, but against theatrical performances and public shows in general; the principal ground of offence being, not cruelty, but worldliness, licentiousness, and particularly the idolatry in which all the shows were involved (see, for instance, Tertullian's *De Spectaculis*). It may well be doubted, indeed, whether the early Christians in general actually attached any higher value to human life than their pagan contemporaries. Murder they regarded as a mortal sin, but so did every moralist of the age; and the notion of the sacredness and inviolability of human personality as such, which commonly underlies modern sentiment upon the subject, was as foreign to the Christian Fathers as to most of their contemporaries. Other sports and spectacles which Christian moralists denounced as vigorously as gladiatorial combats, Constantine apparently made no effort to suppress; and it may well be that in this case some other motive than Christianity moved him to the action he took. Gladiatorial shows were a survival of the age when Rome had large numbers of barbarian captives to draw upon for such purposes, and it may have seemed to a man of Constantine's wisdom, who was not afraid to break with old customs of which he did not approve, and who was interested to re-establish the peace of the Empire and to develop its resources, that such shows were bad both economically and socially. It is interesting to notice that it is only the occurrence of gladiatorial contests in times of

peace that seems to trouble him. He did not succeed in putting an end to them; they were still common later in the fourth century, at any rate in the West (compare the interesting account in Augustine's *Confessions*, vi, 8). According to Theodoret (*Church History*, v, 26) they were suppressed by Honorius in 404, and after that time we actually hear nothing more of them, though combats with beasts, often as bloody and almost as dangerous to human life as the gladiatorial contests, still continued, and the old theatrical performances, against which the Fathers, early and late, protested so vigorously, were apparently as popular and as largely attended as ever.

There are other lines along which it is commonly claimed that Christianity affected the Roman world for good. Thus it is said that it had large influence in promoting charity and in the establishment of public institutions of mercy such as hospitals, asylums, and houses of refuge of one kind and another. Undoubtedly this assertion is justified by the facts. From the very beginning, the Fathers laid emphasis on charity as a leading Christian virtue, insisting that Christians were under obligation to assist and befriend their fellow-disciples in all possible ways. And as the theory and practice of penance developed in the second and following centuries, charity became with prayer and fasting one of the principal means of securing atonement for one's sins. As Augustine remarks, almsgiving and fasting are the two wings upon which prayer flies to God. That this idea promoted the exercise of charity, particularly within the circle of Christian brotherhood, and that it did much to relieve suffering and distress, there can be no doubt. Such a work as Uhlhorn's *Christian Charity* gives abundant information, and in Harnack's *Expansion of Christianity in the First Three Centuries* there is an admirable and sympathetic presentation of the whole matter (Book ii, chapter 3).

It should not be imagined, indeed, that the pagan world was unfamiliar with philanthropy. Many of the great pagan moralists preached humanitarian principles of a high order, and humanitarian impulses existed then as always in civilized nations, and found expression in many private and public charities. At the same time it cannot be doubted that Christianity did much to

promote and foster such philanthropy. And although the interest of Christians was chiefly confined to relieving the necessities of their own Christian brethren, either by giving them work or helping them when they could not work, yet not infrequently, especially in times of public calamity, their good offices transcended the bounds of the church and took in the pagan world outside. The mutual love of Christian brethren and their exercise of charity toward those in need attracted the attention of pagan observers, and doubtless was one of the most engaging features of Christianity, especially to the poorer classes, and one of the most effective means of propaganda among them.

But there is another and less agreeable side to the matter. We come frequently upon the notion that charity is for the sake, not of the one that receives, but of the one that dispenses it; and the tendency of this idea was naturally to tolerate poverty, and to think of it with considerable complacency because it provided Christians with the opportunity of gaining merit for themselves by coming to its relief.<sup>4</sup> Christian charity was not always directed toward the betterment of the condition of those whom it helped. The effect upon them was often a matter of indifference. The result of this kind of charity could in the long run only be disastrous economically and socially. The exercise of charity is in itself a beautiful thing, but, unless it looks consciously and intelligently to the permanent improvement of the lives of those it helps and to the ultimate removal of the conditions which make it necessary, it is inevitably pauperizing and economically demoralizing. That this was actually one of the results of the victory of Christianity within the Roman Empire there can scarcely be room for doubt. Poverty and suffering, at any rate within the Christian church, were relieved on a scale not seen before. And for this all credit is to be given to those Christians who thus manifested the spirit of Christian brotherhood. But that the Roman world at large and Roman civilization in general were permanently benefited more than harmed by this development is not altogether certain.

Again the influence of Christianity in elevating the position of

<sup>4</sup>See e.g. Cyprian, *On Work and Alms*; Chrysostom, *On Penance*, Hom. iii and vi; Salvian, *Against Avarice*.

woman and in promoting the sanctity and purity of home life is often referred to. But there is no evidence that the position of woman was appreciably higher in the later than in the earlier days of the Roman Empire. Her status under the Empire, both early and late, was better than it had once been. Her emancipation had begun long before the opening of the Christian era. But of a marked change between the first and fourth Christian centuries we have no knowledge. The idea of the equality of all Christians in the sight of God had probably as much influence in this regard as in the matter of slavery, but no more. And, on the other hand, the prevailing ascetic character of the Christianity of the age could not fail to react unfavorably at least in some respects upon the general estimate of woman and of her place in the world. Not simply was unchastity denounced as the worst of sins, but marriage itself was regarded as morally on a lower plane than celibacy and as little better than a concession to human weakness (see 1 Corinthians 7 9, which is simply an anticipation of the common patristic attitude on the subject). Such an opinion was hardly calculated to promote the dignity of woman, who was thus looked upon chiefly as a temptation to sin, and as a creature to be avoided by all who wished to live lives of special holiness. The effects of this ascetic spirit upon home life cannot have been altogether beneficial. Doubtless the vigorous and persistent campaign against sins of the flesh had good results; though the complacency of so noble a Christian woman as Monica toward the illicit relation sustained for many years by her son Augustine shows that the general standard of morality was not very different at the end of the fourth century from the beginning of the first. Many were undoubtedly kept from immorality by the influence of Christian principles; but the effect of the church's long insistence upon chastity as the supreme virtue seems to have been almost as much to break up the home by sending men and women into monasteries and convents as to promote the sanctity of the home itself and the purity of the marriage relationship.

It should not be overlooked in this connection that in the matter of divorce and remarriage the church took a strict position, and

threw the weight of its influence against the all-too-lax marriage laws of the Empire. But it is interesting to notice that this was not so much for the sake of preserving the sanctity of home and of the marriage bond as to hinder second marriages, which were regarded by many Fathers, even when the first marriage had been dissolved by death, as little better than adultery. Their teaching was, not that the marriage bond has eternal significance, but that to marry at all is less noble than to remain a celibate, and to marry twice is still worse.<sup>5</sup> Ultimately, when marriage had come to be regarded as a sacrament—a development foreshadowed by the custom, which arose as early as the second century, of bringing Christian marriages under the control of the church—divorce leading to remarriage was prohibited altogether as a profanation of a sacred bond. But this belongs to a later period.

If, then, we can constitute with certainty no general and marked improvement in the social conditions of the Roman Empire the credit for which can be given unquestionably to Christianity, may we at least claim that the later Empire would have been much worse than it really was, had it not been for Christianity? This is a common assumption among historians. If the Roman Empire was not appreciably better in the fifth century than in the first, at least it would have been much worse had not Christianity exercised a restraining and conserving influence. Of course, in the very nature of the case, this opinion can neither be proved nor disproved. What might have been had Christianity not appeared upon the scene we can at best only conjecture. But the opinion is based upon a conception of the nature and purposes of the Christianity of that day whose soundness may be tested. Were the purposes and the ideals of Christianity, as it existed within the Roman world, of such a sort as to justify us in assuming that it must have constituted a preserving and conserving social force, that because of it the Empire lasted longer and was actually better than would otherwise have been the case? The investigation of this question will bring us nearer an answer to our general problem. We shall be in a better position to determine what Christianity actually did for the Roman Empire when we know what it tried

<sup>5</sup> See Tertullian, *Ad Uxorem*, Book i; Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata*, Book iii, chap. 1; Augustine, *De Bono Viduitatis*, etc.

to do; when we know what it was that its adherents, and particularly its leaders, set before themselves as their great end.

One of the most striking things about the early Christians is their almost total lack of social interests and ideals. The gospel of Jesus was pre-eminently a social gospel, but in the hands of his followers it lost its social emphasis and became individualistic and other-worldly to the last degree. Jesus was interested to promote the Kingdom of God, the reign of the spirit of brotherhood here and now. But to his immediate disciples the Kingdom was merely a future reality, to be established after the close of the present world. They lived wholly in the future, striving for nothing in the present except to prepare their friends and neighbors for the consummation by inducing them to repent and accept Jesus as the Messiah.

In the hands of Paul, Christianity became a means of redemption from sin. All men are evil, and doomed to destruction. Becoming united to Christ by faith, they are transformed from corrupt to holy beings, from sinners to saints, and are freed from death and made possessors of eternal life. The Christian is a supernatural being, superior to and separate from the things of this world, living still in the flesh to be sure, but waiting and yearning for his release from it and his enjoyment of the true life of the spirit in another sphere. Paul had large views about the conversion of the Roman Empire and the subjection of all things to the authority of Christ, but the world as he viewed it was essentially evil, and salvation, for Romans as well as Jews, lay only in escape from it by the power of the indwelling Spirit. He learned from Christ to make love the supreme virtue of the Christian life. It is in love for one's fellows, and particularly for one's Christian brethren, that the spirit of Christ in the disciple chiefly manifests itself. But even so, it is not in the improvement of social conditions, or in the promotion of the welfare of human life in this world, that he is interested. Love has significance rather for the one who loves than for the one who is loved. Its value lies not so much in what it effects as in what it expresses. And, in spite of Paul's emphasis upon love, and his assertion of its supreme place in Christian character, the subjection of the flesh to the spirit, manifesting itself in personal purity and holiness, is

equally essential. In fact, it is just this domination of the natural by the supernatural in the life of the individual in which salvation really consists. Paul was not an ascetic in any strict sense, but his underlying principle was ascetic in its tendency, and he showed distinctly ascetic leaning at times; and it is not an accident, nor is it due to the example of other movements, that asceticism early developed within the Christian church. The contrasts which Paul drew between the spirit and the flesh, between divine and human nature, between holiness and sin, between this world and another, all promoted the idea that the Christian life consists primarily in separation from this world and its interests, and in abstinence from its pleasures and indulgences. It was under the influence of his teaching that the author of the First Epistle of John wrote: "Love not the world, neither the things that are in the world. If any man love the world, the love of the Father is not in him. For all that is in the world, the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the vain-glory of life, is not of the Father, but is of the world. And the world passeth away and the lust thereof." From men dominated by such a conception as this little could be expected in the way of social service, or of effort for the amelioration of earthly conditions, economic, civil, or political. A man might be a useful citizen, he might interest himself in public affairs and devote his time and attention to the general good; but if he did, it was rather in spite of his Christianity than because of it. It was just this absence of public spirit, this indifference to the present because of absorption in the future, this disregard for or even hatred of earth because of love of heaven, that constituted the chief fault of Christianity in the eyes of its more intelligent opponents. Instead of making a man a better citizen and a more efficient public servant, Christianity often made him the opposite. That it did not always do so was because it was not always taken with sufficient seriousness by its adherents and was not always given complete control over their lives. In Macrobius's commentary on Cicero's *Dream of Scipio*, a pagan work of the early fifth century, there is an interesting illustration of the way in which religious contemplation, love of heaven, and superiority to the pleasures of earth, could yet be combined with a concern for the welfare of the present world and with a sense of obligation to labor for its



good.\* The contrast between this work and the common Christian attitude of the day is striking. Even after asceticism had developed into monasticism, not all Christians were monks; but monasticism was recognized as the one complete and consistent expression of the prevailing Christian ideal, and its leading representatives became the great heroes of the church. Nearly all the principal Fathers of the fourth and following centuries spent at least a part of their lives in the monastery, and many of them came back into the world to assume ecclesiastical positions of activity and responsibility only under protest and with the greatest reluctance.

It was the same general ideal of the Christian life that found expression in the celibacy of the clergy, which became common as early as the fourth century. If the clergy, charged as they were with active ecclesiastical duties in parish and diocese, could not live apart from the world, they could at any rate eschew the pleasures of the flesh, and by their chastity exemplify in a higher degree than the ordinary layman the Christian ideal shared by all. The sacredness of their calling demanded of them as consistent and thorough-going an expression of Christian principles as their duties permitted. Thus the bishop and the parish priest supplemented the inmate of the monastery in emphasizing and holding up before the world the Christian ideal of abstinence. Not to be a part of the world, but to be separate from it—this meant Christian holiness; and not to serve the world, but to rescue from its toils as many of one's fellows as possible—this meant Christian love.

For a long time the Christian church was a small institution, a mere handful of men and women in the midst of the teeming life of the vast Empire. And if it attracted notice at all, it was only to be hated by the populace and proscribed by the authorities. Under these circumstances it could perhaps hardly be expected that it would entertain any large ideals for the transformation of the life of the Empire and for the betterment of its social and economic conditions, and the utter lack of any hint of such ideals in the Christian literature of the second and third centu-

\* See an account of it in Dill's *Roman Society in the Last Century of the Western Empire*, p. 108 ff.

ries need not cause surprise. But the striking fact is that the Fathers of the fourth and following centuries, after Christianity had become the official religion of the Empire and was in a position to dictate imperial legislation and to dominate the life of the Roman world, are as silent as their predecessors. In their writings, too, there is a complete absence of any suggestion of a comprehensive ideal of social or economic reform. There is plenty of denunciation of vice in high and low life, plenty of commendation of the Christian virtues, particularly of purity and charity, but of anything like a notion that the life of the Empire is to be transformed there is not a trace. The victory of the church found it entirely unprepared to take advantage of its new opportunity. If, before the opportunity came, it had been really interested in the transmutation of this world into the Kingdom of God, if it had placed this before itself as an ideal and had reflected seriously upon it, it would have seized with enthusiasm the great chance given it by Constantine and his successors, and the Empire would really have been changed into some semblance, at least, of a truly Christian state. But of transformation on any large and comprehensive scale none of the Fathers of the day seems to have thought. They had plenty of interest in the church, in the purity of its doctrines, in the strictness of its discipline in the splendor of its ritual, in the perfection of its administration, in its general efficiency as a divine institution existing for the purpose of rescuing men out of a perishing world. But to the world itself they gave little heed. The government's change of attitude toward the church, and the final recognition of Christianity as the state religion, they regarded as a blessing chiefly because it involved advantages to the church. It was of the church they thought rather than of the Empire. To secure for the church protection from its enemies and freedom to do its own work, to secure the backing of the government and the credit and the influence which such backing meant, this is what the Fathers of the fourth and following centuries chiefly wished. Augustine's great work, *The City of God*, is a classic illustration of the general attitude. Not one kingdom, the Kingdom of God, of which all the kingdoms of the world are to be made a part, and into whose likeness they are all to be transformed, but two kingdoms, a heavenly and an earthly,

the *Civitas Dei* and the *Civitas Terrena*, representing two opposing principles and permanently alien to each other. Not the regeneration of the latter, but its subjugation and ultimate destruction, is the final purpose of God.

In view of the somewhat negative conclusions of the present paper the question may be asked, How did it happen that Christianity spread so rapidly within the Roman world, and eventually crowded paganism out and became itself the state religion? In throwing doubt upon the social benefits which accrued to the Empire from Christianity do we not make the explanation of its victory correspondingly difficult? It is impossible in this paper to enter into a detailed discussion of this large question, but a few suggestions may not be out of place.

In the early days of the Roman Empire conditions were altogether favorable to the spread of any religious movement. It was a time of restlessness, of curiosity, and of avidity for things new and strange. It was a time when the world was alive to many needs of which it had not hitherto been conscious. The sense of sin, the recognition of the evil of the present world and the desire for release from it, the craving for redemption from the corruption and limitations of the flesh, the longing for immortality—all these, and others of a less spiritual and ethical character, were becoming very common under the growing influence of the dualism and pessimism of the Orient, the shifting of old landmarks, and the breaking down of time-honored traditions and customs. The new needs were demanding satisfaction, and the result was a great revival of religious faith and sentiment. Old cults became vigorous again, taking on new forms fitted to meet the new needs, and foreign cults which had hitherto had little or no vogue beyond their native land were now seized upon eagerly and gained a world-wide following. The ease of communication within the bounds of the Empire, the great Roman roads binding the provinces together, the excellent police protection making travel safer than ever before, the prevalence of a common language, and the increasing uniformity of culture, made the growth of any world-wide movement easy, and promoted the spread of many faiths. From Syria and Persia and Egypt they swept over the Empire, finding ready access and eager acceptance

everywhere. The remarkable spread of Mithraism during the first three centuries of the Empire is an illustration of the general situation, and an instructive parallel to—and commentary upon—the growth of Christianity. Its popularity in some regions was for generations equal to that of Christianity or even greater, and at one time it seemed about to become the state religion. Christianity was thus one of many faiths appealing to the Roman world, and shared with them the favoring influence of existing conditions. But it is no accident that it became ultimately dominant and crowded all the others off the field. The consciousness of unity among its adherents, however widely separated, and the magnificent organization in which that unity early found expression, making of the movement a compact and well-disciplined army of aggression, undoubtedly had much to do with its great success. The self-consciousness and exclusiveness of the church, and the assured conviction of Christians that they and they alone were the chosen people of God—a conviction inherited from Judaism—was immensely imposing and impressive in that age of religious syncretism and of the easy tolerance of all sorts of divergent faiths. Here was a movement that claimed everything and granted nothing. Bitter hostility was aroused of course, but also fanatical devotion.

But it would be a great mistake to imagine that this was the whole of it. As a matter of fact, ancient Christianity won its victory chiefly because it had far more of the elements of power and permanence, combined a greater variety of attractive features, and satisfied a greater variety of needs than any other system. However alive we may be to its defects, and however much we may deplore them, we must recognize that its victory in the Roman Empire was fairly earned by sheer superiority.

When we look at the matter more closely we find that Christianity appealed to the ancient world in many ways and along many lines. For instance it made a strong and varied religious appeal. Its revelation of one God and of the possibility of communion with him, its promise of redemption from sin and from the evils of the flesh and the world, its assurance of a blessed future in heaven, its spiritual fervor and its mystical rites, all had influence. It was interpreted by its supporters both legally

and mystically. It was given by some a predominantly Jewish, by others an Oriental, by others a Greek character, and so it addressed itself to a great diversity of temperaments.

Then, too, although the interest of the early Christians in social reform was very slight, as has been seen, Christianity did make an appeal to the social instincts of multitudes, especially of the lower classes. The emphasis upon the principle of Christian brotherhood, the idea which existed from the beginning that all Christians were members of one family, the closely knit federation, the intimate association within the local churches, the common care for those in sickness or distress or poverty—all this, matter of common knowledge as it was, must have proved immensely attractive.

Again, Christianity appeared before the world as a philosophy, claiming to offer a solution of the great problems of the ages and to meet as no other system did the intellectual needs of man. There was, for instance, its monotheism, at a time when the tendency of the thinking world was all away from the traditional polytheism of the past; its definite account, based upon alleged divine revelation, of the origin and consummation of the present world; its clear conception of man's place in the universe; its recognition of virtue as the doing of God's will; its doctrine of immortality and of future rewards and punishments; its idea of Christ as a divine being come down from heaven, which made possible the development of an elaborate cosmology and system of redemption; its sacred books, inherited from the Jews, which might be interpreted allegorically, as the great Jewish sage Philo had already interpreted them, and thus constituted a rich storehouse of knowledge and abundant food for speculation. And with all this, it claimed to be the fruit, not of human reflection, but of immediate divine revelation, and thus to be in possession, as no other system was, of the qualities of universality and finality. To philosophers of very diverse interests and tendencies Christianity made its appeal, and thus became a religion, not for the ignorant and uneducated only, but for the learned and cultured of the earth. Its greatest rivals for the conquest of the world were Mithraism, which addressed itself particularly to the instincts and desires of the common man and offered practically nothing

to the philosopher, and Neoplatonism, which appealed to the philosophical classes of the Empire, but not to the populace. Christianity made the double appeal, appearing on the one side as a religion with a practical message to every man, low or high, and on the other side as a philosophy, rivalling the great systems of antiquity, supplementing and correcting them, and at the same time assimilating many of their most persuasive features. No movement can spread rapidly and widely unless it appeals to the common man; and no movement can establish itself firmly and permanently unless it wins the thinking classes, the intellectual leaders of the world. Christianity did both, and it achieved a victory denied to rival faiths.

Still more important was the moral appeal of Christianity. At a time when the need of moral reformation was becoming ever more widely felt, and when both religion and philosophy were beginning to take on an ethical character, Christianity proclaimed with emphasis a strenuous ideal, urged motives of the most compelling character, and offered new and efficient moral power. It came just at a time when the world was most alive to its moral need and most ready to respond to a vigorous moral summons. It is here that we are to find Christianity's greatest and most beneficent influence upon the life of the Roman Empire. Though the Fathers seem to have been devoid of any idea of recreating the Empire in the likeness of Jesus Christ, and though we may be unable to discover that Christianity was actually instrumental in raising the general level of life within the Roman world, or that it promoted in any appreciable degree its change into the Kingdom of God, we are justified in assuming that the lives of multitudes, even of those who did not embrace monasticism, were affected by it, and that for good. It is not so much that Christianity taught an entirely new moral ideal, for many of the virtues that seemed important to the Christian Fathers were recognized by other moral teachers of their own and earlier days. The principle of the brotherhood of man, and the resultant virtues of charity and humanity, were inculcated by the Stoics; and the superiority to the pleasures and pains of the present world evinced by them and by the Cynics was equal to that urged by the Christian Fathers, while asceticism of an extreme type was zealously

preached and practised by the Neopythagoreans. The difference between the Christians and the more serious-minded of their contemporaries was in part simply a matter of emphasis, chastity for instance being given greater ethical importance than it commonly had in the paganism of the age; in part it was due to the special merit attached by the Christians to certain virtues of the gentler sort, which were not always regarded as virtues in the Roman world, such as humility, self-distrust, patience under suffering, forbearance, forgiveness of injuries, self-effacement rather than self-assertion. Here, too, we find anticipations in the pagan systems of the age; but in general the Christian ideal of the good man is different at this point from the pagan, and the tendency of it was to develop a different type of character. This tendency was noticed already by Celsus in the second century, and was the ground of a severe criticism of Christianity for inculcating and cultivating a "slave morality." The general development of Roman life, involving the rise of the lower classes and the gradual breaking down of the old social distinctions, was favorable to the prevalence of the new ideal; and just how much influence in effecting the change is to be attributed to Christianity it is impossible to say. To what degree, indeed, the change was accomplished within the Roman world nobody knows. There can be no doubt that there is a difference, at least in the respect just mentioned, between the Christian ideal, as commonly understood both in the middle and modern age, and the prevailing ideals of the pagan world of antiquity; yet it is difficult to say even now to what extent our modern life is actually controlled by the self-denying or by the self-asserting impulse, and to determine the matter for the later Roman Empire is quite out of the question. One thing, however, is clear enough. The interpretation of the Christian life as primarily and controllingly a life of social service, an interpretation so wide-spread today, was practically unknown among the Christians of the Roman world, and whatever the contrast between the pagan and the Christian ideals of that day may have been, it did not lie here.

But of greater practical importance than any difference of ideal were the new moral enthusiasm and the new moral impulses which Christianity brought to the Roman world. The preaching

of the Christian system as a direct divine revelation, the emphasis upon future rewards and punishments, the insistence upon virtue as a means of salvation, the interpretation of God in moral terms, the appeal to the example of Christ and the saints, the idea of the Christian life as involving moral duties and obligations, and the exhortation to Christians to be worthy of their calling, although not all new to the pagan world, in their combination meant much for the promotion of better living. And, above all, the recognition of the moral possibilities of the lowest, and the belief that every man may be if he will a child of God, had tremendous influence in arousing moral enthusiasm among those classes to which the great pagan moralists made little or no appeal. To the power of these and similar motives within the Christian church itself we have abundant testimony in the writings of the Fathers, both early and late. However difficult it may be to show any large effect of Christianity upon the life of the Empire as a whole, there were certainly multitudes of men and women whom it led to strive, as they would not otherwise have striven, after virtuous living. It is in its effect upon such individual lives, whether it drove them into the monastery or quickened their moral impulses for their daily conduct in the world outside, that we are to see the real influence of Christianity within the Roman world, as we are to see the real interest of the Christians themselves. Even if society in general may not have been much improved, and even if the forces making for the increase of the public weal may not have been largely multiplied, still the lives of many individuals were made better and holier.

It is undoubtedly a great pity that the social interest of Jesus did not live on in his followers. And yet we should not too lightly condemn them. They did a great work in the moral sphere. Even though from the modern point of view their ethical ideals seem defective, and in some respects unwholesome, they actually succeeded in impressing upon their own and all succeeding ages the need of moral reformation, and in supplying new moral enthusiasm and power, and that certainly meant much.

But perhaps more directly effective than all the specific appeals of ancient Christianity, religious, social, philosophical and moral, was the contagion of its personal loyalty to Jesus. Multitudes



who but imperfectly understood his ideals and were far from being controlled by his spirit were devoted to him and to what they believed to be his cause. And the conviction of his divinity but strengthened this devotion and gave a peculiarly exalted character to it. Even martyrdom seemed easy to many. It was no mere abstract principle for which they suffered, but a revered leader, who they believed was really with them, and whose face they looked upon in the rapture of ecstatic vision. As has been already said, the victory of Christianity was not an accident. There was abundant reason why it should attract the people of the Roman world and why it should lay hold upon the consciences and hearts of multitudes.

The Emperor Augustus and many of his successors realized that the Roman Empire needed a common religion to bind together its many and heterogeneous elements. The worship of the Genius of Rome and the Emperor was developed in its early days, and did actually constitute for a long time a religious bond, typifying the unity of the Roman world and nourishing loyalty to it. But at best it was an artificial thing, superimposed upon existing faiths; and it promoted rather official and formal than inner and vital unity. But Christianity was a different thing. Christians were actually bound together in the closest possible fashion. Loyalty to Christ and to the Christian church and to their Christian brethren was a passion with them. There was in the new movement a principle of unity which fitted it to do for the Roman Empire what no other religion of the age possibly could; and the action of Constantine and his successors was inevitable. Once become too strong to be crushed and strong enough to be used by the imperial power, its destiny as the Roman state religion was assured. But the alliance after all was but external. Christianity had been too long an individualistic religion to become in any real and vital sense the religion of a state; and the Empire never became anything more than nominally Christian. Present as it was at the birth of the new Western civilization and of the new Western nationalities, Christianity has dominated modern Europe as it never did the Roman Empire. It is in this modern world, and not in the ancient world, that its influence on any large scale is to be discovered. Here it has actually been a force from the

beginning. We live in an age in which the social conscience has been highly developed, and in which the gospel, in accordance with the spirit of Jesus himself, is interpreted largely in social terms. From this point of view the Christianity of Europe and America is still evidently very defective, and yet our civilization may be called a Christian civilization, not to be sure in any very thoroughgoing sense, but, even so, far more truly than the civilization of the Roman world.

*NEW TESTAMENT ESCHATOLOGY AND  
NEW TESTAMENT ETHICS*

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The most important contribution of this generation to Biblical interpretation has been made, beyond question, through the appreciation and analysis of New Testament eschatology. Round the teaching of the Gospels, like an atmosphere which even though unconscious of it they breathe, lies, according to this view, a circle of apocalyptic expectation, with its literature, its vocabulary, and its inextinguishable hopes. Though Rabbinical orthodoxy might regard this literature as heretical, it may well have had a peculiar fascination for contemplative or poetic minds. When, therefore, after solitary reflection on his mission, Jesus came into Galilee 'preaching the gospel of the kingdom of God,' it might be anticipated that he, like John the Baptist, would apply to that kingdom the language of apocalyptic hope, and would announce its approach as heralded by a catastrophic end of the world-age. This key of interpretation, once in the hands of German learning, has been applied with extraordinary ingenuity to many obscurities and perplexities of the Gospels, and has unlocked some of them with dramatic success. The strange phenomenon, for example, of reserve and privacy in the teaching of Jesus, becomes, in this view, an evidence of his esoteric consciousness of Messiahship, which none but a chosen few were permitted to know. 'He that hath ears to hear, let him hear.' The cardinal phrases of the teaching, 'Kingdom of Heaven,' 'Son of God,' and 'Son of Man,' all point, it is urged, not to a normal, human or social regeneration, but to a supernatural, revolutionary, and catastrophic change. The heart of the gospel is thus disclosed in its mysterious predictive passages: In those days, after that tribulation, they shall see the Son of Man coming in the clouds with great power and glory; I beheld Satan as lightning fall from heaven; and the same note is

struck in the Epistles: Brethren, the time is short; the fashion of this world passeth away. "As a marine plant," remarks a vigorous exponent of this view, "blooms in water, but torn from its home becomes faded and unrecognizable, so the historical Jesus fades when torn from its place in eschatology."<sup>1</sup> Jesus, under this conception, is not so much teacher as prophet; with his gaze fixed, not on the conduct of life in the present world, but on the preparation of life for another world. "How could Jesus, the teacher," asks Schweitzer, in discussing the withdrawal to the North, "at such a moment desert a people so eager for teaching and help? [Such conduct] raises a doubt whether he felt himself to be in fact a teacher. . . . Even the announcement of his mission is not that of a teacher, for his parables were, it is written, designed not to reveal, but to conceal, and of the Kingdom of God he spoke only in parables."<sup>2</sup> "His ideal," an English advocate of the same view has lately said, "was not a human ideal, but a heavenly ideal. He did not wish to give men something to live by, but something wherewith to face the day of the Son of Man."<sup>3</sup> In restrained, yet not unsympathetic, language, Professor Sanday calls attention to the significance of this tendency in criticism: "I doubt if we have realized how far the centre of gravity of our Lord's teaching lay beyond the grave. . . . I doubt if we have realized to what an extent he speaks of the Kingdom of Heaven as essentially future and essentially supernatural. . . . I doubt if we have appreciated the preliminary and preparatory character of his mission."<sup>4</sup>

Now it cannot be doubted that we have in this view an interpretative principle of the first importance. Its far-reaching effect upon critical study can be compared with nothing less than the epoch-making influence of Baur. Once in a century, it would seem, the pillars of New Testament history have to be tested, so that, as the Epistle to the Hebrews says, the removing of those things that are shaken may prove that those things which cannot

<sup>1</sup> A. Schweitzer, *Von Reimarus zu Wrede*, 1906, p. 399.

<sup>2</sup> *Mark* 4 10-12 34; *op. cit.*, p. 350.

<sup>3</sup> H. M. Garrod, *The Religion of All Good Men*, 1906, p. 71.

<sup>4</sup> *The Life of Christ in Recent Research*, 1907, p. 121.

be shaken shall remain. Yet, as it soon appeared that the *Tendenz* theory was destined to receive important qualifications, so that it must now be prized rather as a starting-point than as a conclusion in New Testament criticism, so it may be that eschatology must be submitted to many further tests before it can be trusted to support the whole structure of the gospel. That much of the New Testament language is colored by the apocalyptic anticipation, that the shadow of an imminent catastrophe passes, like a cloud across a landscape, over the Master's teaching, so that his mission receives what Professor Sanday has suggestively called an 'occultation'—all this is not only so probable in the historical setting of the Gospels, but becomes so clarifying an element in their interpretation, that it is likely to remain a permanent factor in critical research. But to say this is to say much less than the consistent eschatologist affirms. To him this occultation was a lifelong eclipse; the Gospels become a kind of drama in which Jesus disguises until the last scene his predetermined purpose; and the narrative is, in effect, the story of a colossal illusion, which Christian theology, by every device of spiritualized interpretation, has endeavored to correct. "The Jesus of Nazareth," it is concluded, "who appeared as Messiah, taught the ethics of the kingdom, and died to consecrate his work, never lived. He is a figure sketched by rationalism, called to life by liberalism, and supplied by modern theology with the clothing of historical science." "The entire history of Christendom down to the present day rests on the delay and non-arrival of the Second Coming, on the surrender of eschatology, and the accompanying and self-developing deliverance of religion from the eschatological idea." \*

Such an interpretation of history invites consideration from many points of view, and may be examined with advantage even by those who are not New Testament critics. One may, for example, approach the subject with the modest equipment of a teacher of ethics, and ask himself what was likely to be the ethical teaching which would naturally issue from this condition of exalted and confident expectation. It has been said that "it is necessary in interpreting the moral ideas of Christ to have our attention

\* Op. cit., p. 131.

• Schweitzer, op. cit., pp. 396, 356.

always fixed on his apocalyptic ideas.”<sup>7</sup> May not the converse of this proposition also be true, and may not the influence of the apocalyptic ideas be fairly estimated by reconsidering the ethics of the Gospels? Instead of applying the key of eschatology to New Testament ethics, may not New Testament ethics be applied as a key to its eschatology? What view of human conduct is likely to be held by one whose absorbing concern is for a supernatural and apocalyptic change, in which the fashion of this world would soon pass away? This inquiry is, at least, one which deals with the most unquestionable of the historical data. Whatever else may have been the purpose of Jesus, he was certainly a preacher of righteousness, and whatever else in his message may have been misinterpreted, his hearers were not likely to forget or to pervert his moral instruction. “The ethical note,” wrote no less radical a critic than Baur, “is the purest and most unmistakable element in the teaching of Jesus, and the essential core of Christianity.”<sup>8</sup> “The ethical ideas of Jesus,” Professor Hermann has said, “are incontestably the essential element in the spiritual experience of the modern world.”<sup>9</sup> May it not then be reasonable to estimate the force of the eschatological anticipation by its effect upon this ethical note? If the controlling interest of the teacher was habitually and consistently detached from present cares, what would his ethics be? Obviously they would express with consistency and continuity this abnormal, anticipatory, waiting habit of mind. The ethics of the Gospels would give us a teaching, not designed for this world, but preparatory for another; an ‘interim-ethics,’ appropriate for those who looked for some great catastrophe, but not to be taken seriously by those who have waked from the apocalyptic dream. The best way of conduct on the approach of an earthquake is not the best rule of conduct in a stable world. “Can any moralist,” it has been asked, “firmly persuaded of the imminent dissolution of the world and all things in it, frame an ethical code adequate for all time?”<sup>10</sup> The answer to this question is in the unwavering dictum of Schweitzer:

<sup>7</sup> Garrod, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

<sup>8</sup> *Christentum der ersten drei Jahrhunderte*, 1860, p. 35.

<sup>9</sup> *Die sittlichen Weisungen Jesu*, 1904, p. 12.

<sup>10</sup> Garrod, *op. cit.*, pp. 60, 61.

"It is altogether false to affirm, with modern theology, that service is the new ethics of the kingdom. There is, to Jesus, no ethics of the kingdom; for in the kingdom all natural conditions, even differences of sex<sup>11</sup> are to disappear. Temptation and sin will no more exist. . . . Service, humility, temptation, willingness to die, even penitence, belong to an interim-ethics."<sup>12</sup>

When, however, we turn with this problem to the Gospels themselves, and set side by side with each other the eschatological dream and the ethical teaching, it seems not too much to say that at many points they do not match. The practical instructions of Jesus for the conduct of life do not easily fit in as a whole with the plot of the apocalyptic drama. Many passages there undoubtedly are which touch the anticipatory and millennial note, and some which strike that note firmly and unmistakably. If one fixes his attention on single passages, or on a single group of passages, he may easily conclude, with Tolstoi, that the essence of the Gospel is in the single virtue of non-resistance, or, with Schweitzer, that it is in the single idea of eschatology. When, however, we recall the prevailing tone of ethical teaching, and still more the habitual attitude of the Teacher toward the world in which he found himself, it is difficult to see in it a predominating quality of indifference to the world's affairs or of complete preoccupation with a supernatural catastrophe. On the contrary, the ethics of Jesus exhibit on the whole a sanity, universality, and applicability which are independent of abnormal circumstances, and free from emotional strain. There is nothing apocalyptic in the parable of the Good Samaritan, or in the appropriation by Jesus of the two great commandments, or in the prayer for to-day's bread and the forgiveness of trespasses, or in the praise of peace-making and purity of heart. Yet in these, and not in the mysterious prophecies of an approaching desolation, the conscience of the world has found its counsellor and guide. The apocalyptic anticipations find their parallels in much of the contemporary literature, but the ethical sagacity and sufficiency are original and unique. The same genuine concern for the existing world is indicated even in the teaching of Jesus concerning the Kingdom of God. Here, no doubt, his message is often colored by the sunset-splendor of the End

<sup>11</sup> Mark 10 25 26.

<sup>12</sup> Op. cit., p. 362.

of the Age; but it is not less often set in the prosaic light of common day. The kingdom is prepared, not for those only who have dismissed from concern the obligations of daily life and have fixed their eyes on a supernatural future, but for those who, in the world as it is, feed the hungry and clothe the naked and visit those who are sick or in prison. Whatever millennial promises may be comprehended in the message of the kingdom, the teaching of Jesus seems quite as often a warning against excessive contemplation of a supernatural consummation and a recall to the humble service of the existing world.

Still more corrective of a thoroughgoing eschatology is the habitual attitude of Jesus toward both nature and life. He looks on both, not with the eye of an ascetic or visionary, as though they stood between him and his supreme desire, but with a keen and undisguised appreciation and delight. Each phase of nature, springtime and harvest, the lilies and the birds, the mountain and the lake, each household task, the working of the leaven and the sweeping of the room—is to him beautiful and sacred; not as of a world that is passing away, but as of a world that is divinely given and spiritually symbolic. Human life also, its joys and sorrows, the children at their play, and the laborer at his work—these are not viewed with the pensive indifference of one whose heart is elsewhere, but with a keen sympathy and alert responsiveness which have suggested to many critics a Hellenic quality in Jesus, and have induced at least one writer to claim for him even a Hellenic descent.<sup>13</sup>

In short the ethical data of the Gospels appear to provide a test which is likely to modify or limit an extreme application of eschatology to their interpretation. If, as Bousset has remarked, the Gospels offer a religion of 'ethical liberation'<sup>14</sup> it may be reasonable to conclude with him that "though steeped in the eschatological hopes of his time and country [Jesus] yet succeeded in altering and purifying them at the critical point, and in breaking through the limits which hemmed them in." The drama dimly discerned in the Gospels may thus be interpreted by the conduct

<sup>13</sup>H. S. Chamberlain, *Die Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts*, I, 119 ff.

<sup>14</sup>Jesus (Trevelyan, 1906), pp. 162, 85.



habitually commended in the Gospels. Either we must conclude that while the mind of the Master was fixed on the future he scattered along his way, as a by-product of that teaching, his universal ethics, or else we must conclude that however real to his thought, as to that of his contemporaries, the Messianic expectation may have been, it did not dominate his teaching or his character, and that in his most characteristic instructions he rose above the anticipations of his time into the presence of timeless ideals. In short, this historical problem has to consider whether the secret of Jesus lay in his reflection of contemporary ideals or in his creation of new ideals; whether the apocalyptic expectation was his master or whether it was his servant; whether he reiterated the current eschatology or utilized and spiritualized it; whether in a word the central motive of his teaching was dramatic or didactic, the work of a herald or the work of a teacher; whether his place in history is to be found within the circle of contemporary thought, or whether he stood above the heads of his reporters. The conclusion which Wellhausen, not without impatience, but with eloquence and authority, announces, may provide a sufficient answer to these questions. "It is held," he remarks, "that the announcement of a future kingdom is the central element in the message. And yet, in Mark's Gospel, this element is completely in the background. Jesus, in his Galilean period, is not a herald but a teacher; and a teacher, it may be added, not of the Kingdom of God, but of the various subjects which, in natural succession, are thrown in his way,—of obvious truths applied to the needs of people misled by their spiritual guides. . . . The eschatological hope first reached its intense significance through the earliest disciples, who attached it to the person of Jesus. . . . His own way of life was not like that of his followers, determined by eschatology. They renounced the world to prepare for his coming; but his ethics were assuredly not, as uninformed persons have recklessly asserted, provisional ethics, to be endured only through the expectation of an approaching end, and beyond that point superfluous. His ethics were the eternal will of God, in heaven as on earth. He was, no doubt, deeply affected by faith in the future, in the general resurrection, the judgment, and the Kingdom of God. All this he could assume

as accepted by his hearers and needing little exhortation. . . . (Yet) it is the non-Jewish and human, rather than the Jewish in him, which stamps his character."<sup>15</sup>

Such are some brief suggestions of a corrective influence on New Testament eschatology which may proceed from New Testament ethics. The eschatological problem, it has been truthfully said, is just now 'in the air.'<sup>16</sup> It may be the task of ethical inquiry to give to this airy structure of criticism a substantial underpinning on the ground. And this, it may be lastly pointed out, is not only an order of procedure which is applicable to New Testament criticism, but one which reflects an order of teaching which seems to have been the way of Jesus himself. Not, first, a conviction concerning his place in the plan of the Eternal and a full understanding of his mission; but, first, loyalty, obedience, moral susceptibility—such seems to have been his education to discipleship. "Follow me," he says, "Take up thy cross and follow"; and along the way of service you may reach the end of truth. Obedience, as Robertson taught, was to Jesus the organ of spiritual vision. Whatever dramatic elements there are included in the message of the Gospels may be best disclosed through its didactic elements. The first appeal of Jesus Christ was not to the reason or the imagination, but to the will. Character to him was the path to insight. The pure in heart should see God. Perhaps the guidance of New Testament criticism to a stable conclusion may be in the same manner committed to Christian ethics, and the metaphysics of the Gospels may be approached through the appreciation of their characteristic morality. Perhaps it may still happen that those who will to do the will are on the way to know the doctrine.

<sup>15</sup> *Einleitung in die drei ersten Evangelien*, 1905, pp. 106, 113, 114.

<sup>16</sup> *Sanday*, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

*THE REALITY OF RELIGIOUS IDEALS*

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Not the least significant fact of this great scientific age is its deep interest in religion. On the one hand, in spite of serious protests from the conservatives, science has established its right to apply the same method to the study of religion which has been of such great service in reducing the facts of other fields from chaos to order; and thus we have Comparative Religion, Higher Criticism, and the Psychology of Religion. On the other hand, attempts have been made from the philosophical side to furnish the same rationale for the ultimate religious concepts as for the scientific. The import of this has been, not to show that both sorts of ideas are ultimately equally invalid, equally lose themselves in the unknowable, as in the dark all cows are gray; but to show the legitimacy and importance of both in steering us in the direction of the real. What I am concerned with in this paper is to inquire into the validity of our religious ideals; but to do this I shall have to inquire first how any ideals become valid. If this seems a roundabout way, I still feel that it is the shortest way to reach the end in view.

The final problem which any theory of knowledge must attempt to solve is: How can ideas or concepts, which are merely structures of my mind, modifications of my brain and carried about in my head, mean or express the real nature of the world? To do justice to this problem here would be to furnish a complete system of epistemology and metaphysics. The limitation of our task makes this impossible; at most we can furnish only mere suggestions. We are concerned with the problem of knowledge in general only so far as this is involved in our more specific problem, namely, the real basis of our religious ideals. The first question, then, which we shall attempt to answer in barest outline is: How do concepts, structures in our mind, crystallize or *thicken*

into being, become objective fact? And the second, more special one, is: How does the criterion of the objectivity of concepts in general apply to the religious ideals?

One of the most suggestive things in modern philosophy is Herbert Spencer's definition of life, as "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations." "We perceive that what we call intelligence shows itself when the external relations to which the internal ones are adjusted begin to be numerous, complex, and remote in time or space; that every advance in intelligence essentially consists in the establishment of more varied, more complete, and more involved adjustments; and that even the highest achievements of science are resolvable into mental relations of coexistence and sequence, so co-ordinated as exactly to tally with certain relations of coexistence and sequence that occur externally." And again: "Any assumption is justified by ascertaining that all the conclusions deducible from it correspond with the facts as directly observed; by showing the agreement between the experiences it leads us to anticipate and the actual experiences."<sup>1</sup> Or, as Professor James would express it: Our ideas are valid when they are "coterminous" with perception or fact. Our idea of an eclipse is true when our anticipation of it in space and time ends in the facts of the eclipse.

Life and knowledge are essentially adjustments to a larger world. The springs for such a process of adjustment must be found in human nature. Modern philosophy and psychology alike emphasize that we are essentially active or willing beings, beings with desires to be satisfied; and we are dependent upon the environment for the satisfaction of those desires. Our impulses or affections, as Butler pointed out long before Darwin and Spencer, are centrifugal; they point to objects beyond themselves for their realization; human nature as such is fragmentary, and points to a larger world for completion. Only in so far as the smaller system is adjusted to the larger system can our desires be realized. But how can the smaller system ever know anything about the larger and thus properly adjust itself?

The English empiricists from Locke down are right in emphasizing that our adjustments are the results of experience. Our

<sup>1</sup> First Principles, Chapter iv, The Relativity of Knowledge.

instinctive tendencies would remain at best vague and inchoate if it were not for individual experience, which serves to make them definite. It is by continuous attempts at adjustments, the fruitful adjustments surviving as exciting interest or gratifying desire while the vain ones perish, that the organism learns gradually what are the proper adjustments. It is only on the level of our ideational adjustments, however, that the question of the true and the false arises. The fruitfulness of these ideational adjustments is one evidence, at least, for their truthfulness. While not all fruitful ideas are true and not all true ideas are useful, in the long run such fruitful adjustments must be true to the character of reality. If deception and illusion worked as well in the long run as truth, science would be in vain; for falsehood is infinite, and there can be no science of falsehood. The usefulness of deception must always be for a limited purpose, due to the imperfect development or pathological condition of human nature. Just as, on the whole, pleasant things are wholesome, so, on the whole, useful ideas are true, though in either case there are temporary exceptions in the evolutionary process; in either case we must supplement experience with further experience.

What the early English empiricists neglected, in their eagerness to show that we learn by experience, was to answer the question, who am I?—to define the individual. They emphasized the part played by the environment at the expense of the individual, his tendencies and needs. The ego was to be a mere passive tablet, a piece of white paper, upon which Nature could write her sequences. This implied that the ego must be a mere nothing in fact, as Hume points out, a mere result of association, a "bundle of perceptions." But in that case there was neither any need nor any possibility of adjustment or knowledge. If the individual centres are nothing, we have a lot of nothings playing on nothings, and the environment has vanished with the individual. Thus Humean empiricism would reach its logical bankruptcy.

It was at this point that Kant took up the problem. Kant emphasized the dignity of the individual at the expense of the environment. The mass of sensations or data which are thrust upon us could present no order or meaning as such. The laws and system of the data are the work of the subject, which confronts the

environment with certain predispositions, certain ways of looking at things. It is a matter of wonder to the naïve Kant that the data conform so obediently to the order forced upon them! For we make the system of nature. What makes nature seem so objective is that we all agree in making it in the same way; it is a sort of social collusion. But the environment takes revenge for this violence upon it. If we insist upon making nature according to our models, she will refuse, at any rate, to tell us anything about herself, and thus leave us to the solitude of our own fancies. When Kant attempts to distinguish between empirical causal relations and causality in general as dictated by the subject, his system utterly breaks down. If particular causal relations must be ascertained through experience, what remains for the boasted category of causality to do? Thus Kant, in giving arbitrary priority to the individual subject, lost all real access to the environment.

In this dilemma the theory of knowledge remained substantially until the evolutionary movement. Both Hume and Kant emphasized important aspects of knowledge: we must learn from experience the real character of nature; and yet we can only get out of nature the meanings or laws with which we confront it. The abstract methods of Hume and Kant could not overcome this antinomy. Both neglected the problem of the genesis of knowledge, in the light of which its nature must be interpreted. The two positions can be reconciled only in a more concrete theory of the individual, which takes account of the nature of the individual as modified by history.

This history is as old as the universe in its changes of cosmic weather—for old as star-dust is mind-stuff, old as existence are ideals. True, we have no right to read the meaning of the later and more complex stages of history into the earlier and simpler ones and speak of inorganic nature in terms of will or reason, as animistic philosophers are fond of doing. It is to us, the spectators, that the simpler stages have meaning or purpose. Yet we believe that the simpler ones are continuous in one history with the more complex ones, that the whole process is obedient to one direction; and though we cannot reproduce even problematically the content or meaning of the simpler stages, we can

at any rate to some extent reproduce their external or phenomenal form. What we must emphasize is that we, as thus conditioned by race history, are subjects, conscious egos, possessing properties of our own, capable of certain habits or adjustments as regards the environment, and not the mere passive result of mechanical laws, a chance conjunction in the dance of atomic elements, whether sensational or material.

When the individual history of human organisms begins, a certain structural differentiation, as a result of the survival process of evolution, has already determined for us our general data of a world. Our sense-organs admit only of a certain kind of diversity; they are tools for picking out a certain range of data as "signs" of the energies of our environment. Not only our data, however, but our capacity for reacting, both in general and in more specific directions, has already been determined by the character of the nervous system. We start upon our brief human history with a certain temperament and endowment; but more than that, we possess an equipment of certain dispositions or tendencies, needs, or demands, which must be satisfied. In these we reap the results of past adjustments from a race history indefinitely old. And while these results are not experience, not innate ideas, they serve to economize experience. They furnish us with the warp for which individual experience must furnish the woof. They are general docilities which can be made definite by being consciously tried out.

These tendencies may be merely individual and material, such as the tendency to self-preservation, characteristic of all life, and, we might say with Spinoza, of physical things, too. Or the tendencies may lead to social satisfaction. They may be a craving for friendship, a taste for music, a feeling for consistency, a sense of right, or a yearning for the supernatural. The special adjustments or tools for the satisfaction of these tendencies have already to a large extent been provided for by the order of things into which we are born. By our tendency to imitate we become familiar with the adjustments of society, its knives and forks, its laws, its science, its religion. In the course of this imitation, which we call education, we discover our own meaning or purpose—ourselves. We contribute our own reaction or interpretation to the

past. But whether our adjustments are the result of inherited dispositions, or of imitation, or of purposive experiment, what determines the repetition or survival of an adjustment is its capacity for ministering to the needs of the individual and the race.

How far our adjustments or dispositions are *a priori*, in the sense of inherited, or are acquired within the history of the individual organism, we are not at present in a position to state, and perhaps never shall know; but one thing is certain, when we begin to be conscious of what we are doing, to reflect upon our own acts and processes, we do find ready-made a complex set of adjustments or dispositions; experience has already taken on certain forms or serial arrangements; we look for certain connections and continuities between phenomena. Hence the *a priori* categories of men like Kant and Schopenhauer. We awaken to that yearning for the wholeness of things which intoxicated Plato; we recognize certain demands for consistency and beauty, which both outstrip and set the programme for individual striving. That these adjustments or dispositions are the products of the interaction of the organism and the environment, physical and ideal, through the history of the race; that the environment has dictated to us what dispositions we must entertain to *survive*, long before our dispositions begin reflectively to dictate to nature what it shall *mean*—this is the contribution of the evolutionist movement. To supplement the empiricism of Locke and Hume, therefore, we must first recognize an instinctive structure with its tendencies, a subject capable of cumulative adjustment; and then substitute for the history of one individual experience the history of the race. In order to learn from experience, we must be equipped with mines of tendencies or interests which the energies out-side us can touch off. Nature can only become real to us as passing through human nature.

In all our adjustments, whether they are self-conscious or merely sentient, is involved trial, or experiment. Knowledge, too, starts with certain guesses, certain random efforts, spontaneous constructions—those surviving, on the whole, which issue in fruitful results. And the results become fruitful because the adjustments are made with reference to the character of reality. The organism must take account of the diversity, as well as identity,



of the environment; in other words, for the mental adjustment to become fact or to be successful, the *meant* identity or *meant* diversity must coincide with the *objective* identity or diversity of character. This aim at adjustment may be found in all stages, and may take account of a very abstract and immediate aspect of the environment or may aim at a very concrete and remote environment. Nor can we be neutral as regards reality beyond us, as we might be if we were merely bundles of perception or logic machines. We are bundles, not of perceptions, but of desires. The necessity to act in order to survive makes it impossible to be indifferent as regards our environment. And our actions imply certain beliefs with reference to the bigger world—the environment which we confront, whether we are conscious of those beliefs and whether they are those we profess or not.

How can we bring these beliefs or hypotheses to the test? How can we know whether they are the mere constructions of our brain, mere symbols, or whether they also express the character of reality? We have two ways of testing: one is a subjective way, referring to the proper functioning of our own thought; the other is objective, or refers to action. Ultimately, the two must coincide. The subjective criterion is that of consistency. Contradictory judgments cannot both be true. If I make the judgments that a house is red and that it is not red in the same respect, both judgments cannot express fact. But mere consistency does not make our ideas objective. Nor is social agreement sufficient to constitute objective fact. We can agree as to the meaning of centaurs and mermaids and a geometry of  $n$  dimensions. Yet this agreement does not constitute them objective facts. Ideas to become objective must not merely be consistent and capable of being agreed upon: they must lead to certain consequences of perception and action. If we can act *as if* a certain faith is real, if the environment responds to our action by ratifying our will, then our faith crystallizes into being and ceases to be mere faith or subjective attitude. We have hit upon the meaning, the real character, of our environment. Hence our environment responds by granting our request. Truth, finally, must be tested through the consequences in the way of conduct or procedure to which it leads—provided that we include in these both the difference which the object makes to our individual nature now and

the ratification of further experience. The latter can only come in as a proviso, necessary at any one time, owing to the finitude of human nature and the fluent character of reality. True, sometimes our response takes the form of intuitive certainty, the net result of race history; but this certainty must in the end be capable of being tested in the procedure of experience—even the golden rule and the venerable axioms of geometry.

In the degree, then, in which we can act *as if*, we have hit upon the true meaning of the environment; we can dictate to it because it has already dictated to us. Most of our guesses or faiths as regards reality are only partially responded to; we can only in part act *as if*. We can only act, perhaps, as though our faith were real for a certain abstract purpose. However, in so far as the environment responds even for the abstractest purpose, our idea or faith must embody an essential aspect of reality. Thus the atomic theory serves admirably for the grosser purposes of chemistry, while, in its classic form at least, it breaks down for certain phenomena of physics, such as electricity. Hence its truth must be regarded as partial. It does not express the whole truth of the character of the physical world; yet it does embody an essential, if abstract, aspect just in so far as we can act as if the world were made that way and get our results. If we take the ether, again, we find that for certain purposes it has been treated as a perfect fluid and for others as a perfect jelly. We have here apparent contradiction in the assumed substrate of phenomena, yet both beliefs with reference to it lead to fruitful consequences. Hence the abstract partial aspects must each have its right; and a concept must be possible that embodies both characters without contradiction. When we can form a concept, a mental construction, on which we can act consistently as if it expressed the essence or nature of reality, then this ceases to be mere belief or idea; it thickens into being, it *is* reality. Reality then conforms to our categories or ideas because these have been adjusted to it. It should be added that knowledge becomes exhaustive only when we deal with objects which are themselves meanings. Any number of people can have the reality of Hamlet.

It has been fashionable of late to speak of concepts as shorthand, merely convenient symbols, but without relation to the real world. In so far as they are mere subjective guesses, and reality

refuses to respond to them, to behave as if they were true, in so far we may speak of them as mere shorthand, mere symbols. But in so far as they become convenient, in so far as they form the basis of prediction, just so far do they cease to be mere shorthand. They must seize upon characters of reality in order to be serviceable, even though in the case of physical nature these characters are to-us-ward and do not reproduce or copy the inner reality of the process, and so do not completely thicken into being, but must be regarded as instrumental—good instruments if they work. So far as regards the real or inner nature of the environment, we must act by faith, not by sight. Our sensations as such are dependent for their character not merely upon the environment, but also upon our psychophysical organism, and at best they are but signs of what we intend. Nor can the real character of the environment be ascertained by mere thought, as Plato supposed, but by thought or creative imagination that realizes itself in action. Our ultimate clue to reality is that it behaves as if it conformed to our idea of it; when that happens, our constructive imagination must have succeeded in divining it or hitting it off, or succeeded so far as our finite limitations permit. How complex this environment shall be assumed to be, what diversity it shall possess for us, depends upon how we must regulate our conduct to obtain the satisfaction of our will. If we must act as if there were other individuals, other relatively independent centres of activity, then there *are* other individuals; and their *character* must be such as we must adjust ourselves to in order to have our expectations of them realized, in order to live properly. If we regard the physical world as mechanical, as mere means to an end, whereas we recognize human beings as ends in themselves, it is because only by distinguishing such objective values we attain the satisfaction, or good, of our will. Thus both the diversity of existence and the diversity of meaning, as regards the bigger world, are known through the differentiation of the activity of the subject, necessary in order to accomplish its end.

It is the plurality and changeability of our world that divorces truth as a mental structure from the characters of reality it means. Our meanings must readjust themselves to their changing objects or else prove false. On the other hand, truth could not mean

reality, could be nothing but mere shorthand, unless our mental structures were continuous with their environment. Here we seem to have an antinomy. Both discontinuity and continuity seem to be necessary in order to account for the nature of truth. Monism, by affirming the unity of the world as a static whole has failed to account for the relativity of truth as it attempts to express fact. Pluralism again, of the old-fashioned type, with its indifferent substances, made unity or continuity impossible, and hence made knowledge impossible. Both unity and plurality, continuity and discontinuity, must be true of the real, though under different conditions, because we must act as if they were true in order properly to adjust ourselves to the environment. Both, however, must be relative. The concrete truth must be somehow a universe of process with diversity of structure; with relatively stable centres that can interact and, in a measure, picture each other; of continuities and discontinuities according as the conditions are present or absent for connecting certain energies. If we must adjust ourselves to it as if it were such, then such it must be, even though we may not now be able to explain how it is so.

How does the above teleological criterion of being apply to the religious environment? We have seen how the mind has constructed for itself and projected a world of ideas in order to meet its environment, and said, "That art thou." In so far as its prediction has been verified and the proper adjustment thus obtained, the environment has replied, "That am I." The character we have given this environment has depended upon the needs of the soul to make itself at home in the world, to satisfy its wants. The environment again has reacted upon the adjustment and shown how far it has been adequate. Thus we have come to construct an inorganic, an organic, and a supra-organic, or psychic, environment, each of which grades of environment has proven its reality by the necessity of adjusting ourselves to it in order for the highest well-being. But in this historic process of adjustment even the psychic environment of social unity has proven inadequate without the faith in an ultimate spiritual environment which shall be the objectivity and fulfilment of our fragmentary human ideals. Thus the soul of man has built itself nobler

mansions, has constructed the ideal world of religion, even as the swallow builds herself a nest in order to feel cosier and more at home in an otherwise cold world. Now, does the religious ideal of a realized good in the world have any real basis, or is it but a fond dream? Is there any environment beyond and still higher than the supra-organic or social environment, already so difficult for us to grasp and yet so real? Man has at any rate acted upon the belief in such an unseen environment, higher than the human, and persists in doing so. Is there any justification for this?

The same criterion must be applied to the reality of the religious environment as has been applied to other kinds of environment. I can see no intrinsic difference as regards the test of religious concepts or hypotheses from the test of scientific. The former are more momentous hypotheses, to be sure, but that does not alter their verification. Science, too, is fundamentally built on faith, a faith built on very slender evidence—the faith that this Chinese puzzle of a world can be sorted and be made to fit together into a systematic whole; as religion is built upon the faith in a Power that is righteous, sympathizes with, and works for, righteousness. In any case the idea must be justified or proved by its consequences, or its ability to satisfy the needs of the individual, or at any rate the race in its progressive evolution. As we expect the scientific demand to grow more definite and articulate in the course of evolution, so we should expect the same in regard to the religious demands. If it is a great distance from Thales to modern science, so it is a long stretch from the Book of Judges to the Sermon on the Mount. In the case of science and religion alike, immediacy—whether the immediacy of perception as in science or the vaguer immediacy of instinctive feeling as in religion—must be interpreted and corrected in the light of further experience.

The question is: Is the religious environment bound up with the history of man in such a way that he must act *as if* it were real in order to attain his highest development? If the religious ideal is bound up with moral and social unity, as well as the highest individual appreciation and satisfaction; if there is no abatement of this adjustment, but, on the contrary, it increases in complexity and unity with the development of human life; if life would

be poorer without it; if, in short, the religious adjustment has proved a necessary one, in order to attain the highest and most effective life; and if materialism fails to inspire such a type of life, then the religious ideal must in some degree possess objective reality. Here, too, we have the survival of the fittest as regards beliefs; and the history of the race might be written as the history of religious beliefs. The working of the religious hypothesis must in-so-far be taken as evidence of its truthfulness, just as the working of the scientific hypothesis is in-so-far regarded as evidence of its truth. Both must be modified in the light of the requirements of further experience. The progressive usefulness in either case must prove the greater objectivity of the content. Can any one doubt the cementing influence of religious beliefs on social unities, or the heightening effect on morality of the faith in an impartial and sympathetic Spectator and Co-operator, or the association of religion with the highest in art? And as we learn to substitute more and more, in the progress of evolution, inner unity for mere mechanical coexistence, are we not progressing towards the appreciation of a higher spiritual unity, a supra-individual unity of souls greater than nations and greater than humanity; a unity which is not a mere block unity, like that of Parmenides, but a unity which embodies the end of ideal striving? If it is a fact that the religious ideal is thus essential to the highest unity and development of life, then the religious ideal can be no mere shadow projected by the imagination of man; but it becomes objective; it thickens into being. It is the ultimate constitution of the cosmos.

The mistake has been in the past of trying to express the environment of the individual and the race in merely physical or perceptual terms. This would provide no standard of fitness. It would merely record the fact of survival, and stamp that fit which does survive. We must, I think, regard the kingdom not-of-this-world as no less real than the kingdom of this world; the realm of formal demands and ideals no less real than the realm of facts and impulses. And not only must the former be as real as the latter, looked at from the point of view of existence, but the former must count for more, must legislate to the latter; the ideal environment must set the ultimate survival conditions of the natural. Else

the process can have no unity or meaning. Else no generalization would be possible. Natural science becomes as hopeless as ethics, for both involve the axiom that the cosmic process has direction, or is amenable to certain ideals.

What has been said with reference to the existence of the religious environment applies equally to its character. We cannot agree with Herbert Spencer that utter characterlessness, existence without content, is the goal of religious progress. What possible efficiency could mere empty existence have in human evolution? The same criterion which shows us *that* God is, shows us also *what* he is. The development of religion, moreover, shows more and more agreement as regards its content. All the developed religions agree in maintaining, though with different emphasis and concreteness, certain attributes as indispensable. Thus the ideal of goodness, as the supreme factor in the religious ideal, is common to all the great religions. It is evident that the more empty and vague the religious ideal is, the less effective it is; and that, on the other hand, the religious content which conduces to the most definite understanding of man's problems and contributes most to the development of man must be most objective.

We can only mention some of the most prominent characters of the religious ideal which have proved indispensable to its historic efficiency. One is the unity of the religious ideal as opposed to polytheism, the demand for one unique and final embodiment of the highest good. Furthermore, this unity must be a personal experience, not necessarily having our limitations, but capable of entering into sympathetic relations with all good strivings, as it has sufficient power to enforce its ideal. God must not be merely an impersonal constitution. Even the atheism of classical Buddhism could not be made practical until it apotheosized the founder.

Practical religion must, furthermore, identify itself with the values or norms of life primarily. In other words, the religious ideal must not be pantheistic. Only the finite can have worth. I do not see how any one can love or worship things in general, this medley of comedy and tragedy, of harmony and discord, which we call a world. Such a worship would seem possible only by killing the nerve of activity, by saying to the passing moment,

"Verweile doch, du bist so schön," which, if we believe Faust, is equivalent to selling one's self to the devil. However satisfying such a view may be aesthetically, it is not ethical. Pantheism is as unethical as materialism. A God that is identical with the totality of existence is helpless to redeem the world, as he is equally responsible for its sins and its virtues. Hence Christianity preaches a kingdom that is not of this world, a God of righteousness. "Be ye perfect as your Father in Heaven is perfect." God is identified with the absolute worth or goodness of the world, not with its mere brute existence. God is just, as identified with the realm of ideals, and as such he sets survival conditions to the lower finite centres; but the God required by human experience must also be merciful, and, as such, he strives to raise our finite lives to the standard. In this love of the perfect and striving to make the finite perfect, justice is not abrogated but fulfilled. The world consists of many centres of consciousness, who must learn to imitate, and make their own, the perfect good, each in his own way. And in this lies both the tragedy and the zest of life.

The truest and most objective religious ideal, then, is that which can furnish the completest and fullest satisfaction of the demands and longings of evolving humanity. The various religions, no matter how ancient and venerable, must submit to the pragmatic test, their ability to minister to human experience in all its complexity. Religions must not appeal merely to our credulity for the miraculous. In that case the savage religions would rank at the top; for, in the absence of science, there is no limit to the miraculous. Nor must the appeal be to a mere supernatural revelation or authority. In that case Brahmanism and the old Pharisaism would rank foremost. Religions must appeal to the good sense of man; they must increase his perspective or sanity. They must enable him to think more deeply and truly; to appreciate and create greater beauty; to live more completely and fully, individually and socially. Christianity neither can nor must claim any exemption from this test of the completest ministry to human nature. With this it stands or falls, not with its ecclesiasticism or creeds. For the Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath.

Christianity is the highest religion to us because it, as no other,



furnishes, in the simplest and completest way, that environment of the soul which satisfies and makes objective its yearning for the highest good. And inasmuch as the personality of Jesus answers all our demands for personal goodness, as no other historic individual does—fulfils them not only relatively but completely—we must acknowledge him as divine in a unique way. He is to the Western world, at any rate, the concrete universal, the beautiful life—not only individually beautiful and complete, as a work of art, but the greatest energizing power for beauty, truth, and goodness. Nor is his claim to this position waning, but ever gaining new strength in the dissolution of dogmas and the crash of creeds. And in the struggle for survival which is now going on between the Western and Eastern world, in spite of, yea from, the smoke and din of battle and secular conquest, the ideal dominion of the Galilean promises to extend itself, in the centuries to come, to the ends of the earth.

*THE USE OF HEBREW TO A MINISTER*

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In its bearings on the preparation for the work of the ministry the question, *Is Hebrew worth while?* is a live one. Like most questions, it has more than one side. I may declare at the outset my own conviction. In the practical work of the ministry Hebrew is not only worth while, but in these times comes near being essential if the work is to be done in a thorough way. Hebrew should, therefore, not only be a part of every seminary curriculum, but should be required for graduation.

I have not room to discuss all the reasons that have been offered on the other side. I can only put together in the briefest way those that have struck me as especially forcible. I confess that they make a very strong case—far stronger than can be represented in my brief statement. I have seen and heard it said by very influential men that the demands made upon the minister today, especially if he be in charge of a city church, leave no time for delving into Hebrew; that this is not to be regretted, as he has little need to know about the long-gone days when Hebrew was a living language and produced a literature; that the learning of the language will draw upon time which, if invested elsewhere, will yield larger returns; that the minister needs to be trained with reference to present-day events, and that a Hebrew classroom is likely to send him forth more or less out of touch with the vital movements of the age which will speedily demand all his attention; that in giving so much time to such studies the seminary is training a man to be a Semitic specialist or professor rather than a minister.

I trust I can appreciate these arguments at their true value. But from most of them I entirely dissent. I know well enough from my own experience in the calling that in addition to a minister's regular work there are all sorts of unexpected and peculiar demands, day and night, from all sorts of people in all sorts of

trouble, from societies, secret orders, unions, camps of veterans, and so on and on. Many of these things are wholly foreign to his vocation; and if he speedily becomes known in the community as a man unwilling to talk and act about matters of which he knows nothing, he and his work will be the gainers in more than one direction. But even after he succeeds in getting and keeping his energies in their proper channel, he is a busy man. The work to be done on the narrowest professional basis, say some, leaves no time for Hebrew. On the contrary—and I am keeping here entirely within the limits of my experience—Hebrew, when systematically prosecuted, is one of the greatest time-savers known. In a surprisingly short time after the study is begun, it will yield a hundred-fold for all the labor spent upon it.

The minister must ordinarily provide for at least two *sermons* a week; must select and develop topics with reference to congregations which are practically unvarying in their constitution from Sunday to Sunday. And however we may deplore the lack of attention of some listeners, there are sure to be others who will remind us, if in our despair we ever dare fall back on an old sermon, that two years ago we preached on that text, and found the same points in it. A good working knowledge of Hebrew will do great things toward eliminating the problems of time, topic, and labor that seem to have fastened themselves so tenaciously to many ministerial careers. Select any Old Testament book you please, and study it with the best lexical, grammatical, and other apparatus to be had—of course keeping in mind as you proceed the work of the Sundays and the plain people with plain needs and no scholarship you must then meet—and your note book will accumulate sermons far faster than you can use them. Hebrew will be found to be the quickest and safest route to the sermon ever tried. I have known several ministers whose nerves almost collapsed under the constant strain of selecting texts and making sermons out of them. Why should there have been a strain? None of these men knew either Hebrew or Greek; and, with all their toils and sufferings, their best was mediocre or worse. Now I do not claim of course that the knowledge of Hebrew is going to make a preacher. But if the preacher be without this knowledge, he is placed at a grave disadvantage.

from which nothing short of the acquisition will relieve him. Nor can it truthfully be said that sermons dug from among Hebrew roots are dry, have a scholastic odor, and are remote from present conditions. Other things being equal, the man who has gone to the sources for his sermon is more likely to interest and benefit the average man than one who does not know the way to the sources. Then, too, sermons are supposed to deal in some way or other with the principles of morals and character as they are developed in the Bible. They cannot reliably and authoritatively be drawn forth from this book except through the close study of it in the form in which it has come to us.

If the minister carries into the pulpit the shavings and tools of the workshop instead of the finished product, that exhibition of pedantry, or the lack of common sense, as the case may be, points to a personal defect that lies much deeper than his knowledge of Hebrew. A seminary professor may fail to appreciate the point of view and needs of the minister, and may discipline his men as though their life's work were to be the discovery of the key to the Hittite language or research in Semitic philology. If so, the professor is certainly in the middle of a stage on which is being played a tragedy, and the authorities that retain him have set out the trappings. But to say that Hebrew ought therefore to be discarded from the course looks to me like shifting the blame from the abuser to the abused. There are some things in most seminary courses for which the minister has no particular use. Perhaps he finds that some things there taught really hamper him, and he must needs unlearn them. But no preacher who has once taken Hebrew along as one of his daily working tools, and found in his experience the surprising number of uses to which it can be put, will ever regard the study of it as of subordinate importance.

I suppose most men who preach sermons, in theory at least, consider that one of the purposes of the sermon is to impart instruction: it is more or less consciously addressed to the intelligence of the auditor. If there is no such purpose, the sermon will have made no demand on the speaker's mind, can make none on the hearer's, and will not be worth thirty minutes of the time of either. The text-book of this instruction is the Bible.

We rarely hear a sermon begin without the announcement of a text. We often hear sermons that immediately abandon the text; but that is the weakness of the preacher, and is another matter. The Bible is likely to maintain its present place in the teaching work of the church. But whether the use to which it there be put is teaching, worship, or something else, the situation, as regards the preacher's knowledge or ignorance of Hebrew, is not altered. Now the Bible was not written in English. The two great languages in which it has come to us abound in words which had an entirely different origin and development from those of the English equivalents which must be used to translate them. This is, of course, much more noticeable in Hebrew than in Greek. To cite only one instance: one of the common words in the Hebrew Old Testament is *Torah*. The English word generally employed in our versions to render it is 'law.' But 'law' has an entirely different origin and history from *torah*; the denotation of the two words coincides only in part while their connotations differ widely. In many instances 'law' does not convey to the English reader what *torah* conveys to the reader of the Hebrew, and in some places it is positively misleading.

It is true that he who uses words in speaking or writing with strict respect to their origin and growth is a pedant. Many men who speak correctly know nothing and care nothing for such things. We use words with reference to their present-day meaning; and a brief comparison of the Authorized and the Revised Versions of the English Bible will show that even in a literary language the significance of words shifts surprisingly in a comparatively short time. But still the origin and growth of words determine, more extensively than we may imagine, the thought, impression, feeling, which they awaken in the mind of one in whose presence they are uttered. Most words retain at least something of their primitive signification. If a word's main force at the present time is a later acquisition, still this is generally qualified, limited, restricted, toned, colored, by its origin in some fine way, of which we in using it may not be conscious. We select a word as the medium of our thought with reference to this qualified significance. When a synonym is proposed, we feel that it cannot play the part of a substitute. Sometimes in writing or speaking

we know that there is just one word to express the meaning we wish our sentence to convey. With that word it embodies our whole idea: without it our idea is dwarfed, enlarged, one-sided—in some manner deformed. We can think of words that almost do. They make good sense, perhaps better rhetoric; but somehow they do not fit. When we finally hit upon the right one, we can give no reason for preferring it: we merely feel that it is the word. These lights and shadows, shades and intensities of words, enter largely into the value of a language as an instrument of speech and into the power and beauty of its literature. Here we may look for much of the difference between two languages. This is one of the main reasons why translations are always inadequate.

In vocabulary Hebrew and English widely diverge, for the reason that the former had small influence in the formation of the latter. When the school-boy takes up Greek—and this is still more true of Latin—he immediately sees points of contact between that language and his own. In every line of his Caesar he meets words whose meanings are suggested by similar words that he daily uses. Latin, Greek, and English have in common many principles of grammar. But in Hebrew not only have we no derived words to assist us in gaining a vocabulary, but how far removed from anything we have heretofore known are the rules of its syntax! In the verb, for instance, there is no time element, no past, present, or future: in our verb, time is a controlling factor. In countless instances no translation can bring over the main force of a Hebrew verb without a circumlocution, which is impossible. These are not simply matters of nice distinctions. They frequently make the difference between the true and false interpretation of a passage. No man can discover the real idea in the mind of the writer of a Hebrew sentence unless he has access to the language. There is again that indefinable thing known as the genius or spirit of a literature, which cannot be adequately expressed in words or in any other material shape, because it is spiritual; which is not to be seen, or to be found by logic or philology, but which must be felt. I do not believe that any one can have a knowledge of the Old Testament sufficient to qualify him to be a teacher of it unless he has experienced this

spirit of its literature, which cannot be preserved in a rendering. To quote from Professor George Adam Smith: "Do not believe that the end of an accurate study of the Hebrew language is simply familiarity with a number of grammatical forms more or less obscure. Pains-taking students are otherwise rewarded. It is they who lay their hands on the prophet's heart and feel it beat; it is they who across the ages see the very features of his face as he calls; it is they into whom his style and his music pass."

No matter how excellent an Old Testament translation may be, the finest and best must be lost in the passage from one language to the other. One may be familiar with the story of Homer's epics, may have an intimate acquaintance with the best English renderings, may be exceptionally gifted as a teacher, but no one would admit the right of a man who does not know Greek to teach Homer. When the preacher announces a text from the Old Testament, he assumes the rôle of teacher of the passage he has chosen. True, we hear much said of the "devotional" treatment of the Bible, whatever that may mean. If it means a treatment with little or no reference to the mind of the man who wrote it, it is dishonest, and likely to lead the hearer to deal falsely with the Bible; if this treatment ignores the primary fact that man is a rational being, it is sure to be some sort of slovenly gush with nothing virile. No safe distinctions can be drawn between the scholastic and devotional study of the Bible. Indeed, it is deep down in the fundamentals of the language, hiding away in the roots of Hebrew words and in the crevices and corners of that language's grammar, that we will find some of the richest spiritual treasures, some of the most beautiful and most fragrant flowers. The appeal to the spiritual and intellectual in man is one. Fortunate indeed is the preacher who can walk with sure foot the field of Hebrew literature, a language as rugged as the land in which it lived; can look around its heavy boulders, and pluck from under their damp shade the violets, and hand them over to the old saint who waits upon his Sabbath morning message. That saint is no scholar, but he knows the fragrance and beauty of violets; and in the gratitude that lights the face the preacher is blessed in the doing.

The minister has no access to some of the finest helps on the Old Testament unless he has a working knowledge of Hebrew; to none of them has he more than a very partial access without this knowledge. The *Lexicon of Brown, Driver, and Briggs* has sermons in every column; it illumines the whole field and explains the details. If he does not know Hebrew it is as useless in a minister's library as a pile of brick. With this knowledge, it is of more practical worth than all the scholastic theology and devotional literature that could be packed in the rolling stock of a transcontinental railway. The *International Critical Commentary* is the greatest achievement in English in the interpretation of the Bible. It cannot be ignored when the meaning of a passage of Scripture is sought. No one is in a position to handle its volumes on the Old Testament if he has failed to master Hebrew. The power to use this great work and reap its magnificent harvest would alone repay the time and labor involved in providing one's self with the tool. Indeed, the value of any reliable work on any phase of the Old Testament, though it be written in a popular style, is increased enormously if the reader can accompany the author to the sources. Such works are entirely too numerous to cite here. But I may mention a recent contribution to biblical study which it may be safely supposed every minister who makes any pretension to keeping abreast of the age has at hand—*Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible*. It can be used, and most profitably, by any thoughtful person; but no one untrained in Hebrew can begin to measure its importance. I know one man who proposed to put the modern languages, especially German, in the place of the Hebrew in the regular seminary course. This looks to me like advising a man to spend all his substance for an ax-helve and leave himself without the means to procure an ax. German, particularly, is exceedingly valuable to the man who knows Hebrew. In that case he cannot better employ his time than in acquiring it. If he knows neither Hebrew nor German, he should acquire Hebrew first. The Germans certainly surpass all other peoples in the number of valuable works on the Bible. The two series of German commentaries on the Old Testament, the *Handkommentar zum Alten Testament*, and the *Kurzer Hand-Commentar zum Alten*



*Testament*, have not yet been equalled. Neither these nor numerous other German works could be accurately used without the knowledge of Hebrew. Now it is little short of ludicrous to expect men to stand before the people as teachers of the Bible, and to perform in the community the service of authorities on the Bible, when they have access neither to the original Bible itself nor to the best work that is being done on the Bible. I doubt if such a lack of professional equipment would be tolerated in any other calling.

Not in his Sunday labors only, but always and everywhere, the minister is considered an authority on all matters pertaining to the Bible. His estimate of himself may not be so extravagant. But his average fellow-citizen, if more considerate than to expect him to furnish at a moment's notice the details of any and every aspect of present-day biblical knowledge, does expect him to know where and how to get this information. This demand is not unjust. If a man is not willing to be, and to be regarded as, a specialist on the Bible, and to have men seek of him reliable opinions, he should resign from the ministry. The merchant owes it not only to his bank account and his own family, but especially to the community in which his business is a servant, to carry a complete stock. The minister needs to realize that one of the duties he owes to his church and to the place of his residence—and by no means his least important—is of the same kind. And in the light of his own ideal of this service he should regard it as immoral and dishonest to carry in stock shelf-worn commodities, left-overs from previous seasons, and dilapidated stuff bought on some one's bargain counters. The man who comes to him for information may find his wants supplied in this kind of stock; or the minister, being ignorant of the standards of value in his own business, may represent what he has as better than it is; or he may even condescend to deliberate deception rather than have his customer go to some one better qualified to serve. But satisfying an inquirer is not the only nor the chief end in view. Any sort of sophistry will generally do that. But the great thing for the minister to understand, when such an occasion arises, is that he has an opportunity, a privilege; that his questioner is interested enough in the Bible to go to the pains

of looking up some one to answer his questions; that he may possibly be able to stimulate these motives and lead the seeker out into the broad fields of biblical learning. If he can succeed in gathering around him a little group of young people or of ambitious Sunday-school teachers—or even one such person—for the purpose of studying the Bible in the original, he may justly regard that as a part of the finest fruit of his ministry.

A thorough, just, honest opinion on some of the most vital questions of the day cannot be formed except through the study of the Hebrew language. One of these is the higher criticism. The daily press and popular religious literature between them have given this subject a great deal of free advertising in recent years. In a certain way, mostly a very perverted way, it has filtered down among the people, and has produced in individual cases quite a variety of interesting psychological results. Some who wish to pose as smart, mostly young and inexperienced people, think they have received the full license for atheism, and that the thought of the age has proclaimed the Bible worthy of no man's serious attention. Some who have tried long and faithfully to live the righteous life, whose experience of the grace of God is far more profound than their knowledge of the conclusions of scholars, have had their faith rudely shaken and their peacefulness agitated by what they have heard of criticism from some third or fourth class source. Some intelligent man, a sincere inquirer after truth, who is not in the church, but who would make a valuable addition to the church, who has no desire to parade his independence or to appear as a freethinker, will drop into the minister's study some evening for expert opinion if he has reason to believe he will receive such. It is clearly a part of the pastoral vocation to handle these and all other classes of men who may be affected by biblical questions of the day in the way that will best promote their characters. He cannot, without a first-hand knowledge of the field such as we demand in his respective department of the physician, the lawyer, the chemist, the architect. Now you can start no Old Testament question that does not run right back, generally along perfectly straight lines, into the Hebrew text. All study above the original is superficial, unreliable, and second-hand, or worse.

Recently something like a breach has begun to appear between the ministry and biblical scholarship. This is perhaps most noticeable in the Old Testament field. Semitic research has met with rich rewards; the vastness of the unexplored ocean that rolls away is now appreciated, and Semitic specialists who have nothing to do with the ministry are associated with our universities. On the other hand the minister, in the midst of complex social conditions and an enormous mass of religious reading matter in his own tongue at hand, at the very beginning of his career finds the temptation strong to abandon the Hebrew he has brought out of the seminary as a useless weight on the journey. Too often he is in utter ignorance of what the Semitic specialist is doing, is too ignorant to appreciate his aims or to understand what he gives the world, even of the names of foremost scholars. Frequently on his library shelves is not to be found a single authoritative work on the Old Testament. Often his general feeling, so far as he has any, is that the scholar is an enemy of the faith, and is deliberately working to destroy all revealed religion. The time to close this breach is now. If it goes on to get wider, it is going to result in trouble for the ministry and the church. Semitic research will continue, whatever may happen to the ministry and the church. The only way to close the breach is for the minister to become a scholar, to get better acquainted with the book he teaches, and to keep up with the progress of biblical science. Investigators have already rendered to Christianity a service which is beyond all calculating; their service in the past would have been still greater if the ministry had been quicker to appreciate it; they have still greater gifts for the future. It becomes the ministry, then, to put itself in a receptive attitude, to get in intelligent sympathy with the work that must always remain fundamental to all progress in Bible study and to all the practical work of the church.

The varied work expected of the minister in this day is no valid excuse for neglecting Hebrew. A surgeon might with equal propriety plead demands upon his time as a reason for not becoming acquainted with certain standard professional instruments. It is his business to know them. In like manner it is the minister's business to know Hebrew. And in both cases

alike the business should appeal to the conscience with all the imperativeness and sacredness that duty can impart. Furthermore, I have pointed out how it is a time-saver. The ease with which Hebrew can be acquired now, in comparison with the difficulties of the study in former days, more than compensates for the fact that the study must now be carried on in a more complex professional life. Yet, in spite of his many duties, I suppose there is no minister today who is living such a laborious and nerve-racking life as John Knox. We are told that when more than forty years of age he discovered that the knowledge of Hebrew would be worth all the pains that acquisition involved, and he found the time to perform the task he thus set for himself. We may profit by his example.

The day has gone—or certainly is rapidly going—when the minister may expect anything from the mere wearing of the cloth. Priestcraft thrives on superstition and ignorance. These are passing. The minister must now establish his worth in the place where he resides as a man, a Christian, and a scholar. He will be respected and appreciated accordingly. Knowledge is all the time becoming more widely disseminated, education is becoming more general. It is needful, then, that the intellectual ideals of the minister, the teacher of the people, should be set above any mark we can find behind us. There is unquestionably a loud cry for ministers of general culture and special scholarship. The minister who recognizes this demand of the age and tries in his individual case to meet it will give his calling and the church a prestige which they both seem to stand in need of. We want, too, people of scholarly attainments and culture in the rank and file of the church's membership, deeply interested in the church's work and aims. Too often we find such persons out of touch with the church. In many instances they feel thus because they have heard its purposes set forth only by incompetent men she has had in her pulpits. These people, though they may never attend church, are not the enemies of Christianity. In fact, if a representative of the church who is their equal in ability, and with an adequate knowledge of what is being done in connection with the Bible, could explain matters to them, the scales would in many cases fall from their eyes, and both they and the church

would be gainers. One such person is worth a hundred people equally good in point of morality but without his intellectual advantages and gifts. It is simply the case of the man with five talents over against the man with one. It is as in the matter of giving. The man of small means who has only one dollar to give, and gives it in a cheerful spirit, certainly deserves as much praise as he who out of his abundance gives a million. But, nevertheless, the million will move mountains, while the work of the one may not be perceptible in the mass. The church must count largely on a ministry thoroughly trained in the book with which it deals to interest and hold that small but controlling class of society composed of the people with many mental talents.

In our country are towns large enough to sustain a half-dozen or more churches with not a minister capable of reading the Bible except in an English translation. It is not to be wondered at that the most intelligent classes in such communities feel that their needs are not supplied by the Sunday messages accessible to them. Neither is it a wonder that there is such a thing as the ministerial "dead-line." And I venture to believe that higher scholastic attainment, Christian character still being maintained as the first essential, would in large measure solve other professional problems.

*ROBERT LOUIS STEVENSON AS AN INTERPRETER  
OF LIFE*

JAMES ALLEN GEISSINGER

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It is difficult to think of Robert Louis Stevenson as other than the creator of delightful and weird romances. His name always calls up Treasure Island—not to mention the other progeny of his fruitful imagination—Treasure Island and the higher geography. Stevenson will always stand forth as master of the finest artistry and as a modern symbol of the imagination. And it seems nothing short of sheer prose to turn from the fairy world flung into space by the deftness and swiftness of this man's fancy to our gray world of every day.

Yet Dr. Japp and Mr. Zangwill both insist that he will finally be remembered as an essayist and not as a romancer. We must all of us agree, I think, that whatever comes of Stevenson the fictionist, Stevenson the essayist has enriched the world by his half-dozen slim volumes of comment on life and men. If we think of the essay as a bit of preachment, we may still think of Stevenson as an essayist. He seems to like the rôle of preacher; and whatever our own homiletical notions may be, we must admit that his preaching is always fresh, human, and in good spirit; his truths stay with us and his disclosures send us afield for more truth,—qualities all preaching does not possess. "To be honest, to be kind, to earn a little and to spend a little less, to make upon the whole a family the happier for his presence, to renounce when that shall be necessary and not be embittered, to keep a few friends, but these without capitulation—above all, on the same grim condition, to keep friends with himself—here is a task for all that a man has of fortitude and delicacy." This is commonplace truth put with such finality and authority that, if it has not become scripture, it has at least served as a text for not a few preachers.

What could be more delightful than this from *An Inland Voyage*?

Stevenson and his companion are off in their canoes. The lads and lasses of Origny run along the banks of the Oise, cheering. The last of those to send their adieus after the gay voyagers are the three graces, and just as the canoes flash round a bend in the stream, one of the girls leaps upon a tree-stump and kisses her hand to the canoeists, crying gleefully, "Come back again, come back again." To which challenge, our preacher cannot refrain from replying from beneath his gypsy mask:—

Come back again? There is no coming back, young ladies, on the impetuous stream of life.

'The merchant bows unto the seaman's star,  
The ploughman from the sun his season takes.'

And we must all set our pocket watches by the clock of fate. There is a headlong, forthright tide, that bears away man with his fancies like straw, and runs fast in time and space. It is full of curves like this, your winding river of Oise; and lingers and returns in pleasant pastorals; and yet, rightly thought upon, never returns at all. For though it should revisit the same acre of meadow in the same hour, it will have made an ample sweep between whiles; many little streams will have fallen in; many exhalations risen towards the sun; and even although it were the same acre, it will not be the same river Oise. And thus, O graces of Origny, although the wandering fortune of my life should carry me back again to where you await death's whistle by the river, that will not be the old I who walks the street; and those wives and mothers, say will those be you?

Some one may think that this comes very near being, what any preaching may easily become, platitudinous; yet it is saved by the freshness of the treatment, by the blithe spirit of the preacher, and by the swish of the paddles that he manages to get into his out-of-doors discourse.

It is said that Coleridge once asked Charles Lamb if he had ever heard him preach. Lamb replied, "I never heard you do anything else." We may say the same for Stevenson. Let no one protest that he was rather an artist. I do not mean that he was a boor. I know that he never wears the prophet's rage like Carlyle, and is never confessedly a teacher of men like Ruskin. He is also

unconventional, both as to subject and treatment. He affects "a light conscience." He assumes a care-free manner. He speaks very much as if he were a scarcely interested spectator of the splendid pageant of life. Still he cannot deceive us. It is easy to see where his heart is. The universe haunts him. He travels far and is always interested in new lands, yet deeper than that interest is his interest in life. He is always trying to get "back of beyond." He rides with a careless grace in his canoe, or astride Modestine, or in the steerage; yet he is always looking out of the tail of his eye at life. He will take the universe unawares and surprise it out of its secret. As he goes to and fro in the world "full of a number of things," he is ever singing the "beauty and terror of the world." I have always thought that that picture of him that shows him a gaunt invalid, propped up in pillows, the haunting face circled with unkempt hair, the eyes looking far away

To where the roads on either hand  
Lead onward into fairy land.

gives us the soul of the man. He is ever doing one thing, in essay or romance—spelling out the meaning of life.

This is not to be wondered at, whether we think of the man's inheritance and experience, or whether we remind ourselves that we are all doing the same thing most of our time. An ancient worthy assures us that God hath given to the sons of men this sore travail to be exercised therewith. And long before his day men were searching out by wisdom all things done under the sun. At the present moment an especial interest is manifest in the interpretation of life, as can be seen from our periodical literature and the lecture platform. The pity is, not that this is so, but that so much of the discourse on life rests upon meagre data, small observation, and limited experience, and proceeds in a petulant mood to a disheartening conclusion. For the most part our latter-day prophets make us to feel the "devouring element in the universe" rather than the universe; while those truths revealed to babes and savages and "hid from political economists" are never set before us. The current reading of life is altogether partial, because so ill-informed. We need to get this point if we are to realize Stevenson's value to



his generation, and we may believe to all generations, as an interpreter of life.

In our childhood we have no suspicion of the universe. We never imagine that we could have made a better one. We are in "eternal brotherhood with it." Life then, whatever its outward seeming, always "has a golden chamber at the heart of it." Then we hear "the nightingale singing" and the "music of the runnel." Life is an opportunity for admiration and joy. Even to the end, for not a few men, life is fraught with hope. Until the autumn time, many a man commits himself to the sunshine on the hills, the laughter of children, gracious women, true men, bird-songs and apple-blossoms; believes in these things as much as he does in "old iron, cheap desires, and cheap fears," and thinks of them more. Some, indeed, like Paul the apostle, grow in capacity for faith, hope, and love, with the years, as every normal person should; but a pathetically large number lose their sight as they grow older. For many of us the bloom of the world gets rubbed off as we go forward across the continent of the years. Then it is that we grow conscious of the catastrophe and forget the myrtle vine. We see nature red in tooth and claw. We accept that miserable fable from the Orient that tells us that life is but the clinging to a wild vine upon which the mice remorselessly gnaw, while the dragon waits patiently below and the beast watches relentlessly above. Our only possibility is a lick at the honey accidentally caught on the wild bush at our side. A *delirium-tremens* view of life, one would say; yet a number of folk who would resent any insinuation of nervous disorder on their part hold this view of the universe and life. Indeed, they seem to get a kind of satisfaction in thinking of the mud and old iron, the poison-berries and pestilences, the ironies and hardships, that enter into the mixture of life. To every man with a reasonably good digestion and a normal perspective of life these fellows must seem to be the blue-devils philosophers, and by good rights ought to join the Suicide Club.

Stevenson had no sympathy with such representations of life. He does not belong in the company of such interpreters. From the first he believed in himself, his fellows, life, and God. He says somewhere, "There is manifestly a God if we want to find

him." Spite of the rampant materialism in the thought of his time, life was always to him more than "a Permanent Possibility of Sensation," and not even the capitalization of the theorem could make up for its other deficiencies. He believed in the "livableness of life." He saw that pessimism is not convincing. Some few men may believe in it. Many other men may believe that they believe in it; but when they draw their chairs in to dinner, it is evident that their philosophy of life sits lightly upon them. The multitude of men and women, Stevenson saw, live their lives with a relish, enjoy their dinners, make their jests with an unmistakable satisfaction, and sleep through the night. This fact weighed with Stevenson, as did the simple faith of the children. So he proclaims the world excellent, revels in the companionship of children, remembers the faces of women without desire, is pleased with the deeds of men without envy, and has an affection for his paddle. In his early manhood he had a dislike for what he calls the "Bastile of civilization." He had no lust for the glory and the wealth that come to him who "can sit squarest on a three-legged stool." He could not see that man's wash-bowl has a right to be considered a worthy competitor of God's river, if the imagination is to be cleansed. Yet as he grew older he came to love even civilization, to see registered in it an age-long and gigantic striving on the part of man, not wholly useless. So in the closing years our gypsily-inclined philosopher, carrying with him the fragrance of the out-of-doors, becomes something of a patriarch, with a numerous household about him and a personal interest in all the affairs of his island empire.

In other words, Stevenson is the prophet of good cheer. The world as he sees it is a heartening place. Suspicion of the nature of things is contemptible. To lack faith is to think that God is not a gentleman. Pessimism becomes an infinite insolence, a suspicion that does not speak well for the character of its holder.

Those of us who have been compelled to listen to the current mouthings of a cheap cynicism, much in vogue, who have been pelted and pestered with the ooze and slime of things in general, have no difficulty in understanding the welcome that was given

at once to Stevenson's protest. His life and his word came as a clean, heartening breath of air. This is generally recognized. No one questions but that he has added immensely to the good cheer of human-kind. We do well, however, to keep one other fact before our minds when we think of this service: his protest was not merely instinctive.

There are evidently not a few critics who tacitly assume that his view of life was largely temperamental. Well, it was temperamental. His life enters into his message, and was back of all his preaching. I think we should not try to question this point. His temperament must be taken into account, and also his training, and his inheritance, and his opportunity for seeing life, and his experience as a sufferer. His temperament was anything but morbid. All of his intimate friends remark the gaiety of the man. His coming into the room was always like the lighting of another candle. He was no juniper-bush fellow. On the contrary, he was a blithe pilgrim, and at the start struck a good stride as he took the road for the City. He loved the road and the morning and the valley. He knew Seigneur, and had found "him the best of acquaintances." He was a Scotchman. Yes, yet not a Shorter Catechist, nor a gypsy, nor a Bohemian; but a genial, brotherly traveller, who somewhere, sometime, must have been converted to the "religion of healthy-mindedness." And though for twelve long years the road ran for him along the Valley of the Shadow, he was all that way "a fellow with something pushing and spontaneous in his inside," and strode right on with unflagging courage, leaving behind him "a hopeful impulse that has immensely bettered the tradition of mankind."

Still, the man's temperament does not account for his view of life. That was reached by a rational process. It came as the result of his large knowledge of the facts of life, of his powers of divination, and of the penetration of his vision.

The interpreters to whom reference has been made lack both in powers of vision and generalization. They see life in spots. They abstract a section of the universe and look at it under their glasses. They literally yank facts out of their settings to study them. They have a capacity for single notes or for the simple themes of life, but not for the great symphony. Their conclusions

are worthless because so partial. Life, whole and living—this is beyond them. They have not the poet's vision, nor the poet's method, nor the poet's artistry. The forward movement of life, the universal lift, registered in the history of man and the cosmos, they have never divined. One gets up from the average book that treats of life, that essays to interpret life to us, and goes forth into the real world, bearing as it does upon its whole face the image of God, and is conscious of one great fact: our book-man has lost the bloom of the world in his reproduction of it—the bloom and the perspective and the liveness. Much of our philosophizing on life is as true as the average amateurish landscape sketch, and no truer. Its hard lines, crude drawing, and wooden surface may suggest to its author the loveliness of the earth, but it is no symbol of that subtle beauty to the general public.

Herein is the genius of Stevenson. He has both vision and the poet's synthetic power. He sees life whole. His picture sets reality before us with the charm and beauty of reality still upon it, satisfying the eyes and the imagination alike. And we may be sure that this kind comes only by patient brooding and quiet thinking, and then only to those to whom the Muses have been unusually generous.

I insist upon this point, as it makes his message all the more significant. And we have his own word for our insistence. We know that he was reared of Scotch parents, under the Scotch creed. We know that he very early began to make notes upon life for himself. We know that he early turned away from his father's Calvinism. The reaction was not violent; still it was important. We are told that various influences soon cured his soul and brought him the vision of God and the Moral Order. These facts help us to understand much of what he has said, and enable us to better appreciate his intellectual temper. Of this experience, or of these experiences, he says: "I came about like a well-handled ship. There stood at the wheel that unknown steersman, whom we call God." His word for it, then, his view of life was an achievement. In the light of his ancestral inheritance, his parental training, his course of life, his temperament, and his suffering, this is all the more important. It will not do for us to wave his word aside as

but the welling up of a happy, care-free heart. He speaks only after a large experience and when his imagination has made the whole circle of truth.

This may seem like making too serious a claim. I know his books are not heavy, lengthy treatises. He deals in no scientific or philosophic jargon. Yet we should not be misled by the gaiety of his manner nor by the lightness of his touch. He is following most closely Nature's method: a delicate line, a filmy hint, an elusive signal. Nature, whenever we go to her, refuses to give us truth in broadsides. She never puts her word into the form of a systematic theology. Still, her suggestions are worthy of our attention. They mark the path to all the truth we shall ever know. Stevenson discloses the greatness of his art in the delicacy of his portraiture. We are stupid indeed if we think that such work indicates a lack of largeness and sincerity and earnestness in the intellectual processes of the man. So when Stevenson insists that life is good and livable and that he knows Seigneur, we are to take him seriously.

Here is an example of what is meant. He had slept the night in God's great hostelry. Setting out anew on his journey, he registers his gratitude: "The room was airy, the water excellent, and the dawn had called me to a moment. I say nothing of the tapestries or the inimitable ceiling, nor yet of the view which I commanded from the windows; but I felt that I was in some one's debt for all this liberal entertainment. And so it pleased me, in a half-laughing way, to leave pieces of money on the turf as I went along, until I had left enough for my night's lodging. I trust they did not fall to some rich and churlish drover." We mistake if we think of this as a mere youthful, whimsical doing, or as a dramatic turn. It is the outgoing of a reverent, grateful, and gentle spirit.

One cannot but think of "Sweet Saint Francis" and his preaching to the birds that gather "from moor and mere and darkest wood" around Assisi's convent gate—a practice on the part of the mystic saint that admits of most severe criticism if we are only prosaic enough; but the poet Longfellow points the deeper meaning. The feathered throng departs—

Deep peace was in Saint Francis' heart.  
He knew not if the brotherhood  
His homily understood;  
He only knew that to one Ear  
The meaning of his words was clear.

Stevenson's "settling" for his liberal entertainment is of a piece with the preaching to the birds.

It is said that Stevenson was once in a boat which was bearing several Sisters of Charity to a lepers' island. As the boat neared the shore and the women caught sight of their future of suffering and isolation, they were very much moved and sat quietly weeping. What finer or more tender or truer word could have been spoken to them under the circumstances than that spoken by Stevenson? "Ladies, God himself is here to give you welcome." Only one who really knows Seigneur can ever speak like that, and we must let such words mean all they can.

So of the Vailima prayers. They have become justly famed. Yet it is a mistake to think of them as simply artistic products, though that they are. They ought to speak to us of a profound and beautiful faith in God, however gaily they seem to trip forth.

If any one still believes that Stevenson's interpretation of life is largely temperamental rather than rational, let him read this: "If I from my spy-hole, looking with purblind eyes upon the least part of a fraction of the universe, yet perceive in my own destiny some broken evidences of a plan, and some signals of an overruling goodness, shall I then be so mad as to complain that all cannot be explained? Shall I not rather wonder with infinite and grateful surprise, that in so vast a scheme I seem to have been able to read, however little, and that little encouraging to faith?" Here in his own words he tells us that his life-view is an achievement.

We all set forth with an instinctive faith in the world. The problem of life, as it presents itself to the intellect, seems to be to adjust this faith to our enlarging and often disconcerting experience. Not a few are utterly unable to do this, and journey most of the way with the "mists of darkness" upon their eyes. A larger number cling to their childhood faith, whether or not they

can rationalize it. Stevenson was gifted above his fellows, was poet and mystic; yet he, too, had to wait. But he was one who could wait. He had it in him to cling to his paddle. And he clung instinctively to his faith until the mists burned off and the whole valley of the earth lay before him in the glory of the sunlight. His victory was facilitated by temperament and a long experience of suffering, yet possible, after all, because of an unusual gift of vision and imagination.

And this Robert Louis Stevenson, who sets forth life whole and with the glory of God upon it, so that a love for it arises in our hearts, belongs of good right, not simply because of his romances, but because of his preaching, among the immortals.

NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIAS<sup>1</sup>

Whatever title to intellectual distinction the future historian may deny to our time, its right to be called the age of encyclopaedias will hardly be challenged. We have general encyclopaedias on a scale almost Chinese and special encyclopaedias of every branch of learning, science, and art. No generation has put so much of its time—profitably or unprofitably—into co-operative enterprises for alphabetizing all knowledge. We have had within the last few years two large Bible dictionaries—one of them with two supplements; a Jewish Encyclopedia in twelve volumes; new editions of the standard Protestant encyclopaedia of Herzog-Plitt-Hauck and of the Catholic encyclopaedia of Wetzer and Welte-Hergenröther-Kaulen; the beginning of a great Catholic Encyclopaedia in English and of an encyclopaedia of Islam; and now the first instalment of an Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, which will extend to at least ten volumes. The scope of the work is thus set forth in the Preface:

“The words ‘Religion’ and ‘Ethics’ are both used in their most comprehensive meaning, as the contents of this volume will show. The Encyclopaedia will contain articles on all the Religions of the world and on all the great systems of Ethics. It will aim, further, at containing articles on every religious belief or custom, and on every ethical movement, every philosophical idea, every moral practice. Such persons and places as are famous in the history of religion and morals will be included. The Encyclopaedia will thus embrace the whole range of Theology and Philosophy, together with the relevant portions of Anthropology,

<sup>1</sup> Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. Edited by James Hastings. Volume I, A-Art. Lex. 8vo, pp. 22 + 903. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1908. Price, cloth, \$7.00 net, half-morocco, \$9.00.

The new Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge. Based on the third edition of the *Realencyclopädie* founded by J. J. Herzog, and edited by Albert Hauck. Prepared . . . under the supervision of Samuel Macauley Jackson, Editor-in-Chief, etc. Volume I, Aachen-Basilians. Lex. 8vo, pp. 30 + 600. New York and London: Funk & Wagnalls Company. 1908. Price, —.



Mythology, Folk-lore, Biology, Psychology, Economics, and Sociology."

There are few things in heaven or earth which are not somewhere and somehow connected with religions or morals, and the editor has been generous in his inclusions. For example, the article on 'Anaesthesia' is a brief history of the use of anaesthetics in surgery, and barely alludes to the opposition to anaesthesia on religious grounds which would seem to be the only reason why the subject should have a place in an encyclopaedia of religion. Several of the biological, economic, and legal articles are, in the manner in which they are treated, somewhat remotely associated with either religion or ethics ('Abiogenesis,' 'Abnormalities,' 'Accumulation,' 'Accidents'); under 'Accommodation' the biological and psychological uses of the word are discussed, but the specific senses in which it has been used in theology and in the history of Christian missions are not touched.

The scale of the whole work is sufficiently ample to allow an author who knows how to deny himself and can write at once concisely and clearly to treat even large subjects adequately. The preservation of reasonable proportion between the several articles demands of the general editor sound judgment and uncommon firmness. It would be too much to say that this superhuman excellence is fully obtained in the present volume. The length of the articles in some cases seems to correspond to the contributor's interest in the subject rather than to their relative importance from the reader's point of view, as in the article on the 'Amana Society,' which fills as much space as 'Alexandrian Theology,' and more than the 'Apostolic Age'; but on the whole this part of the task has been satisfactorily fulfilled.

The editor has achieved a conspicuous success in enlisting contributors; the roll of authors prefixed to the volume contains many eminent names and few quite unknown to fame. An unusual proportion of articles are written by scholars who will be recognized at once as the fittest of living men to treat the subject, and many more by men of unquestioned competence in their respective fields. Thus, Aston writes on various topics connected with the native religion of Japan; Batchelor on the Ainus; Cumont on Mithraic architecture and art; Ehrenreich on South

America; Littmann on Abyssinia; Nöldeke on the religion of the ancient Arabs; Strack on Anti-Semitism, and so on. This feature of the work may be illustrated in another way by taking the names of the writers who contribute the articles connected with India. The list includes Crooke, Rhys Davids and Mrs. Rhys Davids, Fick, Grierson, Hoernle, Jacobi, Jolly, Sylvain Lévi, and de la Vallée Poussin. Among the contributors are numbered not only Europeans and Americans but Oriental scholars of various nationalities—Hindu, Parsee, Japanese.

Among the articles of especial note may be named those on 'Aegean Religion,' by Hogarth—the first comprehensive presentation of the results of archaeological discoveries of recent years; 'Andeans,' by Sir Clements Markham; 'Arabs' (Ancient), by Nöldeke; 'Ajivikas,' by Hoernle; 'Adibuddha,' by de la Vallée Poussin; and the exhaustive article on 'Animals' and animal-worship (fifty-two pages, with full bibliography), by N. W. Thomas.

Customs and beliefs common to many peoples and religions are treated in a series of articles by specialists in the respective fields, to which is prefixed a general introduction surveying the whole ground. Thus, under 'Ancestor-Worship and Cult of the Dead,' William Crooke describes the phenomena as a whole, and discusses the various theories of the relation of the religion of the gods to ancestor-worship; this is followed by articles on ancestor-worship among the peoples of America (S. Hagar); Babylonian ancestor-worship (G. Margoliouth); Celtic (L. H. Gray); Egyptian (H. R. Hall); Fijian (B. Thomson); Hebrew (Margoliouth); Indian (Crooke); Iranian (E. Lehmann); Japanese (M. Revon); Jewish (Margoliouth); Polynesian (Gray); Roman (J. B. Carter); Slavonic (L. Leger); Tasmanian (Gray); Teutonic (H. M. Chadwick); Ugro-Finnic (K. Krohn); while for the African peoples, Aryans, Australians, Chinese, Greeks, and Sabaeans the subject is postponed to articles in future volumes. The whole fills forty-two closely printed pages. The list, though extensive, is not complete: the Mongols, for instance, seem to have no place, unless incidentally in the future article on China.

Other examples of great co-operative articles are 'Architecture' (ninety-eight pages, illustrated in the text) and 'Art' (seventy-one

pages, with fifteen additional pages of half-tone plates). In both these articles many of the authors take their commission very broadly, and do not at all confine themselves to religious architecture or art.

Omissions are inevitable in a work of such wide scope: under 'Alchemy,' e.g., the subdivisions are, Greek and Roman, Muham-madan, and European; Chinese alchemy is not mentioned. It may be presumed that some account of it will be given under 'Taoism'; but the subject is certainly important enough to deserve separate treatment, if only to facilitate comparison with western forms of the pseudo-science. A cursory inspection discovers neither entry nor reference for Abydos (though places of much less religious importance are included), Abraxas ('Amulet' is to be brought in under 'Charm'), or for gods and mythological figures such as Adapa, Aglibol, Alilat (Allat), Anu, Anat—names which a reader would naturally look for in their alphabetical place. Indexes, even if good—and a good index to an encyclopaedia has never been made—are an unsatisfactory substitute for editorial foresight and co-ordination. Many subjects which might be looked for in their alphabetical locus under A, are reserved for other places; a table (p. xv) indicates the probable titles of the articles where the desired information may be found. Allowance must be made for editorial exigencies; otherwise it might be said that Aesculapius, who is not primarily or exclusively a god of healing, should have had a place to himself rather than be lugged into the article on 'Health'; and that the postponement of Adonis to the article 'Tammuz' implies a begging of the question—is Attis also to be made a 'Tammuz'?

The treatment of the subjects is in general very satisfactory. Ample and well-digested learning was to be expected of the scholars who have co-operated in the work. No less conspicuous, however, is the prevailing sanity of the work, the recognition of the limits of present knowledge, the abstinence from sweeping generalizations from insufficient evidence and unfathomable speculations with no foundation at all. One of the most encouraging things about this Encyclopaedia is the proof it gives that the study of religions, which has suffered so much in the esteem of serious scholars from the vagaries of theorists and faddists, has

been taken up in earnest by men of methodical training and sober judgment, armed with a wholesome scepticism against the universal hypotheses which fit so nicely the facts that are selected—not to say manipulated—to fit them.

The value of the work is enhanced by the conspectus of the literature appended to the several articles; the lists are sufficiently full, and the titles seem to be judiciously selected.

After all criticism, it must be repeated that the volume maintains throughout a remarkably high standard of excellence, and that the Encyclopaedia has at the outset made itself an indispensable place in the apparatus of the student of any part of its wide field.

The "Religious Encyclopedia," better known as "Schaff-Herzog," which was completed in 1884, notwithstanding grave defects, did useful service in many ministers' libraries as a compendious work of reference covering a wide field. It was based mainly upon the second edition (1877-1888) of the *Realencyclopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*, but for subjects which fell in the latter part of the German alphabet on the first edition (1853-1868). The severe abridgment of the articles, in some cases, it must be admitted, incompetently done, gave offence to many of the German authors, who saw their contributions mutilated by prentice hands, while their names were affixed to the articles in spite of their disclaimers, and made "Schaff-Herzog" for a while a painful subject to American scholars, who, however unjustly, were held collectively responsible for what was called "a characteristic piece of American enterprise." It is gratifying, therefore, to learn from the preface to the new work that the editors have taken all reasonable pains to avoid this ground of complaint. The translation and condensation have doubtless been much more intelligently done—in some cases the articles have been rewritten by the authors themselves—and the whole has had the benefit of revision in proof by American scholars of good standing in their several fields, who have in many instances supplemented the original treatment of the subject, bringing it down to a more recent date or adapting it to English readers.

On a considerable number of subjects articles by American

scholars have been substituted for the corresponding German articles with manifest advantage. The articles on Old Testament topics in the third edition of the *Realencyclopädie* are, speaking generally, distinctly inferior to those in other departments, such as Church history; some of them, as has repeatedly been pointed out by critics, are a generation or more out of date. The editors have been well advised in replacing them by entirely new articles, many of which are written by Professor McCurdy. The same author has furnished substitutes also for some of the best articles in the German work, such as Baudissin's learned contributions on Astarte and Ashera, Baal and Bel, which either did not admit of condensation or seemed to be more suitable to professional scholars than to the prospective users of the Encyclopedia.<sup>2</sup> Inasmuch as the biblical articles are not intended to make a Bible Dictionary superfluous, it may be thought that some of them are disproportionately long—for example, Balaam's importance in the history of religion seems to be considerably overestimated.

This criticism applies with greater force to the articles 'Assyria' and 'Babylonia,' by G. W. Gilmore (one of the editors), which together fill more than thirty pages—say roughly about one-seventeenth of the entire volume! They include a detailed account of the excavations and the decipherment of the cuneiform characters—shelf-worn learning which Assyriologists will never spare us; a detailed history of the two countries, which is for the greater part as irrelevant as the history of China; and a sketch of the religion, from which the influence of Babylonian mythology and cosmology or astrological fatalism on the religions of Western Asia seems to be deliberately excluded, though the question is clearly of more concern to the intelligent reader than the pedigree of "Lugal-zaggisi." The article on 'Amarna Tablets' is two and a half times as long as that on the prophet Amos, which, it may be added, is inadequate in other respects than its brevity.

Some large or controversial questions are divided, and discussed by several writers: thus 'Baptism' embraces contributions by Feine, Kattenbusch, Drews, Warfield, Schaff, and Norman

<sup>2</sup> It is surprising that Baudissin's name should not appear in the Literature of these articles.

Fox; while Professor A. H. Newman writes on 'Baptists.' The composite result is excellent, but of inordinate dimensions, filling, with 'Anabaptists,' about forty-five pages, or close to one eleventh of the volume.

Under 'Africa' H. C. Dwight, one of the editors of the *Encyclopedia of Missions*, gives full and recent information about the country and its inhabitants, and especially about the work of missions, both Catholic and Protestant; he and his co-editor, E. M. Bliss, supplement Gelzer's article on Armenia by a brief history of the evangelical movement among the Armenians and an account of Armenian immigration to the United States. The co-operation of these two writers promises to give peculiar value to the articles on missionary topics.

Several important articles from the pen of Professor B. B. Warfield, of Princeton Seminary, including 'Annihilationism,' 'Apologetics,' 'Atonement,' are conspicuous for learning, acumen, and admirable clearness of presentation. Other theological articles are written by Professor Beckwith, of Chicago, who has had the general oversight of that department and laid an improving hand on many pages.

One of the features in which "Schaff-Herzog" differs from the German work is the inclusion of short biographical notices of living men whose names may be supposed for some reason to be of interest to the users of the *Encyclopedia*. The material has whatever authenticity may be given it by the fact that it has been for the most part furnished by the subjects themselves.

Much pains have evidently been spent upon the bibliographies appended to the several articles, and in the preface Mr. Gilmore devotes a dozen pages or more to the general bibliographical apparatus for theology and religion.

The New Schaff-Herzog in every respect excels its predecessor and will doubtless enjoy even greater popularity.

*THE HARVARD EXPEDITION TO SAMARIA*

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The ruins of the ancient capital of Israel lie on a large, detached hill about six miles northwest of Nablus and twenty miles from the Mediterranean. The hill rises about three hundred and fifty feet above the surrounding valleys, and about fourteen hundred and fifty feet above the sea. It is enclosed by mountains, some of which reach a much greater height. At its base the hill has the appearance of being between four and five miles in circuit. The ascent is everywhere steep, but, owing to a saddle connecting with the mountains on the east, is less steep on that side than on the others. Like all the mountains about it, the hill is covered with large artificial terraces, constructed to prevent the washing away of the soil and to make cultivation easier. The surface of these terraces has a gentle slope, but their sides are in many places so steep as to be climbed only with great difficulty. The entire hill is under cultivation, and there are extensive olive orchards, interspersed with fig and pomegranate trees.

On the eastern slope is a village of about eight hundred inhabitants (Fig. 1).<sup>1</sup> The name of this village, Sebastiyeh (pronounced by the natives Sebustye), perpetuates the name Sebaste, which, in honor of Augustus, Herod gave to the city when he rebuilt it. On the western slope are the ruins of two towers, flanking the gateway through an ancient wall. The principal path on the hill runs south of the summit from this gateway to the village, half a mile distant. It passes by the side of a long row of columns, some standing, some prostrate, which were part of a great colonnade erected by Herod. There is also a group of columns on the

<sup>1</sup> Figures 1, 2, 3, and 7 are drawn by Mr. Clarence S. Fisher. The material for figures 1 and 3 comes almost entirely from larger plans drawn by Dr. Gottlieb Schumacher.

western side of the threshing floor just above the village, commonly supposed to be the remains of a Herodian temple. These form an eastern and a western row; several fallen columns lie scattered about the threshing floor. The area of the threshing floor may be about two acres. Here the heaping up of the harvest begins in May, and the slow process of threshing continues throughout the summer—a circumstance which will make the exploration at this spot especially difficult. To the north of this, about halfway down to the valley, are other rows of columns defining two sides of a structure of great extent, perhaps a hippodrome, or circus. Fragments of columns and carved stones from ancient buildings are built into the houses or lie about the streets of the village; others are found in the walls which divide the fields or are scattered here and there over the ground.

Though long recognized as an important site for exploration, Samaria has deterred explorers by its extent, and by the great cost of the undertaking. The new Turkish law relating to antiquities is very strict, being much like those of Greece and Italy. No one may dig without a permit from the Sultan, and every object found is the property of the government. The discoverer may have photographs, casts, and squeezes, and he may publish the results of his work. The enlargement of knowledge is therefore the only incentive to exploration.

The expenses of the Harvard expedition to Samaria are borne by Mr. Jacob H. Schiff, of New York. In 1905 application was made at Constantinople for a permit, which was granted about two years later. Professor George A. Reisner, who had been originally chosen to conduct the expedition, being at the time engaged in the archaeological survey of Upper Egypt, the work at Samaria was intrusted to Doctor Gottlieb Schumacher, of Haifa, who has long resided in the land, and has had much experience in Palestinian excavations. Professor Reisner was able, however, to take a brief leave of absence in April, 1908, when he and Dr. Schumacher went to Samaria and laid out the work to be undertaken the first year. It is expected that next year Professor Reisner will be in charge as originally planned. The present writer joined the expedition in May. With him went Mr. Clarence S. Fisher, of Philadelphia, in the capacity of architect and drafts-



man. Mr. Oric Bates, of Boston, was also on the ground during a part of April.

The actual digging went on only nine weeks (April 24 to May 1, May 22 to June 3, and July 11 to August 21). The interruptions were caused by local difficulties, which happily did not occur again during July and August. The digging was done by men, while women, boys, and girls removed the earth and débris in baskets. The number of laborers varied from ten at the end of the second period to about four hundred during a considerable part of the third. Throughout the second period, the demands of the harvest, and the uncertainty overhanging the work owing to local difficulties, kept the number small and inefficient. The laborers came from Sebastiyeh and the neighboring villages.

The digging was carried on at two points. The first of these was among the standing columns beside the threshing floor (Fig. 2). On the steep downward slope to the north of the columns a trench running east and west (A)<sup>2</sup> was begun, in order to determine whether dump heaps might be made here without covering up important remains. Rude stone walls were struck near the surface. Below these, at one point, at a depth of about fifteen feet, a wall of dressed blocks of stone was found. Another trench, or rather a pit (B), was dug beside a column which seemed to belong to the southern side of the temple, the floor level being reached at a depth of about ten feet. The column stood on a socle, and was twisted partly out of position as if by earthquake. To the east of it at the level of the socle lay a second column, the end of which projected into the pit. A third pit (C), still further east, was not carried below some late rough walls which were found just below the surface. North of the eastern row of standing columns, and in a line with it, a trench (D) was dug. A few inches below the surface four socles in a line were uncovered. This trench was further lengthened during the third period of digging, and several additional socles were found (Fig. 4). During the same period a fifth pit (M) was dug at the intersection of the western and the southern lines of columns, with a view to determining the southwest angle of the building. No socle was found; but at a depth of about fifteen feet the remains of the foundation

<sup>2</sup> This trench was a little further north than the space covered by Fig. 2.

were laid bare—a broad wall running from the corner toward the east and toward the north.

The main work of excavation in this building was undertaken along the northern end, cutting back toward the south, on a level with the floor, the space limited by the eastern and western rows of columns. On the eastern end of this cut, about three feet below the surface, we found the top of a foundation wall running east and west. It rests on the rock, and is now fourteen feet high and six feet broad. On the western end of the cut, in a line with the wall just described, was the northern side of a wall of fine masonry of large, well-fitted blocks of stone. This wall turned south in a line with the western row of standing columns, and appears, therefore, to be the northwestern corner of the building. As we cut backward toward the south it became evident that much of the excellent masonry (Fig. 5) at this point was made of stones not in their original position. They had been used again by later architects. A broad curve in the masonry on its inner side suggested the apse of a church, and various details made it probable that the later structure had belonged to the Byzantine period. The original building seems clearly a temple of Roman times. Beneath it we may expect Hebrew remains. If the columns lying about the threshing floor belonged to it, the building was one of vast proportions, and a thorough exploration of it will require the work of a large force for many months.

Of small objects, there were found in these trenches, near the surface, more than two hundred clay lamps from the Arabic period; and, deeper, great masses of broken Roman roof tiles and many fragments of glass vessels and of Greek and Roman pottery.

The second point of excavation was the summit and on the two terraces west of it (Figs. 1 and 3). The lower terrace is an olive grove, and is separated from the upper by a steep and high embankment. A trench (E) was here cut in a direction east and west, and at its eastern end carried to the rock. The foundations of house walls were struck only a few inches below the surface. At the upper edge of the embankment is a massive but rude wall (Fig. 6), probably of Arabic origin, running at this point north and south following the line of the terrace. The embankment was cut

back to a point directly underneath this wall, and then tunnelled on a line with the rock. A few feet back was found the outer face of a massive wall (Fig. 7), resting on the rock, and running north and south. The large size of the stones, the mode of dressing, and the fact that the wall is buried beneath about thirty feet of *débris* seem to make it certain that this is a Hebrew wall—a conclusion confirmed by finding nearby several similar stones with marks such as have been found elsewhere and recognized as made by Hebrew masons. The way in which these loose stones lie suggests that they once formed part of the wall. Of this wall, five courses of stone are still in position. The upper surface of the wall was also reached by the trench (F) on the upper terrace, at a depth of about twenty-one feet, and cleared toward the east for about fourteen feet. This great thickness indicates that the wall must have been one of importance, perhaps the wall of the city or of a citadel. The discovery of the wall came too late in our work to allow further exploration, which must here be slow on account of the great overlying mass of *débris*.

The trench (F) on the upper terrace continued that on the lower, though not in a straight line. It was carried to the rock at two points. At the western end it came upon the upper surface of the Hebrew wall, as already described. Just to the east of this is another wall of smaller stones, resting on the rock and reaching up almost to the present level. Near its base are other loose building blocks, about as large as those in the trench on the lower terrace. Some of the fragments of pottery seem to be of Hebrew origin. Near the middle of the trench were found two cisterns cut in the rock. One of these was cleared of the rubbish which filled it, and it yielded a large quantity of potsherds and bones. The other had, above the rock, a fine rectangular shaft about eight feet deep, formed of squared stones. Leading to the top of this shaft, about five feet below the present level of the ground, was a plastered drain of stone, by which the cistern was fed. Nearby was a variety of rude walls and small chambers, belonging to ancient buildings. At its eastern end this trench ended at the embankment which separates the terrace from the summit.

It was on the summit that most of our work was done. The present form of the summit is due to dumping and levelling, as is

evident from the stratification of the *débris* (Fig. 8). In the east and west trench (G; Fig. 3) continuing that of the upper terrace was found on June 2, the day before the second period of work closed, a section of a stairway ascending from the north. Fourteen steps were partially uncovered, the uppermost five feet below the surface, the lowest about thirteen feet. One of the steps was dug out to a length of sixteen feet. The blocks of stone composing the stairway are about a yard long, and each tread overlaps by several inches the next lower tread. The height of the risers was about seven inches, and the breadth varied from  $14\frac{1}{2}$  to  $15\frac{1}{2}$  inches, except in the case of the seventh from above, which is a landing about three feet broad. The stones were well cut and well laid, and the whole staircase, as far as uncovered in June, remarkably well preserved. In the *débris* were found large quantities of stucco in several colors, but in a condition too fragmentary to make possible the restoration of any of the figures of the decoration.

When the work began again in July, our first task was exploration of the stairway, and we expected to find at its top the base of a column from which three drums about four feet in diameter, on the embankment between the summit and the western terrace, might have come. At the same time two other trenches were started, one running north from where we first struck the stairway (I), the other (H) running south from a point a few feet further to the east. The summit was thus cut into four sections, one of which, the northwestern, we cleared away down to the level of the terrace.

The trench east and west was broadened toward the north and the south, thus laying bare the stairway through its whole width (Fig. 9), which, as indicated by the lines of masonry supporting the eastern and the western ends, was originally eighty feet. Every step has, however, suffered more or less loss at both ends. In the present condition the shortest step is about fifty-seven feet long, and the longest about seventy-three. The steps are sixteen in number. At the top may have been one or two more in order to reach the platform soon to be described. At the foot is a seventeenth step, of softer stone, and consequently much more worn away. Near the eastern end are two other short steps at the foot, likewise much worn. The dimensions and condition of these

three are so different from those of the sixteen as to suggest a different period of construction. At its foot the stairway is supported by a wall of rude masonry, which may be of earlier date. We cleared this wall in part to the level of the rock, about eight feet below. There is another wall, still rougher, running the length of the stairway at its top.

About twelve feet south of the stairway, and from one to two feet below the surface, we found a floor, or platform (Figs. 9, 16), paved with thick slabs of stone. These are of varying size, in general smaller than those composing the stairway. This platform may have been as long as the steps; but has suffered by the removal of stones from its edges. In the present state it is nearly rectangular, its length east and west being fifty-seven feet and its greatest width about twenty-seven. Between the stairway and the platform were found two other large drums of a column.

In the trench running to the south (H), about three feet below the surface, we found a large piece of mosaic floor; a deep cistern at the southern end; and many massive walls of crude workmanship. Near the northern end a cross-wall (Fig. 14, left edge) of later date was preserved almost to the present level of the ground. North of this wall the rest of the trench was cleared down to the rock. There were great masses of *débris*, including numerous large building stones, many of them carved with designs of rosettes, leaves, and the egg-and-dart pattern.<sup>3</sup> In the rock were two cisterns or caves and several small bowl-like depressions; likewise shallow trenches or canals. One of these trenches, circular in shape, was part of an ancient oil or wine press. Half of it is concealed by the eastern stair wall, which is, therefore, of later date than the press.

This massive wall of large blocks of stone (Fig. 14) extends from the northeast corner of the stairway to the southern side of the platform. The northern part of this wall, east of the stairway, and the southern part, east of the platform, are in line; but the two sections are not bonded together, and the courses of stone composing them do not match (see also Fig. 17). Moreover, the southern part has a foundation consisting of three courses of smaller stones. These differences suggest that the two parts

<sup>3</sup> Some of these stones are now lying on the platform (Fig. 16).

are not of the same age. South of the platform the line of the wall is set back toward the west about one foot (Fig. 3), and then continues southward for an unknown distance. We followed it a hundred and thirty-five feet, to the edge of the plateau of the summit. Only the three lower courses of the foundation are preserved. The stones are set edgewise, the successive courses receding slightly from the perpendicular (Fig. 15). In all probability the higher courses have been removed for use in later buildings. Of such later use the evidence is abundant, fragments of columns, capitals, and other carved stones appearing in the walls now uncovered on the summit.

The long foundation probably belonged to the eastern wall of a temple. There was not time to trace the western wall, nor could we explore the large area between the two; all we had time for was a narrow trench (Fig. 3) running south from the middle of the southern side of the platform. In this trench several walls were met, some at right angles with the trench, others nearly parallel to it.

The wall bounding the stairway and the platform on the west is better preserved than that on the east, and both are several feet lower than the level of the platform. Between the stairway and the platform a trench was dug east and west. Here were found three bases of columns resting on a wall about eight feet thick (Fig. 17). The bases were in a line, and their diameters were about six feet. From their position on the eastern half of the wall one would judge that there may have been six or eight of the columns. The bases are all overturned, and the great wall on which they rest seems to be a foundation rather than a finished wall. They may have been overturned in order to extract for building material the better quality of finished stone on which they once rested. South of the platform is a similar cross-wall, not quite so thick. On the top of this was found a copper coin of Herod, of a well-known type.

All these enclosing walls are at present several feet lower than the platform (Fig. 9), and are probably of earlier date than the platform and the stairway. That other buildings still earlier occupied the site appears from the fact that a trench in the western part of the enclosure revealed other cross-walls beneath the mass of débris

on which the platform rests. It seems likely that this was a sacred spot from Hebrew times down.

On the west of the stairway we dug out a great chamber (Fig. 13) lying east and west, about forty by twenty feet. It is cut partly out of the rock, and its top, which seems to have been flat, is on a line with the bottom step of the stairway. Its northern wall is likewise in line with the northern wall supporting the stairway. In the northern wall of the chamber are two windows and a doorway, with several steps leading downward on the interior (Fig. 12). The walls are very massive, and the roof was an arch, of which the course next to the western wall of the stairway is still in place. All the rest of the roof was broken in. Among the architectural fragments in the *débris* was a large drum, coming perhaps from one of the columns which stood on the wall north of the platform. The walls of the chamber had been covered with a heavy coat of plaster, on which there seemed to be traces of color. In the eastern end of the floor is a large cavern or cistern, which we explored to a depth of about six feet. It was filled with large stones and earth, and was already filled when the chamber was in use, as is clear from the fact that the floor passes over the top of the cistern. Through this floor a trench was dug near the middle of the chamber, and the levels of earlier floors of stamped earth were thus brought to light. In the western wall is a doorway, the sill of which is on a level with the latest floor of the chamber. It may have led into other chambers. The western wall continues an unknown distance to the north of the chamber. Between it and the great stairway are several other massive walls, proceeding northward from the wall of the chamber (Fig. 13).

A few Greek graffiti were found, and about one hundred and fifty of the so-called Rhodian, stamped amphora-handles; also many fragments of Latin inscriptions on bits of marble slabs. The only complete inscription is on the side of a stele (Fig. 18) which was found on the stairway near the bottom. The stele is nearly four feet in height, and has a shallow, bowl-like depression on the top. Professor Clifford H. Moore, of Harvard University, has kindly resolved the abbreviations and translated the inscription:

J(ovi) O(ptimo) M(aximo)	To Jupiter Optimus Maximus,
mil(ites) VI XII	Soldiers of the Sixth and Twelfth
coh(ortium) P(annoniorum) su-	Cohorts of Upper Pannonians,
p(eriorum)	two (?) citizens of Siscia,
cives Sisci(ani)	(and) Varciani
II (?) Varcian(i)	and Latobici,
et Latobici	have made this dedication.
sacrum fecer(unt)	

In the trench running north from the stairway, and only a few feet from it, was found, beneath about fifteen feet of débris, the torso of a statue of heroic size (Figs. 19, 20), finely carved out of a block of white marble. It was lying on its back. Head, arms, legs, and feet are gone, but the trunk is united to the base by a massive square column. The head, left arm, and one of the legs were attached by dowels, as appears from the sockets in the torso. The base is nearly three feet square and a little over five inches thick. Including the base, the figure is now, without its head, over eight feet in height. A robe is thrown over the left shoulder, and a breastplate covers the body. The dress, pose, and fine workmanship seem to make it certain that this statue is that of a Roman emperor, probably that of Augustus, though by a change of the head it may have served also for later emperors. Nearby was found a piece of a large hand which may have belonged to the statue. About two hundred feet to the south, at a depth of some eight feet, a fragment of a large head (Fig. 21) was excavated, of which the eyes, forehead, and part of the nose remain. Both material and work seem inferior to the statue; and the head probably belonged to a second piece of sculpture of heroic size. Our statue may have stood on a pedestal near where it lay, but no trace of a pedestal was discovered. The statue lay on a thin bed of earth of a gray color. This bed could be traced along the walls of the trench, and marks the beaten level at the time when the statue fell.

When the northwest section of the summit was dug away to the level of the terrace below, there appeared a few feet to the west of the statue and about the same distance to the north of the stairway, a Roman altar (Figs. 3, 9, 11), about thirteen feet long from east to west, and a little more than half as wide. Beneath the beaten



level just described (Fig. 11) is the foundation of rough stones on which the altar rests. Above this level the altar rises in six courses of stone, with mouldings near the top and bottom, to a height of about six feet. Part of the upper surface is gone. The walls of the altar were covered with stucco, some of which was still in position. East of the altar, and almost touching it, was a second stele, with a much-defaced Latin inscription. It is between three and four feet high, and rested in a socket which was buried in the earth to about the level of the beaten floor.<sup>4</sup> North and south of this were two similar sockets, in which other stelae doubtless once stood. No steps to the altar were found. From the north a broad inclined plane (Fig. 10) of gentle slope led up to its top. There may have been a revetment or a covering of stucco to cover the very rough masonry of this approach to the altar.

West of the altar a small space was cleared to the rock, and here were found two large blocks of stone, on one of which was a mark like those made by Hebrew masons. The stones probably come from a Hebrew building which may have stood near this spot.

In the trench containing the statue, and a few feet north of it, occurs a perpendicular cut in the rock, running east and west. The bottom of this cut is about seven feet deep, and to this depth a space of about sixteen feet square was cleared. The remarkable feature in this clearing is a rock column, nearly round, and about a yard in diameter. It stands in its original position, being cut out of the rock, to which it is still joined at the bottom. Further excavation may make its meaning clear. In the pit which revealed this column were found many fragments of colored stucco, several of them containing remnants of a Greek inscription, the letters of which are scratched through the paint. There are similar scratchings representing a bird and part of the figure of an animal.

The foregoing is an account of our first year's work at Samaria.


<sup>4</sup> Professor Clifford H. Moore thinks that this stele also may have been set up by soldiers from Pannonia, described in the inscription as *cives Bot(iveneses)*, or *cives Bol(entiani)*. If the reading BOT is correct, the soldiers came from Botivo in Upper Pannonia. If BOL is the right reading, they came from Bolentium, also in Upper Pannonia.

While most of the structures whose remains have been discovered seem to be later than the Roman annexation of Palestine, the work has not gone far enough to make it possible to distinguish clearly the different periods represented, and all suggestions as to dates must be provisional. It seems very probable that the massive wall surrounding the platform is Herodian, and the altar may belong to the same era. The platform and the great stairway seem to be younger; while the walls south of the platform are perhaps older.

The stele found on the stairway was dedicated by soldiers stationed in Palestine, probably after the great Jewish war under Hadrian (132-134 A.D.). The time and circumstance of the ruin of the edifices upon the summit are unknown. The stone of which they were built, taken in part from older structures, was used over and over by later builders.


Some of our most promising discoveries came so late in the season's work that we could not follow up the clues which they offered. Having for good reasons chosen August 21 as the date for closing the work of digging, we could not go on longer, however many questions were left unanswered. The campaign of 1909 should answer some of these; and we hope it may be rich in the finds of Hebrew origin.






1. PLAN OF SEBASTIYEH, SHOWING ANCIENT WALL, VILLAGE, AND  
POINTS OF EXCAVATION

Wol



2. PLAN OF THE EXCAVATIONS NEAR THE VILLAGE

Wol



3. PLAN OF EXCAVATIONS ON SUMMIT AND TERRACES







**4. NORTHEAST CORNER OF EXCAVATIONS NEAR THE VILLAGE,  
LOOKING SOUTH**



**5. NORTHWEST CORNER OF EXCAVATIONS NEAR THE VILLAGE,  
LOOKING SOUTH**





**4. NORTHEAST CORNER OF EXCAVATIONS NEAR THE VILLAGE,  
LOOKING SOUTH**




**5. NORTHWEST CORNER OF EXCAVATIONS NEAR THE VILLAGE,  
LOOKING SOUTH**



6. EASTERN END OF TRENCH E, LOOKING EAST



7. WESTERN FACE OF HEBREW WALL, TRENCH E







8. SECTION OF SUMMIT, SHOWING STRATIFICATION OF DÉBRIS,  
LOOKING NORTH




9. GENERAL VIEW OF SUMMIT EXCAVATIONS, LOOKING SOUTHWEST



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10. ALTAR WITH STONE APPROACH THERETO, LOOKING EAST




11. ALTAR AFTER REMOVAL OF APPROACH, LOOKING SOUTHWEST

87011



10. ALTAR WITH STONE APPROACH THERETO, LOOKING EAST



11. ALTAR AFTER REMOVAL OF APPROACH, LOOKING SOUTHWEST

WFOU



**12. VAULTED CHAMBER, NORTHWEST CORNER, LOOKING EAST  
OF NORTH**



**13. VAULTED CHAMBER AND STAIRWAY, LOOKING SOUTHEAST**

WFOU



**14. WALL ON EAST SIDE OF STAIRWAY AND PLATFORM, LOOKING  
SOUTHWEST**



**15. FOUNDATION OF WALL RUNNING SOUTH, CONTINUING WALL  
OF FIG. 14, LOOKING SOUTHWEST**







16. PLATFORM AT HEAD OF STAIRWAY, LOOKING WEST



17. TRENCH BETWEEN STAIRWAY AND PLATFORM, LOOKING WEST



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
16. PLATFORM AT HEAD OF STAIRWAY, LOOKING WEST



17. TRENCH BETWEEN STAIRWAY AND PLATFORM, LOOKING WEST



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


18. INSCRIBED STELE FOUND ON STAIRWAY,  
NEAR BOTTOM STEP



19. TRENCH I, SHOWING STATUE, LOOKING  
NORTH

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
**20. NEARER VIEW OF STATUE, LOOKING SOUTH**



**21. FRAGMENT OF LARGE HEAD FROM SOUTHERN EDGE OF SUMMIT**



WU




18. INSCRIBED STELE FOUND ON STAIRWAY,  
NEAR BOTTOM STEP



19. TRENCH I, SHOWING STATUE, LOOKING  
NORTH

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


18. INSCRIBED STELE FOUND ON STAIRWAY,  
NEAR BOTTOM STEP



19. TRENCH I, SHOWING STATUE, LOOKING  
NORTH

Mr. U



20. NEARER VIEW OF STATUE, LOOKING SOUTH



21. FRAGMENT OF LARGE HEAD FROM SOUTHERN EDGE OF SUMMIT

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# HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

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## EDWARD CAIRD

ROBERT MARK WENLEY

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

The career of a man who devotes his life to reflection upon philosophy and religion, whose active work consists in teaching these subjects and in writing about them, is little likely to furnish incidents meet for flamboyant biography. But it may well be a source of profound influence, destined to affect the culture of a people or an age long after events that splash noisily upon the momentary surface have sunk into oblivion. Now Caird constituted an exceptional force, particularly in that native home of English-speaking philosophy and religion, Scotland; as such he merits memorial in these pages. Moreover, we must remember that, although, to his great regret, expressed to me often, he never visited the United States, his spirit has wrought strongly on this continent. Years ago, when I was a young Fellow at Glasgow, I received a letter from an American philosopher which concluded with words that have always stuck in my memory, "We look to Glasgow for light and leading." Here Glasgow happened to be a synonym for the brothers Caird.

The external facts of Edward Caird's life are as follows. He was born in the Clydeside city of Greenock on March 22d, 1835, sixth son of John Caird, head of the firm of Caird & Co., engineers and shipbuilders. Like his distinguished eldest brother, John, who was fifteen years his senior, and afterwards his academic chief at Glasgow, Edward received his early education at the Greenock Grammar School (Academy). Thence he passed to the University of Glasgow at the age of fifteen, and resided as



an undergraduate from 1850-56. In the academic year 1856-57, he matriculated as a student of theology at the University of St. Andrews, but returned to Glasgow in 1858-59, having apparently abandoned his first intention to enter the ministry of the Church of Scotland. As an undergraduate he achieved distinction in Latin, Greek, and Hebrew. In April, 1860, he gained the Snell Exhibition, a foundation that has sent a long line of eminent Scotsmen to Oxford,<sup>1</sup> and entered upon residence at Balliol College in the October following. In 1861 he was awarded the Pusey and Ellerton Scholarship for Hebrew, and in 1862 the Jenkyns Exhibition, a coveted distinction; he took a First-Class in Classical Moderations in the same year, and a First-Class in the Final School of *Literae Humaniores* in 1863, when he proceeded to the degree of B.A. He refused to pass to the M.A. degree till the theological tests were abolished (1873). In 1864 he was elected a Fellow of Merton College, and remained here for two years, engaged in the usual work of a college tutor at Oxford. In 1866 he was elected to the Chair of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow, whither his brother John had preceded him by four years to the Chair of Divinity. Here he spent the twenty-seven best and most fruitful years of his life. He received the customary two-year appointment to the Gifford Lectureship on Natural Theology<sup>2</sup> in the University of St. Andrews in 1890. Upon Jowett's death, after a unique career as Master of Balliol, the Fellows were in serious straits regarding a successor. Consequent upon anxious deliberation, wherein, as one has heard, many possibilities were discussed, the office was offered to Caird in the early winter of 1893. In the spring of 1894 he resigned his Glasgow chair, forsaking the wonderful position he had created for himself—an act of deliberate self-sacrifice—and returned to Oxford, where he conducted the most famous Foundation of the University with marked success till ill-health compelled his resignation in 1907, when, to his deep gratification, he was succeeded by his

<sup>1</sup> See W. Innes Addison, *The Snell Exhibitions from the University of Glasgow to Balliol College, Oxford, 1697-1900*. (New York, Macmillan Co., 1901.)

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Articles by me: "The Gifford Lectureships" (in *The Open Court*, February, 1900); "Philosophy of Religion and the Endowment of Natural Theology" (in *The Monist*, October, 1901).

lifelong friend, and old pupil of Merton days, Dr. J. L. Strachan-Davidson. In 1900 he returned to the scene of his Scottish triumphs as Gifford Lecturer.

As was to be anticipated, more than the ordinary share of academic honors fell to his lot. He received the honorary degree of LL.D. from St. Andrews in 1878; of D.C.L. from Oxford in 1892; of LL.D. from Glasgow in 1894; of Litt.D. from Cambridge in 1898; of D.Lit. from Wales in 1902; and, most appropriately, he was created an honorary Doctor of Philosophy by Kant's University. In 1900, the Royal Society of Edinburgh added his name to its short list of Honorary Fellows. Inevitably, he became one of the original Fellows of the British Academy, and he honored the French Academy by accepting election as a Corresponding Member. Early in 1906 he suffered a paralytic seizure, which proved the first indication of the break-down that ended in death on November 1st, 1908. He lies buried at Oxford beside some whom he had "loved long since, and lost awhile."

Plainly enough, this bare record divides the career into several parts. We have, *first*, the period of formation, and early experience as a teacher at Oxford; *second*, the epoch—this is the only name for it—of the Glasgow professorship; *third*, the headship of Balliol; *fourth*, the work and the man.

## I

It is difficult, if not impossible, for one writing at this late day to realize the atmosphere of Glasgow, St. Andrews, and Oxford in the middle of the 19th century. The "reforms" wrought upon the Scottish and English universities since were still in the future, and many things differed vastly from their present state. So far as the Scottish universities were concerned, and with special reference to his eventual eminence in philosophy, it is probably correct to adduce a familiar maxim in description of Caird's experience: "Every man who rises above the common level has received two educations: the first from his teachers; the second, more personal and important, from himself." At Glasgow, William Ramsay, professor of Latin, was a remarkable personality, a capital teacher, and a scholar of parts; Lushington, professor of

Greek, Tennyson's brother-in-law, combined profound learning with much grace, but could not teach beginners; Weir, professor of Hebrew, ranked with the best in his subject. From them Caird undoubtedly secured the groundwork of accurate scholarship that stood him in such good stead later at the home of classical learning. But the philosophical professors, as he informed me himself, helped him little. "Logic Bob," as Buchanan, professor of Logic and Rhetoric was dubbed, excelled in the art of teaching, possessed a caustic wit, but lacked speculative insight. Fleming, in Moral Philosophy, Caird's immediate predecessor, happened to be more or less a respectable nonentity. With reference to the theological professors, Luke, the ablest Glasgow man then at Oxford, wrote to John Nichol, afterwards Caird's colleague in English Literature, "Caird is at St. Andrews—enjoying it—delivered from St. Rollox<sup>3</sup> and the Glasgow Divinity Hall" (1857). The strong likelihood is that Caird migrated to St. Andrews in the expectation that he would get something more to the point from Tulloch, who had entered upon his professorship in 1854; but Tulloch, despite his eminence as an orator, as a literary man, and as a liberalizing influence in the Church, could hardly be accounted a philosopher. Whether Caird acquired aught from Ferrier, the celebrated professor of Moral Philosophy, I do not know; as a theological student, he would not be required to hear him.

On the other hand, at Glasgow, as at Oxford after, Caird fell among a group of exceptionally gifted students, some of them devoted to the new prophet, Carlyle. From association with them he obtained materials for the "second education—from himself." Of this scintillating company were John Nichol; John Service, thirty years later the most remarkable man in the ministry of the Church of Scotland, and author of what has been called the best volume of sermons ever written;<sup>4</sup> Ross, the historian of early Scottish literature; Luke, the brilliant classic, snatched by drowning ere his prime; A. Mackennal, afterwards a light in the English Free Churches; Donald Macleod, editor of *Good Words*,

<sup>3</sup> The slum district of the city, in which the university buildings were situated then.

<sup>4</sup> *Salvation Here and Hereafter.* (Macmillan & Co., 1877.)

and Moderator of the Church of Scotland; Henry Crosskey, the geologist, and Unitarian leader at Birmingham; Flint, most learned of Scottish theologians; D. B. Monro, who became one of Oxford's bright particular stars, Provost of Oriel; Jack, once editor of the *Glasgow Herald*, still professor of Mathematics at Glasgow; and Alexander Smith, the poet, whom Herbert Spencer ranked "as the greatest poet since Shakespeare."<sup>5</sup> These ardent youths stimulated one another, lived a vivid intellectual life irrespective of their teachers, enjoyed the fostering friendship and hospitality of Nichol's father, J. P. Nichol, the eloquent professor of Astronomy, partisan of Kossuth and Mazzini, fervid sympathizer with the anti-slavery party in the United States, protagonist of free-trade. To alter a phrase of Bentham's,<sup>6</sup> they were talking nonsense, and accumulating wisdom. Accordingly, Caird arrived at Oxford with a capital linguistic outfit, with a perspective incomparably wider than that of the English Public School boy, with a deep tincture of seriousness, inbred by the national Calvinism—in short, revolving the deep things.

At Balliol, too, Jowett certainly excepted, and possibly Riddell,<sup>7</sup> he appears to have gathered much more from his associates, especially several who were his seniors in academic standing, than from the regular staff. John Nichol had preceded Caird in the Snell by four years, and the Society—remarkable for its *personnel*—founded by him offered the younger man an environment even more memorable and transforming than that of Glasgow. "By some members" of the 'Old Mortality,' Caird wrote long after, "its meetings are remembered as the very salt of their university life. The free discussion of everything in heaven or earth, the fresh enjoyment of intellectual sympathy, the fearless intercommunion of spirits, the youthful faith that the key of truth lies very near to our hands, give a unique zest and charm to those meetings of students with students, before the inevitable parting of the ways of manhood has come."<sup>8</sup> "Its being's end and

<sup>5</sup> David Duncan, *Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer*, I, 87 (American edition).

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *Deontology*, I, 39.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. *Dictionary of National Biography*, XLVIII, 270-271.

<sup>8</sup> William Knight, *Memoir of John Nichol*, p. 154.

aim," wrote another member, "was philosophical discussion, and certainly its mental atmosphere was very keen." The same writer also recorded, "Kant and Hegel were new names to most of us, and we got our first introduction to them from Nichol. His strong Scotch logic was of no ordinary force, at a time when Mansel's Bampton Lectures waged the war of orthodoxy with the sword of Sir W. Hamilton."<sup>9</sup> Small wonder that the Society left its mark, for of its number were T. H. Green, Swinburne, A. V. Dicey, T. E. Holland, Luke, Birkbeck Hill, James Bryce, Pater, and Bywater, with others destined to scarce less distinction. A new wave was gathering, to sweep the place left vacant by the receding tide of the Oxford Movement, and to cast up something less dispiriting than Mansel's agnosticism. To this Caird himself was to contribute more effectually than anyone save T. H. Green and, indirectly, Jowett.

Of the two years at Merton little need be said. Caird undertook the philosophical instruction for "Greats," and proved a recruit of distinctive capacity. His knowledge and sweep, humor and kindness, were in evidence already, although his extraordinary power and luminousness as a lecturer had not developed fully as yet. "He nearly always could, and (which is quite a different thing in pastors and masters) always, when he could, would tell you what you wanted to know, and not merely what he wanted to say. And I still have (or ought to have) in a letter which he wrote to me, on an occasion to me sufficiently disgusting, one of the kindest and wisest documents of marked wisdom and kindness that I ever received myself or read as having been addressed to others."<sup>10</sup>

## II

It may be taken as almost axiomatic that remarkable men seldom achieve full success unless supported by congenial, if not completely amicable, circumstances. The power of the man and the power of the moment must agree, as Matthew Arnold phrased it. Sufficient water has run beneath the bridges since 1866 to

<sup>9</sup> William Knight, *Memoir of John Nichol*, pp. 148-149.

<sup>10</sup> Professor Saintsbury, "Caird at Merton" (*Glasgow Herald*, November 6th, 1908).

make it apparent to the present observer that Caird entered upon his Glasgow Chair at a favorable period. The Alexandria of Scotland stood on the verge of her striking expansion in wealth and population, paralleled only in the young cities of the New World. The Act of 1859 had ended some abuses in the universities, and, the battle lost and won, men could adjust themselves calmly to the fresh order. Educational agitation rent the air, and the epoch-making bill of 1870 lay just ahead, destined to rouse keen self-consciousness among the people as a whole. The religious world, echoes of German "rationalism" in its ears, had begun to doubt the old ways. The democratic movement that kept the Liberals in power for nigh two generations maintained its restless march. The idea of civic responsibility, fated to great illustration in Glasgow, was on the point of asserting itself. On all these issues Caird stood with face turned immovable, and full of hope, to the progressive things. Moreover, when her history comes to be set down, even with those deductions that will be made inevitably when we actors in her drama are gone, it will surely record that the University of Glasgow had arrived on the threshold of her golden age. During the years from 1860 to 1890, she commanded the services of a galaxy of talent unexampled before, little likely to be duplicated for long. Experts, running critical eye along the list, can hardly fail to note names of the highest eminence in their respective fields. The lustre cast upon philosophy by Caird and his brother was much enhanced in other departments by such men as Nichol and A. C. Bradley in English literature; Lushington, Jebb, and Murray, now Bywater's successor at Oxford, in Greek; Veitch, the learned mediaevalist, in logic; Lord Kelvin in physics; Grant in astronomy; Macquorne Rankine in engineering; Elgar in naval architecture; I. Balfour (now professor at Edinburgh) and Bower in botany; Allen Thomson and Cleland in anatomy; McKendrick in physiology; Leishman, Macewen, and Thomas Barr in surgery; Dickson, of prodigious learning, Story, prince of ecclesiastics, and Robertson, a kind of Old Testament Zahn, in theology; W. G. Miller in jurisprudence; Max Müller, and W. Wallace, Hegel's expositor, in natural theology—a truly remarkable aggregation. Nor were the younger men who assisted unworthy their chiefs.

At least a score of them have won their own spurs since; it may not be invidious to mention Sir William Ramsay, the chemist, Sonnenschein, the Plautine scholar, and Smart, the economist.

The university proved a veritable seething-pot of ideas, the Witenagemot Society being our counterpart to the Old Mortality of Caird's student days at Oxford. No one would deny that Caird played the rôle of presiding genius, and that the impassioned pulpit eloquence of his brother, the Principal, carried the doctrine everywhere. I entered the Moral Philosophy class in 1879, the period of the very crest of the wave, to be swept off like the rest. In eighteen months I found myself a changed being; too much so, for the terrific competitive strain characteristic of the Scottish universities, plus the stress of spiritual readjustment, broke my physical strength, and I had to seek restoration in travel. On return, nearly two years later, the tide stayed still at the full,<sup>11</sup> and gave few signs of recession for a septennate. When Caird returned to Balliol, outsiders, among whom I recall specially A. B. Bruce, the intrepid theologian, held that the ebb had set in. Even so, the flood left a mark that will not become part of a historical past for another generation. The effervescence could not but produce results, and Caird's pupils are everywhere now, his look, gesture, and utterance, above all, his character, speaking to and through them. They fill twenty-five chairs, a majority in philosophy and theology, in the Universities of St. Andrews, Glasgow, Edinburgh, Manchester, Birmingham, Liverpool, Wales, London, and in the Free Church Colleges at Aberdeen and Glasgow. Naturally, the English universities were affected otherwise. Caird's Oxford influence has passed mainly, I judge, into the Public Services and politics, though some Tutors, and several Professors, have not escaped it. At Cambridge, two or three prominent philosophers, though never his pupils, feel the touch of his magic. His intellectual children guard the outposts of the Empire. Seven chairs in Canada, five in India, two at least in Australia, one at the Cape, one at least in New Zealand, are in their occupancy; while three, possibly more, labor in the United States, where the careers of Morris, Howison, Harris, Dewey,

<sup>11</sup> Many would agree, I think, that high tide was marked by the publication of *Essays in Philosophical Criticism* (1883); see bibliography, p. 137.

Royce, and others, testify to his persuasiveness. Forty-four professorships, at a minimum, represent an incalculable leverage, one exercised on a larger scale and with a bigger audience in the Scottish churches, whose outlook he and his brother may be said to have transformed in considerable part. Nor is this all. The great world of practical effort bears his sign. To give a brief list, the Archbishop of York, the Secretary of the Scottish Education Department, the Minister of Education in Egypt, the Master of the Canadian Mint, the Superintendent-General of Education at the Cape, the Secretary of the Carnegie Trust for the Scottish Universities, all heard him at Glasgow, while the Minister of War is a distinguished Edinburgh coworker. Such things are not accomplished down the averages of time. They cannot fail to create curiosity about the man among those who never met him face to face. For the upshot of the matter is that, like Hume a century sooner, though in circumstances more favorable by far to personal leadership, he placed Scotland once more in the main stream of modern thought.

### III

When we come to the period of the Balliol Mastership, I must state at the outset that intimate knowledge fails me. For, while I lived in Glasgow for twenty-four of the twenty-seven years covered by Caird's professorship, I crossed the ocean two years after his migration to Oxford, and thus lost the personal familiarity with events possible to a fellow-citizen and, in a lesser degree, to a resident of the same country. Accordingly, I am unable to offer more than impressions formed at Oxford on three visits during Caird's *régime*, two of them, thanks to his hospitality, at Balliol Lodge. Of course, public reports and private letters lie before me, as well as notes of conversations with several Oxonians, Balliol and anti-Balliol.

By way of introduction, it may be as well to face a disagreeable business and have done with it. The single serious check, if such it can be called, in Caird's external career was his failure to secure election to the Whyte's Professorship of Moral Philosophy after Wallace's lamentable death by accident, in 1897. And some things about the difficulties and problems of the Mastership,



possibly best left unsaid, are explained when one remembers that the professorial incident may be laid in part to College jealousies and faction, probably the fruit of long tradition, in part to politics, in great part to *odium theologicum*. The simple facts are: that Caird submitted his name to the electors—itsself a sufficiently superfluous requirement—in response to a memorial signed with practical unanimity by Oxford teachers of philosophy, and by eminent representatives of the subject elsewhere; that British expert opinion elected him overwhelmingly; and that the non-expert Board thought otherwise. Those who are able to read between the lines can supply the perspective for themselves.<sup>12</sup>

It is not possible to grasp the conditions that confronted Caird without some reference to what had preceded. Balliol's golden age coincided with the reign of Jowett. As details are out of the question in the space at disposal, it may be said bluntly that the eminence of the College pivoted upon two men—Thomas Hill Green and Jowett himself. For Caird personally, I am inclined to believe that, on the whole, the former proved more important. The Caird epoch at Glasgow found contemporary parallel at Oxford in a manner quite similar, *mutatis mutandis* for striking differences between Scots and English circumstances.<sup>13</sup> A philosophical renaissance swept the university, wielding potent influence, not merely in scholarship, but also in social and political life. Green, who was Caird's junior by one year, had come up to Balliol five years sooner, thanks to Rugby training. He thus began his transforming activity as a teacher while his friend was still an undergraduate. His predecessor, W. L. Newman, author of the monumental edition of Aristotle's *Politics*, ranked, in Green's estimate, "the best lecturer he had ever heard," so that

<sup>12</sup> This delicate situation has been discussed with an admirable combination of tact and firmness by Prof. J. H. Muirhead, of Birmingham, in "The Oxford Chairs of Philosophy," in the *Contemporary Review*, LXXIV, 724 f. (1898). This article contains much information that cannot fail to interest the cisatlantic academic world; I suggest, however, that it would hardly be wise to proceed to thank God that we are not even as this publican! For there is an exceedingly strong tradition in Oxford against the appointment of the 'Head of a House' to a professorship, although a professor who is elected 'Head of a House' is under no obligation to resign his chair.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. my article "Some Lights on the British Idealistic Movement," in the *American Journal of Theology*, January, 1901.

the new-comer felt stimulated to do his utmost from the outset. Disappointed of Ferrier's chair at St. Andrews, by the time Caird returned to Glasgow, Green had settled down to Oxford life, fortified by valuable experience as a member of the Schools Inquiry Commission (1864).<sup>14</sup> An exceptional personality, of potent moral force, he was fortunate in exceptional pupils and associates.<sup>15</sup> To name a few out of many. William Wallace matriculated at Balliol in 1864 and, after a distinguished course, remained in Oxford as a Fellow of Merton.<sup>16</sup> A little later F. H. Bradley, who also became a Fellow of Merton, and R. L. Nettleship,<sup>17</sup> who was to be Green's colleague from 1869, entered. Bernard Bosanquet, who was elected a Lecturer of University College in 1871, followed immediately, to be succeeded by another remarkable pupil in the person of Arnold Toynbee;<sup>18</sup> about the same period, Andrew Cecil Bradley, who became Green's colleague in 1874, joined the College. Thanks to this wealth of talent, the philosophical movement assumed large proportions, not without opposition, as may be supposed, *teste* Green's failure to receive election to the Whyte's Professorship, in 1874, and Nettleship's, to the Waynflete Professorship of Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy, in 1889. Meanwhile, as concerned the relation of the College to the ampler world of the University, of society, politics, and empire, Jowett was engineering prodigious success, in short, was "the mainspring of its activities." Thanks to his knowledge of human nature, and shrewd wisdom not common in the children of light, "Balliol had become the nursery of Bishops, Viceroy's, and Cabinet Ministers, an Eton among colleges, and almost a university in itself. The Master's Lodge . . . was the scene of week-end parties, where European secrets were discussed and Cabinet affairs settled. Its success had its dangers, for the

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Memoir by R. L. Nettleship, in Works of Thomas Hill Green, vol. III (1886). A remarkable piece of biography "from the inside out."

<sup>15</sup> Cf. E. Abbott and L. Campbell, Life and Letters of Benjamin Jowett, *passim*.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Biography (by Caird), in W. Wallace, Lectures and Essays on Natural Theology and Ethics (1898).

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Biographical Sketch, A. C. Bradley and G. R. Benson, in The Philosophical Lectures and Remains of R. L. Nettleship, 2 vols. (1907).

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Memoir (by Jowett), in Arnold Toynbee, Lectures on the Industrial Revolution in England (Rivingtons, 1884).

Jowett régime was very worldly." So far as I am able to form impressions, three things had happened when Caird succeeded. First, the Green movement, its founder dead twelve years, tended distinctly to wane.<sup>10</sup> Second, Jowett's policy of "colonizing" other colleges with Balliol men had eventuated in several formidable rivals. Third (this I mention with reserve), in some quarters Balliol had developed incipient consciousness of her utilitarian attitude towards success in the "great world." In addition, one must allow for perspective induced in the public mind by the passage of time. The men who stand to the credit of the Jowett administration have reached ages of from thirty-six to sixty now, have taken their permanent places on the ladder of life—some count as personages. On the contrary, the products of Caird's incumbency, at the ages of from twenty-five to thirty-five, still face towards their main activities. Allow twenty years to elapse, and the comparison will run fairer.

There can be no doubt that, when Jowett died, all felt the unique nature of the gap. A successor who could or would follow in his very steps did not exist. Accordingly, Caird's election was accompanied by much shaking of heads in England and Scotland alike. I know many who believed then that he would live to regret the change, for the Oxford of the nineties had travelled a long road from the Oxford of the sixties. But *le vrai mérite ne dépend point du temps ni de la mode*. Caird remained his old self, and won success, thanks in large part to the vivid contrast between him and his predecessor. Balliol and, in a lesser degree, the University, recognized that they had to reckon with a force of a new order. Further, in the first place, the younger teachers of philosophy were ready to welcome him—his accession lent fresh hope, for it added a distinguished personality to the staff at a time when outstanding figures lacked. In the second place, Balliol stood ready to discover his worth. And from the outset he devoted himself to the College. From beginning to end of his Headship, he mastered little details, and conducted trivial

<sup>10</sup> This decline received striking emphasis at the time of Caird's death from the jaunty nonchalance evidently deemed the proper attitude towards the event by a London weekly. One may hazard the remark, it is well for the Mother Land that she produces Scottish philosophers sometimes. Otherwise cockney journalists might delude her into the belief that the sound of Bow Bells coincides with the music of the spheres.

pieces of business which, in the eyes of an outsider at least, seemed sometimes too wasteful of time so valuable. Not only this; he took the trouble to place himself in close touch with the course followed by undergraduates, even to the extent of careful study of the prescribed texts, and familiarized himself with the examination tests by undertaking the duties—no light matter for one of his years—of a Public Examiner in the Final Schools. He showed distinct ability to adapt himself to the unaccustomed position with its more unaccustomed calls. As a result, Balliol preserved her reputation intact, and her faithful staff, like her students, rallied to him, full of confidence. So far as I am able to judge, he did not essay a prominent part in the workaday business of the university, although I have heard it said frankly, and with evident sincerity, by men of experience outside Balliol circles, that he was the most weighty personality in Oxford. He labored for Somerville College, and for the education of women generally. His power within Balliol rooted in his character; within the University, in his outstanding position as a representative of his subject. With regard to the latter, the University had good reason for its estimate. In the United States, at all events, Oxford at once moved to a higher plane by the mere fact of his presence. Unquestionably, he made common cause with a party that counts numerous enemies, and identified himself with unpopular causes open to easy ridicule—degrees for women, female suffrage, radicalism in social, political, and theological controversies. Moreover, he advocated all with a serene simplicity devoid of anything like calculated worldly wisdom, so that, likely enough, his practical interferences were not always well timed. I understand that his activity at the time of the South African War was particularly resented. So, summing everything, “his work was with Balliol, and in a secondary sense with the teaching of philosophy in Oxford. Under his rule the first did not lose prestige, and the second most assuredly developed.” Thus, if we reckon fairly with what had preceded, and realize the consequent difficulty, complexity, ay, hopelessness, as it seemed to some, of the situation to be met, we must grant that his achievement left his lustre undimmed. His domination at Glasgow did not, simply because it could not, repeat itself at Oxford. Nevertheless, he main-

tained Balliol's leadership in a crisis that might readily have proved fatal, and lent additional fame to the university as a home of philosophical inquiry. It was no common feat for a student by nature and nurture to effect so much. And the outcome ran favorable, because motivated, not merely by a rare intellect, but by a *humane* being, whose forgetfulness of self, sacrificial devotion to truth, persistent energy, and incapacity for anything petty or mean, could not but win upon others. Principal Fairbairn, who saw much of the Master during these years, summarizes the case delicately, and reveals the basal fact, when he avers, "I never met Caird without feeling humiliated and reproved. Under him Balliol acquired a new reputation: it was less a home of brilliant scholars than of men who had the sincerity of large convictions and genuine insight." Caird's magnificent integrity touched his Headship to fine issues, whereof Balliol and the Empire will yet learn in years to come. Briefly, the magnitude of the man developed a new magnitude in the office, no matter how greatly it had been filled in the immediate past. Ever and anon in his *Lay Sermons* he lays bare, all unconsciously, the secret of his Oxford success—a success, not of things that command attention by loud appeal to conventional judgments, but of transforming thrust into the recesses of the human spirit. "We should endeavor to view our life and our relations to others in the light in which we are revealed to ourselves in our clearest and best moments. . . . All men have such moments of awakened consciousness or conscience, . . . moments in which it seems a simple and plain thing to succeed, and almost an impossibility to fail in living the better life."<sup>20</sup> His feet, lighted by this lamp, stood firm and sure, and he enjoyed that greatest of privileges, power to show others the more excellent way, wherein they might walk to their lives' end. This, as I saw and see it, lent amplitude and truest success to the Oxford career.

#### IV

In order to render this article, so imperfect otherwise, a less unworthy memorial of Caird, I append a list of his publications known to me. Although it may lack a few reviews, contributed

<sup>20</sup> Pages 35–36.

anonymously to the *Glasgow Herald*, for example, and episodal writings, of local interest more or less, pertaining to the Balliol years, it suffices to show the curve of his activity, and to illustrate his central interests. In conversation once he said to me, with characteristic simplicity, "I had done nothing when I was appointed to the Glasgow chair; it was much easier to obtain a professorship then than it is now." Nevertheless, the two *North British Review* articles indicate that, at the age of thirty-two, his standpoint had already gone far towards formation. For the rest, the list reveals that his productive life divides itself into three periods. We have, first, the time of preliminary work, including the earlier form of the great book on Kant, the *Britannica* article on "Cartesianism," itself a notable performance, and the illuminating critique of Rousseau. The years of most continuous and important production follow (1879-93), with a score of serial publications, and four books, among them the two masterpieces—the masterpiece in large, *The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant*, and *Hegel*, the "little masterpiece." Finally we have what may be termed the theological (in the sense of philosophy of religion) period, with the two series of Gifford Lectures, the *Lay Sermons*, and some half-dozen articles whose theological titles arrest the eye. It may be remarked that, as his Scottish pupils know very well, the Gifford Lectures belong really to the time of the Glasgow professorship, and that *The Theory of Ethics*, announced (in 1890) for the 'Library of Philosophy,' edited by Professor Muirhead, was never written, the urgency of Oxford duties interposing—a matter for permanent regret. Later still, bodily weakness frustrated his intention to lecture on the philosophy of religion from Augustine to the present day. He has left no manuscripts that could be published.

Thanks to the difficulties that beset intimate knowledge of our fellow-men, we rest satisfied for the most part with synoptic views, often of a rather external kind. This tendency leads by insensible steps to labels and, finally, the static label appropriates the place of the dynamic personality. Philosophers, especially if they command attention from the man in the street, suffer more than their fair share of ills from this otiose method, and Caird fell a ready victim to its apt spell. I remember very well when one

morning, now thirty years ago, I stood at the door of Jebb's class-room, a raw Freshman, a mate confided to me that Caird was a transcendentalist. I did not know what this strange animal might be; but, forthwith, Caird occupied a decent, orderly corner in my jumbled intellectual rag-bag. Later on, I discovered that older and more authoritative folk baptized him a Hegelian, and the *affiche* serves handily with many even yet. Still this is no more than a lazy evasion of a question fraught with several difficulties. Like Green and Wallace, the two contemporaries who were his compeers and coworkers, Caird held that Plato and Hegel must be accounted the thinkers of the past who had sensed the truth most surely. They approached the problem in the right spirit, and along the strait path that led past every blind alley. But, attempt to range him with Hegel's pupils and colleagues, in the attractive rows of Right, Left, or Centre, and you find at once that he eludes your complacent attentions. The national temper and traditions of the Scot vary so fundamentally from those of the Swabian, the philosophical situation in Britain during the rule of Gladstone was so different from the speculative excitement in the Prussia of Stein and Hardenberg, that simple reproduction of the one spirit by the other is an idea too naïve for serious consideration.<sup>21</sup> Further, Caird has indicated his own attitude with no uncertain sound. "To us, at this distance of time, Hegel, at the highest, can be only the last great philosopher who deserves to be placed on the same level with Plato and Aristotle in ancient, and with Spinoza and Kant in modern times, and who, like them, has given an 'epoch-making' contribution to the development of the philosophic, or, taking the word in the highest sense, the idealistic, interpretation of the world. . . . The only important question now is, not whether we are disciples of Hegel,—the days of discipleship are past,—but whether we recognize the existence of a living development of philosophy, and especially of that spiritual or idealistic view of things in which philosophy culminates."<sup>22</sup>

<sup>21</sup> The same thing holds always. To take a contemporary case: I find my advanced students of philosophy of religion puzzled constantly by the strong protestant note sounded so frequently in the works of German writers, Pfleiderer and Harnack, for example. We do not need to strike it—and thereby hangs a most important tale.

<sup>22</sup> Hegel, pp. 223, 224.

Appreciation of a thinker's philosophy demands some knowledge of his life-history. For, after all, consecutive reflection constitutes an effort to dispel problems, and these originate amid definite conditions as seized and presented by a vital personality. The Scotland of Caird's youth had not emancipated herself from the bonds of the eighteenth century; theology formed her main intellectual interest, and here she was still threshing the old straw—not hers, but presented to her—of the Westminster Confession. In 1831, John M'Leod Campbell had been deposed from the ministry of the National Church, because he had maintained a view of the atonement traversing the doctrines of 'reprobation' and 'election.' For the next twenty-five years ecclesiastical controversy swept the land, and the evangelical party, which founded the Free Church (1843), won immense political *éclat*, thus concentrating attention upon practical affairs and postponing discussion of fundamental problems. The works of Burns and Scott, popular though they were, failed to transform, indeed they hardly touched, convictions on deep things of the spirit. So far as mental activity went, headquarters were at the University of Edinburgh, then midmost its golden age. Hamilton, Christopher North, Aytoun, Forbes, Syme, Christison, Simpson, Gregory, and Bennett maintained the reputation of the capital as the "modern Athens." Yet, even at this, the influence must be characterized as literary rather than speculative in the higher sense. Eminently cultivated, pleasing, respectable, or what you will, it was nevertheless a backwater in the broad current of modern thought. First principles were not being subjected to critical examination. Strange as it may seem in these days of rapid international intercourse, even Kant amounted to little more than a vagrom rumor two generations after *The Critique of Pure Reason*! What Caird records of his brother, the Principal, held true of the atmosphere he himself encountered at the University of Glasgow. "He had been brought up in a circle into which any idea of scepticism as to the doctrines of the Christian faith had hardly entered; and his philosophical studies, which were at that time mainly in Reid and Stewart, while they exercised his powers, were not such as to affect his intellectual or moral life very deeply."<sup>23</sup> The date of this refer-

<sup>23</sup> *The Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, I, xiv.



ence is 1840-45. Caird went up a decade later, and even a decade may count for righteousness. What was the difference? In the spring of 1880, during a long tramp with Caird through the country round Glasgow, he stopped suddenly, faced round to me, and asked, "What are you young men thinking about, who is influencing you?" I replied instantly, "Darwin, and the whole question of evolution." Then, without giving him time to strike in, I inquired, "What were you and your comrades thinking about thirty years ago, who was influencing you?" He answered, as rapidly, "Carlyle!" If we recall what Carlyle thought of his Edinburgh professors—"hide-bound pedants," was the barbed phrase—we have the key to the beginning of things with Caird. Coleridge's Teutonic obligations had been noised abroad by Ferrier as early as 1840,<sup>24</sup> by the fifties, students at least knew something about the sources of Carlyle's inspiration. So quite naturally Carlyle led to Goethe and Fichte, whence it was but a step to Kant and the whole idealistic movement. Once this became accessible to Caird and his generation, longing as they were for deliverance from the polite ineffectualities that occupied the "seats of the mighty," it sounded in their ears like a trumpet-call, and rallied to a new life. Here, I think, we must detect the secret of the profound influence wielded by the British idealistic masters. Not only were they strong men by grace of nature, but they had appropriated a veritable gospel, and they preached it as if inspired. But, thanks to their national circumstances, it became a new thing in their hands. Hume and Rousseau did not move them as Kant had been moved; they were not required to unify and deliver a people, like Fichte; the progress of science had set Schelling's *Naturphilosophie* beyond the bounds of practical politics; a lifetime of revolutionary riot, such as caused Hegel to long for peace, formed no part of their portion. Above all, the inbred puritan strain turned their thoughts to ethics and religion,

<sup>24</sup> Cf. *Blackwood's Magazine*, March, 1840. It should be noted that Coleridge exerted much directer influence upon philosophy in this country than in Britain; witness James Marsh, Hickok, Tappan, Shedd, Bushnell, and Bascom, to name no others. Some American scholar ought to elucidate this movement thoroughly. Perhaps it may not be too presumptuous in a foreigner to say that, after Edwards, Marsh and Tappan are the most original minds in philosophy that the United States has produced so far.

interests never very far off even in their most technical excursions; while the social structure of England directed their appeal to the whole body of the middle and upper classes rather than to neophytes of *Wissenschaft*. *Nullum simile quatuor pedibus currit*.

When Caird came to his own, the philosophical outlook in Britain could not be called promising. Intuitionism, under Hamilton, sensationalism, under the Mills, seemed to have accomplished their best—or worst. Some raw rationalism, connected with ‘advanced’ political notions, harbored here and there. Spencer was just afoot, with his cosmic extension of Hume. Darwin had revealed himself, while Huxley and Tyndall were about to deliver their onslaught upon the scientific infelicities of dogmatism. It looked as if a dull, drab view of life might submerge everything, and the sole recourse for safety appeared to be pious iteration of outworn formulae. Carlyle had prophesied against it all. “On the one side has been dreary cant, with a *reminiscence* of things holy and divine; on the other side, acrid candor, with a *prophecy* of things brutal, and infernal.” But he had not attempted anything in the nature of systematic demonstration. “Though he owes much to the later German philosophy, especially to Fichte’s popular works, he seems to have cared only about the results, and nothing at all about the processes. Metaphysical theories in general . . . he regards as absurd attempts to measure the immensurable, or weigh with earthly scales . . . infinite reality.”<sup>28</sup> Caird joined the lists at this juncture, and showed that a thoroughgoing analysis of experience enables one to transcend the partial views of reactionary intuitionism and of militant sensationalism—to prove, in short, that the cosmos incarnates a spirit which “does all things well.” He thus became a prominent exponent of the genetic view of the universe interpreted in terms of idealism. While this is not the occasion to expound his philosophy, it is well to note that it operated in three directions. First, it resulted in a new study of philosophy as *Wissenschaft*. Second, it passed over into the world of practice, deflecting the old Liberalism of *laissez-faire*, and transforming the outlook upon moral, social, and even political problems. Third, it evoked a fresh interest in systematic study of religion. A word is proper here with respect to the last.

<sup>28</sup> E. Caird, *Essays*, I, 248.

It must be said that, so far, Caird's teaching has not resulted in any thorough-going reconstruction of religious thought, framework with facts. But it may be affirmed that the traditional ideas upon which Scotland, and England in another fashion, had fed for some generations, have undergone deliquescence. Men think no longer in the consecrated categories. Higher criticism, like scholarship in general, has lost many of its terrors. At the same time, the situation diverges widely from that regnant, say, in Germany. All things considered, theologians attach themselves, not to philosophical movements, with their transitive principles, but to the confessional churches, State and Free, with their practical needs. Accordingly, without conscious evasion, a mediating tendency has held captivity captive for the most part. In other words, while ready to accept all the weapons proffered by idealism for discomfiture of materialism, sensationalism, agnosticism, and naturalism, few theologians have evinced ready disposition to go the whole way with the purview implied in the system. So, I think, we must view Caird's achievement—not in his own person assuredly, but in those whom he led—as that of a *Bahnbrecher* rather than the founder of a 'new' theology. Criticism in detail, panoplied by history, anthropology, and the like, must still effect much ere the old country will be ready to accept the principles of the idealistic synthesis so completely as to use them in construction of a modern edifice from the foundation up. Perhaps large social displacements may have to supervene; for it has even been alleged that high churchmen have "carried off the honey from the Hegelian hive." Truth to tell, whenever it has been possible to snatch at means of compromise, this method has found nimble supporters, tingling with alacrity. As Caird said himself of his brother's attitude, there must be an immense transformation of the Creed of Christendom before the hut of the fisherman can be transformed into the altar of the great Temple of Humanity.<sup>28</sup> What shall we say of this transformation? "We might call it, in Carlyle's own language, a Christianity divested of almost all its clothing; a Christianity without supernaturalism, without dogmas, and without church, reduced to the belief that the universe is in its deepest meaning spiritual, and that therefore, as he expresses it,

<sup>28</sup> Cf. *The Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, I, lxxvii.

'the true Shekinah is man'; a belief, in other words, that in the moral life of man we have the clearest revelation or symbol of that which the divine Spirit is."<sup>27</sup> Nevertheless, Caird's enormous service lay in showing that, no matter how far we *must* go with modern science and scholarship, the last word lies with the spirit of man, not with the play of spectral atoms or the heedless crash of 'causal' history. It was an invaluable work, done with superlative skill, and with a weight of high seriousness that carried it far further than the circumstances might have permitted in other hands. We may characterize it as the first, and therefore most difficult, chapter in an entirely new book, so far as English-speaking folk are concerned. Caird wrote *himself* into it, when a different personality might easily have made lamentable shipwreck.

And this leads me to say, in conclusion, that the man was made for the mission. Needless to record, the subtle force of any personality, especially of a great personality, escapes every verbal statement. It must therefore suffice to relate that Caird owned in altogether remarkable degree one of the main characteristics of genius. He was compelling, in the sense that he could transplant himself, and this without apparent effort. He passed over to others, making his ideals theirs, reorienting their very being so that, having once felt the magic of his power, they became as men transfigured. Undoubtedly, many factors combined to this end. Caird's possession of and by a message lent him incalculable representative and reproductive capacity. He impressed, because he stood for an entire universe of things unseen and eternal. His being thus underwent enlargement by its own loss of self.

The historic personage

Put by, leaves prominent the impulse of his age;  
Truth sets aside speech, act, time, place, indeed, but brings  
Nakedly forward now the principle of things  
Highest and least.

Nichol once said to me, "Caird's great limitation is that he has a gospel." On the contrary, to those of us who were younger, this proved the transitive secret of his winsomeness.

<sup>27</sup> E. Caird, *Essays*, I, 256.

Once more, and on the practical side, nature and experience had gifted him with preternatural facility of luminous exposition. His books, admirably written though they are, models of philosophical interpretation, convey but faint idea of his felicity as a lecturer. (I have heard many eminent teachers, but he stands first—with no second. The very artlessness of his performance rendered it the more striking. And here, I think, we must find the clue, missed by his mere readers, in the character of the man. In this respect he was a walking epitome of the best that Scots nationality can produce—and a Scot may be forgiven for saying that this is very good! The combination of serious, but light, gravity, of quaint humor, keen yet never mordant, of simplicity, sometimes almost laughable, with a mind that spent its whole time in intimate companionship of the masters of those who know, culminated in a vitalizing temperament that wrought irresistibly. Like all human beings, he had his limitations. But, in his chosen sphere, the class-room, they counted least, nay, almost disappeared; in the professorial chair, he came as near the ideal as anyone ever can. Entirely unaware of the fact, he ruled by service; and, inevitably, earned the teacher's highest praise and richest reward—he had many souls to his hire. Those of us who knew him intimately, who must remain under incalculable obligation to him to our lives' end, in taking last, poignant farewell, can only say of him, to others who knew him not—*Sic itur ad astra*; and, sharpened by fond remembrance, readopt the principle he inculcated and lived—*Sic vos non vobis*.)

True master thou of those that know and hope,  
Whose wise years mingled with the wine of youth,  
Leader unlost, upon the upward slope,  
Of souls that freely climb fresh opening truth;

Here, in still Autumn's lingering prescient pause,  
Death lays in love a reconciling palm  
On that broad brow, and more divinely draws  
Life's veil. God's light is thine, His gracious calm.

We, half forlorn, although our spirits live  
Rich heritors of all thy lips bequeath,  
We, poorer now, disciples, debtors, give  
Out of our poverty love's reverent wreath.

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*CALVIN AND SERVETUS<sup>1</sup>*

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In the Genevan suburb of Champel, in an angle formed by the crossing of two unfrequented roads, stands a monument erected in the year 1903 by citizens of Geneva to commemorate an incident in the history of their community which for three centuries and a half has justly been regarded by critics as a blot upon its good name. The monument consists of a rough, irregular granite block about a man's height and resting upon a base of natural rock. On one side is the name of Michael Servetus, and on the other the following touching inscription:

FILS  
RESPECTUEUX ET RECONNAISSANTS  
DE CALVIN  
NOTRE GRAND REFORMATEUR  
MAIS CONDAMNANT UNE ERREUR  
QUI FUT CELLE DE SON SIECLE  
ET FERMEMENT ATTACHES  
A LA LIBERTE DE CONSCIENCE  
SELON LES VRAIS PRINCIPES  
DE LA REFORMATION ET DE L'EVANGILE  
NOUS AVONS ELEVE  
CE MONUMENT EXPIATOIRE  
LE XXVII OCTOBRE MCMIII

That such an inscription could be accepted as an expression of the best judgment of the modern Genevese in regard to this action of their fathers is evidence of a change of sentiment that has required all these three and a half centuries to come to its rights. During my travels two years ago I met a Genevan scholar of world-wide reputation in a field of knowledge that has kept him for the greater part of his active life far removed from the provincial feeling that might well cling to one who had never left the familiar scenes of early life. He was a member of an ancient

<sup>1</sup> A lecture given in the Lowell Institute course at King's Chapel, Boston, January 25, 1909.



Genevan aristocratic family, still in possession of a landed estate that for six generations at least had been in the hands of his fathers. In the course of conversation I remarked upon the admirable action of his fellow-citizens in showing, though tardily, their sense of the historic significance of Calvin's terrible act of justice. In so doing I meant to pay to Geneva the respectful tribute of my humble admiration. But the response was not such as I had anticipated. Not even yet was this Genevan aristocrat quite ready to admit that his fellow-citizens had done well to recognize thus publicly their regret that the man to whom they as well as he looked back as the creator of their redoubtable commonwealth had allowed himself this one human slip. Even modified as their expression of regret was, even though they had guarded the reputation of Calvin by ascribing his fault to the Spirit of the Age, still it seemed to this sturdy conservative that any such confession of error could be only another outburst of that radical temper which was slowly transforming the Geneva of Calvin into a community more in sympathy with the liberalism of the modern world.

During my last visit, in 1907, the whole canton of Geneva was thrown into the greatest excitement by the proposition to withdraw all public support from the churches, in other words, definitely to separate between church and state. I found that the conservative elements, notably the remnants of the ancient aristocracy, however much the theory of a free church in a free state might appeal to them individually, were to a man united against putting it in practice in their own community. They dreaded still lest, if this ancient bond were severed, the inrush of the modern spirit of unrest, already in many ways threatening the fair fame of their city, should prove fatal to the traditions they valued. I believed this point of view to be wrong, because it seemed to me that the spirit of Calvin at his best as well as at his worst was still very much alive in this scene of his wonderful activities. For years, while the recognized churches of Geneva had been supported by public taxation, there had been also in existence a church of the type with which we are familiar. A preacher of great personal influence had gathered about him a congregation that Sunday after Sunday packed the largest assembly hall in

the city, paid its own bills, and was exercising in the whole community an influence greater than that of any other religious organization. It seemed to me that this was in so far evidence that Geneva was not likely to become less religious, but rather more so, when her own people were thrown upon their own resources to prove their loyalty to their great inheritance.

It has seemed worth while to take these hurried glimpses into the modern world of Genevan thought and feeling in order that we may the better understand—or come the nearer to understanding—the conditions of our subject. There could hardly be a greater contrast than that between this community in the year 1553 and the man who is to occupy us today. If there is one thing more than another that marks the Puritan commonwealth, it is the sense of obligation of the individual to submit himself to the higher judgment of the community as a whole, this judgment being expressed through its recognized organs. If we had to select one trait of Servetus that would express the man almost to the exclusion of all others, it would be his rampant self-assertion. It is in the dramatic opposition of these two qualities that the interest of his encounter with Calvin is mainly to be found.

Our information as to the origin and early life of Servetus is singularly meagre and untrustworthy. It is derived in great part from his own declarations made under the stress of trial for his life, and unhappily it appears quite certain that many of these declarations were more or less deliberately untrue. Furthermore there has not yet appeared any one successful effort to unravel the mystery of Servetus' life and thought. Frequent attempts have indeed been made. The most important contributor to our knowledge in recent times has been a Protestant pastor in Magdeburg, in Germany, by the name of Tollin, who, in a series of monographs published in several different periodicals and covering the eighth and ninth decades of the last century, has tried to clear up one after another of the puzzles presented by this enigmatic personage. It appears to have been Tollin's intention eventually to write the long-desired biography of Servetus, but he died before this could be accomplished. In England there is little beyond the careful study of Robert Willis, a physician who,

largely relying upon Tollin's work, but adding much on the side of Servetus' contributions to natural science, published in 1877 an interesting narrative account in one sizable volume. The libraries of Harvard College and the City of Boston have each a copy of the second imprint (1790) from the original edition of 1553 of the *Christianismi Restitutio*, the most important of Servetus' own writings. The copy in Harvard College was the property of my predecessor Professor Converse Francis, of the Harvard Divinity School, and has many manuscript notes in his hand.

Michael Servetus, alias Reves, alias Villeneuve (Villanova), was undoubtedly a Spaniard, a native either of Aragon or of Navarre. He was almost, if not exactly, of the same age as Calvin; born, that is, in the year 1509 or 1511. He came evidently of a family of some consideration and was given the best education possible to his time. His precocity is one of his most striking traits. He can hardly have been much over nineteen when he was selected by Father Quintana, the confessor of Charles, King of Spain and Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, as in some sense his private secretary. Probably this choice was due to the boy's proficiency in languages; for he seems already to have had a practical command of Hebrew, Greek, and Latin—very remarkable attainments at any time, but little less than phenomenal in a day when these studies, under the eager leadership of Erasmus and his fellow-workers, were just beginning to acquire a scientific standing in the educational centres of western Europe. Whatever his duties in the capacity of secretary may have been, the important thing in his relation to Quintana is his expedition to Italy, and thence into Germany, in the following of the Emperor. These were the months just after that terrible sack of Rome by the imperial army which resulted in the restoration of what was called peace between Papacy and Empire and the consequent strengthening of the Emperor's hands, so that he could turn his attention for the first time seriously to the religious movement in Germany.

Servetus was present at the triumphal entry of the Pope and the Emperor into Bologna, an event which left upon his sensitive mind a profound impression of the worldliness and unsanctity

of the papal institution, and prepared him unquestionably to expect to find among the reformers in Germany and Switzerland a condition of things more in harmony with the ideas of the religious life that were already shaping themselves in his independent thought. At Augsburg, whither the imperial journey was directed, Servetus was—or might have been—present at the meeting of the famous Diet of the Empire at which the Lutheran party presented their "Confession," the fundamental document of German Lutheranism for all time. With the exception of Luther, the leading theologians of the party were gathered at Augsburg, and it would not have been impossible for the young Spaniard at least to have had speech of them, but there is, I think, no trace of any significant personal relations with them at this time. Pastor Tollin, it is true, makes as much as possible out of a brief notice of a conversation between Philipp Melanchthon and certain Spaniards in the antechamber of Quintana, but I cannot think this important. What has, however, a real bearing upon our subject is that the Lutherans at Augsburg were above all things interested in presenting their case to the Diet in such moderate terms that they might conciliate opposition. Their chief desire was to let Papacy and Empire see that they were not extremists. Radicalism in any form was as repellent to them as to their Catholic opponents. Schism, a division in the sacred unity of the church, was far from being their ideal solution of the religious conflict. In those paragraphs of the Confession which touch upon the radical tendencies of the day, they take every pains to show that these are not characteristic of their own ways of thought.

It is clear therefore that, in so far as the mind of Servetus was already leaping forward to the conclusions inevitable from his independent attitude, he was quite as little likely to find sympathy here as in the immediate surroundings of the imperial court. What it was that led to his parting company with Quintana we do not know. It is more than probable that some indiscretion on his part had revealed to the imperial confessor the danger that might come from his continued patronage of a man who dared think for himself and was already showing a perilous tendency to speak out his innermost thought. At all events, it is clear that shortly

after the Diet of 1530 Servetus was afloat upon the world, dependent for his living upon the exercise of his many talents.

For a short period he seems to have had the wherewithal to exist, and he improved this interval to make, or attempt to make, connections with the reformers of Switzerland. In their denunciations of radicalism the German Lutherans had pointed in unmistakable terms to their Swiss brethren. Only a year before, at the decisive conference between the two reforming churches at Marburg, they had drawn the lines of their differences so that henceforth their fundamental opposition of attitude toward the tradition of the church could not fail to be clear to every one. On the critical question of the transubstantiation the Swiss had crossed the line from the "sacramental" to the figurative interpretation, and thus definitely declared themselves for the natural or rational understanding of the whole system of Christian thought. When, therefore, he had failed to make connections with the Germans, it was quite natural for Servetus to imagine that he might receive from the Swiss the kind of welcome which his own rapidly advancing thought would seem to warrant. He began at this time a series of letters—unfortunately lost, and known to us only by the writings of his opponents—in which he called upon the leading Swiss theologians to give their opinions in regard to his views about the primary propositions of Christian speculation. It is clear from the comments of his correspondents that he was already well started along the several roads which his maturer thought was to follow. The impression he made upon them was that of a restless, half-irresponsible youth, losing himself in the mazes of a philosophy that was more heathen than Christian. The chief theologian of Basel, Oecolampadius, complained to Zwingli, the leader of the church at Zürich, that he was being tormented by a Spaniard who had put forward doctrines in regard to the person of Christ which savored strongly of Arianism. He had declared that Christ was not consubstantial and co-eternal with God. It is interesting to notice that Oecolampadius criticizes Servetus especially for implying that in the prophetic writings of the Old Testament it is always a future Son of God that is predicted. He would not admit, says his critic, that the eternal Son of God was to appear as man, but only that a man

was to come who should be the Son of God. This is the earliest intimation we have as to the speculations which were occupying the mind of the young scholar. It is highly significant that from the start he was impressed with what we should now call the historical view of theology. As he read the Old Testament, its writers seemed to him to be referring to things that their hearers would understand. Their gaze into the future was limited by the fortunes of their people at the moment. To imagine them possessed of all the divine mysteries and to have in mind the person of the man Jesus as the ultimate object of all their prophetic vision was to reflect back the knowledge of history into a past to which such knowledge was impossible. So far as I can understand him, this is the key to all Servetus' later thought. His manner of expressing himself is confusing and intricate to the last degree, so much so that neither in his own time nor since has any one quite dared to say that he understood it. To his contemporaries he was a half-mad fanatic; to those who have studied him, even sympathetically, his thought remains to a great extent enigmatical; but this one point is fairly clear: that he grasped, as no one up to his time had grasped, this one central notion, that, whatever the divine plan may have been, it must be revealed by the long, slow movement of history—that, to understand the record of the past, it must be read, so far as that is possible, with the mind of those to whom it was immediately addressed, and must not be twisted into the meanings that may suit the fancy of later generations.

To have seized upon such an idea as this—an idea which has begun to come to its rights only within our own memories—was an achievement which marks this youth of twenty as at all events an extraordinary individual, a disturbing element in his world, a man who was not likely to let the authorities rest calmly in possession of all the truth there was.

These earliest speculations seem to have occupied Servetus during the latter part of the year 1530. If he seemed to be entering into a field of thought where speculation was out of place and where it was the manifest duty of the Christian man to accept the teaching of authority and be happy, we must remind ourselves that in the year 1530 this question of authority was precisely the

one as to which no final answer was possible. The whole world of thinking men was disturbed by the stirring of a spirit of inquiry and criticism that would not be held in check. In the thirteen years just preceding, the Lutherans in Germany had been working out their protest into a scheme of doctrine and of organization which had just been put before the world at Augsburg in such a form that it was clear there was to be no going backward from it. Carried along on the wave of this more conservative Lutheranism there had gone side-currents of radicalism that within five years were to culminate in the horrors of Münster, and thus to show all the elements of order in society how carefully they must guard themselves against this insidious foe. Switzerland had developed its own triumphant Protestantism, differing alike from that of the Lutherans and of the now discredited radicals. John Calvin was a student at Paris, laying the foundations of that system which in the next five years was to ripen out into the scheme of theology that was to prove the most effective agent in the spread of the reformed faith. Erasmus, living at Basel at the moment, was serving now the cause of revolt and now that of reaction, as the pressure of the case seemed to warrant. Even the organized mechanisms of the Roman tradition were proving unequal to the task of satisfying the restless spirit that was abroad among its own enlightened followers. Where was a young, eager, inquiring scholar in the year 1530 to look for satisfaction if not into the inner depths of his own honest thought?

Such, so far as we can trace it, is the genesis of the first important work by which Servetus drew upon himself the attention of the learned world. In the course of the year 1531 appeared the treatise, *De Trinitatis Erroribus Libri Septem*. It was printed at the little town of Hagenau in Alsatia, and bore on its title-page the name "Michaellem Serveto, aliàs Reves, ab Aragonia, Hispanum," but no indication of the publisher or the place of publication.<sup>2</sup>

In the months immediately preceding its appearance, Servetus had been, as we have seen, in frequent relations with the leaders

<sup>2</sup>I am indebted for a copy of this very rare book to Dr. Samuel Macauley Jackson, of New York. The Library of Harvard University contains a manuscript copy of perhaps the seventeenth century.

of the Swiss Reformation, and seems also to have had friendly dealings with the heads of the reformed church at Strassburg, Bucer and Capito. His name was on the title-page of this terrible book, and yet it appears to be a fact that he was not personally identified with its authorship until shortly before he appeared on trial for his life twenty years later at Geneva. The essential point of Servetus' error in this first formal presentation of his thought is his treatment of the accepted doctrine of the Trinity. He starts, as all his predecessors along this same line had started, from the idea of the oneness of God as the necessary presumption of all thought about the divine being. It seemed to him that the church in its formulations had departed from this essential conception, and had wandered over into the region of polytheistic imaginings, from which it still believed itself to have escaped. In this aberration of the church he thought he saw the reason of its failure to appeal to the vast masses of mankind, notably to those peoples who had found in the monotheism of Islam the satisfaction of their religious demands. It seemed to him that, in its attempt to exalt the person of Christ, the church had in reality distorted it, and deprived it of its true relation to mankind.

The Christ idea as represented in the person of Jesus was to him worthy of all devotion. No language is too strong for him to express his almost extravagant sense of the dignity and elevation of this central figure of the Christian tradition. Like his great forerunner, Arius, he was willing to accept almost any description of the divine perfections of the redeeming Christ—only he would not admit the thought of his eternal existence. The word Trinity he could not find in the Scriptures, nor in the writings of the earliest Christian theologians of the formative period. Yet he had no objection to the term if only he might give it his own interpretation. He could quite comprehend the value of a method of approach to an understanding of the divine nature which sought to distinguish between the various forms in which that nature is revealed to men. He was willing to use the words "Son" and "Holy Spirit," provided only that these should not be thought of as separate existences by themselves. He did not even object to the word "Person," but insisted that it should be used in its



proper and original sense of a dramatic impersonation. He went back to the Greek equivalent *πρόσωπον*, and showed how this had been used by early Greek writers to express precisely this notion—that the several persons of the Trinity or Triad were only manifestations of the one single and indivisible idea of supreme Deity.

In a word, Servetus shows himself the intellectual kinsman of those thinkers of the second century who have come down to us as Monarchians. His thought reminds us at once of those opposite types of monarchian speculation which are identified with the names of Sabellius and Paul of Samosata. It was largely in combating these attempts to formulate Christian doctrine on a strictly monarchian basis that the creeds of the fourth and fifth centuries had been evolved. Those creeds represented a long series of compromises. They were the expression of an enforced unity, made possible through an alliance with the civil government, and supported by a theological method in which plain reason and the laws of the physical universe were subordinated to a religious ideal too lofty and too spiritual to admit of expression in language intelligible to ordinary human understanding. The creeds did their great work of welding together all the divergent forces of aggressive Christianity and concentrating them on the one great task of winning the world to the following of the Christ. That was their merit, and for that service they deserve our interest and our gratitude; but, like all formulations of human speech, they could win their victory only by a rigid exclusion of whatever tended to weaken their hold upon the blind acceptance of their followers. Above all else they excluded, and must exclude, all right of the individual mind to indulge in the free exercise of its own native powers upon the subjects they claimed once for all to have disposed of.

Upon this comparatively simple substructure of the great creeds the church had reared its fabric of doctrines and usages, for which it had tried to claim the same sanctity as for the creeds themselves. It had secured the same kind of support from the new civil governments of Europe that had been given it by the older civil government of Rome. It had evolved a new theology to maintain this new structure of faith and practice. That had gone

on until, from the early fourteenth century onward, one after another of its defences had been attacked, and in the great Protest of the sixteenth it seemed as if there were danger that they would be swept away entirely. The authority of the Papacy had been rejected. The sacramental system, the key to its hold on the consciences of men, had been reduced to its lowest terms. The whole theological method of the Middle Ages had been held up to the contempt of the enlightened intellect. Where should men stop?

The answer is to be found in the universal horror with which this first essay of Servetus was received in the circles where he thought he might most surely count upon a favorable hearing. The expressions of opinion that have come down to us are almost entirely from the Protestant regions of Switzerland and Germany. In Catholic France the book seems to have been little known. Almost without exception, the judgment of the Protestant leaders was hostile in the extreme. It is not that they were led into controversy with the daring author. Nothing could have pleased him better than that. It is rather as if some noxious reptile had suddenly appeared in their midst and threatened to poison the very springs from which they drew the sources of their own resistance to the dominant church. From Luther and from the heads of the Protestant communities in Switzerland and Upper Germany we have utterances that reflect the controversial temper of the age. Bucer in Strassburg, often known as the Peacemaker of the Reformation, seems at first to have listened with some patience, if not actual interest, to the Spaniard's vagaries, but now, having read his book, he publicly declares that such a man ought to be disembowelled and torn to pieces.

Philipp Melanchthon, the theologian of the Lutheran party, was inclined to be a little more lenient. Servetus interested his eminently speculative mind; but, as he came to examine more carefully into his thought and to see whither it must lead, he too joined in the chorus of condemnation. The most he could say was that this whole subject of the Trinity was one involving a mystery, about which men ought to be careful in expressing definite opinions.

Disappointed in his expectations of finding sympathy among

those of his contemporaries who were themselves rebelling most distinctly against the existing church order, Servetus now left Germany and went over into France. There he dropped his proper family name and took that of Villeneuve (Villanovanus) from the name of his birthplace. So completely did he cover the traces of his life during the past few years that for the next twenty he was able to live and work with entire freedom and no little success in several lines of activity without, so far as we know, rousing the slightest suspicion that he was the Michael Servetus whose name stood on the title-page of the terrible pamphlet of 1531. His first visit was to Paris, where he lived for some time, perhaps supporting himself by the natural resource of teaching, while he was at the same time attending more or less of the instruction offered at the University. There was a tradition that in these earliest years at Paris he made the personal acquaintance of Calvin, and had plans for a public discussion with him on religious questions, but that this plan failed. There is, I believe, but slight foundation for a situation so full of dramatic suggestion for the future of the two youths; but it is more than probable that they were at Paris at the same time, and they may well have met in the gatherings of eager minds already deeply moved by the stirrings of the Reformation.

In 1534 we hear of Servetus at Orleans and at Avignon, and then at Lyons, where he settled for a time as a reader for the press of the famous publishers, the brothers Trechsel. It was while in their employ that he edited a new edition of Ptolemy's Geography, following the text of Wilibald Pirkheimer, the Nuremberg humanist, and adding commentaries of his own. In these commentaries Servetus brings in the scraps of learning about men and countries that he had collected from wide reading. They are of interest to us only as showing his irrepressible impulse to express what he had in his mind without special concern as to its relevancy. In connection, for instance, with the map of the Holy Land, he states the accepted tradition that it was a land flowing with milk and honey, but adds that this was mere boasting and falsehood, for the observations of modern travellers had shown that it was a barren, desolate region, without attractions of any kind. So that one might say that this "promised land" was anything but

a "promising land." This passage appears in the edition of 1535, but in the second edition of 1541 the whole section in regard to the Holy Land has disappeared.<sup>3</sup>

During his trial at Geneva, eighteen years later, this criticism of the Hebrew tradition was brought up against Servetus as proof of his readiness to question the trustworthiness of Moses as a recorder of geographical facts.

Soon after this, Servetus is again at Paris, living probably on the proceeds of his industry at Lyons, and now engaged in the study of medicine. He advanced here to the degrees of A.M. and M.D., and began to lecture on Ptolemy and on astrology, of the scientific nature of which he was, curiously enough, thoroughly convinced. He is reported to have been a successful lecturer and to have attracted large audiences. In any case he was widely known under his soubriquet of Villeneuve, and, though well known also to be of Spanish origin, no one seems to have connected him in any way with the dangerous doctrines of Servetus. Trouble, however, came upon him through his incredible devotion to the pseudo-science of astrology. He was prosecuted on this ground by the Medical Faculty, and examined by the Inquisitor of Paris as to his religious soundness. The Inquisitor satisfied himself of his orthodoxy, but he was then tried by the highest civil jurisdiction, the Parliament of Paris, for the offence of teaching and practising astrology. In spite of a vigorous defence, he was condemned, was forbidden to teach further, and ordered to withdraw the pamphlet in which he had presented an apology for the forbidden science.

Evidently a singular person, widely gifted, insatiable in his desire for knowledge, industrious, and with personal attractions that secured him friends; but erratic in his pursuits, restless under authority, and liable, as in this matter of astrology, to be led off into side-paths of speculation that might carry him over into regions of pure fantasy.

We next hear of Servetus at the little town of Charlieu, near Lyons, as a practising physician; but apparently some trouble with citizens of the place led to his removal in the year 1539 to Vienne, in the Rhône valley, where the Archbishop, Paumier,

<sup>3</sup> Both editions are in the Library of Harvard University.

was a former friend and fellow-pupil of his Paris days. Here he really settled, and for the next fourteen years lived as a physician of good standing, occupied with studies in many fields, but never quite forgetting his early interest in theology. He re-edited Ptolemy, and in 1542 published an edition of the Bible in Latin from the text of Pagnini, with original notes, chiefly historical and literal, but without betraying any dangerous tendencies in the direction of criticism.

The final chapter in Servetus' life begins in 1546 or 1547. At that time he opened a correspondence with Calvin, still, of course, under his name of Villeneuve, and many letters passed between them. Those of Calvin are unfortunately lost, but those of Servetus are printed in his later book. They show that his mind was now turning with increasing interest to the problems that had occupied him sixteen years before, the fundamental questions of the Christian theology. His inquiries of Calvin related especially to the doctrine of the Trinity and the proofs necessary to establish it. It is evident that the tone of Calvin's answers was severe to the point of violence, and Servetus was not behind him in his use of vigorous language. In a letter written to Farel at this time, Calvin refers to this correspondence, and makes the afterwards famous declaration that, if he could lay his hands on the wretch who was publishing such outrageous views, he would never let him escape alive. Much has been made of this letter as showing the *animus* with which Calvin entered upon the fateful trial of 1553, but I hardly think too much weight should be laid upon it. Such an expression was quite in the natural order of sixteenth century controversy, and probably reflected nothing more than Calvin's natural horror at opinions that seemed to him nothing short of blasphemous. It is clear that Servetus had found himself rather strengthened than otherwise in the opinions of his youth by later study. What had been in 1530 the intuitive perceptions of an unusually clever youth had ripened in the interval into something that might be called a philosophy of life. His appeal to Calvin is perfectly in accordance with his action in the earlier stage of his thought. As he had then addressed himself to the leaders of what he supposed to be the most advanced theological thought, so now he turned to the man who more than any other

was shaping the thoughts of the Protestant world. His attitude then was not precisely humble, and it was not greatly changed now. He was not appealing to an authority now any more than then, but it would have been a great encouragement to him in the loneliness of his own researches if he could have gained the countenance of an acknowledged expert in his field. The result was, as it had been before, to throw him back upon himself, and to show him that, if his views were to win a place in the world, it must be in virtue of their own convincing force.

It is probable that in connection with his correspondence Servetus sent to Calvin a draft of the book which is his chief literary monument, the *Christianismi Restitutio*, which, however, was not to be printed until 1553. The leniency or indifference of the authorities in the good Catholic town of Vienne has always been a matter of wonder to the students of Servetus. It seems altogether probable that he was regarded there with the kind of indulgence which men everywhere and always are inclined to give to a "queer fellow" of undoubted gifts, useful in his way, though with notions that might perhaps be a little off color, but were not clearly perceived as dangerous. The Archbishop was his friend, and we must bear in mind that Villeneuve was so far not suspected of any connection with the forgotten heretic Servetus, of nearly twenty years before.

I wish I were at once theologian, philosopher, and natural scientist enough to make quite clear either to you or to myself just what this philosophy of life was that had half formed itself in the active brain of Servetus, and was now crowding for expression. So far as I can grasp it, it was based upon a profound conviction of the unity of all being, this unity expressing itself indeed in manifold forms, but these forms all correlated to each other and to the whole by an active principle which corresponds to his idea of God. Or, putting it in the reverse order, his idea of God was of a being so completely pervading all life that it was hardly to be distinguished from the things it so utterly filled and animated. The handiest word to describe an idea of this sort is "pantheism," and in fact the theology of Servetus has often been thus described. Yet he was quite ready to use most of the terminology of the

church, provided only that he might give to it his own interpretation.

The most curious illustration of this striving after a unity of life is to be found in the extraordinary discovery upon which he seems to have fallen in the course of his regular medical study and practice, but which he at once incorporates into his discussion of theology. There can be little doubt that Servetus had practised dissection of the human body, and had made himself familiar especially with the processes of foetal life. In the chapter of his book on the Restoration of Christianity in which he treats of the Holy Spirit, he attempts first a definition of the several spirits, the natural, the vital, and the animal, by which the human body is animated. In the course of his description of the vital spirit he tells how, in his opinion, the blood is sent from the right to the left ventricle of the heart, not, as was generally supposed, by passing through the mid-wall of the heart, but passing first through the pulmonary artery into the lungs and thence through the pulmonary vein into the left ventricle. The aëration of the blood in the lungs he describes as a mingling of the outer air with the rarer parts of the substance of the blood, thus producing the vital spirit, which is then communicated to the body through the red blood of the arteries. In other words, Servetus is the undoubted discoverer of so much of the fact of the circulation of the blood as relates to what is called the pulmonary circulation. Apparently he was led to his conclusions by the observations, first, that the mid-wall of the heart was not of a texture to permit as free passage for the blood as would be necessary, although a slight trans-fusion might take place, such as I am informed does actually occur in certain forms of disease; then, the reflection that so great a supply of blood could not be sent to the lungs merely for the purpose of nourishing them; and also that the left ventricle was too small to permit of the thorough mingling of the air with the blood whereby the vital spirit is produced. It is generally accepted as a fact that the rest of the process, the systemic circulation whereby the blood is returned to the heart, escaped the observation of Servetus, and it would certainly be presumption for a mere lay-man to assert the contrary. It is quite certain that he does not describe the process in any language that would correspond to

our modern description. It is certain that he did not understand the idea of capillary attraction. Yet one cannot quite overlook his remark that what he calls "the natural spirit" is communicated from the arteries to the veins "by their *anastomoses*." Some notion of a passage from the arteries to the veins he must have had. It must be remembered that he is writing not primarily a treatise on physiology, but on theology, and that his interest in the question was merely the definition of the vital spirit. I am not yet so far convinced by the arguments of Dr. Willis as to be perfectly sure, as he is, that the honor of this immense discovery is not to be ascribed in full measure to Servetus rather than to Harvey nearly a century later.

As to the book itself, the *Christianismi Restitutio* is an attempt to bring Christianity back to what Servetus believed to be its original conditions. It is not merely reform, it is restoration, that he has in mind. He finds the central fact of Christian speculation, not in the doctrine of the Trinity as formulated by the schools, but in the fact of the divine incarnation in the person of Jesus. He admits the divine birth, explaining it as in harmony with a general law of divine manifestation whereby the spiritual is revealed in the material. He would not accept the idea of an eternal sonship, except in this sense, that the divine Word, the Logos, had always been active as the expression in outward form of the divine activity. So, in the fulness of time, this same Logos produced a being from a human mother upon whom at the moment of his birth the divine Spirit was breathed. Obviously this is not the "eternal Son" of the creeds, and herein lay the especial theological crime of Servetus. In his criticism of the church order, of the papal government, of the sacramental system, he does not differ essentially from the more radical of the reformers. On the essential matters of baptism and the Eucharist he goes quite beyond the established reforming churches. In both cases he invokes the principle of plain reason. He rejects infant baptism on the ground that the infant can have no faith, and that the practice is therefore mere incantation. He denies transubstantiation on the rational basis that substances and accidents may not be separated, and does not spare the reforming leaders for what seemed to him their half-hearted attitude on this point. His language throughout



is harsh and violent, except where, as at the close of his chapters, he passes over into the forms of devotion and closes his diatribes with prayers of great beauty and spirituality.

This work was done by Servetus while he was living unmolested in a thoroughly Roman Catholic community, surrounded with all the mechanisms of detection and repression always at the disposal of the church. The printing was accomplished in secret, and a thousand copies were made ready for the market. It seems clear that an early copy reached Calvin, and confirmed him in his purpose, probably long since formed, to crush this enemy of all Christian men whenever the opportunity should occur. There is little room for doubt that the information upon which the authorities of Vienne were led to action reached them by way of Geneva. We have the correspondence between a French refugee, a friend of Calvin, and a Viennese friend of his upon which the proof is based. The authorities were informed that the supposed Villeneuve was no other than the wretch Servetus, and they at once proceeded to act. Servetus was arrested, examined, and imprisoned in the episcopal palace. His imprisonment seems to have been a rather nominal one; the garden gate was conveniently left open, and he had only to walk out and betake himself to a place of safety. The local inquisitor came into the affair just too late to recapture him, and had to be content with condemning his books and having him burned in effigy.

This brings us to the last scene in the tragedy of this singular life. Writers have exhausted their ingenuity in guessing why, of all places in the world, Servetus should have ventured into the Geneva of Calvin, the most outspoken enemy he had ever encountered. In his own testimony Servetus apparently wished to convey the idea that he was on his way to Italy, and that he had in fact made all arrangements for leaving Geneva after a short sojourn, when, having ventured into a public meeting, he was recognized by some one who reported his presence to Calvin and thus brought about his arrest. I am inclined to bring this Genevan visit into line with other earlier actions of Servetus, and to think that he was led by the same desire which had once led him to seek out the leaders of thought in Switzerland and Germany and to take the serious risks of a long correspondence with Calvin

himself. He was obviously a singular mixture of prudence and imprudence, and this time the imprudence got the better of him.

The account of this, one of the famous heresy trials of the world, is preserved to us in the formal records of the Genevan Councils and in the abundant contemporary writings. It has been the subject of a vast deal of sentimental criticism, and has served as the text for infinite demonstrations that Protestantism was no better than its predecessor in the matter of religious liberty, and that Calvin was a furious tyrant, thirsting for the blood of his opponents. A calmer judgment, however, shows us that seldom, if ever, was a trial for opinions conducted with larger guarantees of fairness, more openly, or more in accordance with the principles which the soundest leaders of thought at the time would approve. The methods of judicial inquiry in the sixteenth century and for a long time afterward were not pretty methods. The right of the accused to have counsel and to be placed on an equality, so far as opportunity was concerned, with the accusing party, was not recognized. Imprisonment was harsh, the means of extracting evidence were barbarous, and the tone of the judicial authorities toward the alleged criminal was such as to prejudice his case to the utmost. All these incidents were present in the trial of Servetus. There can be no doubt that Calvin—who, it must be remembered, held no office in Geneva other than that of its most respected preacher—pushed the case to its utmost limit. It has been shown, especially in recent treatments of this subject, that he had what may on the face of it be described as a personal interest in the issue. In spite of the success that had so far attended his work in Geneva, we must not forget that this success had been gained in the face of an opposition that was by no means overcome. Personal and family animosities had been developed that would have tested the strength of a far stronger governmental machine than he had at his disposal. The one indispensable condition of permanence for his work was that it should be held straight to the program with which it started—the establishment in Geneva of a civil state founded on the idea of the kingdom of God. To do this, it must above all else keep itself pure from even the suspicion of fanaticism or false doctrine.

The conviction of error within its borders was the most tangible form which such proof of Puritan thoroughness could take. If, therefore, such conviction was in a sense a personal victory for Calvin, we must remember that, aside from the triumph of principle, he had no ends of his own to gain. If we are tempted for a moment to compare him with those other tyrants who, for instance in the Italian republics, raised themselves and their families to wealth and hereditary power by methods of which we are here reminded, such a comparison breaks down at the start. No such ambition for personal or family honors stains the memory of Calvin. He threw himself into this prosecution of Servetus with all his energy because he believed that upon its success depended the victory of truth over falsehood and right over wrong.

It cannot serve our purpose to go, ever so slightly, into the miserable detail of the proceedings. From the beginning it was made clear that the real crime of Servetus was that which the dominant church has always correctly described as heresy; i.e., the crime of choosing one's opinions for one's self instead of accepting them from any authority whatever. It was not merely the opinions themselves. Even so moderate a person as Melancthon had admitted that the formulas of expression as to the divine nature contained much that was puzzling to the thoughtful mind. It was rather that attitude of the mind which the earliest church had instinctively expressed by the word from which we take our word "heresy"—the word "choice." He who dares to choose his belief must necessarily be wrong, and, as soon as the church had made its fatal alliance with the civil power, it inevitably took the next step and, attaching to the idea of free choice the further notion of moral depravity, invented the crime known as *haereticae pravitatis*. And this idea persisted. It is only the modern world that has come to recognize in honest heresy a title of honor. The leaders of the Reformation repudiated the charge with the utmost indignation, and, entering again into alliance with the civil powers, gained once more the means to shift the burden of theological freedom on to the shoulders of men who dared to go beyond the limits they themselves prescribed.

The case of Servetus was not the first in which the Genevan tribunals had vindicated the purity of their faith. In the previous six years there had been several notable instances of opposition to the dominant doctrine and discipline, and these had all so far been decided to the advantage of Calvin. Still, the hostility continued, and at the moment of the arrest of Servetus it seemed almost as if the strain were coming to be too great for his resources. It has been conjectured, with some show of reason, that Servetus was actually, though not openly, protected by these elements of the Genevan opposition—was, in short, made a tool for their purposes, and that to this fact is owing the prolongation of the trial and its apparent uncertainty. It would be strange indeed if considerations of this sort had not played their part in this as in other complications of Genevan politics; but it should not blind us to the real issue. What that issue was is clearly enough reflected in the replies of the other important churches of Switzerland to which Geneva referred the case for their opinion. Without a dissenting voice, the ministers of Zürich, Schaffhausen, Basel, and Bern, declared that the opinions of Servetus were contrary to the true faith, congratulated Geneva on having got him into its power, and expressed the hope that this pest of the Christian world would not be allowed further opportunity to corrupt the faithful with his horrid blasphemies. In no one of these replies is the punishment of death specifically mentioned, but the implication was enough. So far as the Protestant world was concerned, Calvin had nothing to fear. The Roman Catholic authorities at Vienne had sent a request that Servetus might be handed over to them; but Geneva replied that he could be properly attended to there.

It is evident to any one who reads the record of the court that the condemnation of Servetus was a foregone conclusion. His own attitude towards his judges was certainly not calculated to lessen the feeling of hostility. His confidence in himself and his open contempt of his accusers did not desert him for a moment. He was defiant to the last. It would be a satisfaction if one could make him rather more of an heroic figure; but it must be admitted that his account of himself was not always consistent and can in some places be shown to be incorrect. Calvin was

insistent for the sentence of death, but said what he could in favor of a merciful form of execution. Overcome for a moment by the announcement of his sentence, Servetus rallied at once and met his end with cheerful fortitude. With his last breath he called upon the name of Jesus, the Son of the eternal God.

Thus Genevan orthodoxy was vindicated. If Servetus had been willing to change the order of his last words and say "Jesus, the Eternal Son of God," he might, probably, have been set free. It was this which stamped him as the enemy of Christian truth, against whom every Christian man's hand ought to be raised in protest even to the point of his destruction. In reply to certain unofficial criticisms of his action Calvin wrote an extended refutation of the errors of Servetus, incorporating with this a defence of the principle of capital punishment for heresy. The essence of this defence is in its concluding paragraph. No sane man, he says, will deny that there are two good reasons for such punishment: first, if the man is so obstinate that he cannot be brought to reason by milder measures: second, if the content of his opinion is desperately vicious. Now in the case of Servetus both these reasons are combined. In other words, he was condemned for fidelity to his opinions and because those opinions seemed to the leaders of orthodox thought dangerous to the welfare of Christian society. It can hardly soften our judgment of Calvin that in this attack upon an enemy now beyond the reach of his assault, he should have chosen to employ the foulest and most insulting language in his choice vocabulary of abuse. That he acted throughout in what he believed to be the only right way there is as little doubt as there is that the execution of Servetus was a foul crime against the higher law of liberty which Calvin had himself followed in breaking away from the servitude of Rome. The spirit of persecution has never lacked arguments, and never will, whenever the fatal union of civil and religious power puts effective weapons into its hand.

*THE MORAL JUSTIFICATION OF RELIGION*

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It is generally agreed that religion is either the paramount issue or the most serious obstacle to progress. To its devotees religion is of overwhelming importance; to unbelievers it is, in the phrasing of Burke, "superstitious folly, enthusiastical nonsense, and holy tyranny." The difference between the friends and the enemies of religion may, I think, be resolved as follows. Religion recognizes some final arbitration of human destiny; it is a lively awareness of the fact that, while man proposes, it is only within certain narrow limits that he can dispose his own plans. His nicest adjustments and most ardent longings are overruled; he knows that until he can discount or conciliate that which commands his fortunes his condition is precarious and miserable. And through his eagerness to save himself he leaps to conclusions that are uncritical and premature. Irreligion, on the other hand, flourishes among those who are more snugly intrenched within the cities of man. It is a product of civilization. Comfortably housed as he is, and enjoying an artificial illumination behind drawn blinds, the irreligious man has the heart to criticize the hasty speculations and abject fear of those who stand without in the presence of the surrounding darkness. In other words, religion is perpetually on the exposed side of civilization, sensitive to the blasts that blow from the surrounding universe; while irreligion is in the lee of civilization, with enough remove from danger to foster a refined concern for logic and personal liberty. There is a sense, then, in which both religion and irreligion are to be justified. If religion is guilty of unreason, irreligion is guilty of apathy. For without doubt the situation of the individual man is broadly such as religion conceives it to be. There is nothing that he can build, nor any precaution that he can take, that weighs appreciably in the balance against the powers which decree good and ill fortune, catastrophe and tri-

umph, life and death. Hence to be without fear is the part of folly. Behold, the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom.

Religion is man's recognition of the overruling control of his fortunes. It is neither metaphysical nor mythical, but urgently practical. Primeval chaos, Chronos the father of Zeus, and the long line of speculative Absolutes have no worshippers because they take no hand in man's affairs. They may be neglected with impunity. But not so the gods who send health and sickness, fertility and death, victory and defeat, or he who sits in judgment on the last day to determine the doom of eternity. Religion is the manifestation of supreme concern for life, an alertness to the remotest threat of danger and promise of hope. A certain momentousness attaches to all the affairs of religion, because everything is at stake. Its dealings are with the last court of appeal, in behalf of the most indispensable good.

In form, religion is a case of *belief*; that is, of settled conviction. There is no religion until some interpretation of life, some accommodation between man and God, has been so far accepted as to be unhesitatingly practised. The absurdity of doubt in matters of religion has been pointed in the well-known parody, "O God, if there be a God, save my soul, if I have a soul." The quality of religion lies not in the entertaining of a speculative hypothesis, but in an assurance so confident that its object is not only thought, but enacted. God is not God until his unquestioned existence is assimilated to life. Indeed, it is conceivable that an object thus made the basis of action should still remain theoretically doubtful. To Fontenelle is attributed the remark that he "did not believe in ghosts, but was afraid of them." This is a paradox until we distinguish theoretical and practical conviction; then it becomes not only credible, but commonplace. If one prays to God, it is not necessary for the purposes of religion that one should in Fontenelle's sense believe in him. But I prefer to use the term "belief" more strictly, to connote such assent as expresses itself, not in a deliberate judgment made conformable to one's intellectual conscience, but in fear, love, and purpose, in habitual imagery, in any attitude or activity that is spontaneous and that freely presupposes the object with which it deals.

By conceiving religion as belief we may understand not only

its air of certainty but also the variety of its forms and agencies. Belief sits at the centre of life and qualifies all its manifestations. Hence the futility of attempting to associate religion exclusively with any single function of man. The guises in which religious belief may appear are as multiform as human nature, and will vary with every shading of mood and temperament. Its central objects may be thought, imagined, or dealt with—in short, responded to in all the divers ways, internal and overt, that the powers and occasions of life define.

This will suffice, I trust, to lay the general topic of religion before us. I shall employ the terms and phrases which I have formulated as a working definition: Religion is belief on the part of individuals or communities concerning the final or overruling control of their interests. I propose from this point to keep in the forefront of the discussion the standards whereby religion is to be estimated, and approved or condemned. On what grounds may a religion be criticized? What would constitute the proof of an absolute religion? History is strewn with discredited religions; men began to quarrel over religion so soon as they had any; and it is customary for every religious devotee to believe jealously and exclusively. There can be no doubt, then, that religion is subject to justification; it remains to distinguish the tests which may with propriety be applied, and in particular to isolate and emphasize the moral test.

In the first place let me mention briefly a test which it is customary to apply, but which is not so much an estimate as it is a measure. I refer to the various respects in which an individual or community may be said to be *more* or *less* religious. Thus, for example, certain religious phenomena surpass others in acuteness or intensity. This is peculiarly true of the phenomena manifested in conversion and in revivals. In this respect the mysteries of the ancients exceeded their regular public worship. Individuals and communities vary in the degree to which they are capable of enthusiasm, excitement, or ecstasy.

Or a religion may be measured extensively. He whose religion is constant and uniform is more religious than he whose observance is confined to the Sabbath day, or he whose concern in the matter appears only in time of trouble or at the approach



of death. This test may best be summed up in terms of consistency. Religion may vary in the degree to which it pervades the various activities of life. That religion is confined and small which manifests itself only in words or public deeds or emotions exclusively. If it is to be effective it must be systematic, so thoroughly adopted as to be cumulative and progressive. It must engage every activity, qualify all thought and imagination, in short, infuse the whole of life with its saving grace.

It is clear, however, that a measure of religion does not constitute either proof or disproof. If a religion be good or true, or on like grounds accredited, then the more of it the better. But differences of degree appear in all religions. Indeed, the quantitative test has been most adequately met by forms of religion the warrant of which is generally held to be highly questionable. We may, therefore, dismiss this test without further consideration. The application of it must be based upon a prior and more fundamental justification.

There is one test of religion which has been universally applied by believers and critics alike, a test which, I think, will shortly appear to deserve precedence over all others. I refer to the test of truth. Every religion has been justified to its believers and recommended to unbelievers on grounds of evidence. It has been verified in its working, or attested by either observation, reflection, revelation, or authority.

In spite of the general assent which this proposition will doubtless command, it is deserving of special emphasis at the present time. Students of religion have latterly shifted attention from its claims to truth to its utility and subjective form. This pragmatic and psychological study of religion has created no little confusion of mind concerning its real meaning, and obscured that which is after all its essential claim—the claim, namely, to offer an illumination of life. Religious belief, like all belief, is reducible to judgments. These judgments are not, it is true, explicit and theoretically formulated; but they are none the less answerable to evidence from that context of experience to which they refer. It is true that the believer's assurance is not consciously rational, but it is none the less liable before the court of reason. Cardinal Newman fairly expressed the difference be-

tween the method of religion and the method of science when he said that "ten thousand difficulties do not make one doubt," that "difficulty and doubt are incommensurate." "Nevertheless, the difficulties are in each case germane; and the fact that every article of faith has its besetting doubt is proof that the thorough justification of faith requires the settlement of theoretical difficulties.

No religion can survive the demonstration of its untruth, for salvation, whether present or eternal, depends on processes actually operative in the environment. Religion must reveal the undeniable situation, and prepare man for it. It must charge the unbeliever with being guilty of folly, with deceiving himself through failing to see and take heed. Every religious propaganda is a cry of warning, putting men on their guard against invisible dangers; or a promise of succor, bringing glad tidings of great joy. And its prophecy is empty and trivial if the danger or the succor can be shown to be unreal. The one unfailing bias in life is the bias for disillusionment, springing from the organic instinct for that real environment to which, whether friendly or hostile, it must adapt itself. Every man knows in his heart that he cannot be saved through being deceived. Illusions cannot endure; and those who lightly perpetrate them are fortunate if they escape the resentment and swift vengeance which overtook the prophets of Baal.

The grounds of religious truth will require prolonged consideration; but before discussing them further let me first mention a test of religion which belongs to the class of psychological and pragmatic tests to which I have just alluded, but which has latterly assumed special prominence. Though realizing that I use a somewhat disparaging term, I suggest that we call this the therapeutic test. It has been proved that the state of piety possesses a direct curative value through its capacity to exhilarate or pacify, according to the needs of a disordered mind. As a potent form of suggestion, it lends itself to the uses of psychiatry; it may be medicinally employed as a tonic, stimulant, or sedative.

Now we can afford to remind ourselves that from the point of view of the patient this use of religion bears a striking resemblance to certain primitive practices in which God was conceived as a

glorified medicine-man, and the healing of the body strangely confused with spiritual regeneration. Bishop Gregory of Tours once addressed the following apostrophe to the worshipful St. Martin: "O unspeakable theriac! ineffable pigment! admirable antidote! celestial purgative! superior to all the skill of physicians, more fragrant than aromatic drugs, stronger than all ointments combined! thou cleanest the bowels as well as scammony, and the lungs as well as hyssop; thou cleanest the head as well as camomile!"<sup>1</sup>

It is true that religion is in these days recommended for more subtle disorders; but even religious ecstasy may be virtually equivalent to a mere state of emotional exhilaration, or piety to a condition of mental and moral stupor. What does it profit a man to be content with his lot, or to experience the rapture of the saints, if he has lost his soul? The saving of a soul is a much more serious matter than the cessation of worry or the curing of insomnia, or even than the acquiring of a habit of delirious joy. Tranquillity and happiness are, it is true, the legitimate fruits of religion, but only provided they be infused with goodness and truth. If religion is to be a spiritual tonic, and not merely a physical tonic, it must be based on moral organization and intellectual enlightenment. I do not doubt that religion has in all times recommended itself to men mainly through its contributing to their lives a certain peculiar buoyancy and peace. There is such a generic value in religion, which cannot be attributed wholly to any of its component parts. But, like the intensity or extent of religion, this may manifest itself upon all levels of development. Sound piety, a tranquillity and happiness which mark the soul's real salvation, must be founded on truth, on an interpretation of life which expresses the fullest light. Again, then, we are referred to the test of truth for the fundamental justification of religion. There is a generic value which is deserving of the last word, but that word can be said only after a rigorous examination of the moral fundamental values from which it is derived.

Religious truth is divisible into two judgments, involved in every religious belief, and answerable respectively to ethical and

<sup>1</sup> Munro and Sellery, *Mediaeval Civilization*, p. 69.

cosmological evidence. Since religion is a belief concerning the overruling control of human interests, it involves on the one hand a summing up of these interests, a conception of what the believer has at stake, in short an ethical judgment; and on the other hand, an interpretation of the environment at large, in other words a cosmological judgment. Religion construes the practical situation in its totality; which means that it generalizes concerning the content of fortune, or the good, and the sources of fortune, or nature. Both factors are invariably present, and no religion can escape criticism on this twofold ground.

The ethical implications of religion are peculiarly far-reaching, since they determine not only its conception of man, but also in part its conception of God. This is due to the fact that the term God signifies not the environment in its inherent nature, but the environment in its bearing on the worshipper's interests. It follows that whether God be construed as favorable or hostile will depend upon the worshipper's conception of these interests. Thus, if worldly success or long life be regarded as the values most eagerly to be conserved, God must be feared as cruel or capricious; whereas, if the lesson of discipline and humility be conceived as the highest good, the providence of God may be trusted without any change in its manifestation.

Furthermore, as we shall shortly have occasion to remark, it is characteristic of religion to insist, so far as possible, upon the favorableness of the environment. But this favorableness must be construed in terms of what are held to be man's highest interests. Consequently, the disposition and motive of God always reflect human purposes. This is the main source of the inevitable anthropomorphism of religion.

Conceptions of nature, on the other hand, define the degree to which the environment is morally determined, and the unity or plurality of its causes. Animism, for example, reflects the general opinion that the causes of natural events are wilful rather than mechanical. Such an opinion obtained at the time when no sharp distinction was made between inorganic and organic phenomena, the action of the environment being conceived as a play of impulses.

Religion is corrected, then, by light obtained from these sources:

man's knowledge of his highest interests and his knowledge of nature. As a rule, one or the other of these two methods of criticism tends to predominate in accordance with the genius of the race or period. Thus the evolution of Greek religion is determined mainly by the development of science. Xenophanes attacks the religion of his times on the ground of its crude anthropomorphism. "Mortals," he says, "think that the gods are born as they are, and have perception like theirs, and voice and form." But this naïve opinion Xenophanes corrects because it is not consistent with the new enlightenment concerning the *ἀρχή*, or first principle of nature. "And he [God] abideth ever in the same place, moving not at all; nor doth it befit him to go about, now hither, now thither."<sup>2</sup>

In a later age Lucretius criticized the whole system of Greek religion in terms of the atomistic and mechanical cosmology of Epicurus:

For verily not by design did the first-beginnings of things station themselves each in its right place guided by keen intelligence, nor did they bargain sooth to say what motions each should assume, but because many in number and shifting about in many ways throughout the universe, they are driven and tormented by blows during infinite time past, after trying motions and unions of every kind at length they fall into arrangements such as those out of which our sum of things has been formed.<sup>3</sup>

In the light of such principles Lucretius demonstrates the absurdity of hoping or fearing anything from a world beyond or a life to come. In this case, as in the case above, the religion of enlightenment does not differ essentially from the religion of the average man in its conception of the interests at stake, but only in its conception of the methods of worship or forms of imagery which it is reasonable to employ in view of the actual nature of the environment.

If on the other hand we turn to the early development of the Hebrew religion, we find that it is corrected to meet the demands not of cosmological, but of ethical enlightenment. No question arises as to the existence or power of God, but only as to what he

<sup>2</sup> Fragments of Xenophanes. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, p. 115.

<sup>3</sup> Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura*, i, 1021-28. Translation by Munro.

requires of those who serve him. The prophets represent the moral genius of the race, its acute discernment of the causes of social integrity or decay. "And when ye spread forth your hands, I will hide mine eyes from you: yea, when ye make many prayers, I will not hear: your hands are full of blood. Wash you, make you clean; put away the evil of your doings from before mine eyes; cease to do evil: learn to do well; seek judgment, relieve the oppressed, judge the fatherless, plead for the widow."<sup>4</sup>

But whichever of these two methods of criticism predominates, it is clear that they both draw upon bodies of truth which grow independently of religion. The history of Christianity affords a most remarkable record of the continual adjustment of religious belief to secular rationality. The offices of religion have availed no more to justify cruelty, intolerance, and bigotry than to establish the Ptolemaic astronomy or the scriptural account of creation. This is more readily admitted in the case of natural science than in the case of ethics, but only because teachers of religion have commonly had a more expert acquaintance with moral matters than with the orbits of the planets or the natural history of the earth.

For the principles of conduct, like the principles of nature, must be derived from a study of the field to which they are applied. They require nothing more for their establishment than the analysis and generalization of the moral situation. If two or more persons conduct themselves with reference to one another and to an external object, their action either possesses or lacks, in some degree, that specific value which we call moral goodness. And by the principles of ethics we mean the principles which truly define and explicate this value. Now neither the truth nor the falsity of any religion affects these fundamental and essential conditions. If the teachings of religion be accepted as true, then certain factors may be added to the concrete practical situation; but if so, these fall within the field of morality and must be submitted to ethical principles. Thus, if there be a God whose personality permits of reciprocal social relations with man, then man ought, in the moral sense, to be prudent with reference to him, and may reasonably demand justice or good-will at his hands.

<sup>4</sup>Isaiah 1 15-17.

But the mere existence of a God, whatever be his nature, can neither invalidate nor establish the ethical principles of prudence, justice, and good-will. Were a God whose existence is proved to recommend injustice, this would not affect in the slightest degree the moral obligation to be just. Moral revelation stands upon precisely the same footing as revelation in the sphere of theoretical truth: its acceptance can be justified only through its being confirmed by experience or reason. In other words, it is the office of revelation to reveal truth, but not to establish it. In consequence of this fact it may even be necessary that man should redeem the truth in defiance of what he takes to be the disposition of God. Neither individual conscience nor the moral judgment of mankind can be superseded or modified save through a higher insight which these may themselves be brought to confirm. Whatever a man may think of God, if he continues to live in the midst of his fellows, he places himself within the jurisdiction of the laws which obtain there. Morality is the method of reconciling and fulfilling the interests of beings having the capacity to conduct themselves rationally, and ethics is the formulation of the general principles which underlie this method. The attempt to live rationally—and, humanly speaking, there is no alternative save the total abnegation of life—brings one within the jurisdiction of these principles, precisely as thinking brings one within the jurisdiction of the principles of logic, or as the moving of one's body brings one within the jurisdiction of the principles of mechanics.

Religion, then, mediates an enlightenment which it does not of itself originate. In religious belief the truth which is derived from a studious observation of nature and the cumulative experience of life is heightened and vivified. Like all belief, religion is conservative; and rightly so. But in the long run, steadily and inevitably, it responds to every forward step which man is enabled to take through the exercise of his natural cognitive powers. Only so does religion serve its real purpose of benefiting life by expanding its horizon and defining its course.

I have hitherto left out of account a certain stress or insistence that must now be recognized as fundamental in religious development. This I shall call the optimistic bias. This bias is not

accidental or arbitrary, but significant of the fact that religion, like morality, springs from the same motive as life itself, and makes towards the same goal of fruition and abundance. Life is essentially interest, and interest is essentially positive or provident; fear is incidental to hope, and hate to love. Man seeks to know the worst only in order that he may avoid or counterwork it in the furtherance of his interests. Religion is the result of man's search for support in the last extremity. This is true even when men are largely preoccupied with the mere struggle for existence. It appears more and more plainly as life becomes aggressive and is engaged in the constructive enterprise of civilization. Religion expresses man's highest hope of attainment, whether this be conceived as the efficacy of a fetish or the kingdom of God.

Such, then, are the general facts of religion and the fundamental critical principles which justify and define its development. Religion is man's belief in salvation, his confident appeal to the overruling control of his ultimate fortunes. The reconstruction of religious belief is made necessary whenever it fails to express the last verified truth, cosmological or ethical. The direction of religious development is thus a resultant of two forces: the optimistic bias, or the saving hope of life, and rational criticism, or the progressive revelation of the principles which define life and its environment.

I shall proceed now to the consideration of types of religion which illustrate this critical reconstruction. The types which I shall select represent certain forms of inadequacy which I think it important to distinguish. They are only roughly historical, as is necessarily the case, since all religions represent different types in the various stages of their development and in the different interpretations which are put on them in any given time by various classes of believers. I shall consider in turn, using the terms in a manner to be precisely indicated as we proceed, *superstition*, *tutelary religion*, and two forms of *philosophical religion*, the one *metaphysical idealism*, and the other *moral idealism*.

*Superstition* is distinguished by a lack of organization both in man and his environment. It is a direct cross-relationship between an elementary interest, passion, or need, and some isolated and capricious natural power. The deity is externally



related to the worshipper, having private interests of his own which the worshipper respects only from motives of prudence. Religious observance takes the form of barter or propitiation—*do ut des, do ut abeas*. The method of superstition is arbitrary, furthermore, in that it is defined only by the liking or aversion of an unprincipled agency.

Let us consider briefly the type of superstition which is associated with the most primitive stage in the development of society. The worshipper has neither raised nor answered the ethical question as to what is his greatest good. Indeed, he is much more concerned to meet the pressing needs of life than he is to co-ordinate them or understand to what they lead. He cannot even be said to be actuated by the principle of rational self-interest. Like the brute whose lot is similar to his own, he feels his wants severally, and is forced to meet them as they arise or be trampled under foot in the struggle for existence. There is little co-ordination of his interests beyond that which is provided for in the organic and social structure with which nature has endowed him. Over and above the instinct of self-preservation he recognizes in custom the principle of tribal or racial solidarity. But this is proof, not so much of a recognition of community of interest, as of the vagueness of his ideas concerning the boundaries of his own selfhood. The very fact that his interests are scattering and loosely knit prevents him from clearly distinguishing his own. He readily identifies himself not only with his body, but with his clothing, his habitation, and various trinkets which have been accidentally associated with his life. It is only natural that he should similarly identify himself with those other beings like himself with whom he is connected by the bonds of blood and of intimate contact. Morally, then, primitive man is an indefinite and incoherent aggregate of interests which have not yet assumed the form even of individual and community purpose.

To turn to the second, or cosmological, component, we find that primitive man's conception of ultimate powers is like his conception of his own interests in being both indefinite and incoherent. In consequence of the daily vicissitudes of his fortune, he is well aware that he is affected for better or for worse by agencies

which fall outside the more familiar routine operations of society and nature. So great is the disproportion between the calculable and the incalculable elements of his life that he is like a man crouching in the dark expecting a blow from any quarter. The agencies whose working can be discounted in advance form his secular world; but this world is narrow and meagre, and is overshadowed by a beyond which is both mysterious and terrible. Of the world beyond he has no single comprehensive idea, but he acknowledges it in his expectation of the injuries and benefits which he may at any time receive from it. It is an abyss whose depths he has never sounded, but which he is forced practically to recognize, since he is at the mercy of forces which emanate from it.

The method of primitive religion is the inevitable sequel. In behalf of the interests which represent him, man must here, as ever, make the best terms he can with the powers which beset him. He has no concern with these powers except the desire to propitiate them. He has no knowledge of their working excepting as respects their bearing upon his interests. Obeying a law of human nature which is as valid now as then, he seeks for remedies whose proof is the cure which they effect. Let the association between a certain action on his own part and a favorable turn in the tide of fortune once be established, and the subsequent course of events will seem to confirm it. Coincidences are remembered, and exceptions forgotten. Furthermore, there always remains, as the final justification for his belief in the effectual working of the established plan, the difficulty of proving any other alternative plan to be better.

But, in order to understand superstition, it is not necessary to reconstruct the earliest period in the history of society, nor even to study contemporary savage life; for the superstitious intelligence and the superstitious method survive in every stage of development. They appear, for example, in mediaeval Christianity; in Clovis's appeal to Christ on the battlefield, "Clotilda says that Thou art the Son of the living God, and that Thou dost give victory to those who put their trust in Thee. I have besought my gods, but they give me no aid. I see well that their strength is naught. I beseech Thee, and I will believe in Thee, only save

me from the hands of mine enemies." The same period is represented by the petition attributed to Saint Eloi, "Give, Lord, since we have given! *Da, Domine, quia dedimus!*"<sup>5</sup> In modern life the motive of superstition pervades almost all worship, appearing in prayer for rain or the healing of the sick, and in sundry expectations of special favor to be gained by service or importunity.

The application of critical enlightenment to this type of religion has already been made with general consent. It is recognized that morally superstition represents the merely prudential level of life. It bespeaks a state of panic or a narrow regard for isolated needs and desires. Furthermore, it tends to emphasize these considerations and at the same time degrade the object of worship through claiming the attention of God in their behalf. The deity is conceived not under the form of a broad and consecutive purpose, but under the form of a casual and desultory good nature.

But superstition has been corrected mainly by the advancement of scientific knowledge. Science has pronounced finally against the belief in localized or isolated natural processes. Whether the mechanical theory be accepted or not, its method is beyond question in so far as it defines laws and brings all events and phenomena under their control. So far as nature is concerned, there can be no favoritism, no special dispensations, no bargaining over the counter.

The correction of superstition brings us to our second type, which I have chosen to call *tutelary religion*. It is distinguished by the fact that life is organized into a definite purpose, which, although still narrow and partisan with reference to humanity at large, nevertheless embraces and subordinates the manifold desires of a community. The deity represents this purpose in the cosmos at large, and rallies the forces of nature to its support. He is no longer capricious, but is possessed of a character defined by systematic devotion to an end. His ways are the ways of effectiveness. Furthermore, since his aims are identical with those of his worshippers, he is now loved and served for himself. It follows that he will demand of his followers only conformity to those rules which define the realization of the com-

<sup>5</sup> Munro and Sellery, *Mediaeval Civilization*, pp. 80, 75.

mon aim, and that these rules will be enforced by the community as the conditions of its secular well-being. Ritual is no longer arbitrary, but is based on an enlightened knowledge of ways and means.

While this type of religion is clearly present in the most primitive tribal worship, it is best exemplified when a racial or national purpose manifests itself aggressively and self-consciously, as in the cases of ancient Assyria and Egypt. Here God is identified with the kingship, both being symbols of nationality. Among the Assyrians the national purpose was predominantly one of military aggrandizement. Istar communicates to Esarhaddon this promise of support: "Fear not, O Esarhaddon; the breath of inspiration which speaks to thee is spoken by me, and I conceal it not. . . . I am the mighty mistress, Istar of Arbela, who have put thine enemies to flight before thy feet. Where are the words which I speak unto thee, that thou hast not believed them? . . . I am Istar of Arbela; in front of thee and at thy side do I march. Fear not, thou art in the midst of those that can heal thee; I am in the midst of thy host."<sup>6</sup>

Egyptian nationality was identified rather with the principles of agriculture and political organization. The deity is the fertilizing Nile, or the judge of right conduct. There is recorded in the Book of the Dead the pleading of a soul before Osiris, in which the commands of the god are thus identified with the conditions of national welfare.

I have not committed fraud and evil against men.  
I have not diverted justice in the judgment hall.  
I have not known meanness.  
I have not caused a man to do more than his day's work.  
I have not caused a slave to be ill treated by his overseer.  
I have not committed murder.  
I have not spoiled the bread of offering in the temples.  
I have not added to the weight of the balance.  
I have not taken milk from the mouths of children.  
I have not turned aside the water at the time of inundation.  
I have not cut off an arm of the river in its course.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Sayce, *Babylonians and Assyrians*, p. 253.

<sup>7</sup> Wiedemann, *Religion of the Ancient Egyptians*, p. 250.

Similar illustrations might be drawn from the nationalistic phase of Hebraism. The same principle appears in mediaeval Christianity, and is thus embodied in the prologue of the Salic Law, "Long live the Christ who loves the Franks." In more recent times one might point to the Christianity of the Puritan revolution, not wholly misrepresented by the maxim popularly attributed to Cromwell, "Put your trust in God and keep your powder dry," or in Poor Richard's observation that "God helps them that help themselves."

Such is the religion of nationalism, sectarianism, of sustained but narrow purpose. I shall not attempt to formulate exhaustively the ideas through which this religion has been corrected. It is clear that its defect lies in its partisanship. All forms of partisanship yield slowly but inevitably to the higher conception of social solidarity. Such enlightenment reflects a recognition of community of interest, and a widening of sympathy through intercourse and acquaintance. Tutelary religion, in short, is corrected through the validity of the ethical principles of justice and good will. The cosmological correction of this type of religion is due to the same enlightenment that discredits superstition, a knowledge, namely, of a systematic unity of the cosmos. The laws of nature are as indifferent to private purposes as they are to private desires, and whether they be personal or social in their scope. Furthermore the universality of God is recognized in principle in the rules of worship. For a god of war or agriculture or politics cannot be privately appropriated. If the observance of the principles proper to these institutions brings success to one, it brings success to all. In short, a god of nationality must be a god of all nations.

The correction of tutelary religion brings us at length to a type which may be said to be formally enlightened. Both components of belief, the ethical and the cosmological, are universalized. I shall call this type, in its general form, *philosophical religion*, since it recognizes the unities which systematic reflection defines. It recognizes, on the one hand, the summing up of life in a universal ideal, and on the other hand, a summing up of the total environment in some scientifically formulated generalization. It affirms the priority of justice and good-will

over party interest, and the determination of the world without reference to special privilege. Religion is now the issue between the good—the highest good, the good of all—and the undivided cosmos.

Within the limits of philosophical religion thus broadly defined, there is yet provision for almost endless variety of belief. Religions may still differ in tradition, symbolism, and ritual. They may differ as moral codes and sentiments differ, and reflect all shades of opinion as this is determined by discovery and criticism.

But I propose to confine myself to a difference which is at once the most broad and fundamental, and the most clearly defined, in contemporary controversy. This difference relates to neither ethics nor cosmology exclusively, but to the religious judgment itself in which these two are united. How is the universe in its entirety to be construed with reference to the good? In both of the answers which I propose to consider it is claimed that goodness in some sense possesses the world. Hence both may be called *idealisms*. But in one of these answers, which I shall call *metaphysical idealism*, the cosmological motive receives the greater emphasis. The good is construed in terms of being; and, in order that it may be absolutely identified therewith, its original nature must, if necessary, be compromised. In the other, the ethical motive predominates. It is held that goodness must not lose its meaning, even if it be necessary that its claims upon the cosmos should be somewhat abated.

*Metaphysical idealism* is the extreme form of the optimistic bias. It provides a moral individual with a sense of proprietorship in the universe; it justifies him in the belief that the moral victory has been won from all eternity. Goodness is held to be the very essence and condition of being.

Let me briefly state the inherent difficulty in this philosophy of religion. Being is judged to be identical with good. But the world of experience is not good; it must therefore be condemned as unreal. Wherein, then, lies the goodness of being? If an empty formalism is to be avoided, the all-good and all-real must be restored to the world of experience. But, as the all-real it cannot consistently be identified with only a part of that world; and if it be identified with the whole, its all-goodness contradicts the moral

distinction between good and evil. The theory is now confronted with the opposite danger, that of materialism, or moral promiscuousness. Let me illustrate this full swing of the pendulum from formalism to materialism by briefly summarizing certain well-known types of religious philosophy.

At the formalistic extreme stands the Buddhistic pessimism, which rests on a recognition of the inevitable taint of this world, of the implication of evil in life. To avoid this taint, the all-real and all-good must be freed even from existence. It can be conceived and attained only by denial. Nirvana is at once the all-real, the all-good, and—in terms of the existent world—nothing.

Other-worldliness is the Christian modification of the Oriental philosophy of illusion. Heaven is a world beyond, to be exchanged for this. It is not constituted by the denial of this world, as is Nirvana, but access to it is conditioned by such denial. It is goodness and happiness hypostasized, and offered as compensation for martyrdom. But since every natural impulse and source of satisfaction must be repudiated, it remains a purely formal conception, except in so far as the worldly imagination unlawfully figures it. Rigorously construed, it consists only in obedience, a willing of God's will, whatever that may be.

Mysticism, which appears as a motive in all religions of this type, defines the all-real and all-good in terms of the consummation of a progression certain intermediate stages of which constitute man's present activities. In Brahmanism, God is the perfect unity, which may be approximated by dwelling on identities and ignoring differences; in Platonism, God is the good-for-all, which may be approximated by dwelling exclusively upon the utilities and fitnesses of things. The absolute world still remains beyond this world and excludes it, although a hint of its actual nature may now be obtained. But there at once appears a formidable difficulty. So long as the absolute world is wholly separated from this world, and therefore purely formal, evil need not be imputed to it; but at the moment when it is conceived by completing and perfecting certain processes belonging to this world, it is committed to these processes with all their implications, and tends to be usurped by them. In other words, heaven, in so far as it obtains meaning, grows worldly.

In the conception which may be termed *panlogism*, heaven is boldly removed to earth. It is identified with laws or other universals that lie within the scope of human intelligence and control the course of nature. God is now immanent rather than transcendent; he has obtained a certain definable content. But the difficulty which has already appeared in mysticism now grows more formidable. How can it be said that a being that coincides with the known laws of nature works only good? Among the Stoics the attempt was made to conceive all necessities as somehow "beneficial," as somehow good in the commonly accepted sense of the term.\* But even the Stoics found themselves compelled to abandon the common conception of goodness. And in Spinoza the motive of panlogism is clear and uncompromising. God as the immanent order of the world is good only in that he is necessary—good only in so far as he satisfies the logical interest and enables the mind to understand. In panlogism, then, we find metaphysical idealism already compelled in behalf of its cardinal principle to deny the moral consciousness. But this is not all. For, even were it to be admitted that mere system and order constitute the good wholly without reference to their bearing on the concerns of life, the fact remains that even such a good does not fairly represent the character of this world. For experience conveys not only law, but also irrelevance and chaos; not only harmony but also discord.

To meet this last difficulty, and at the same time better to provide for the complexity of human interests, metaphysical idealism finally assumes the aesthetic form. The absolute world, the all-real and all-good, is boldly construed in terms of the historical process itself, with all its concreteness and immediacy. Endless detail, contrast, and even contradiction may be brought under the form of aesthetic value. The very flux of experience, the very struggles and defeats of life, are not without their picturesqueness and dramatic quality. Upon this romantic love of tumult and privation is founded the last of all metaphysical idealisms. A strange sequel to the doctrine of despair with which our brief survey began!

\* Cf., e.g., Epictetus, *Discourses*, chap. 8.



I can only recapitulate most briefly the characteristic limitations of an aesthetic idealism. Firstly, in spite of the fact that aesthetic value may be extraordinarily comprehensive in its content, as a value it is none the less narrow and exclusive. For in order that experience may have aesthetic value, an aesthetic interest must be taken in it. And even were all experience to satisfy some such interest, this would in no wise provide for the endless variety of non-aesthetic interests that are also taken in it. Thus, were it to be proved that life on the whole is picturesque, this would in no way affect the fact that it is also painful, stultifying, and otherwise abounding in evil.

But, even if it were to be granted that aesthetic value embraces and subordinates all other values, this higher value would still exist only where such an aesthetic interest was actually fulfilled. If it were assumed that the totality of the world is pleasing in the sight of God, this would in no way affect the fact that it is otherwise in the eyes of men. Those who furnish a spectacle which has dramatic value for an observer do not themselves share in that value. It is an incontrovertible fact that even the aesthetic interests of men are actually defeated; and this whether or no some other aesthetic interest, that for example of a divine onlooker, is fulfilled.

But the radical defect of this aesthetic philosophy of religion lies in its absolute discrediting of moral distinctions. Optimism has so far overreached itself as to sacrifice the very meaning of goodness. In order that the ideal may possess the world, it has been reduced to the world. God is no more than a name for the unmitigated reality. Like Hardy's Spirit of the Years, he is the mere affirmation of things as they are:

I view, not urge; nor more than mark  
 What designate your titles Good and Ill.  
 'Tis not in me to feel with, or against,  
 These flesh-hinged mannikins Its hand upwinds  
 To click-clack off Its preadjusted laws;  
 But only through my centuries to behold  
 Their aspects, and their movements, and their mould.\*

\* Hardy, *The Dynasts*, Part i, p. 6.

Morally, there could be no more sinister interpretation of life. It offers itself as a philosophy of hope, promising the lover of good that his purpose shall be fulfilled, nay, that it is fulfilled from all eternity. But when the pledge is redeemed, it is found to stipulate that the good shall mean only life as it is already possessed. In other words, man is promised what he wants if he will agree to want what he has. This is worse than a sorry jest. It is a philosophy of moral dissolution, discrediting every downright judgment of good and evil, removing the grounds upon which is based every single-minded endeavor to purify and consummate life. John Davidson says: "Irony integrates good and evil, the constituents of the universe. It is that Beyond-Good-and-Evil that somebody clamored for."<sup>10</sup> Irony is indeed the last refuge of that uncompromising optimism that equates goodness and being.

But the bankruptcy of metaphysical idealism does not end the matter. There is another idealism in which religious faith both confirms moral endeavor and gives it the incentive of hope. This idealism establishes itself upon an unequivocal acceptance of moral truth. It calls good good and evil evil, with all the finality which attaches to the human experience of these things, leaving no room for compromise. Its faith lies in the expectation that the world shall become good through the elimination of evil; it manifests itself in the resolution to hasten that time. God is loved for the enemies he has made. Evil is hated without reservation as none of his doing, and man is free to reverence the Lord his God with all his heart.

From the standpoint of *moral idealism* the universe resumes something of its pristine ruggedness and grandeur. If, as James says, "the world appears as something more epic than dramatic," the dignity of life is enhanced and not diminished on that account.<sup>11</sup> Life is not a spiritual exercise the results of which are discounted in advance; but is actually creative, fashioning and perfecting a good that has never been. And the moment evil is conceived as the necessary but diminishing complement to partial success, the sting of it is gone. Evil as a temporary and accidental necessity is tolerable; but not so an evil which is

<sup>10</sup> Davidson, *A Rosary*, p. 88.

<sup>11</sup> James, *Pragmatism*, p. 144.

absolutely necessary, and which must be construed with some hypothetical divine satisfaction.

This in no way contradicts the fact that the fullest life under present conditions involves contact with evil. Innocence must be tragic if it is not to be weak. Jesus without the cross would possess something of that quality of unreality which attaches to Aristotle's high-minded man. But this does not prove that life involves evil; it proves only that life will be narrow and complacent when it is out of touch with things as they are. Since evil is now real, he who altogether escapes it is ignorant and idle, taking no hand in the real work to be done. Not to feel pain when pain abounds, not to bear some share of the burden, is indeed cause for shame. In that remarkable allegory, "The Man who was Thursday," Chesterton has most vividly presented this truth. In the last confrontation, the real anarchist, the spokesman of Satan, accuses the friends of order of being happy, of having been protected from suffering. But the philosopher, who has hitherto been unable to understand the despair to which he and his companions have been driven, repels this slander.

"I see everything," he cried, "everything that there is. Why does each thing on the earth war against each other thing? Why does each small thing in the world have to fight against the world itself? . . . So that each thing that obeys law may have the glory and isolation of the anarchist. So that each man fighting for order may be as brave and good a man as the dynamiter. So that the real lie of Satan may be flung back in the face of this blasphemer, so that by tears and torture we may earn the right to say to this man, 'You lie!' No agonies can be too great to buy the right to say to this accuser, 'We also have suffered.'

"It is not true that we have never been broken. We have been broken upon the wheel. . . . We have descended into hell. We were complaining of unforgettable miseries even at the very moment when this man entered insolently to accuse us of happiness. I repel the slander; we have not been happy."<sup>12</sup>

But the charge of happiness is to be repelled as a slander only because there are real sufferers in the world to make the charge. It is after all not happiness but insensibility which is the real

<sup>12</sup> Chesterton, *The Man who was Thursday*, p. 278.

disgrace. If the suffering is real, not to see it, not to feel it, not to heal it, is intolerable. To say, however, that suffering is willfully caused in order that it may eventually contribute to an ultimate reconciliation, is to charge God with something worse than complacency. If life is a real tragedy, it can be endured, and to enter into it will bring the deep satisfaction which every form of heroism affords. But if the tragedy of life be preconceived and wilfully perpetrated, it must be resented for the sake of self-respect. Even man possesses a dignity which is not consistent with puppetry and mock heroics.

Moral idealism means to interpret life consistently with ethical, scientific, and metaphysical truth. It endeavors to justify the maximum of hope, without compromising or confusing any enlightened judgment of truth. In this it is, I think, not only consistent with the spirit of a liberal and rational age, but also with the primary motive of religion. There can be no religion with reservations, fearful of increasing light. No man can do the work of religion without an open and candid mind as well as an indomitable purpose.

I cannot here elaborate the evidence upon which moral idealism is grounded; but it might be broadly classified as ethical, cosmological, and historical. The ethical ground of moral idealism is the virtual unity of life, the working therein of one eventual purpose sustained by the good will of all moral beings. The cosmological proof lies in the moral fruitfulness and plasticity of nature. The historical proof lies in the fact of moral progress, in the advent and steady betterment of life.

In conclusion I wish to revert to the topic of the generic proof of religion. We have defined the tests which any special religion must meet, and unless conformably to such tests it is possible to justify some form of idealism, it is clear that the full possibilities of religion as a source of strength and consolation must fail to be realized. But it may now be affirmed that there is a moral value in religion which is independent of the cosmological considerations which prove or disprove a special religion. No scientific or metaphysical evidence can controvert the fact that man is engaged in an enterprise which comprehends all the actualities and possibilities of life, and that the success of this enterprise is con-

ditioned in the end on the compliance of the universe. A summing up of the situation as involving these two factors is morally inevitable. Some solution of the problem, assimilated and enacted, in other words, some form of piety, is no more than the last stage of moral growth.

The value of religious belief, in this generic moral sense, consists in the enlargement of the circle of life. Man knows the best and the worst. He walks in the open, apprehending the world in its full sweep and just proportions. An inclusive view of the universe, whatever it may reveal, throws into relief the lot of man. Religion promulgates the idea of life as a whole, and composes and proportions its activities with reference to their ultimate end. Religion advocates not the virtues in their severalty, but the whole moral enterprise. With this it affiliates all the sundry activities of life, thus bringing both action and thought under the form of service of the ideal. At the same time it offers a supreme object for the passions, which are otherwise divided against themselves, or vented upon unworthy and fantastical objects. Through being thus economized and guided, these moving energies may be brought to support moral endeavor and bear it with them in their current.

Piety carries with it also that sense of high resolve without which life must be haunted with a sense of ignominy. This is the immediate value of the good will: the full deliverance of one's self to the cause of goodness. This value is independent of attainment. It is that *doing of one's best* which is the least that one can do. Having sped one's action with good will, one can only leave the outcome to the confluence and summing of like forces. But such service is blessed both in the eventualities and in a present harmony as well. The good of participation in the greatest and most worthy enterprise is proved in its lending fruitfulness, dignity, and momentousness to action; but also in its infusing the individual life with that ardor and tenderness which is called the love of humanity and of God, and which is the only form of happiness that fully measures up to the awakened moral consciousness.

Since religion emphasizes the unity of life and supplies it with meaning and dignity, it is the function of religion to kindle moral enthusiasm in society at large. Religion is responsible for the

prestige of morality. As an institution, it is the appointed guardian and medium of that supreme value which is hidden from the world; of that finality which, in the course of human affairs, is so easily lost to view and so infrequently proved. It is therefore the function of the religious leader to make men lovers, not of the parts, but of the whole of goodness. Embarrassed by their very plenitude of life, men require to have the good will that is in them aroused and put in control. This, then, is the work of religion: to strike home to the moral nature itself, and to induce in men a keener and more vivid realization of their latent preference for the higher over the lower values. This office requires for its fulfilment a constructive moral imagination, a power to arouse and direct the contagious emotions, and the use of the means of personality and ritual for the creation of a sweetening and uplifting environment.

In culture and religion human life is brought to the elevation which is proper to it. They are both forms of discipline through which is inculcated that spirit of magnanimity and service which is the mark of spiritual maturity. But while culture is essentially contemplative, far-seeing, sensitive, and tolerant, religion is more stirring and vital. Both are love of perfection, but culture is admiration; religion concern. "Not he that saith Lord, Lord, but he that doeth the will of his Father, shall be saved." In religion the old note of fear is always present. It is a perpetual watchfulness lest the work of life be undone, or lest a chance for the best be forfeited.

*THE EVANGELIZATION OF JAPAN VIEWED IN  
ITS INTELLECTUAL ASPECT*

DANJO EBINA

TOKYO, JAPAN

When Protestant missionaries arrived in Japan with the religion of one God and the brotherhood of mankind, the native religions of Japan were in a deplorable condition. Buddhism had received such a fatal blow that there could be no hope of its revival. It was almost destroyed by the revolution of 1868. Many priests and monks had left their professions. Some became Shintoists; others became officers, soldiers, teachers, merchants, or artisans. Temples were deserted, and used for schools, offices, or barracks. Bells were converted into cannon. Sacred books were burned or sold as waste paper. Idols were standing neglected, partly stripped or broken—despised, mocked, and shunned. Compared with Buddhism, Confucianism was in a somewhat better state; but some of its progressive adherents, filled with admiration for western science, lost faith in the sacred books, and turned from the study of them to that of science. Those who still adhered to Confucianism were despised as conservative, bigoted, ignorant, and narrow-minded, unable to go forward in the advancing steps of the nation. At the time of the revolution Shintoism gained the ascendancy, and for a time was considered a state religion. The decree of the emperor was given in the name of the heavenly gods. "Return to your origin and be grateful to the beginning" was the motto of the loyal and patriotic. But among the preachers and adherents of this movement there were many who went to extremes, insisting that along with the power of the emperor everything else that was ancient should be restored. Some of these nationalists were narrow-minded, especially in their attitude toward foreigners. They insisted that the holy land of Japan should not be trodden down and defiled by unclean strangers. Meanwhile the tide of the revolution changed its course from restoration to progress, from exclusiveness to open-

mindfulness. It began to flow directly against the principles of Shintoism then held by many. This decided its destiny. Shintoism met the same fate as Jewish Christianity in the first century of the Christian era. Thus Buddhism, Confucianism, and Shintoism had been, one after another, submerged in the overwhelming tides of the revolution when Christianity appeared in the extra-territorial establishments of foreign residents.

Though the soil was thus ploughed and made ready for the seed, Christianity was not a religion to be at once welcomed by the people. It had failed three hundred years before to take root in Japan, and had lost the confidence of the people. It was at that time too extreme, too exclusive, and too intolerant of other faiths. Its Spanish adherents persecuted the people of other faiths at Nagasaki, and tortured them with cruel instruments which Japan had never known. No wonder that the tolerant and gentle-hearted Japanese hated Christianity as an enemy to gods and men! The government had also discovered the political intrigues of the Jesuits, and decided to expel them at once. From that time, for more than two hundred and fifty years, Christianity had been dreaded as the religion of devils. This was the religion in name, notwithstanding the radical change of its spirit and principle, which came again with the new civilization. Though the people were very enthusiastic to receive anything that was new, they hesitated to accept Christianity, because it seemed to them but the same evil in new form against which Japan had been compelled against her will to close her doors for almost three centuries. Missionaries patiently waited for the change of national sentiment and attempted gradually to introduce Christian truth. It was slow work; only patience could accomplish it.

Meanwhile western science and thought spread over all Japan with wonderful rapidity. Rousseau's *Social Contract*, Montesquieu's *Spirit of Laws*, Mill's *Representative Government* and *Three Essays on Religion*, Bentham's *Legislation*, and Thomas Paine's *Age of Reason* were translated, and eagerly read by many people. Buckle's *History of Civilization* and Draper's *Conflict between Science and Religion* were also read. I need not say that Spencer's works were very popular. Some of the advocates



of western civilization thought it advisable to introduce Christianity also. Their moral and intellectual influence was considerable, and, as they were the leaders of new thought, their voices were regarded as prophetic. Two of them were already Christians. One was Dr. Nakamura, the greatest Chinese scholar of Japan, and the other was Viscount Mori, who became the minister of education. The latter was the first advocate of strict monogamy, and of the abolition of the *eta*, or outcast, class. The former translated Smiles's *Self-help and Character* and Mill's *Essay on Liberty*. As they advanced in thought, they came, however, to see, and to acknowledge without reserve, that there were many doctrines in Christian belief which could in no way be reconciled with the requirements of reason. Gradually their faith became cold, and finally died out, though their Christian character was retained. If they had become the champions of Protestant Christianity in Japan, their religious influence might have been tremendous. But, alas! this opportunity was missed. It pleased God that the burden of the task should be placed, not on the shoulders of older men, but on those of the younger generation that succeeded them.

While western thought was spreading speedily, only a small number of young men who were studying the English language and western science were affected by the Christian idea of ethics, religion, and science. Four things especially in Christianity impressed them deeply—the idea of one living God and his universe, the new life of freedom, the Christian idea of chastity, and the universal brotherhood of mankind. They were convinced that these truths should form the spiritual foundation of new Japan. They believed the gospel of Christ as it is clearly stated in the Sermon on the Mount, and received baptism, which was then a very bold step. Some became Christians at Yokohama, some at Kumamoto, some at Sapporo, some at Hirosaki and elsewhere—the majority led to the truth by foreign teachers both in Government and private schools. Almost all these young men were the sons of Samurai. They became earnest preachers of the Gospel and the founders of Christian churches in new Japan.

The task which they took upon themselves was a very hard one.

"Without were fightings and within were fears." They had to fight with the long-inherited prejudice of their fellow-countrymen against Christianity. Their battles were not alone with mortally wounded Buddhism, Confucianism, and Shintoism, but with vigorous European infidelity also, which was already introduced and not to be easily defeated. They had fears within themselves. They must reconcile themselves to many hard Christian doctrines before they could preach—the infallibility of the Bible, the credibility of miracles, the partiality of divine government, the origin of evil, the doctrine of the Trinity, the doctrine of two natures in one person, the doctrine of vicarious blood atonement, the plan of redemption, future retribution, and so forth. Missionaries, who inherited these doctrines from their ancestors without asking any questions, were surprised by the searching questions put to them by their pupils—questions which seemed to them strange and even impious. Sometimes they tried to suppress them as instigated by evil, but in vain. To the Japanese mind these traditional doctrines did not appear axiomatic, but questionable. Was it necessary to believe them equally with the truths of one living God and the new spiritual life of freedom, chastity, and the brotherhood of mankind?

Though oppressed by such doubts, these young men could not but preach. "Necessity is laid upon me; for woe is unto me if I preach not the gospel," was an inner feeling of compulsion that they could not suppress. By their zealous and pure lives they led many to Christ, although they could not satisfactorily answer the difficult questions put to them. Churches were founded here and there—the light of the nation. Christian work went on prosperously for fifteen years, from 1872, in which the first church was founded at Yokohama, to 1888, the year of Viscount Mori's assassination. Outside of Christian circles there were also some tendencies that helped the spread of the new religion. The Europeanization of Japan was the far-reaching demand of intelligent men, to which not a few listened with approval. Many understood that this demand included Christianization also, and thus it helped considerably the spread of Christianity. This period was the bright morning of Protestant missions in Japan.

The period of spontaneous faith passed, and that of reason ensued. While Christianity was being propagated, the scientific doctrine of evolution was spreading; Darwin's *Origin of Species* and *Descent of Man* were eagerly read by many educated people. From the first, Christian missionaries taught the Copernican theory of the universe, which conflicted with the astronomical theories of Buddhism and Confucianism. They were thus esteemed as heralds of new knowledge, and Christianity was regarded as a patron of science and philosophy. But it was soon discovered that the missionaries were very conservative in regard to the doctrine of evolution. Some branded it openly as a false philosophy, the wisdom of this world that soon passes away. On the other hand, scientists began to attack Christianity as a religion of the ignorant and backward, which could not keep abreast of science; it had done its appointed work and bequeathed its task to science, its rightful successor. Foreign missionaries and native scientists could not be reconciled to each other. The stories of creation in Genesis could not be accounted for in the light of science. The infallibility of the Bible could not be maintained beside the scientific doctrine of evolution. Some tried to affirm that the Bible is inspired only so far as the ethical and religious truths were concerned, but this was considered a lame solution. As the young Christians of scientific culture grew in religious experience and thought, they found out more and more fully the irreconcilable contradiction between modern culture and some of the Christian doctrines. They prayed earnestly, and sometimes even expostulated before God. That we cannot have both faith and knowledge was the conclusion of some earnestly pious minds. The Japanese already felt the power of the living God in the innermost depth of their hearts, in spite of disturbing doubt concerning some Christian doctrines. It was thus impossible for them to forsake their faith and follow after science; although it must be frankly stated that some, whose religious experience was not sufficiently deep, failed to maintain their religious life with some of their beliefs thus contradicted and plainly demonstrated to be absurd. A still greater and harder trial awaited them.

Intelligent Christians found out not only the contradictions

between science and Christianity, but the inner contradiction between Christian experience and doctrine. For instance, they were taught that God is supramundane, dwelling in the highest heaven, yet coming down at times to intervene in the actions of men. They were taught also that he is the creator of heaven and earth, the first cause of all things, and that he had appeared at sundry times to reveal his will to his chosen people. On the other hand, they experienced in themselves the reality of the Holy Spirit, who is ever present in the Christian consciousness as the comforter and the teacher of all truth. They were taught also that the Holy Spirit is God. The idea of God as the first cause might please their intellect, but could not satisfy the requirement of their religious consciousness, which demands the immediate presence of God within as well as above. "As the hart panteth after the water-brooks, so panteth my soul after thee, O God," is the longing cry of the pious soul of Japan. If the Holy Spirit be God himself, Christian experience testifies that men have God in themselves. "Having God in us," they questioned, "must we go to the records of the ancients to know the truth?" Is the age of revelation passed? Must revealed truth be stereotyped in books, and handed down to generations that have no knowledge of God in themselves? Has he not rather been revealing his truth to his sons and daughters in an ever better way as mankind has advanced in its capacity of understanding? They were not only taught that God is a gracious father, who gives bountifully a spirit of sonship that cries after God, "Abba, Father," but they experienced in themselves a heart yearning after God, and were convinced that God is really their Father, ever near them, forgiving their sins, and receiving and caressing them in his loving arms.

What did it mean, again, that one should die to appease the divine wrath? "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have eternal life"—this is the voice of the deepest Christian experience. Is it not a contradiction to offer a human or divine sacrifice to propitiate such a loving father? Is not this doctrine a contradictory combination of the Jewish idea of God according to law and the Christian idea of God according to

love? God lives in us and we live in him through the same spiritual essence that exists in God and man. Is it necessary that such an intermediate being as the angel Gabriel should come down and intercede between them? If God is the father of mankind, does he not make his sun of righteousness rise on Mohammedans and Jews, and send his rain of grace on Christians and Buddhists? Are not all religions the revelations of one eternal, omnipresent God, the father of all, who is over all, through all, and in all? If the patriarchs, prophets, and saints of Israel are in heaven, why not the sages, wise men, philosophers, and saints of all the world? Not that there is no distinction between Christianity and other religions. As the revelations of the old dispensation were not equal to the new, so all revelations are not of the same kind and degree. One form of Christianity is superior to another, according to the law of evolution. But there is no doubt that the highest, clearest, and richest will supersede all. God has been educating mankind from the beginning even until now. The great Apostle of the Gentiles taught that there are many stages of belief; so that it is not necessary to follow all the details of revelation, either in the old or in the new dispensation. Paul plainly expressed his own experience when he said: "When I was a child, I spake as a child, I felt as a child, I thought as a child; now that I am become a man, I put away childish things. For now we see in a mirror darkly, but then face to face; now I know in part, but then shall I know fully even as also I was fully known."

These thoughts, questions, doubts, upset the minds of the young ministers of Japan. They felt that they must solve these problems themselves. Collision between the missionaries and the thinking native ministers was inevitable. The former were very solicitous for the latter, as an aged father for his young and enterprising son. Misunderstandings and ill feelings alienated the two parties. For a time they could not work harmoniously as before. It was a sad situation. German missionaries, the representatives of the liberal school, arrived; American Unitarian missionaries also came in the early part of this critical period. Though the liberals did not succeed in organizing strong churches, they diffused their liberal thought. It was at first

controverted by native ministers, but at last captivated them. Not a few bright young scholars of the Congregational faith went over to liberalism and became an intermediate link between liberal Christianity and Congregationalism in Japan.

One more difficulty had to be overcome. Ever since the introduction of western science and civilization Japan had been surprised and blinded by the dazzling light of the intellectual attainment of the western nations. She lost her self-consciousness in admiration and her self-respect in blindly following their footsteps. But when some of the Japanese patriots found out how conscious the western nations are of their own powers and proud of their own things and ways, the conviction flashed upon their minds that without self-consciousness and national pride a nation cannot maintain her dignity and make her people patriotic, energetic, and virtuous. Thus they brought Japan to reflect about herself, and to inquire what good and valuable things she had of her own; she began to be conscious of her own nationality; she found out that she had not a few valuable possessions. She perceived that she must be independent, dignified, and follow her own ways. To do otherwise would be unpatriotic and dishonorable to herself. Thus came a reactionary feeling against the Europeanization of Japan. The people began again to set up their native religions against Christianity, which they stigmatized as a foreign religion. The national feeling awakened; Buddhism, Confucianism, and Shintoism began to revive and to resume their former glory. Viscount Mori was assassinated for innovation and sacrilege. Count Okuma was struck down because his treaty revision was supposed to bring dishonor to the nation. Reactionary feeling became intense. Just at this time the imperial edict on education was issued. It was interpreted by many as the voice of the Japanese nation, maintaining itself against Christianity and stigmatizing it as a foreign innovation.

This national consciousness did not fail to affect the Christians. Some Japanese ministers, conscious of their own peculiar experiences, began to emphasize what was national and unique in their religious experience, protesting that a true Christian may be a true citizen, not only of the British Empire or the American Republic, but of Japan also, and interpreting the national spirit

in a broader way and with a deeper meaning. They endeavored to set up what is called the Christianity of Japan; that is, a Christianity founded on, or interpreted by, the peculiar religious consciousness of the Japanese. As Latin Christianity differs from Greek, and both from Teutonic, Christianity, so there may well be an Oriental or Japanese Christianity. This religious spirit, reflecting the national spirit, stood up and bravely fought against jingoism, as hard steel against a blunt sword. Yet it appeared to some not a development of the teachings of the missionaries, but a rebellion against them. While some thought it a degeneration, many prized it as their own glorious production. The so-called Christianity of Japan—let it be said—is as yet nothing but a germ. Whether it will grow and attain to its own ideal life is for the future to reveal.

One more important fact is to be noted, as a result of the blended spirit of Congregationalism and nationalism. The American Board of Missions emphasized the self-supporting principle. It was welcomed by the Japanese. The poor and inexperienced young Christians endeavored to organize self-supporting churches under the auspices of their foreign teachers. But, when they became more resolute to follow their own ways and govern themselves, they tried to be entirely independent of the influence of the missionaries. While the missionaries were petting them as small, clever boys, they ventured to take the responsibility of entire self-management upon themselves. Those who bring up strong boys will endure harder experiences than others. Such was the experience of the missionaries of the American Board in Japan during this critical period.

The discipline of the young Christians in Japan was indeed a severe one. But through this divine ordeal the churches were purified, strengthened, and prepared for a greater and more important task. During these internal and external struggles, two important events favorable for Christianity occurred in Japan. The constitution was promulgated in 1889; and freedom of faith was declared. Hitherto the spread of Christianity was winked at. After the promulgation of the constitution no one could say publicly that Christianity was a prohibited religion. This was no small gain.

The great Chino-Japanese war took place in 1894. Some imagined that, if the Japanese were victorious, they would be puffed up with vanity, arrogance, and self-conceit, and hold the religion of Christ in contempt. In this they were mistaken. The war broadened the minds of the people. Their political and commercial activity became wider than before. With the growth of the national consciousness, the nation felt a greater responsibility. Victory made Japan humble, and conscious of her want of moral power. Professors of the Imperial University were convinced of the lack of the spiritual element in their instruction, and tried to find a warrant for it in the Imperial Edict on education. Shintoism was consulted as a guide at hand. The Shintoists and their ardent pupils boldly emphasized the national spirit exemplified in Shintoism, and vehemently attacked both Buddhism and Christianity as aliens. Apparently they were about to triumph; but in reality they were behind the time. The national spirit expanded on a larger scale than they had supposed. The spirit of Shintoism was too narrow, and not adequate to the enlarged national sympathy. Shintoism was forever doomed because the nation had outlived it, whereas Buddhism, with its universal law and transcendental idea, rose again, as it were, from the dead, claiming to be a sister religion of Christianity.

Buddhism no longer treats Christianity as its enemy, but looks complacently on its progress. With its optimistic faith, it has begun a new career, endeavoring to be the most comprehensive religion of the world ever produced. It tries to include Christianity as an important branch of itself, and regards Jesus as a Buddha. It has taken up Christian chastity, temperance, philanthropic work, prison improvement, Sunday-schools, young men's associations, translation of the sacred books into Japanese colloquial language, and so forth. Buddhism endeavors to keep abreast with Christianity. Whereas the latter is emphasizing the doctrine of divine immanence, the former emphasizes that of divine personality. The terms Buddha and God are now interchangeably used. The ideas of the Christian religion and ethics have been rapidly spreading, whether in the name of Christianity or in the name of Buddhism.



The period of these internal and external struggles lasted for eleven years, and ended with the close of the nineteenth century. During these eleven years Christians did not greatly increase. The number who fell away equalled the number received. Many intelligent men thought that Protestantism also had failed, as Catholicism seemed to have failed three hundred years ago. Perhaps Christianity was by its very nature ill-adapted to the Japanese. This judgment was erroneous. Christianity was not deteriorating during the years of its internal struggles, but undergoing a metamorphosis. "Life is conflict," says a great German philosopher. Christianity has often experienced just such severe trials as it did in Japan. Internal struggles have not always been detrimental to Christianity. Rather the fountain of Christian experience has become deeper and purer through them. Christianity recovered its strength, and was ready to spread anew with the commencement of the new century. Christians were no longer babes. Churches had become mature enough to carry out their self-governing policy.

Man cannot live by bread alone, much less by the husks that swine eat. Young men, especially students, began to yearn after spiritual food. For thirty years religion had been despised as a thing for the ignorant. The older men had had some sort of spiritual education in their youth, through the influence of Confucian teachings, but the younger generation had received none. Their minds were filled with the dry knowledge of western science and nothing more. They felt intensely in their hearts the lack of spiritual culture. They hungered after righteousness—not dead theories of ethics, but the living personality that touches the innermost heart. One of our brilliant scholars, who received the complete education of Japan, from the lowest grade of the common school to the highest grade of the Imperial University, cried out in pathetic tones, "Whereas I asked for bread, my teachers gave me a stone; I sought after a fish, but they gave me a serpent; I longed for eggs, but they gave me scorpions." Hundreds and thousands of students sympathized with this heart-rending cry. Carlyle, Tennyson, Wordsworth, Goethe, Schiller, Browning, Tolstoi, Byron, Milton, even Dante and Spinoza, were consulted to show the way of life. Longing after spiritual food

has never been so intense in Japan as during the last ten years. Some have tried to find the way of life in Confucianism; some have turned to Buddhism; and some have come to Christianity.

Yomei Gaku, the most spiritual school of Confucianism, has been resorted to by many. It teaches the essential spirituality of human nature. To be conscious of that is the beginning of knowledge. True knowledge realizes itself in conduct, and makes man essentially free and noble. Some Christian ministers, even, oppressed and annoyed by the complicated reasonings of systematic theology, have consulted this school and received much benefit.

Buddhism in its old form cannot meet this new longing. Only its newer types, reading the longing on the faces of their fellow-students, try to fulfil their need. There are two schools of the new Buddhism: one is something like Unitarianism, while the other is pious and practical like Methodism. Buddhistic Unitarianism is extremely rational, critical, and destructive. Its aim is to save the people from old superstitions and errors. It is not cold and indifferent, but zealous to fulfil its task. It has, however, very little of the religious element. The pious type of Buddhism emphasizes religious experience, the principal manifestations of which are peace, joy, comfort, and hope, the fruits of faith in one eternal merciful Buddha, who saves all sinners, giving himself for them. It holds the total depravity of human nature; that man is radically sinful, and has no capacity in himself to get rid of sin and guilt; only the gracious hand of all-merciful Amida can save mankind from its utter depravity. Beside these bodies, one more sect is becoming popular. It is that of Zen-shu, which teaches the essential spirituality of human nature and the vanity of the material world. Its first effort is to get a clear consciousness of Buddha, who lives in every soul on earth. There are many steps through which human souls must pass in order to enter Nirvana or to obtain Buddhahood, the perfect salvation of the soul. Thus two opposite doctrines, the total depravity of human nature and its essential spirituality, are proposed in the name of Buddhism, for the salvation of the people. Those of a weaker type prefer the former, while those of stronger mental constitution adopt the latter. Their ways are antipodal, but

their common goal is Buddhahood. One emphasizes the salvation of the soul by its own power; the other, salvation only through the power of another. These forms of Buddhism are now gaining strength and influence. It is a great and interesting problem whether they will prove able to accomplish the reform of Buddhism which they desire. They are very friendly to Christianity and Christians.

Meanwhile Christianity has recovered its former vigor, and again begun to spread. The atmosphere and soil have become more favorable to its propagation than before. The inherited prejudice has almost passed away. Students, both male and female, frequent in crowds the preaching of certain special pulpits. They do not come to hear something to satisfy their curiosity; they are earnestly seeking the bread of life. Not a few receive baptism. But Christianity is not yet readily received by educated men, and the uneducated still cling to their ancestral faith. New doubts have begun to trouble inquiring minds. What is Christianity? It is rather a new question. In former times the people were taught, and sincerely believed, that Christianity is the religion of devils. Such an absurd interpretation has been forever buried by the peaceful lives of the missionaries. What, then, is Christianity? Educated Japanese answer: It is the religion taught by most of the Protestant missionaries in the last forty years—that the world was created in six days through periodical divine interventions, and that man was formed from the dust of the earth by the divine hand; that God was existent as the Holy Trinity before the creation; that death entered into the world through the sin of Adam, the ancestor of all mankind; that one of the three persons in the Godhead came down from heaven to save mankind from eternal death, was incarnated in the Virgin Mary, performed many miracles, died on the cross to propitiate a wrathful God, was buried, and rose again bodily from the grave on the third day; that God lives somewhere in heaven, surrounded by angels and archangels, but sometimes comes down to earth to amend his work by supernatural operations; that Christ will come on the clouds of heaven to judge the world and separate the righteous from the wicked—and so forth. We once tried, they say, to believe this teaching, but could

not. The God of Christians is a creation of their own imagination. Christians are good men, doing good works, encouraging temperance and philanthropy, but their doctrines are unreasonable and contradictory to science. Christianity is a relic of the past; it does not deserve the faith of students.

If there be some who insist that the essence of Christianity is not creeds, notions, opinions, and theologies, but life and spirit, manifested in the ethico-religious consciousness of its founder and his followers, Japanese scholars declare that this is not genuine Christianity. Some conservative Christian ministers, also, assert that whatever is stated in the form of the new theology is not genuine Christianity; it preserves merely the name, stripped of its essential contents and doctrines. Japanese scholars are pleased to have this confirmation of their own contention, and turn it to prove the absurdity and worthlessness of Christianity.

There is one more obstacle to the progress of Christianity. Some Christians—though they are a very small number—are socialists or friends of extreme socialists. They condemn war absolutely, insisting that nationality is itself an evil. Some are anarchists. Hence many are suspicious of Christianity, imagining that it is the seed of socialism and anarchism, and urge strongly that it must not be allowed to spread among soldiers.

The experience of the great apostle of the Gentiles is still a reality—"Without were fightings, within were fears." But the God of Christ and his apostles has been ever present with the missionaries and the Christians of Japan, to will and to work in them for the furtherance of the eternal living gospel, the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of mankind. Christianity has succeeded at many points. The people have recognized the truth taught in the Sermon on the Mount—the fatherhood of God, the inner righteousness of spiritual disposition, the worth of the individual soul, chastity, monogamy as the basis of the family, and the brotherhood of man. None, whether they be Buddhists, Shintoists, or Confucianists, can gainsay these teachings; rather they now endeavor to realize them in their life and conduct. The Japanese long for whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honorable, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things

are of good repute; if there be any virtue, if there be any praise, they think on these things. The essence of Christianity as recently expounded by eminent scholars will be appreciated and gladly believed by many in Japan if demonstrated to be true Christianity. But it is doubtful if the traditional creeds and theologies will take root in the religious soil of Japan. Have they not been troubling many western Christians, presenting obstacles to the faith of philosophers and scientists? If that be the case in the West, why not also in the East? Japan longs after the essence and kernel, not the formal shell of Christianity.

The Japanese-Russian war did much to rouse the people from their spiritual torpor. Soldiers and officers, even the emperor himself, attribute the great victory to the unseen hand of Providence. The people have become more religious, and are ready to hear religious truth. The higher schools are open to religious teaching. Men of strong personality are invited by the school authorities to address the students, whether they be Christian ministers or not. People come in crowds to hear the addresses of eminent pastors and laymen. Last year the Congregational churches alone received over two thousand and three hundred new members. Business men are now beginning to realize that men who have genuine religious faith are more reliable than the unbelieving or superstitious. Some propose that the business principles of Japan be conformed to European standards. To accomplish this object, it is recognized that Christian principles should be inculcated in the minds of young business men. For a long time the business class was despised. Bushido, the virtue of Japan, was not taught as ethics for this class. Business men were left alone in their low morality and superstition. But they have just begun to see new light. As they come more and more in contact with the intellectual and moral civilization of the Anglo-Saxons through their business transactions, their eyes are opened to recognize the new principles on which their own business organization must be founded. Christianity has already taken root in the intellectual circles of Japan. If it succeeds also in taking root in the business world, it will triumph, and become the strongest moral power in Japan. Morality cannot be kindled except

by the intense heat of religious fire. Bushido, the virtue and glory of Japan, cannot be deeply inculcated in the minds of the people without the powerful aid of religion. Any authority that can sanctify virtue, any power that can nourish moral strength, will win the glorious leadership of Japan. Is not Christianity the power by which the eternal ideal is to be realized in man?

*TRUTH AND IMMORTALITY*

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One everywhere finds people who have given up the hope of immortality or else regard it with extreme doubt. Forms of belief with which it has been associated have proved unthinkable to them. Worse yet, to hope for immortality seems not to be loyal to truth. "We want reality," they say. "We propose to face the facts; we demand honest thinking. We have no use for dreams, however pleasant; we wish only truth." Mr. Huxley's famous letter to his friend Charles Kingsley expresses this attitude. Here is a man who, in the greatest of sorrows, feels obliged to put away comfort and hope in obedience to the demand of truth. It is not possible to divide his mind into exclusive compartments, and to indulge an ancient religious emotion on one side of himself, while on the other side he remains the conscientious student of science. He must keep his integrity at any cost to his feelings. No one can help admiring this type of mind. A multitude of people who have nothing like Mr. Huxley's rigor of conscience are immensely moved by the attitude of such men as he. If he could see no truth in immortality and had to remain an agnostic about it, why should we not be agnostics also?

I believe that Mr. Huxley was right in his insistence upon truth and conscience. I believe also that he was mistaken as to the relation between truth and the hope of immortality. I shall try to show in this paper that the hope of immortality, so far from being excluded from the realm of truth and reality, is involved in the essential structure of this realm. I shall have occasion to point out considerations to which I see no evidence that Mr. Huxley (and I use his name as the type of a considerable class) ever paid attention. The fact is, that the thinking men of the last century suffered an immense reaction in the tide of

the new thoughts that came in with the scientific period of development. The first net impression was the sense of a loss of the fabric of ancient traditions and religions. It was not easy immediately to adjust one's eyes to the new light and to estimate what kind of a universe had been brought to view. I cannot doubt that if such minds as Mr. Huxley had only gone on to urge their splendid courage and loyalty a few steps further, they would have come to the same constructive conclusions which their somewhat cautious negative work has vastly helped us of a later generation to reach.

Let us, however, put aside the subject of immortality for a while, and first ask the straight question: What is truth? Or, what constitutes reality? As with most ultimate questions, this is not easy precisely to say. The ultimate things appear always to be larger than our definitions. In a general and quite undogmatic sense we may say that truth is that which fits into its place or order. The untrue is that which does not fit, or match. We are using here a parable taken from outward things, but our thinking is none the worse because it falls into this form of illustration. Does not all thinking proceed by figures and symbols?

We make a simple statement: The earth is round. This is true, so far as the description "round" fits the shape of the earth. We know that it is not exactly true. Why is it not quite true? Because we have an idea of perfect roundness into which the earth, as it is, does not fit. We describe an occurrence, an accident perhaps, which we have witnessed. Our account may possibly express our view of the facts. Yet we can almost never make our description tell the exact story of what happened. Our senses are imperfect instruments of observation; our memories may play us false; our language is only a makeshift, and never quite conveys even our imperfect impressions of an event. Neither do our words—a system of makeshift symbols—always mean the same thing to another as they mean to us. No two pairs of eyes perhaps witness exactly the same occurrence. The question already begins to arise: Why, since the truth is so elusive, should we be so strenuous to insist upon it?

Our idea of reality is involved with our notion of truth. We



hold that, behind impressions and sensations and the words that describe our feelings about things, there is some substance (call it matter or spirit as you please) which, so far as our description of it is exact, corresponds to, or matches with, the description. We do not pretend that we know or can know this substance, as it is, but we think or assume that we know it at least in the form of its relations to us, and that its relations, as we discover them, translate the reality on the whole fairly well, as if by picture language, for all practical purposes.

We assume, too, or surmise (may we dare to say that we know?) that everything in this realm of reality that lies just behind all phenomena is related or matched together with everything else. To know the truth would be to know how things fit or are related together. To know all about a grain of sand would thus be to know all about the world. At any rate the phenomena—the picture language with which our minds are impressed through our eyes and ears and nerves of sense—come to us in the most elaborate network of relations, sometimes of mere juxtaposition, sometimes in relations of what we call cause and effect, always in a certain succession in time, always also suggestive of a unity, or order, or harmony, to which, if we knew enough, all would be found to belong. In other words, we surmise that truth, if we could get at it, would be the complete description of the order and unity of the world in and through all its parts and its motions.

We are now sailing audaciously over great depths in thought. If any one cares to object and question: How dare you surmise and assume so much? How dare you speak of fitnesses and order and relations of unity? we have to reply that we cannot help making these bold assumptions if we are going to think at all, or to investigate, or even to live sanely. Our interest and impulse to observe, and still more to try to order our observations into the form of science, spring from our conviction, or faith, that there is order and significance and unity to be discovered—in other words, that this is not chaos in which we live, but a universe. This is a faith; it certainly is not “solid fact” or knowledge. But the very idea of truth is bound up with the faith. If there were no reality corresponding to our view of

things, if things did not fit together so as to spell out into intelligible meanings, if the net impression of the world was only an ash-heap and not a universe, what possible sense would there be in urging the necessity of truth? Truth is a postulate of faith, albeit an intellectual and not a supernatural kind of faith.

We know more about our own minds than we know of anything outside of us. Our minds impose certain forms of thinking upon us. Our minds instinctively work on the lines of order. They tend to expect relations of fitness and harmony. They are prompted by all kinds of stimuli to set up standards and ideals. They act under certain universal categories to inquire, Where? When? Why? To use a figure of speech, we may say that they behave like a kaleidoscope, which, turn it as you will, imposes color and order on the material within it. So it is the nature of intelligence to reflect everything which falls upon its mirror in forms of order. The mind seems to be made to construct, that is, to fit its material together, as a poet or architect does. The intelligence looks for and expects significance and unity. Even before it gets demonstration, it tends to proceed on its faith that its world is reasonable, or, at least, that there is a standard of reason and fitness into which, if things do not match, they are futile. Yes. Even when the doubting mind in its pessimist mood pronounces the world an illusion, or when the agnostic mind halts in doubt whether the universe means anything to man beyond his burial-ground, this very pronouncement of desperation proceeds on the marvellous conception of a possible world of order and beauty with which, as a standard, the actual world is tried and found wanting.

Thus the most negative "truth" gets its meaning out of the depths of an intelligence that cannot help thinking in terms of reason and unity. Why tell the dismal truth, some one asks, that all things are vanity? Because the mind conceives the idea of a real world which puts a vain world to shame. It is the faith in at least the possibility of a real world that gives character to criticism, blasphemy, and denial.

What we call "reality," at every point, when we try to approach it, proves to be beyond anything that we distinctly

know or can define. Our thought of it arises, indeed, out of the region of our senses and by the aid of our instruments of research. It begins with "solid facts" (which are not solid at all, but merely our consciousness of relations in phenomena) and passes over at once into a realm, absolutely necessary to our thinking and living, and yet always beyond the touch of our senses. We have so many things,  $a$ ,  $b$ ,  $c$ , etc., given us as our working material, and presently we find  $x$ ,  $y$ ,  $z$ , into which the simple deliverances of our senses have been irresistibly transformed. The realm of what we call known values in things is not so real or necessary to us as is this realm of thoughts, of order, of fitnesses and unity, with which alone truth is concerned. Truth is thus always  $a + x$  or  $b + z$ ; that is, the thing we get by our senses plus what our minds make of it by the act of the faith of reason, in trying to fit it as well as we can into a place in our realm of reality.

See how true this is in the very beginnings of our thought of the visible world. We call a stone hard and rough. This is the  $a$  and  $b$  of our knowledge. But we go a step further, and every atom of the stone is in motion. These atoms are unknown creations,  $x$  and  $y$ . We try to catch the atoms and weigh them and tell in how large platoons they march together. Presently we are not contemplating atoms at all, in the sense of hard bits of stuff. We are in the presence of infinitesimal tornadoes of force. Whatever now we decide to call this substance of the rock, whether matter, or atoms, or centres of force, or spirit, it is the name for our faith in an almighty and wonderful reality rather than an exact description of a solid fact that we know all about. Our conclusion—that is, the truth about matter—is the best makeshift or working theory that we can reach to fit together our experiences of what matter does for us. Truth challenges our modesty as much as the accuracy of our observation and description.

Take another simple statement of fact. We say that a certain line drawn on the paper is not straight. How do we know this? No one of us has ever seen a perfect line; yet we carry in our minds the idea of straightness, or of circularity, which has only been suggested to us, but never realized. In the realm of

our thought, the idea of the straight line or the perfect circle is essential. It is more real, though invisible, than any line that we see. We are so made that, while intelligence survives, this idea will live with us when all visible lines are expunged. Truth in lines and forms is measured by this ideal and most actual standard. However this standard may have grown out of our experience, it always transcends experience. It is indeed a necessity of our thought.

We catch sight now of a group of standards and ideals, all different from the actual "facts" of life, related to the facts, suggested perhaps by the facts, but always above the facts, and quite as essential to our practical use of the facts as the yardstick or the standard pound is essential in buying and selling. Every utility or convenience, a comfortable dwelling, a hygienic system of plumbing, a proper suit of clothes or pair of shoes, presupposes an ideal, invisible standard of thoroughness and excellence of workmanship. We say that the suit fits; we say that the foundation wall is true. We proceed at every practical issue by ideal standards which no work of man ever completely reached. The ideal of what a house or a ship should be is more real than the actual construction. Moreover, we believe that, if we knew more, we should see even a nobler ideal of fitness and truth than that by which we now measure our workmanship. Our ideal is like the asymptote, always approximating, but never quite touching the invisible ultimate ideals toward which our faith, guided by each new access of experience, climbs.

We are introduced immediately into the realm of beauty. To the eyes of the artist or poet there is nothing so actual as the vision of beautiful objects that the visible universe only suggests, but never quite realizes; or can realize, in material form. Our true humanity has not begun till we love these visions of beauty and strive to keep their company. Thus, there is nothing in the world more wonderful and mysterious than the facts, the forms, and the power of music. It arises out of noises and sound waves, but it consists in harmonies which ally it to the ideal kingdom of mathematics. Its delight is in the fact that it fits and satisfies

our ears. It demands truth or fidelity in the musician; it depends upon the attunement and the perfect time of his instrument. The standard is always beyond his best effort. This standard, which no man ever reaches, is more real than any of his work.

Why must the artist or the musician obey the law of this quite ideal vision or standard? Why must the violinist play up to a degree of perfection that no one can reach? Why must the painter follow his vision, though he may never be thanked or rewarded, and though the work of the "pot-boiler" may bring him cheap fame and pay? The fact is that man, at his best, belongs to an ideal world, which, once being entered upon, becomes more real than the solid ground under his feet. There is no truth, except within this region of invisible realities.

All the moralities now face us with their commanding Presences. "Duty, stern daughter of the voice of God," is here. Conscience sets up its imperative, the strange word "ought." We can get along quite well for a little way with a superficial explanation of morality. We may say that it is merely customary conduct, imitating the traditions and usages of a tribe or a family. We may say that it arises out of social expediency. All this is true. The point which we urge is that all morality, however simply it arises, moves up into the realm of ideal values. In other words, truth in morals is more than the mere fitness of an action to a custom or tradition or an act of legislation; it is the effort to fit a standard or ideal that no words, least of all the terms of an enactment, can define. Take Mr. Haeckel's insistence upon the scientist's duty to say what he thinks. You cannot measure this duty in terms of expediency, any more than you can rate a beautiful painting in so many dollars. You cannot prescribe how far the scientist must go in his telling the truth, any more than you can say how far the musician shall go in his effort after perfection of tone and harmony. You cannot prove that it will do Mr. Haeckel any material good to tell the truth, or even that his truth will do the world any good. Yet we all agree with Mr. Haeckel that he must tell the truth, even if the whole world holds up its hands in horror at him. This idea of

an absolute or infinite duty to truth is in another realm from that of the "solid facts" of the man on the street. It belongs in the realm of the ideal and invisible, and what, for want of any better term, we call the spiritual. But the man on the street applauds it, and believes in it, and owns that it is more real and permanent than the stones under his feet. Yes, It is a part of his being.<sup>1</sup>

Consider, again, the ideal of wedded love. There is nothing that we behold more real and yet more wonderful. It has its rise on the animal side of us. It is related to the bodily senses and to passion. It has a strange, gross, sensual history of ages behind it. It hardly yet more than fairly emerges into the higher consciousness of the average man. The woman is still a chattel or plaything in the eyes of multitudes of brutish men. Nevertheless, here stands the ideal of true marriage and a love mutual, loyal, devoted, constant, undying, which no two lovers ever succeeded altogether in compassing, yet without which real love hardly exists. This love already orders thousands of homes. It commands the consciences of a host of people who only feebly live up to its splendid "ought." It brings joy and satisfaction wherever men and women obey it. Under its beneficent rule, the passions and senses themselves are at their highest perfection of use, and children are born under auspices most favorable for their health and happiness. The word "home" gets all its wealth of significance from this ideal reality of love.

What, now, is truth in the marriage relation? It does not merely mean to hold to a verbal promise or to obey the laws of the state. It means nothing less than fitness of act and thought, and of temper also, to an ideal standard beyond and above all words. Once seeing this ideal, we become base and unworthy to fall away from it. Who in England had a loftier sense of this reality than Mr. Huxley had? What a world of ethical reality he lived in and belonged to!

Consider a moment the almost new sense of humane social relations that slowly tends to prevail among men. You can always make out a case for the grim rule of selfishness, more

<sup>1</sup> The lack of clear recognition of the fundamental idea of truth in Mr. William James' Pragmatism is perhaps the chief fault in his treatment.

or less enlightened. You can say that the law of life is the survival of the fittest; you can translate human realities into animal, military, and commercial terms. You can say, "Every man for himself," and "Every man has his price." Why is it that no man can ever be content in saying such things? No man who is a man really believes that these things are quite true. What, then, do we all, at our best, hold to be true of social relations? We believe in an unwritten law, quite ideal, beyond the range of all human rewards or penalties. This law bids us each and all to share our good things with one another; it bids us be ready to suffer and die for the common good—not merely for the nation, but for humanity, for those whom we have never seen, for those unborn. It bids us let our own selfish will go, in the name of a universal good will. It sets martyrs rather than kings, Jesus rather than Caesar, Lincoln and not Napoleon, for the admiration of the world. There is no true man who does not, at his best, bow to this kind of ideal. Here is a touch of the infinite in man. There is no finite range to the bounds of his duty.

There is a philosophy that undertakes to explain everything in terms of mechanics. Whatever a man does, or thinks, or feels is registered in the changes of motion in nerve cells. First comes the change in a cell, as the man's senses are moved from without, and then, as if pulled by a wire, thought and consciousness follow. No one doubts the fact of this registry of deeds and thoughts. Does it explain anything? Does it not rather leave a world of mystery still to be explained? For consciousness is infinitely more wonderful than motion or mechanics, which in no way explain consciousness. The great overpowering fact of life is not the mechanical motion in a man's brain, but the vast range of his consciousness. His life, however related to the brain cells, is not real life at all till it rises into consciousness. All reality, in fact, lies in the field of consciousness, without which we could not even know anything about the mechanics of motion or the elementary differences between greater and less, higher and lower, better and worse.

Moreover, so far as consciousness tells any truth, it tells us of moral and spiritual sequences that daily alter the flow of our lives,

and in the aggregate make and alter the meaning of history. The story of a hero, a bit of a psalm, "a passage from Euripides," strikes our consciousness, and we become, at least for the moment, changed men in our conduct. The alteration of conduct, itself touching material facts, perhaps costing hard-earned money, or risking labor and life, is a spiritual or humane or social change in us. Its value consists in ideal terms, such as happiness, contentment, satisfaction.

We have used the word "happiness." What is this thing that every one wants, that no one can exactly define, that begins in the plane of creature comforts, and rises into all manner of ideal relations? Our thought of what truth is helps us to answer this question. Truth is fitness, harmony, the unison of relations. The happy life, then, is the life in which all the parts fit and match and make unity. The body is well and serves the man; the mind is sane, the conscience is enlightened and prompt to act, the man is full of good-will, expressing itself in kindly words and generous deeds. In short, the happy life conforms to, and corresponds with, an ideal beyond and above itself, never yet exactly seen, but the most real furniture that exists in every mature man's consciousness. The perfect truth of manhood is more than the man reaches, yet the reality of the man himself consists in his reaching toward this truth and trying to fit himself to it. His highest satisfaction lies in this effort. In this type of effort all the experiences of his life, even his failures and sorrows, tend to blend and harmonize into the unity of a real person. Consciousness tells us nothing more sure than this, and the more surely, the more often we have made the endeavor. We are happy, we reach approximate unity, in and through every moment of hearty good-will. To be true to a man's standard of manhood is the essence of the happy life.

Here again, as before, truth is both *a* and *x*. It is that which fits facts which we have experienced, and it is also an item of faith or venture; it is that which fits into an ideal beyond actual experience. This transcendental element of truth, this venture from the known towards the higher and unknown, is precisely what gives truth its character of reality.



Another idea has been, and is still, immensely important as a factor in the highest human activity. It is the idea of progress. It is related intimately to the great scientific thought of development and evolution. Men think that the world is better than it once was, and they believe or hope that it will grow better. This is not an unpractical thought. It adds value, worth, and motive force to action. It is a spur to morality and the noblest forms of devotion. The world and human life are worth more in a world that grows better than in a world that has stopped growing and may even be on the decline. Though I ought to be just, floating on a raft and waiting to be annihilated, yet I can have no enthusiasm for justice in such a condition. Give me the hope that my justice may bring rescue from the raft, even though to save others at my own loss, and my whole soul rises to do justice. So men are stirred to activity in the hope of human progress, not for their own sake, but for generations to come. This hope of progress moreover is illimitable. Draw a line anywhere and put an end to it; translate the efforts of men into any final form of death, however many thousands of years away, and the heart goes out of their work. There is an infinite element in the thought. It seems to point to something beyond the terms of mortal life. It is not *a*, however multiplied, but *a plus x*. The unknown part of it makes it true,

We have already suggested the bold but quite necessary venture of thought that we make in speaking of a world-order, or "universe." We thereby express our faith that all things fit together and make one world. Thus all the sciences are one science. Thus all processes are a part of a universal order. This is faith or trust quite as much as knowledge. But, as Mr. Tyndall has happily shown, science proceeds by leaps of inspired imagination, and arrives at its conclusions in advance of its ammunition trains and baggage wagons. Thus faith proceeds in the face of superficial difficulties. At first blush no one sees a universe, but rather the theatre of conflicting powers. The savage's gods are in conflict. Yet we hold, for substance of truth, that all forces are one. Doubt this, and the universe itself begins to dissolve, and truth to disintegrate.

The mightiest of all generalization follows, inextricably involved throughout with all that we have said. It is the thought of God. The word or name is of little moment. We take such words as we have at hand—only symbols at best for a conception which no words can do more than suggest. Our thought of God is only the extension and perfecting of our vision of a world-order or universe. It is equally necessary; it grows out of the other; it is born of and arises out of our science and experience. It seems compelled upon us by our thought, unless we stop thinking altogether.

Our thought of God is the expression of our sense of the necessary unity of all the values, ideals, and standards which give meaning to life. Order, beauty, intelligence, goodness, truth, love, are so many names of God. They all seem to go together. The realm of beauty is not alien to the realm of righteousness, but one with it. The realm of things—atoms, forces, motions—is not alien to the realm of consciousness, thought, order, ideals, justice, goodness, but subsidiary to it and one with it.

This carries us further. The thought of God means that the world outside and within, phenomena and consciousness also, is significant. It is an intelligible world—intelligence appealing to, and reflected upon, intelligence. This is the idea that men have expressed in the thought of a purposeful world. They have meant to express the conviction that no blind fate, but an all-inspiring reason ruled the universe. They meant a conviction that the universe is good, not evil—good in its whirling forces, good on the side of its omnipresent beauty, good in the working of its supreme intelligence. They meant that even seeming evil will be found, when once we know enough, to fall under the compelling law of good.

This is bold to think, but necessary if we think at all. We may not say that we know God instinctively. But we are compelled by the quality and framework of our intelligence to think in the terms that sooner or later signify God. The thought of God, in the ultimate analysis, is imposed on our thinking, first, as crudely suggested by the facts of life; then, as a form of intellectual faith; then, next, as required to meet the demands of that ideal realm of ethics and truth to which as men we belong.

World forces running to evil, a universal intelligence without purpose or meaning, consciousness everywhere yet void of reality, beauty everywhere expressing nothing real behind it, morality, virtue, conscience, and duty in us pressing us to be willing to die for a principle or an ideal, and yet nothing moral in the universe to match with and correspond to this universal pressure; love in us rising to a sense of infinite devotion, and no infinite love above or beyond us—these things do not fit together, are not intelligible, do not therefore make truth. Our thought of God is our way of affirming that the universe is real, is one, is beautiful, is good, is enduring.

This faith in the truth of the universe, that is, in God, is akin to the faith that we have in ourselves. We are a mystery and enigma to ourselves. Where are we? Who are we? What are the bounds of our personality? How can we be described or defined? And yet we believe in ourselves, the invisible persons, inhabiting space, using atoms and forces, and dwelling in consciousness. We believe in ourselves, the microcosms, much as we believe in God as the universal order. We are what we are, and real persons, by virtue of thought, beauty, good-will, unified together and entering into a vast conscious or vital order of goodness.

We deny God, and we presently cut at the roots of our faith in ourselves. What is real, if the universe is not real? What is good, if the life out of which we spring and of which man at his best is the highest and most illustrative fruitage that we know, is not good? What is worth while—science, or justice, or love, much less food and comfort—unless the standards hold good by which we set values? Now God is our name for the standards that give life its meaning.

We have taken a very long circle to reach the idea of immortality. But here at last it stands, as inevitable as any of the other items of reality which go to constitute life. Truth, we see, is that which fits and makes harmony and unity. It is whatever is necessary to make the order of thought complete. It is whatever belongs to the realm of reality. Truth is not merely what we see embodied, but beyond our immediate sight—what

our faith in the ultimate reality foresees by anticipation. This fact has held good at every step which we have taken. Truth was always more than we could define or demonstrate. It was also what our intelligence demanded in order to fit things together and make sense of them.

It need not disturb us in the least to be told how the hope of immortality may have arisen. Grant that it had its origin in material sensations, in the visions of savages, in the repeating of ghost stories. What human thought, art, or science, did not thus spring out of the earth, and take material shape to clothe itself? The indisputable fact remains that there is an immaterial, and yet real, order of life, which characterizes man as human. There is a hierarchy of values, leading up to the True, the Good, the Beautiful. We cannot throw them aside or condemn them, and keep our humanity. We cannot belittle truth or reason and logic—the architect's plan of the Cologne Cathedral, the builder of the Brooklyn Bridge, the painter of the Dresden Madonna, the exiles for conscience' sake who founded America, the integrity of honest fathers, the love of our mothers, the death on the Cross. "Here are the infinite values," say all of us, or else we cease to be men.

We belong to a kingdom of values, an order of good, a universe. Grant this. What of it? We cannot think then that a man dies like a fly, and that is the end of him. We cannot think that the sweet mothers, and the brave, true-hearted men whom we have known, are of no more use in the order of the universe than the whirling dust in the streets. We cannot think that the life of this planet, with its gigantic cost in blood and sorrow and tears, with its glorious victories of truth, freedom, justice, and love, will all be measured up, in a few thousands of years, in the mute story of the moon—a dead world without a conscious intelligence to shed a tear over it. This is to pronounce the doom of the universe, to break the order and beauty, to bring intelligence to confusion, to deny serious values, and to dethrone reality.

The intellect in us, the sense of right, the instinct for order, the love of beauty and goodness—all that makes us worthy as men—the reality in us reacts against an unreal world. The

hope of immortality is our sense that the world may be trusted, that the real values abide, that the sum of all life is not death, but life yet more noble.

This is not a strange and unscientific statement. It is quite like the statement of our senses touching the straightness of a line or the beauty of a face. We know it, but we cannot prove it to a blind man. The standard of our judgment is in our own nature. The one thing is true or fits, and the opposite does not fit or correspond. We cannot help trusting this judgment. It is all that we have to trust. Moreover, in this instance, as with the judgment of the line or of a righteous act, there tends to be a great and growing consensus of similar judgment. The same mind everywhere tends to see something real in the hope of immortality.

Another harmony now appears. We have seen that a man has a certain integrity as a person. At his best, all his powers working in unison, he is at the acme of efficiency and happiness. Three great spiritual elements go to make such a man. One is faith, or trust, for example, in the validity of law, in the essential righteousness of the world, in the humanity of one's fellow men—in a word, in a good God. Another element of the complete life is love, or good-will. The man at his best pours out, or expresses, his good-will in all his acts and words, in his face and gestures. Again, the man needs hope in order to be at his best. He will work best, he will best keep his health, he will do most good to his fellows, he will be most truly a man with hope in his eyes.

We do not say what the object of his hope must be. It surely need not be selfish or personal. But it must be worthy of his manhood and fit the terms of manhood. We will not insist that his hope shall rest on the idea of immortality. But it must rest on reality. It needs to go up into the ideal realm of values, where the idea of the infinite and the immortal belong. The man cannot be satisfied for long with any hope that is sentenced to ultimate death.

Now we hold that whatever is essential to the best and most harmonious life of a man, without which he is reduced in his manhood, deserves to be trusted as true or real. The immense

presumption is in its favor. If hope is one element of life, then there is that which corresponds to hope. The hope is entitled to "the benefit of the doubt." If a grand hope is needful to a noble life, then we hold that whatever substance corresponds to the hope will be noble also. True, this is faith again; but the same kind of faith which we have found to be inseparable from all valid thinking.

We are often asked if we can believe in personal immortality. The truth is that in the highest region of thought all terms and definitions are inadequate. We felt this even in our glimpse at the mystery of substance, or matter. We use the terms *atoms* and *wave motions* and *vortices*, not as sufficient to express the reality, but as the best modes of imaging to ourselves the nature of the reality in which, in some sense, we firmly believe. Substance, we say, seems to behave like groupings of orderly atoms, or like whirling forces. It behaves as if waves traversed it. So we say with the use of the term "personal immortality." This is the best form of thought we know to express our sense of the abiding reality of a noble life. Thus "In Memoriam" rises, in the face of all doubt, to the conviction that the loved friend can never die. As we see no other way to conceive of substance except under the figure of some form which we know, so we see no possible way to conserve immortal values in persons except what we name personal immortality. As substance may prove to be more valid and wonderful than any of our figures of speech, so immortality may prove to be richer and more satisfying than our name for it suggests. We cannot believe it to be less than our name for it. Meanwhile we have to go on using the words that serve to convey the utmost positive sense of reality. That they are popular words does not hurt their value, but rather enhances it. Why should not the popular instinct go in the direction of the best constructive and philosophical thought? Here is another fitness or harmony such as we find everywhere in our world. What kind of philosophy—that is, love of truth—would it be that proved to serve no end except to destroy man's sense of worth and reality! This would be, in the name of truth, to deny the existence of truth.

We have proceeded very much as men do in building a struct-

ure, for example, an archway. We have used the best material. We have set the base of our structure into the concrete matter of all sorts of facts of life. We have laid logic and reason for foundation stones. We have built the values of order, beauty, justice, truth, humanity, and love into our work. We have found a place for every noble experience of sympathy, of sorrow, of victory, for every aspiration, for every mighty standard. All the high things that make life worth living are in our structure. The name of the structure is the universal life; it means the integrity of man and the reality of God.

There is just one stone which we need to make the arch complete. It is the keystone of the work. It is small, compared with the massive foundation; one might possibly think that the columns would stand apart by themselves. They would stand for a while if no great stress were put on the work. But our sense of form and perfection, that is, our sense of truth or fitness, calls for the keystone in order to join the piers and springers together. Our sense of necessity also and our knowledge of the action of forces call for the keystone. Our arch will never be safe till we have put that one binding stone into place.

So we judge of the hope of immortality. It belongs with and fits into a structure; it is that without which you can never make the beauty or unity last, without which also the structure tends to fall apart. The arch is not yet *true* till every stone fits into place. Put the hope of immortality into the crown of the values of life, and they cohere, and all of them take on new significance. Each stone built into the structure is worth more than it is worth by itself in the field. Each stone is worth still more when the structure is finished. Refuse your keystone the place for which it seems to be fitted exactly, and you have put every precious value at risk. You are not so sure of a good God any longer. Human life is no longer so significant as it was before. You have lost worth out of love and friendship, and levelled them toward the dust. You have reduced patriotism and philanthropy to finite values, each with its price. You have taken buoyant joy and enthusiasm out of all mature men's life, and threatened them with an earlier old age. You have shaken the bases of morality and put righteousness into terms of comfort and policy. You

have bidden the artist, the poet, and the prophet laugh at their visions and doubt their validity. You have distinctly shaken man's faith in logic and reason, and brought all intellectual processes into discredit. For all that logic is for is to bind things into coherence and unity. All values, in fact, belong in the ideal realm; they go together and make a unity, or else they fall together.

Fall together? No! No man can make the great values fall, or take them apart, or hurt one of them. A man can hurt and mar his own life by his distrust, but he can mar no reality. No man's doubt can make justice, beauty, truth, love, less than real. These things are ingrained in our nature. We need only to trust them. They constitute an infinite order. They validate themselves the more we throw our weight upon them. The hope of immortality is simply the keystone, which always stands fast, beyond any man's doubt, at the crown of the structure. It fits its companion values, and they clasp it with their arms into a serene integrity. They bid us trust our lives upon the archway, which every value in the universe has joined to construct. We did not build the beautiful structure: we only found it.

"What is excellent,  
As God lives, is permanent."

I have wished to make it plain that the hope of immortality is not merely the concern of sentimentalists, ready to hug a pleasant delusion, much less of egoists, eagerly grasping after every straw of selfish comfort for themselves: it is the serious concern of all men who have other values at heart besides pleasures and money; of all who care for law and order, for true homes, for just government, and friendly society among men; of all who love their fellows and struggle for human progress, having faith that such struggle is worth while; of all who love beauty, and find a noble worth in art and music; of all who think sanely, and have any sort of faith in a good universe—the poets, the artists, the thinkers, the statesmen, the multitude also of modest and high-minded men and women whose religion consists in acts of faith, hope, and love. The companionship of such persons, the mem-



ory of such persons, their faith and their deeds, bring you into, and leave you in, an attitude of hope. This world would not be a quite true world with the hope of immortality left out. This world needs nothing less than the hope of immortality in order to complete its integrity.

*INDIVIDUALISM AND RELIGION IN THE EARLY  
ROMAN EMPIRE*<sup>1</sup>

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Whoever reads the meditations of Marcus Aurelius must be impressed with the constant self-examination which the writer practised. Far on the northern boundaries of his empire, among the Quadi, on the banks of the Gran, he composed his first book, analyzing his own nature, gratefully recounting his obligations to his kin, his teachers, and his friends. All the succeeding books grow out of a similar self-examination, accompanied by self-directed exhortations to fidelity, constancy, and patience. The title which the work bears is indeed the only possible one—*To Himself*—for self is alike the subject and the object of the author's meditations. The emperor's simple humility, his high desire to fulfil in every way his duty, his patient humanity, shut out effectively all priggishness and offensive egotism from his pages. Marcus Aurelius was not alone in his concern for self. If we look into other ranks of life in the second century, we find the same interest. With all its peace, calm, and nobility, the age of the Antonines was an age of egoism, of valetudinarianism both of body and of soul. Aristides the rhetorician has left us an account of his long and impassioned search for health, which for him was a religious quest. Apuleius, in his anxiety for his soul, had himself initiated into all possible sacred mysteries, until he at last found rest in the holy brotherhood of the servants of Isis. The emperor, the rhetorician, and the superstitious mystic furnish three striking illustrations of the tendency of the time.

Self-examination was no new thing for the philosopher under the empire. While Epictetus, so far as we know, did not incul-

<sup>1</sup>This article originally formed part of a lecture delivered before the Harvard Summer School of Theology in July, 1908.

cate its practice directly, none the less his teaching implies it, for the individual, the self, was the centre of his universe; self-concern was for him the proper interest for the *sapiens*; in self he found the source and warrant of the soul's security and independence. Seneca in a familiar passage tells us how each evening in quiet he reviewed his words and acts of the day, concealing nothing from himself, omitting nothing. This practice he had learned from his teacher Sextius, for that exercise of the Pythagoreans, which their ancient interpreters at least regarded as mnemonic, in the course of time had become a moral discipline. Witness these verses of the *Carmen Aureum*: "Never let sleep come upon thy yielding eyelids until thou hast thrice reviewed each one of thy acts of the day. 'In what have I erred?' 'What have I done?' 'What have I failed to do that I should have done?' Begin with thy first act and review in order. If thou hast done ill, be ashamed; if well, then rejoice."

When one surveys the history of Roman thought from the last century of the republic to the reign of Marcus Aurelius, he finds that the earlier ideal of action was gradually replaced by that of contemplation; that the concept of the individual as an inseparable member of the state yielded to that of the individual, independent of external relations, but the centre of man's thought and interest. Evidence for these individualistic tendencies is by no means confined to the works of the philosophers, but is found in many other forms of literature as well. Among Roman historians Tacitus shows pre-eminently a psychological interest; turning from mere events, he endeavored to find in the human soul the motives of the individual's action. The comparison frequently made between him and Thucydides brings clearly into contrast the interests of the two. The latter is concerned chiefly with events—expeditions, battles, victories, defeats; in his entire account of twenty momentous years few personalities appear: the actors are Athenians, Lacedaemonians, Corinthians, Argives. In like fashion Cato the elder, writing in the middle of the second century before our era, did not even name the Roman leaders in his *Origines*. In Tacitus, however, the actors are not peoples, but individuals. The characters of Tiberius, Germanicus, the two Agrippinas, of Claudius and Nero, of Galba, Otho, and

Vitellius—to mention only some of the chief personages—are clearly drawn. It is true that Tacitus's sense of the dignity required of the historian kept him from sinking to the meaner external details which Suetonius employed, and that he also avoided the carefully balanced antitheses which Sallust used in his elaborate portraits; but none the less we see in every case the individual clearly defined as Tacitus conceived him. The anecdotal character of Suetonius's work, as of the biographies of the *Scriptores Historiae Augustae* after him, is due to the same interest in personality. In fact, the rise of Roman biography in the latter part of the second century B.C. was coincident with the increase of individualism; likewise among the Greeks the development of this branch of literature, as of realistic portraiture, fell in the period after Alexander. The growth of Roman epistolography was prompted by the same interest as biography; and satire in the sense of *carmen . . . maledictum et ad carpenda hominum vitia . . . compositum* developed with the spread of individualism until it reached the bitter invective of Juvenal.

The causes which produced the extraordinary change of interest in the period from the Second Punic War to the age of the Antonines were manifold—political, economic, social, and philosophic. The great period of Roman conquest and struggle which continued to the close of the Second Punic War on the whole fostered a national spirit; the citizen's life was inseparably connected with the state; but, when the stimulus of common dangers from foreign foes and of common victories over them had ceased, new phenomena arose. On the one hand a cosmopolitan spirit appears, on the other we find men trying to realize their own individualities. The course of conquest had widened men's views; contact with other nations and with ancient civilizations had made it impossible to confine their thoughts and interest to the old narrow limit. Hellenism now poured the full stream of its influence into every channel of Roman life, but in Hellenistic thought that revolution has already been wrought which it was to pass on to Rome.<sup>3</sup> The increase of wealth gave men leisure for

<sup>3</sup>On the development of individualism in the Hellenistic period, see Jevons "Hellenism and Christianity," in this Review for April, 1908.

intellectual pursuits or the means of gaining political power, while the realization of selfish ambition was made the easier by the fact that the problem of the poor had become more pressing, so that the demagogue had a larger opportunity. As is well known, political history from the time of the Gracchi to the battle of Actium centres around prominent men, leaders in attempts made more or less openly to override the constitution. Unselfish though the Gracchi may have been, they hurried Rome on a new course; the day Tiberius Gracchus deposed his fellow tribune, he began a revolution which was to end a century later in the establishment of the empire. Political agencies were corrupted and weakened; the allegiance of the citizens was transferred from the state to Marius, Cinna, Sulla; to Caesar, Pompey, Crassus; to Octavianus, Antony, and Lepidus. The ability, and to no small degree the desire, to govern was lost in the people. When the battle of Actium decided the leadership of the Roman world—the form of government which was to ensue had been determined long before that event—peace and security were finally obtained, but at the expense of political power. The assemblies of the people ceased to perform any real functions before fifty years had passed. The Senate, even under Augustus, became hardly more than an advisory board, although the fiction that it was a co-ordinate and independent part of the government was kept up for two centuries. In fact, from the first that which was a dyarchy in theory tended to become a monarchy in reality. Political life, once the free field of action for the Romans of the higher class, was now largely closed; dignity, not power, was the highest possession of the Senate. The equestrian order likewise had little opportunity save in a few administrative and military offices; while the mass of the people was wholly without political activity and without interest in government; indeed so indifferent was the populace that the bloody struggles of the year 69 A.D. between the armed forces of Vitellius and Vespasian interested the masses chiefly as a superior kind of gladiatorial show, which concerned them as little as the murder of Galba had earlier in the same year.

The stifling of political life had its inevitable results; the upper classes turned, some to the empty employments of luxury or to sensuality, while others of a nobler cast devoted themselves to

rhetoric, philosophy, and similar intellectual pursuits. The old ideal of devotion to the state which we find in Cicero, which lay behind Horace's earlier political verse at least, and formed the basis of Vergil's appeal to patriotism, gave way to the concept of a paternal government which was the ideal of Seneca, Pliny, and Dio Chrysostom, as well as the desire of the mob. The influence of Greece and the Orient had overcome the earlier Roman concepts of government. As a result, the national spirit was weakened or gone. Thinking men could no longer effectively make the welfare of the state the object of their thoughts or satisfy their own needs by action in its behalf, but were rather turned in upon themselves. In short, the political changes all tended to give an individualistic direction to Roman thought which was often noble, but was capable of becoming utter selfishness.

Yet the selfish satisfactions of great possessions were checked by the time the first century of the empire had passed. The enormous losses caused by the civil wars had been followed, it is true, by a rapid increase of wealth which gave opportunity for an extravagance hitherto unknown in the Roman world; but, as Tacitus in a familiar passage points out, waste and imperial oppression had done their work before Nero's death, so that with Vespasian, under force of necessity and the imperial example, a simpler mode of life began to prevail. Yet the happy age of the Antonines after Domitian's reign of terror could not restore the wasted wealth. Agriculture had never been successfully revived; oppressed by a system of slave labor and many centuries of bad management, the economic condition of the West steadily grew worse. This fact goes far to explain the general pessimism of the second century of our era. Empty rhetoric was not able to lighten this gloom; scientific pursuits, which had been followed with no little interest during the first century of the empire, as is attested by Seneca and Pliny the elder, and which might have provided intellectual satisfaction to the educated class, had been largely abandoned from lack of good scientific method. Marcus Aurelius thanks heaven that he never wasted his time on natural philosophy. Furthermore, among the intellectual classes there had actually developed a certain ascetism, a scorn of the body, which stood at diameter with the older Hellenic satisfaction with

life and with the former Roman physical vigor. The welfare of the soul, the safety of self, had become the chief interest of men. Nor was this interest confined to the upper classes; the humbler grades of society were moved by the same desires.

While political changes tended to develop individualism, the social changes of the period under consideration seem at first sight to tend rather toward cosmopolitanism. Rome's population from an early period was composite; but during the closing century of the republic and the first of the empire it became international, as is shown by every grade of society. The literary class was hardly Italian after Cicero's day. Toward the close of the republic and in the Augustan age, we find Furius Bibaculus, Catullus, Vergil, Cornelius Gallus, Aemilius Macer, Nepos, and Livy from upper Italy; Varro Atacinus and Pompeius Trogus from Transalpine Gaul. In the next century Gaul had become the teacher of the Britons—"Gallia causicos docuit facunda Britannos"—while Spain furnished the two Senecas, Columella, Pomponius Mela, Lucan, Quintilian, Martial, Herennius Senecio, and perhaps Valerius Flaccus; and Africa had become the nurse of advocates—"Africa nutricula causicorum."

The international character of the population, however, is naturally seen more clearly in the trading and lower classes. The numerous slaves and freedmen were made up of all nations, although chiefly Greeks and Orientals; so large were the additions made by manumission to the ranks of the freedmen that Augustus felt it necessary to have a law passed restricting to one hundred the number of slaves to whom freedom could be given by will; this very number shows how serious the danger of swamping the Italian elements was felt to be. Immigration from the East had been great. Under Augustus an embassy from King Herod was attended by eight thousand Jews resident at Rome; in 14 A.D., four thousand freedmen tainted with Jewish and other Oriental superstitions were banished to Sardinia; under the empire a large Oriental quarter developed in what is now Trastevere. Voices of protest against this invasion were not lacking. Lucan declared that the single city of Rome was receiving the whole world's dregs; and Juvenal vowed that he could not endure the capital, with its flood of Greek-speaking peoples from Asia

Minor and Syria—"Long since the Syrian Orontes poured its flood into the Tiber." Furthermore, society was rapidly affected by the number of plebeians and freedmen who came to wealth and influence. The vulgar pretensions of the rich parvenu became one of the stock subjects for the satirist. Petronius has given us Trimalchio, who made a cool ten million by a single lucky venture; Juvenal depicts the rich upstart, whose pierced ears showed that he was born on the banks of the Euphrates, but who none the less demands precedence over prætors and tribunes because of his four hundred thousand a year. In the imperial service, until Hadrian's day, freedmen were widely employed in positions of power and authority. Many a knight or senator traced his ancestry back to a wealthy *libertus*; the upper classes were recruited and often revived from below, while the lowest class was constantly looking forward to the possibility of wealth and social advancement. Such influences broke down the social narrowness of an earlier day, when the Roman noble prided himself on being a noble of a city-state apart from the rest of the world, member of a class, not impregnable, it is true, but seldom invaded from below. Nor must we forget the effect of the decay of family life which is eloquently testified to by the vain marriage laws of Augustus and the efforts of his successors. The constant flux of society, the varied nationalities living at Rome representative of the complexity of the vast empire, alike operated to substitute a cosmopolitan spirit for the earlier provincialism, and uniting with the influence of a common allegiance and a common law which bound the empire together, made men feel, before the age of the Antonines, that they were no longer citizens of a town or district, but of the world. Yet these same influences loosened the bonds that bind the individual in a coherent society, and left him in a certain isolation.

But a most potent influence in the period we have been considering was philosophy, and above all Stoicism. When introduced, this system appealed to the Romans because it fitted action, it worked in practical political life; when that life was gone, the resistant elements of Stoicism were brought to the front and became a source of moral strength and of spiritual consolation. Stoicism at its birth had been influenced by the new concept



of a world-wide empire just realized by Alexander. In his treatise on the state Zeno first taught the doctrine of the common citizenship of man in a state identical with the world, and at once gave his philosophy that cosmopolitan stamp which in spite of all changes it retained to the end. The latest leaders among the Stoics—Seneca, Musonius, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius—dwell on citizenship in the cosmos, in which all reasoning men are brothers by virtue of their very reason. It is not wholly alien to our subject to note the extent to which the Stoic ideal of the brotherhood of man was realized under the empire. Though no attempt was made to illustrate the equality of the *servus sapiens* and the *Caesar sapiens* by replacing Caesar with the slave, the Stoic teachings, more than any other influence, led to the amelioration of the condition of the slave and to care for the children of the poor and for orphans, while the jurists Paulus, Ulpian, and Florentinus fixed permanently in written law the doctrine of the freedom and equality of men, secured to them by a law of nature superior to all human law. In short, the dominant philosophy of the second century of our era was at one with the cosmopolitanism of every-day thought and practice. But cosmopolitanism is the very soil in which individualism grows best. When the close bonds of state, society, and religion are broken down, as they were in Greece during the Hellenistic period, or as they were, *mutatis mutandis*, in the Roman world after the Second Punic War, the individual is always turned in upon himself, and, unable to feel the demands of the larger world as his fathers felt the claims of their provincial state, finds in self the centre of his interest. Philosophy of every school had long made self the subject of man's thought and measure of his world. The sophistic dictum, "man is the measure of all things," and the personality of Socrates had accomplished that. The Stoic doctrine of perception and concept, which is closely allied to the nominalism of the Cynics, and above all the ideal of the self-sufficient wise man, fostered egoism; and, further, the Stoic doctrine of *ἀνάρθρα* led in this direction hardly more insistently than the Epicurean *τὸ μακρόως ζῆν* and the Sceptic *ἀραπαξία*.

To resume then briefly, political changes cut the Romans off from the great fields of activity in which the higher classes had

once found their satisfaction, and forced them to turn to unsatisfying pursuits. Economic decay, following on the period of extravagant luxury, deprived many of the satisfactions which the possession and expenditure of money give, and before the close of the second century of our era had produced a deep pessimism. Social changes had broken up the old class solidarity. Finally, philosophy had made men feel themselves citizens of the world, but of a world whose centre was the individual. Cosmopolitanism and individualism were therefore equally the results of the complex influences which I have sketched above.

I now wish to consider some of the results of the development of individualism so far as religion was concerned. In spite of all shocks and catastrophes, there is no question that at the close of the republic a strong religious sentiment still persisted among the people. Its existence is well attested by the poem of Lucretius, by many passages in other writers, and by the fact that the religious reforms of Augustus were based upon it. The means of religious expression, however, were unsatisfactory; the approved Graeco-Roman religion inculcated scrupulosity in fulfilling one's duty towards the gods, in properly paying them one's obligations, and, no doubt, offered a certain aesthetic satisfaction; but it made no moral demands on the worshipper beyond those of duty; it was objective and external, a community affair rather than the individual's dearest concern. But both national interest and the Hellenic confidence in the satisfactions of this life lost their hold. A new sense of moral guilt, stimulated in Italy no doubt by the horrors of the civil war, finds expression in Vergil, Horace, and in Livy's preface. Seneca recalled with new emphasis Plato's definition of the sum of righteousness—imitation of God: "The first point in the worship of the gods is to believe that the gods exist; second, to render unto them their own majesty, to render their own goodness without which there is no majesty; to know that the gods are they who preside over the world, who direct the universe by their power, who protect mankind, and sometimes have regard for individuals. These neither bring evil nor have it in themselves; but they chastise and check some men, they inflict penalties, sometimes they punish under the guise of blessings. Wouldst thou propitiate the gods? Be thou good thyself. He

has worshipped them rightly who has imitated them." Again, "The divine nature is not worshipped with the fat bodies of slain bulls, nor with gold or silver votive offerings, nor with money collected for the sacred treasury, but with a pious and upright will." Epictetus regarded the praise of God to be man's first duty: "I am a rational creature, and therefore I should praise God; this is my task; I will do it, nor will I leave my part, so long as I may keep it; and I urge you to join in this same song." Such passages show the change which had taken place in Roman religious thought. The time had indeed come before Seneca wrote when many an individual was possessed by a sense of moral unworthiness, when he demanded some spiritual satisfaction for himself, some assurance that he could personally enter into communion with divinity and find a warrant therein for his own security.

This warrant and satisfaction were given by the cults imported from the East. The hold these cults had at Rome and in much of the West can only be understood, I believe, in connection with the changes which we have been hastily reviewing. Their introduction began early, for the Great Mother of the Gods was imported by state action in 204 B.C.; but her orgiastic worship was so abhorrent to the Romans that at least three centuries seem to have passed before the state allowed Roman citizens to become members of her priesthood. On the other hand, the Dionysiac mysteries, coming by way of southern Italy, spread rapidly after the Second Punic War; although their excesses had to be checked in 186 B.C., their hold was so great that the authorities did not try to forbid but only to regulate initiation into them. The famous Pythagorean books, which a timid senate burned in 181 B.C., should be reckoned with the religious rather than with the philosophic movements of the period, if we may presume to separate the two. A century later Sulla's campaigns in the East brought in the Cappadocian Ma, and gave the legions their first acquaintance with the Persian Mithras. Soon after, Isis with her associates had established herself on the capitol, whence she defied all efforts to dislodge her. It may be claimed that these divinities under the republic were worshipped only by foreigners and the lower classes, but this is certainly not true of the first century of the empire. It must be remembered that these cults offered, in

crasser form perhaps, the same satisfactions and assurances that were given by the Eleusinian mysteries, which had always enjoyed high social favor; and the fact that Nero was at one time devoted to the Dea Syria, that Otho, Vespasian, and Domitian favored the Egyptian divinities, secured these Orientals some following among the official, if not among the intellectual classes. As a matter of fact, there is little doubt that all grades of society, with the possible exception of the most intellectual circles, in which ancient traditions or rationalistic views were strong, were profoundly affected by the tide of orientalism which rose rapidly in the latter part of the first and throughout the second century of our era. Mithras became prominent in Trajan's day; soon after, the *taurobolium*—the rite of blood—was introduced into the worship of the Great Mother, whose festivals were greatly extended before the close of the second century. It is unnecessary to name all the Oriental gods whose devotees were to be found in Italy and the West; many of them, it is true, appealed chiefly to the people of the land from which they sprang, but many were worshipped by Roman citizens. All required penances and purification, all offered through their mysteries a communion with the divine, and gave a warrant of safety in the present life and the life to come. Upon the neophyte who was to be admitted to the sacred band of the *Isiaci* were imposed continence and abstinence from animal food and wine; he began the day of his initiation with sacred ablutions and prayers, and was baptized with holy water from the Nile; then, clad in a linen robe, he was led into the holy of holies where the secret ceremonies were performed. Although we are naturally ignorant of what was actually done in these mystic rites, there can be no doubt of the effect on the initiate. Apuleius's hero Lucius exclaims in ecstasy, "I have approached the threshold of Proserpina, and after being carried through all the elements I have returned into the upper world; at midnight I have seen the sun flashing with a brilliant light; the gods of heaven and hell I have approached in very person and done them obeisance face to face." Many other moving ceremonies were performed, closing with a sacred meal, all calculated to impress the novice and to satisfy his religious desires. The rites of admission to each of the three grades in the mysteries of

Isis were essentially similar. In the mysteries of Mithras there were no less than seven grades in all, the first three of which were preliminary to full communion; lustral ablutions, self-restraint and abstinence, an oath, and tests of courage and constancy were required. A holy communion was regularly celebrated by the devotees, who thus recalled the final act of Mithras upon earth, and strengthened themselves for their warfare with the powers of evil, in which struggle Mithras was the ally of the faithful, protecting them in this world and assuring them immortality hereafter. In the worship of Mithras, Isis, and indeed in most if not all similar cults, matins and vespers, recurring festivals and fasts, sacred processions and reunions of the *sacrati*, satisfied religious desires and stimulated religious emotion. The ecstatic joy which the devout soul felt may be well illustrated by the opening of the hymn of praise to Isis which Apuleius puts into Lucius' mouth: "Thou holy and eternal preserver of mankind, thou dost ever cherish mortals by thy kindness, thou dost show the sweet affection of a mother toward the wretched in their afflictions. Neither day, nor night, nor briefest moment passes without thy bounty; thou protectest man on land and sea, and driving away the storms of life thou dost extend thy saving hand," etc. Of the reality of the religious satisfaction which these Oriental cults brought there can be no question; and the joyful anticipation of the future which the *sacrati* possessed was not less than that of an Eleusinian initiate of the third century whose tombstone declares, "Death is not only no evil, but is a blessing to mankind." It was then through such mysteries that the individual found assurance of his own security. Not by reason or philosophy, but by penance, purification and mystic communion he secured his peace. In fact, before the close of the second century of our era the world had passed from rationalism to mysticism.

It has, however, been maintained that these Eastern worships did not exert so powerful an influence as the above implies, that the number of their devotees was not large, and that they did not swamp the older gods. It is very true that dedications to the old Roman and Graeco-Roman gods continued to be set up into the fourth century, but the phenomenon of a state or tra-

ditional worship supported and carried on by men whose beliefs are quite at variance with the doctrines of that worship is no strange thing in modern times; still less remarkable was it in antiquity, when men were not bound by the exclusiveness of monotheism, but were ready to see the divine anywhere; the priest of Mithras could set up a dedication to Jupiter without hesitation or any sense of incongruity, although his concept of Jupiter was probably profoundly modified by the ideas he derived from the East. As to the number of dedications to the Oriental gods, they form a large proportion of the total number preserved to us, and come from almost every portion of the western part of the empire, so that there is no reason to doubt that the total number of devotees was very considerable. Furthermore, no one can study the religious history of the first three centuries without seeing how completely men's thought was permeated with ideas derived from the pagan East.

The victory of mysticism carried with it the doom of Stoic philosophy; in spite of all the modifications which that system had undergone, even the intellectual world demanded something more satisfactory than the virtue of the self-sufficient *sapiens*; men felt the need of help from a divine source, and this assistance the Oriental mysteries secured them. Marcus Aurelius was the last of the Stoics, because the Roman world had absorbed what Stoicism had to give; but Stoicism had helped to prepare the way for the Neo-Pythagoreanism and Neo-Platonism of the third and fourth century. Side by side, or rather in connection with these pantheistic religious philosophies, we see the Oriental gods reach their highest influence.

The same individualistic tendencies which fostered the spread of Oriental paganism contributed to the expansion of Christianity. This offered similar rewards and imposed similar obligations. It was, however, free from those crude and repulsive legends which were connected with every one of the pagan cults, and which could only be explained away for the cultivated devotee by some rationalistic effort or by a violent exercise of faith. Not only did it have a nobler character in its origin, but it offered a loftier satisfaction and warrant to those who accepted it. The world into which it came was bound together in an empire whose

roads were to be the highways for its missionaries to remotest lands. But this is not the place to trace the history of early Christianity. In Marcus Aurelius' day it was comparatively weak in the West, but before a century had passed it had spread enormously; in fact the battle between paganism and the religion of the cross had been already won.

*THE SERVICE TO NERVOUS INVALIDS OF THE  
PHYSICIAN AND OF THE MINISTER*

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Nervous invalidism as a specific problem is in one way or another everybody's concern. The invalid himself naturally wishes to get well; but he should recognize that it is possible to be sound in mind even though limited in bodily strength, and should come to see with peculiar clearness some of the needs and dangers and opportunities that illness may bring. We are apt to construe health too narrowly, and to forget the relations of both health and illness to character and insight.

It is better that invalids should think of themselves as students and teachers of an important subject than that they should feel themselves to be objects of commiseration. The community needs the counsel of the intelligent invalid in deciding how the problem of invalidism should be met.

But the well should likewise understand this problem. Not only are they neighbors to the sick, but the strongest person's health is not so secure that he may not at any moment be called upon to face the responsibilities of illness, and he should have a fair and just conception of the nature of these responsibilities. The problem is also of importance for the parent and the school-teacher. For the more closely the subject of the origin of nervous invalidism is studied, the more clearly it appears that this condition often rests upon tendencies formed in childhood, frequently overshadowed shortly afterwards, but having a strong liability to reappear under new forms. The nervous child's greatest danger seems to lie in misdirected repressions and concealments; while the best means of prevention consist in giving him intelligent sympathy and explanation, the chance to develop his powers through well-directed activity, and the conditions favorable to good bodily health. The ignorance of the nature of their children shown by



well-meaning parents, and the cruelty due to ignorance, have been a source of nervous invalidism to a degree that we are now learning to appreciate. A more than halfway readiness on the part of parents and teachers to talk with children over their difficulties, freely and in a liberal spirit even if without expert knowledge, is often of immense service, while there can be no question but that there is abundant room for expert knowledge. Through the studies of physicians into the working of the disordered mind, facts are being gathered which parents and teachers will be able to utilize in the service of good mental health. A portion of these facts have already been made public, but it is certain that there are many more to come.

Even in drawing this hasty outline of the influences which favor healthy childhood, it would be unjust to omit mention of the importance of the religious training of the child, and of the principle recognized by the best educational systems, but especially by the kindergarten, that moral development and intellectual development may go on, not only side by side, but as a double outcome of many single efforts.

For many persons, the religious sentiments acquired in childhood serve, in later years, as their best defence against the demoralization with which illness threatens them, but there are others for whom religious doctrines have proved a source of excitement of a morbid sort. Even at this day, nervous invalids occasionally present themselves to physicians, whose childhood was made terrible by the doctrines of eternal damnation and the unpardonable sin. It is true that the children who take these doctrines so seriously to heart are usually of the sort to whom a sense of dread is natural, and whose own brothers and sisters may have turned an indifferent ear to the same teaching; but, none the less, the experience of the more sensitive children should serve as a valuable warning.

The child's own home, the kindergarten, the school-room, the playground, and all the other centres where eager children congregate are likewise places where all who seek means for preventing nervous invalidism, whatever their professions, can meet in imagination, as on common ground. Few persons would dispute the view that the encouragement of personal enthusiasm,

of personal skill and effort, and of the habit of personal effacement for the general good, that mark so many different educational movements of the present day, counts against invalidism and for good health.

Finally, the problem of nervous invalidism comes home to the psychologists, the physicians, the clergymen, the social workers. All such persons and all such classes of persons may make some contribution towards its solution, but each should realize that this opportunity entails a corresponding responsibility. The contribution, to be of value, should be based on adequate knowledge, and should be made with the best interests of the community as a whole in clear sight. This last point is of great significance. We ought to conceive of the community as personified, as marshalling its forces to meet the dangers that confront it, and as indicating to individuals and to professions their appropriate duties and opportunities, with the double purpose of founding systems endowed with the capacity for healthy growth and of encouraging individual enterprise. Every one concerned may and should study into the facts of nervous invalidism with the intention of forming a personal judgment as to what measures ought to be adopted with regard to them; but, when it comes to making expert application of this knowledge upon a large scale, every one should recognize that the best interests of the community demand the separation of those who work in its behalf into separate professions, organized so as to secure for each individual member a thorough, guaranteed training, subject to ready criticism and supervision. Private persons, school-teachers, clergymen, physicians, and social workers may profitably work in common, sharing and contributing to each other's knowledge, using each other's weapons, enjoying each other's confidence, but always under a tacit agreement that every one should recognize the importance of promoting the steady growth in expert skill of special groups of workers, the gain in strength and public confidence of professions and of systems; in other words, with a view to the best interests of the community as a whole.

The progress which the last forty years have seen with regard to the study of the nervous system and the mind has taken two strikingly different lines. On the one hand, any one who really

considers, in the light of accurate knowledge, what it means to acquaint one's self not only with medicine and surgery in general, but with the anatomy and the physiology of the nervous system, psychology in its new developments, philosophy and metaphysics—all of which are closely correlated studies, and all necessary for an adequate knowledge of the working of the mind—must realize that the department of nervous diseases is the most difficult of any with which the physician has to deal. It is so difficult that even the most advanced thinkers and observers feel themselves still groping in the dark, though not without visions illuminated by certain brilliant gleams of light.

Yet, on the other hand, in spite of all difficulties, this subject has a very popular and very fascinating side, and to that side the public has been effectively introduced. Of late years we have been showered with a popular literature, much of which is of an excellent sort, and every one has had abundant opportunity to make himself familiar with technical terms, such as "sub-liminal consciousness," "double personality," "obsession," and many more, without having the fact at all adequately forced upon him that these terms hint at depths of ignorance which no one has adequately plumbed. Furthermore, it has been made obvious that great knowledge is not an essential element of the power to bring about striking cures in certain cases of nervous invalidism. Enthusiasm, "suggestion," expressed or even implied, confidence in another or one's self, obedience to a principle or a belief, have often proved sufficient to accomplish these results, whether in the tents of the medicine-man, the shrines of the churches, or the consulting-rooms of the experts. This discovery that persons not having a physician's training could often accomplish successfully a portion of what had previously been considered the physician's work has favored the establishment and growth of certain popular movements the study of which is full of interest. I have in mind especially the Christian Science movement, and that which came in under the name of "mind healing" and is represented by a number of persons who have believed in themselves and in their cause, and have benefited a great many of their followers. One striking feature of the Christian Science movement, which is present also, though to a much less degree, in "mind healing," is the

discarding of scientific and medical authority and methods. To this iconoclastic attitude the Christian Science movement has undoubtedly owed a certain measure of its success.

Then came the Emmanuel movement, with its cordial recognition of scientific and medical authority, yet with its assertion of an independent position on many medical questions, and its claim that it is the duty of the church to assume various responsibilities and utilize various methods that hitherto physicians alone had been considered qualified to employ. One avowed reason for the movement was a desire to strengthen the position of the church, and another was a belief in the insufficient preparation of the great body of the physicians for adequately seeing and dealing with the mental element in disease. This movement is still on trial. The vast majority of physicians unquestionably disapprove of it. But there are others who support it, and others still who welcome it as one of the means through which popular sentiment may arouse a keener interest in an important subject.

The leaders of the Emmanuel movement in Boston have, it is understood, recently adopted new rules and to some extent new principles for their guidance. But it is still held to be desirable for clergymen at large to act as practising physicians; that is, systematically, and as a part of their regular work, to give practical advice to sick persons with regard to their sicknesses, provided only that the plan has the approval, in each case, of a physician who at least nominally has the patient in his charge.

The question is not whether physicians who feel themselves unable to give in a suitable manner the moral advice and consolation which a patient needs should be given a better opportunity to secure the aid of clergymen especially interested in the mental and moral state of sick persons. It is whether the community should indorse a new form of medical specialty, represented by persons without adequate training for their task. It is unquestionably true that persons without medical training have sometimes utilized their talents and their devotion in giving object-lessons that physicians could profitably follow. It was an engineer of Zürich who gave the first definite impulse to the important movement for utilizing work of various sorts as a cure for nervous invalidism, and his successful efforts met with warm

appreciation. The *Naturärzte* of Germany went far beyond reasonable limits in substituting zeal for knowledge. Yet it has been asserted that their successes and their popular following did great service to the cause of physical therapeutics by forcing an important means of treatment upon the notice of scientific men. Private enterprises of these sorts stand, however, on a different plane from wide-spread movements to become the basis of organizable institutions.<sup>1</sup>

It is often said that physicians have only themselves to blame if so many of their patients have left them to join one or another popular movement, and that the success of these movements constitutes a species of rebuke to them for not having paid more attention to their patients' mental and spiritual needs. In fact, I do not think that the indication furnished by the number of adherents to the popular movements is really to be read in this sense, nor that the defects of the physicians are sufficient to justify the establishment of a new system. Obviously, a portion of the support given to such movements is mere restlessness and a vague hope of gain through change. Defects must, however, be admitted, both in the physicians' knowledge of the nervous system and its diseases and in their general attitude towards life. Many physicians are materialistic in their tendencies; familiar with the marvellous discoveries of natural science, they make the mistake of believing that the methods by which these discoveries have been made afford an avenue to the whole field of knowledge.<sup>2</sup> But, although these statements are true of many physicians, they are far from being true of all; and no one has been able to take a step of any consequence in the treatment of the nervous invalid without referring to the pioneer work which physicians are doing and have done.

<sup>1</sup>It has long been known to those who cared to know, that a few professed psychologists, whose studies, sympathies, and talents have led them to take a special interest in the condition of persons suffering from mental troubles, have given them advice and treatment through "suggestion" and in kindred ways. This has been done on such a limited scale that the question has never arisen in connection with it whether a new medical specialty was likely to become thereby established. It has been, rather, an affair of personal enterprise and experiment, analogous to that of the Zürich engineer referred to in the text.

<sup>2</sup>Farrar, *Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases*, January, 1909.

I think it is true that physicians as a body, and even neurologists as a body, have been backward in the study and treatment of certain forms of nervous invalidism, but I feel less concerned to blame them for this lack of interest than to find out its cause and to help toward a better state of things. One portion of the cause has been that general practitioners have either seen or dimly felt the difficulties of the study, looked at from its scientific side, and have shrunk from making the effort needed to overcome them. Yet they shrank also from joining popular movements and felt it their duty to disapprove the action of those among themselves who adopted popular fashions of influencing nervous invalids.

There is something to regret and something to approve of in these attitudes; but, however that may be, the main object of interest for the community is to see that the defects of physicians are removed by a better education, and the relations between physicians and clergymen improved by a better comprehension of each other's aims.

Physicians and clergymen represent two different but co-ordinate professions. The community should be willing to show infinite patience with the mistakes and shortcomings of both, infinite willingness to note one by one the defects in their work with the purpose of removing them. At the same time their permanent distinction should be safeguarded, for the very life of two great institutions of civilization, each with a long history and manifest future, and each founded on a different set of instincts, is at stake. A profession represents the filtered thought and traditions of many generations; it is the product of growth and continuity; it represents more than the best of any individual or of many individuals. No one person can adequately represent the whole of these traditions, any more than one person can adequately represent all the good qualities of the nation to which he belongs. But what every one can do is to recognize a certain patent of nobility, and the obligations that go with it by virtue of the aggregate achievements of the profession to which he owes his allegiance. The standing in the community of the two professions of religion and medicine is unquestionably strong, and yet not by any means so strong but that it could be

stronger. It is the duty of each member of both of them, and of every man who believes that the community should husband its resources to the best advantage, to see to it that by his criticism, on the one hand, and his effective support, upon the other, he endeavors to strengthen their dignity and sense of responsibility and to define the boundaries of their respective functions.

The clergymen who now stand forward as the representatives of the new medical movement are able and energetic, and their purposes command our sympathy; they are in the first flush of recognition of their power in a new field over large numbers of their fellow-men; they see, as might have been predicted, diseases usually accounted very serious or even incurable apparently yielding to their touch. It would be impossible that they should escape a certain intoxication of success in the face of these experiences, impossible that they should abstain from using their new-found powers in ways that their own riper judgment might disapprove. On one side, it is urged, stands the community with its sorrows, on the other stands a band of men knowing themselves equipped with weapons for rescue and capable of utter devotion in the use of them. Why should they not rush in, thrust aside customs and conventions, constitute themselves a *posse comitatus*, and do what they can, as men for men?

There are many generous-minded persons who regard these facts and arguments as covering the case, and say that when the house is in flames it is no time to inquire too carefully into the credentials of those who pass the water-buckets. From this standpoint it would obviously be of little consequence whether the performance of the volunteer fire-brigade was in all respects up to the best technical standard, or whether or not it exactly squared with their intentions as at first asserted.

But do these sentiments really represent the facts? I think that they do not, and I ask you to consider, fairly and calmly, what really are the needs of the nervous invalid and of the community which contains nervous invalids, and by what organized means these needs can best be met.

It is common to hear it said: The teacher, the clergyman, the social worker, should treat the "mental disorders" of the invalid; the physician should treat his body; or, in other words, the

clergyman may treat "functional" diseases, the physician "organic" diseases.

But these distinctions are untenable and unworkable. The mind, strictly speaking, is not subject to disease, any more than is the force of gravitation; and the only practical question is, What are the conditions which prevent the mind from working to the best advantage, and how can these unfavorable conditions best be removed? The needs of the nervous invalid—which we may take as indicating the kinds of expert skill required in meeting them—can be roughly classified as follows. People become depressed, discouraged, the victims of fears and doubts, of the sense of isolation, of incompetency and failure, or of a thousand lesser or analogous ills, partly because of bodily illness, partly because of unfortunate mental habits—dating back it may be to experiences of childhood—which have become so fixed that they share the attributes of bodily illnesses; partly because of faulty mental attitudes; partly because of peculiarly unfavorable environments.

How may these unfavorable conditions best be neutralized? I shall speak only of two principal and contrasted methods. First, there is no doubt that one of the most effective ways of meeting the signs of invalidism is by boldly ignoring them and pressing forward confidently toward a better future. Many symptoms may be effectively side-tracked by an engrossing occupation, or made trivial through the growth of character, or reduced to insignificance under the touch of an inspiring personality or the acceptance of an inspiring creed. So much can, indeed, be accomplished in this way that it is not to be wondered at that this method should have been widely regarded—especially by vigorous-minded persons who had acquired skill in wielding the weapons that it furnished—as affording a complete solution of the problem of invalidism, and as adapted for unlimited use without fear that harm could follow.

Clergymen, parents, teachers, physicians, and neighbors have all utilized with good effect agencies of the kind just indicated, but the more conservative of them have felt that the method had its limitations. Gallantry, courage, energy, and faith can accomplish much; and may successfully carry many an invalid over



some danger-point or open for him new avenues of power. At the least it may enable him to fulfil an important task with credit, as in the case of Napoleon's ensign-bearer in Browning's "Rats-bon." But they may also conceal from him the need of other remedies until it is too late to use them to advantage. It is obvious that some way should be found for securing the benefits of this method without opening the door to too many of the risks which sometimes follow in its train.

The second method of meeting the needs of the nervous invalid is that which involves a careful searching out of all the bodily and mental causes of the invalid state, and an equally careful application of the appropriate physical and mental remedies. It takes much personal experience and strong interest to enable one even to appreciate the importance of this method, the difficulties attending its application, the length of training in all the branches of medicine, and the amount of personal investigation needed for making it successful and for eliminating the dangers that attend it. But on the development of this second method the very future of the scientific treatment of nervous invalidism depends. No large portion of the medical profession is as yet thoroughly aware of the importance of the part which that department of medicine that deals with the nervous system is bound to play in the future; and for most laymen the striking effects of the first of the two methods of treatment that I have here outlined has led to a misapprehension of the real province of the ideal neurologist, who must utilize both methods alike.

The specialty called neurology has been until recently accounted relatively narrow; but in fact it is bound in the end to be recognized as more important than any other specialty, just as the functions of the nervous system are more important, at least as regards success and happiness, than the functions of any other organ of the body. Functional nervous disorders are more common than any other class of disorders to which the human being is exposed. The troubles of the nervous invalid are full of interest, human and scientific, the more so because the invalid himself is often a person capable of intelligent co-operation and appreciation. The work of the neurologist brings him into close contact with all the great departments of medical theory and prac-

tice. Even ordinary fatigue induces disorders which the neurologist cannot understand unless he is theoretically and practically familiar with the work of the orthopedist, the gynaecologist, and the internist, and unless he is able to consult with them on almost equal terms. He must be equally familiar with the work of the laryngologist, the oculist, and the aurist, for the headaches and signs of mental weakness which occur so often with debilitated conditions of the nervous system may be induced by disorders of the organs with which these specialists have primarily to do. Thus, while the neurologist is himself neither an internist nor a surgeon of any of the numerous types, he must be in close sympathy with all of them. But the work of the ideal neurologist only begins with these sorts of co-operation. His acquaintance with the disorders of the mind makes him familiar also with a long series of great influences, varying from those that rock the foundations of society to those which contribute to its passions, its pleasures, and its needs, from which these disorders spring. He must study, likewise, the more intimate disturbances of the brain in its relations to the body and the mind; and the person who would fulfil such obligations must, for the time, take the standpoints of the pathologist, the chemist, the anatomist, the physiologist, the psychologist, and the student of philosophy. Let me go one step farther, and in doing so open the door leading to regions which in some respects are more important than any of those yet indicated, by saying that in dealing with patients suffering from fears and broken hopes the neurologist must feel himself in full sympathy with the clergyman.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> I wish to acknowledge that it rests with the neurologists to see that the students who graduate at our medical schools have a far better training as regards the knowledge and qualities necessary for appreciating the needs of the nervous invalid and applying the suitable remedies than their predecessors have had. It is one of the advantages of specialism in medicine that the more prominent specialists, by gathering together and condensing into a small space the main results of their vast experience, can place at the service of their colleagues a collection of relatively simple principles of diagnosis and treatment which can then be utilized by a large number of practitioners. Every intelligent physician can thus obtain, if he will take the pains, a broad outlook over the whole field of medicine. But in order to take this broad view he must devote himself to the principles and practice of medicine with his whole heart and mind, making every other interest secondary to that. In order to give this teaching in the way it should be given, neurologists

I have given it as my opinion that the training and experience of the physician is absolutely indispensable for certain portions of the treatment of the nervous invalid, and that the ideal physician should be capable of appreciating, and in some measure of representing, the whole field of duties to which reference has been made. But in saying this I have not claimed that all physicians or all neurologists now fulfil these duties as they should, or that there are no others with whom these duties should be shared.

The work accomplished by the churches in behalf of the nervous invalid is, in its field, as important as that of the physician, while it is even broader in its scope. For the particular problems that come to each man and each profession for solution are all subservient to the larger problem of the duties of each man and each profession as members of the community, conceived in the widest sense. The churches stand for this wider view of personal responsibility, and are in a position to look at the problem of nervous invalidism, at the work of the medical profession as a whole, and at the moral and spiritual issues that this work involves, as against the background of a thousand other issues and problems of duty and opportunity related to the work of the lawyer, the statesman, the man of business, and the philanthropist, and to the problems of the rich and of the poor. The clergyman thus stands for the recognition of a sort of public service in which all professions may unite, and has the chance of pointing out for the benefit of each one the landmarks of moral progress to which the others have attained. But, further than this, he is the natural representative and exponent, through word and pen, of a great realm of scientific truth concerning the spiritual life of human beings, and of the sentiments that accompany, and in a sense forestall, conviction on these matters. Here his province overlaps the province of the philosophers; and, if the signs of the times are being rightly read, we are entering on a period when their joint arguments will secure a hearing to a degree that has

need endowed departments in our medical schools, and endowed hospitals in which nervous invalids can be adequately studied and treated. We must look for the means for accomplishing the difficult task before us to the liberality of interested members of the community. A generous friend of the Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore has already provided an ample fund for this purpose in that city. This example should be imitated elsewhere.

been denied them during the past half-century of intense absorption in the scientific problems of the physicist and the biologist. I wish I could adequately express my appreciation of the service of this sort which the church can render, and has rendered, to the physician and to the nervous invalid.

Daily, to each of them, the question presents itself whether he shall content himself with the belief that the narrow world of sense and suffering within which he is apparently confined is necessarily bounded by a prison wall, or whether he may not discover that it is a world of freedom, of order, of beauty, and of power.

"While I walk about my chamber with unsteady steps, my spirit sweeps skyward on eagle wings, and looks out with unquenchable vision upon a world of eternal beauty"<sup>4</sup>—this is the sentiment of one who was deprived at an early age of the two senses of sight and hearing, yet who won a sense of spiritual freedom such as few attain to in greater measure. Visions of truth and power, of this and kindred sorts, have been gratefully received in the past at the hands of inspired ministers of the churches of every name, and of inspired writers like Emerson. Such preachers, such writers, have never lacked an audience.

But this sort of service by no means represents all that the churches have done for nervous invalids.

It is well known that the influence of clergymen as friendly advisers of individuals in distress has at times been great, and has been particularly marked, or at any rate particularly wholesome, when the social or pastoral relationship has been of long standing. The clergymen who have rendered this sort of service have not as a rule felt the need of special training other than that which they had acquired in studying and practising their own profession. The very fact that they have not pretended to great technical information has enabled them to impress with greater force the beliefs on which their lives were based.

The work of the clergymen for the sick has, as every one is aware, varied in amount in proportion to each man's special

<sup>4</sup>Helen Keller, *Sense and Sensibility*. *Century Magazine*, February and March, 1908.

sense of fitness. Some ministers shrink from sick persons, and go to them only from a sense of duty, while others feel an instinctive desire to make themselves of personal use to individuals in distress. The name of the late Bishop Brooks has often been mentioned in connection with this sort of work. The pastor of Emmanuel Church evidently belongs in this same class.

Something should be said as to the difficulty of estimating the number of persons who suffer from nervous symptoms so seriously as to need help from outside sources, and for whose needs the community should provide. In endeavoring to make this estimate, the significant fact should be borne in mind that it depends very much upon circumstances whether a man classes himself as sick or well. When new and attractive opportunities for treatment are offered, they are taken advantage of by new groups of applicants, especially if the treatments are of a sort to appeal strongly to the imagination and the sentiments. There are many invalids, also, who like to meet in groups, as if to make common cause in seeking relief from their afflictions and to gain from each other new enthusiasm and new hope. This is all in accordance with deep-seated human instincts, and accounts in part for the success of popular healing movements as well as of popular religious movements. It is something more than convenience that draws into one pilgrimage from many quarters the throngs that pay their annual visits to the shrine of Lourdes. The size of the multitude measures in part the success of the visit. But these chances of success necessarily attract many individuals who would have done better to stay at home or to seek advice in private. All of us have troubles of which we gladly would be rid, and in conversation with our friends, if in no other way, we often seek consolation, encouragement, or advice. But it often happens, also, that we purposely refrain from doing this, and feel ourselves the stronger for refraining. If this latter sentiment were recognized on a larger scale, the number of invalids in the community would seem smaller than it now does.

Still another inference suggests itself in this connection. It has been asserted that we physicians have not adequately appreciated the legitimate emotional needs of the people who make the

large popular movements possible, and have not prepared ourselves to offer them a sort of leadership that we could offer and they accept. My own experience induces me to believe that there is something to say for this opinion.

Let me summarize, in conclusion, the points to which I wish to call attention: There is undoubtedly a real problem of nervous invalidism, though just what its magnitude is it is impossible to say. Many different classes of citizens, including invalids themselves, have special opportunities and responsibilities in relation to this problem. Contributions of every sort, from whatever source they come, looking toward a solution of this problem, should be welcomed; but intelligent and liberal-minded persons who have the best interests of the community at heart should seek to strengthen the hands of those groups of persons who have laid out for themselves the most difficult and the most comprehensive portion of the task. The work of the church seems to me to consist mainly in the development of character and motives, and in these respects it occupies the same position with regard to the sick as to the well. Believing that individual enterprise and skill should be encouraged, yet not at the cost of endangering the progress of organized institutions, I should welcome the aid of clergymen as of real value, but should deprecate the systematic entrance of representatives of the churches into the medical field. Physicians should stand for the skilled employment of special means of preventing disease, with all its causes, and of treating sick persons;<sup>5</sup> clergymen represent

<sup>5</sup>I cannot leave this characterization of the physician's work without some reference to that of the social service workers, at present developed mainly in connection with certain hospitals and dispensaries. The nature of this admirable work, as organized three years ago at the Massachusetts General Hospital by Dr. Richard C. Cabot, deserves particular mention. The physicians to the great dispensaries save out some two or three hours from a busy day and devote them to giving what advice they can to a large number of patients whose illnesses present problems of the most varied sorts. In the department to which I am attached the needs of as many as forty patients must at times be considered by the physician and his assistants in the course of one forenoon. It is obvious that these physicians cannot find time to know in detail what goes on within the homes of these many individuals, nor to what harmful influences they are exposed; nor can they give the patient labor needed for ferreting out the best measures of relief. All this the social service worker spends her day in doing, ever increasing thereby her

the main agency by which the demoralization of invalidism is counteracted, and the misfortunes of the invalid transformed into a means of progress, through the instilling of moral courage, religious insight, and the sense of fellowship and of responsibility.

own rich stock of kindness, hopefulness, and wisdom, and leading the patients to exhibit these qualities in their turn. A piece of therapeutic work unique in dispensary experience has been done, through the help of these workers, in maintaining instruction in clay-modelling for some of the nervous invalids attending as out-patients at the Massachusetts General Hospital, and the intelligent co-operation of an outside friend has made it possible for these same patients to attend lectures at the Museum of Fine Arts.

## BOOKS RECEIVED

- WHAT IS PRAGMATISM? *By James Bissett Pratt.* 12mo, pp. 12+254. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1909. \$1.25 net.
- THE PHILOSOPHY OF REVELATION. *By Herman Bavinck.* 12mo, pp. 10+349. New York: Longmans, Green & Co. 1909. \$2. net.
- ANSELM'S THEORY OF THE ATONEMENT. *By George Cadwalader Foley.* 12mo, pp. 15+327. New York: Longmans, Green & Co. 1909. \$1.50 net.
- PEACE AND HAPPINESS. *By Lord Avebury.* 12mo, pp. 10+386. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1909. \$1.50 net.
- REDEEMING VISION. *By J. Stuart Holden.* 12mo, pp. 13+214. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1909. \$1.25 net.
- TOWARDS SOCIAL REFORM. *By Canon and Mrs. S. A. Barnett.* 12mo, pp. 8+352. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1909. \$1.50 net.
- SHELburne ESSAYS. *By Paul Elmer More.* 12mo, pp. 355. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1909. \$1.25 net.
- SOCIAL LIFE AT ROME IN THE AGE OF CICERO. *By W. Warde Fowler.* 12mo, pp. 13+362. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1909. \$2.25 net.
- THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE. *By Theodor von Haering.* Translated by James S. Hill, with an introduction by W. D. Morrison. 12mo, pp. 16+479. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1909. \$3 net.
- THE MISSION AND EXPANSION OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE FIRST THREE CENTURIES. *By Adolf Harnack.* Translated and edited by James Moffatt. 2 vols. 12mo, pp. 15+513, 357. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1908. \$7 net.
- THE ACTS OF THE APOSTLES. *By Adolf Harnack.* Translated by J. R. Wilkinson. 12mo, pp. 11+303. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1909.
- THE PREACHER; HIS PERSON, MESSAGE AND METHOD. *By Arthur S. Hoyt.* 12mo, pp. 10+380. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1909. \$1.50 net.



EARLY CHRISTIANITY. *By S. B. Slack.* 16mo, pp. 10+88. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company.

MODERN THOUGHT AND THE CRISIS IN BELIEF. *By R. M. Wenley.* 12mo, pp. 9+364. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1909. \$1.50 net.

THE LAWS OF FRIENDSHIP, HUMAN AND DIVINE. *By Henry Churchill King.* 12mo, pp. 10+159. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1909. \$1.25 net.

RELIGIONSGESCHICHTLICHE ERKLÄRUNG DES NEUEN TESTAMENTS. *Von Carl Clemen.* 12mo, pp. 8+301. Geissen: Alfred Töpelmann. 1909. 10 Marks.

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# HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

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## *THE BEARING OF HISTORICAL STUDIES ON THE RELIGIOUS USE OF THE BIBLE*

FRANK C. PORTER

YALE UNIVERSITY

The Bible is better understood by scholars today than ever before, but it seems to be at the same time less generally used and less enjoyed, and it is natural to ask whether there is a connection between the increasing knowledge of the book by specialists and the lessening familiarity with it and regard for it among the people. The problem thus suggested is not an isolated one. In regard to other books it may be asked whether the advance of learning is accompanied by a gain or a loss in the capacity to read with enjoyment and uplift; and in regard to other facts than those recorded in the Bible the question is in place whether scientific study stimulates or dulls the sense of their poetic beauty or spiritual value. Yet the problem is peculiarly pressing in regard to the Bible and the facts it records, because of the unique significance of these books and of this history for our higher life.

It has been the first duty of historical students to defend the intellectual necessity and to maintain the scientific character of their work against both the unconscious influence and the outspoken opposition of tradition and prejudice. Certainly theological preconceptions and perhaps even religious interests required to be silenced in order that facts, literary and historical, might be seen as they were, and allowed to speak for themselves. But when his freedom has been fully won, the historical student will naturally hope that his work may prove helpful to religion, at least that it will not create obstacles to faith. He will hope



that religious faith will be able to appropriate and put to its own higher uses such results of scientific study as are commonly accepted and secure, and at the same time that it will not wait for or depend upon results that must in the nature of the case remain uncertain. He will want the right understanding of the book to spread among the people, but he will not want the average man to imagine that the Bible belongs to scholars and that to the unlearned it is a closed book.

If science and religion could go each its own free way in the use of the Bible, neither interfering with the other, the problem proposed by our theme would be easily solved. In fact such independence may fairly be claimed so far at least as it is involved in the assertion that the religious spirit and the reasoning intellect are two normal factors in the higher life of man, two interests and faculties of the mind, each equally deserving our trust and requiring satisfaction. Yet the adjustment of these two faculties of our nature to each other is not quite a matter of course. A division of material between them cannot be carried through. It cannot be said that science has to do with things seen, religion with things unseen. The aim of science is knowledge, that of religion is communion with God. Whatever has reality we must seek to understand, to find its place in the one order of the universe; but at the same time all things real, though in different ways and measures, must become to us revelations of God, ways of approach to him. Religion itself may properly be an object of scientific study; science itself may inspire religious feeling. Still less than a division of material between science and religion should we undertake or permit a division among ourselves between men of science and men of religion. That one man should pursue the scientific study of the Bible and another put it to its religious uses is not the way in which the independence of science and religion in this region is to be secured. We may believe that since both the scientific and the religious interests belong to us by nature they should not interfere with each other and cannot in the end harm each other; but this does not mean that they may not unduly and dangerously limit each other's claim to the attention and energy of the individual man. It is not well for one to be only an historical

student of a literature which is fitted to stir the emotions and quicken the imagination and determine the will. The danger which we have now to fear is not that the results of scientific study will disprove and prohibit a religious view of the world, but that science will prove too absorbing a pursuit and produce in us satisfaction in understanding, as if that were our highest power, and the atrophy of our faculties of imagination and feeling. We have an eager desire for knowledge, regardless of uses and consequences. This is the characteristic higher life of our time. Below this is the still more current desire to put our new knowledge to new uses, to make it contribute to our power and enjoyment. Pleasure in knowledge and pleasure through knowledge are the higher and lower sides of that mental life which is most characteristic of our age. But, if we can trust the testimony of the greatest human spirits, there are pleasures greater than those of knowledge. Now the higher appeal of literature is of course to the imagination and the heart, not to the intellect. It is especially in literature, therefore, that scientific studies are in danger of being pursued at the expense of higher uses and enjoyments; and this danger besets the students of the Bible no less than the students of other great books.

Practically, then, the scientific study and the religious use of the Bible, dealing as they do with the same material and claiming the interest and the energy of the same minds, cannot be kept independent, but will interact upon each other. Our problem is to discover what that interaction actually is, and ought normally to be. It is at once evident that it is not the same in all parts of the book. The Bible contains a great variety of elements, differing widely in their historical character and interest, and in the kind and degree of their religious power. It may be said—not forgetting that such a classification has uneven and overlapping edges, and sometimes applies to different aspects rather than to different parts of the book—that in some parts of the Bible historical studies practically exclude the religious use; that in some parts, on the other hand, they leave the religious use quite unchanged; that in some parts, again, history yields results that are positively helpful to faith; and that in some cases religion may give aid to history, may add the needed human

meaning and value to the bare facts which history brings to light, or even supply the clew to their true explanation.

I. There are, then, in the first place the cases in which historical interpretation practically excludes the religious use of the Bible. The Song of Solomon is secular, not religious poetry, and can no longer be put to religious uses now that an allegorizing interpretation of it is no longer possible. There are in the New Testament arguments which rest on a literalistic or on an allegorical use of the Old Testament, which we can no longer follow with any other than an historical interest, even though we may sympathize with the end which the writer reaches by this to us impassable road. There are, especially in the Old Testament, ceremonial rites, moral ideals and motives, and intellectual conceptions for which we cannot make room in our view of the world,—customs, ideas, and ideals to which we feel that we have done full justice when we have traced their origin and put them in their place in the development of human thought. In such cases historical study satisfies us, and leaves us disinclined to attempt any present spiritual appropriation of what belongs so completely to the past. There will be differences of opinion as to how far and at what points the historical account has this right to take the place of any other use of Biblical conceptions. Most modern men would agree that in regard to the accounts of first things and last things, the descriptions of heaven and of sheol, of angels and of demons, we need nothing but an historical account and explanation, and by this are freed from any further responsibility. To most of us this is only a part of that emancipation which science has achieved from superstitions which have enslaved the human mind, not only in ancient times but almost until our own generation.

There are perhaps some who would answer the question suggested by our theme in no other way than this. Science, they would say, removes the quality of supernaturalness from the Bible and so makes an end of its religious use. To this it can fairly be replied that the Bible shows its remarkable quality in the slight relative degree to which its religious value has been lessened by a science which has fundamentally altered our conception of nature and the supernatural. There are sacred books

whose sacredness vanishes in the light of science. If our Bible were composed chiefly of ritual laws, or of miraculous legends, or of apocalyptic visions, the rise of historical criticism would have involved the end of its religious value. The growth of science has had much more effect upon the later doctrines of the Christian church than upon the Bible, because the Bible contains so little that is of the nature of science, and has so little concern for the communication of knowledge.

II. There are, in the second place, parts and aspects of the Bible of which it can be said that historical studies have substantially no influence upon their religious use. It is of course a superficial judgment that hastens to declare that this is everywhere the case, and that the book remains after historical criticism just what it was before. It is at once clear that this definition of the bearing of historical studies on the higher uses of the Bible applies to it so far as its qualities and effects are of the literary sort. The Book of Psalms presents the clearest instance of a Biblical book of which the religious value is little affected by historical studies. Historical problems are here, of course, in abundance; problems of time and occasion, of authorship and composition, of original and later uses and interpretations. Such problems are difficult enough to excite the zest of the historical explorer and to make the search in itself a pleasure. They are as a matter of fact the more difficult because they are the less important; for the absence of historical data is largely due to the fact that these poems are not closely connected with historical events, but move in a region that is above time and place. After historical criticism has done its utmost, the Psalms remain what they were before. The book continues to be a book of prayer and of song for all peoples; and the true appreciation of songs and prayers is reserved for those who sing and pray.

What is true of the Psalms is true of all the parts of the Bible of which the quality and effect are of the same sort; books or parts of books which are made and meant to be enjoyed rather than to give information, to inspire rather than to instruct. There are many parts of the Bible of which the greater value lies in the beauty, the passion, the uplifting power of their expression of religious faith and hope and love. In many parts of the pro-

phetical books, pre-eminently in Deutero-Isaiah, this is the case. In regard to many of the stories in the Pentateuch and the historical books it is beyond dispute that the greater value to the spirit of man lies upon the surface of the narratives, not in the obscurities of tradition below, and the still greater obscurities of historical fact. ♣ The stories as they are can be enjoyed by children, and still, in even fuller measure, by mature men and women, enjoyed in a degree determined by the reader's humanity, not by his learning. But this does not bring us by any means to the limits of the region within which such simple literary appreciation is the higher use of the Bible. We must include parts of the letters of Paul, larger parts than we should at first suppose. The writings of Paul have been so long used as books of theological science, and are now so eagerly and fruitfully searched as documents of historical science, that they have hardly been allowed to reveal, except to the unlearned, their true nature. They are books of passion more than books of reasoning; and so far as they are books of passion they remain for religious uses much the same after historical criticism as before. After the work of scholarship, Paul will still, as before, be best read and most truly appreciated by those who most nearly share his experience, those to whom the power to call God, Father, and Jesus, Lord, and the experience of divine love as an indwelling Spirit make the soul glow with gratitude and lift it up to an exultant consciousness of freedom and of essential immortality.

Of many of the stories and sayings of the gospels it is no less true that their proper character is that of poetry. By no means all that Jesus said was new and comes to us as information. Jesus had a marvellous power not only to sift the wheat from the chaff in the moral ideals and religious faiths of his people, but to give to what he approved memorable expression, and to send old truths as well as new in forms of moving beauty and convincing illustration down to the common people and forth into the world. Many of his words in the gospels have this character. Their effect does not even depend on the certainty that he uttered them. They are self-evidencing, and speak to us with the direct authority of conscience itself.

Our religious use and enjoyment of such language, whether in

the Psalms or in the letters of Paul, in Genesis or Isaiah or the gospels, does not depend altogether on the degree in which we actually share the conceptions, or even appreciate the situation of the writers. It belongs to the nature of the language of emotion that it adapts itself to varying moods and adjusts itself to new conditions, and that the power it exerts is in a measure independent of the reader's understanding of its original sense. In the Book of Psalms the Jewish church preserved and used songs of which the original meaning and the point of view reflected in them had already been left far behind. Of these outgrown meanings the Jewish readers were quite unaware. Quite unconsciously they adapted the words to their own views, yet they used them truly in accordance with their deeper character. We ourselves use the Psalms with still different ideas in our minds, involuntarily giving a poetic value to words of which the original sense is not possible to us. We do this easily in the case of the Psalms, and there can be no doubt that in the reading of Paul also we are nearer to that communion of soul in which true reading consists when we feel the heart of his emotion than when we turn upon his language the light of contemporary conceptions. It is beyond doubt one of the disadvantages of our scientific training and habit of thought that the world of facts and ideas imposes itself upon us as a thing of greater reality than the world of imagination and feeling. It is hard for us, in spite of the argument and appeal of every great literary critic from Aristotle to Coleridge and Wordsworth and Arnold, to confess that poetic truth has no less validity and much more value than historic fact; hard therefore to admit that to enjoy a book is a greater thing than to understand it, and brings into play higher faculties of the mind.

There are then important parts of the Bible in which historical study has little bearing upon religious use, in which indeed our chief anxiety should be lest it bear too hard, lest the scientific interests crowd the religious out of that first place which rightly belongs to it. These parts are all such as offer their greater worth as it were upon their surface, in their quality as books, to the sympathetic and responsive soul; such as do not hide their greater treasure beneath the surface in the region of historical fact.

III. But let us at once confess that there are parts of the Bible of which the greater value lies not on the surface but below it, to be unearthed and brought to light only by historical research. These are the parts which fall under our third division, those in which historical study helps us to a better religious use of the book. The help that the historical study of the Bible offers to religion is both negative and positive, and, if it prove to be more negative than positive, this will not mean that it is not needed and great. Historical study compels us to make, and enables us to make intelligently and with conscious purpose, certain discriminations in the book which have the effect of removing obstacles to our enjoyment of it and imparting freedom in our use of it. The fact that there are many things in the book that are not in agreement with our knowledge of nature, or with our moral ideals, or with our conceptions of God, can no longer perplex us or drive us to allegorizing, when we recognize an historical development in which the imperfect has its place, either as crude beginnings, or as evidence of a decline from higher to lower levels. Historical science points out a reasonable way in which we may make such discriminations in our religious reading of the Bible as religious people have always made, though often in a capricious and ill-considered way. Historical science has made it easier for us to follow Coleridge's counsel than it was for Coleridge himself, to find for ourselves in the Bible that which finds us, to give freely the greater value to that which finds us at the greater depths of our nature. To be sure, the bondage from which, whether we will or not, historical study sets us free has never been so great as to prevent spiritual profit and satisfaction in the reading of the book. The things in it to which the religious soul responds with joy are too many and great to be lost behind the things that offend. Yet the offence becomes greater as the scientific spirit prevails and our uneasiness or even rebellion under the yoke of bondage to the letter increases.

There are subtler distinctions also which historical studies help us make. The difference of which we have become so conscious between our own scientific and religious interests enables us to grasp with greater clearness the difference between intellectual forms of conception in the Bible itself and the sub-

stance of religious experience, between what we might call the scientific element in these writings and the religious. The facts as to the history of thought have a right to guide, even though they do not compel, our judgments as to the value of the intellectual conceptions in which religious experience has from time to time, in one mind and another, sought to find expression and explanation. We have here only an instance of the function which scholarship has to perform in preparing the way for the higher uses of great books in general. That it has such a function, even though only a preparatory one, is especially evident in the case of foreign and ancient literatures. For the appreciation of such books we need in some way to bridge the chasm that separates us from the writers and their times. Historical studies are often important in order that we may become more properly contemporary with the book we would enjoy. We must understand and sympathize with the writer's ideas, though we cannot make them our own, thinking for the time as he thought in order that we may feel as he felt; yet never forgetting that the abiding value belongs to his feelings rather than to his thoughts. To understand the ideas of the Biblical writers, so to understand them that we are free from the sense of bondage to them, is to many of us a prime condition of the discrimination between the human and temporary and the eternal and divine elements in the book; and historical studies are for us the straightest and surest path to such understanding and freedom.

But lest the historian should be exalted above measure by the evident importance of this task, it is necessary to take account of certain limitations of its value. It must be acknowledged, for one thing, that the greatest books need such intervention of learning least. They are greatest for that very reason, or at least are known to be greatest by that sign. They can be read in translations, in remote lands and new times, with undiminished delight and inspiration. Men may not find in them what their first readers found, or just what their writers meant. They may bring with them to their reading and carry over into the book itself thoughts and feelings of their own. For a book is great, as Longinus taught, not only because it so transports us and carries us away with it that we feel as if we had ourselves



produced what we read, but also because it impels us to new thoughts, such, we feel sure, as the author would himself have if he were in our place. The immortal books have this quality of perennial vitality and ready adaptability to all minds and all ages. The human element in them is greater than the national or individual, although it may be the fortunes of a nation or an individual that they describe. In the immediateness and power of its human appeal the Bible has been found to possess pre-eminently among books this quality of universality. In the form of a history of the Israelitish people and of its great men it brings to classical and satisfying expression the religious thoughts and feelings of man. We do not so much need painfully to work our way backward that we may become contemporary in our mental mood and atmosphere with this book because the book has in an extraordinary degree the power to make itself contemporary with us. Looking at it as a whole, as a book, it is certain that the man of genuine and deep humanity will find the best that is in it more surely than the man of learning.

But, still further, even in parts of the Bible where the help of learning is more necessary than it is in the book as a whole,—as indeed in other books where the need is greater than it is in this one,—it should not be overlooked that the task of scholarship is only to prepare the way. It can remove some of the obstacles that lie between our minds and the mind of the writer; but when it has brought us into his presence it must stand aside. An inner sympathy and communion of spirit with spirit remains the condition of the true reading of a book, or rather constitutes the nature of true reading. That process of making the past live again which must constitute the most religious use of a sacred literature remains essentially the work of the imagination. Historical studies perform their highest task when they enable us more easily and completely to overcome the real hindrances to sympathy which differences of language and of age and race create, when they liberate the imagination and leave one free to read the book as his own, in the light of his own experiences and for the satisfaction of his own needs. All this, then, is a negative service of historical science, and in regard to it our greater danger is that we shall forget that it is only a means to an end, and shall

fancy that we are really reading the book when we read it with constant reference to the circumstances in which it was written and with a realizing sense of the world of thought which it presupposes.

But there is a more positive side of the help which history offers to religion. What it brings to light from its search below the surface of the Biblical records is in part itself of obvious religious significance. Historical study has enabled us to recover in its great outlines the course of development of morals and religion in Israel, and the causes and processes through which Christianity came to be. It has also given us a far closer and truer view of the great personalities who in part appear to be determined by that development and represent its successive steps, in part seem rather to have determined the development, to have anticipated and fixed its later stages, and to stand themselves above it as permanent types of the higher life of man. These two discoveries can make strong claims to be of direct and great value to religious faith and life. This again is sometimes declared to be the complete answer to our question. Revelation, it is said, consists in the historical facts which are the deeds of God, not in the records which are the imperfect recollections and interpretations of men. When the historian searches out the facts before and below the records, he is simply putting the deeds of God in the place of the traditions of men. This can be only of advantage to religion.

Now it would be neither wise nor right to depreciate the real value to religion of our modern conception of the course of Israel's religious history. The disclosure of the actual relation between the legal and the prophetic movements cannot but aid the religion of the spirit in its slow triumph over the religions of authority. In the light of historical study it is easier to accept the prophetic and Christian principle that God requires not sacrifice, but righteousness and mercy and humility before him. The development of morals and religion in Israel which the modern historian traces, though it goes forward without miracle, is to our minds far more worthy of being called a divine plan and deed than is the picture which the Jewish church conceived and drew of its past, in accordance with which the Old Testament

canon was shaped. The facts which lie below the surface, which only historical study can uncover, are to our way of thinking more impressive and in our struggle for faith more helpful than the picture which appears on the surface of the books. So also it can hardly be questioned that the better knowledge of the great prophets, of the apostles, of Jesus himself, which has been gained by historical study, must prove only useful and helpful to the purity of religious faith and the reality and depth of religious experience. Here too the closer approach to facts which historical science permits is at the same time an approach to greater values. In the Old Testament it is especially the books of the pre-exilic prophets which are given a heightened human and religious worth through historical research. These books do indeed contain passages which have their virtue in themselves and make the same appeal before and after the historian's work. But as a whole such books as Amos and Hosea have become through modern study far stronger in their appeal to conscience and to faith than they were before. The figures of Isaiah and Jeremiah have been given a new power over the higher life by the separation of their own words from later additions to their books, and by a better understanding of their times and of their influence upon the great historic movement in which they stand. The same may be said of the advantage gained from a nearer and more human view of the Apostle Paul. And surely in the case of the gospels, if the critical comparison of the Fourth Gospel with the other three, and of the three with one another, has brought us nearer to the actual words and the living personality of Jesus, and if a comparison of his teachings with what preceded and with what followed has thrown light on their meaning and significance, who would undertake to deny that in this case historical study, when it leads us from the records and through the criticism of them to the facts behind, is taking us from the thing of less to the thing of greater value for religion?

Yet even here an historian cannot but acknowledge certain limitations of the religious value of his work. It is almost self-evident that religious faith will never be able to rest securely, as on its ultimate foundation, upon the results of scholarly research. These results have not the certainty and permanence which relig-

ion requires. Moreover, if historical research were the condition of a right religious use of the Bible, the book would be taken from the hands of the people, and Christianity would become either an esoteric pursuit of the learned few or a religion of submission on the part of the many to the authority of a new priesthood of scholars. This would be a radical and disastrous departure from that which scholars themselves recognize as most characteristic of the religion of Christ and of Paul, that it was a religion for the common people, and emphasized rather the dangers than the advantages of learning. It should be a chief concern of scholars to reassure religious people, and first of all their own religious natures, of their full freedom and first rights in the Bible, to quicken sympathy and liberate "that imagination which is spiritual vision," to revive joy in the book, the reverent and exultant joy which it is the greatness of a great book to inspire. Two things might contribute to this end. The historian on his part should more fully recognize that in dealing with the Bible he is dealing with a book of literary quality and power, and that in such a book facts, especially concealed facts which it requires his special skill to uncover, are usually not the things of greater value. What is true of other great books is presumably true of this one, that their eminence as well as the persistence of their power over men is due not to the facts they impart, but to the thoughts and feelings which have transfigured the facts and made them their own language and incarnation. Scholarship may fairly be called upon to assist in the recognition of this quality in the book. Such analysis of the secret of the actual power of a book is in fact the chief task of proper literary criticism. The other thing religion itself must supply. Such facts as historical science brings to our secure possession, that development of morals and religion, that action, if one prefers so to describe it, with its tragic element, and its universal human appeal, those great men, in their human reality and in their typical significance, religious faith and experience must undertake to master, to make a living factor in the present life of the spirit. But with this we have advanced to the fourth division of our treatment.

IV. There are places in the Bible in which religion helps historical science, places in which history has less to say in the

way of suggestion and guidance to the man of religion than religion has to say to the historical student. I must anticipate an instinctive dissent from the proposition that religion can direct or assist scientific research. It is easier for us to affirm that science can help religion in the weighing of values, than that religion can help science in the determination of facts. No doubt religion has often transgressed its boundaries by demanding that history reaffirm matters of fact on which faith has been accustomed to depend. Since faith finds the Biblical history at its high points unique in power, it has wished the historian to demonstrate that it is there unique also in its causes and processes. Because religion has required miracle, and science asks for rational order, religious interests have often appeared to obstruct rather than further the progress of science. It has seemed best, therefore, that scientific studies should go on their way without regard to religious feelings. Science seems to us to have a greater objectivity and to require a more unconditional assent than religious needs and hopes. It is easier for us to give science the first place and to let religion follow as it may. It is no doubt the duty of religious faith to listen to what scholars may say of the books and persons and events which it is accustomed to value. When something clear and confessed emerges out of the currents of Biblical criticism, faith should no doubt undertake to adjust itself to the new facts; or rather—and this makes an important difference—it should attempt to interpret the newly discovered facts to the spirit of man, to bring to light the spiritual significance of the facts; or perhaps—and this would make a still further difference—it should proceed to impart to the facts spiritual significance. It cannot be necessary or appropriate for our religious nature to wait in an attitude of mere submission upon the dictates of our reason. It is rather the function of religion to help science by bringing a needed supplement to its work; to help man, we should rather say, by adding to his growing knowledge spiritual meaning and human interest. Nothing could better illustrate this function of religion with reference to the results of historical study than Wordsworth's classic description of the function of poetry in relation to science. If the work of men of science, he says, should ever create any material revo-

lution in our condition and in the impressions which we habitually receive, if their discoveries should become familiar to us and the relations under which they are contemplated should be manifestly and palpably material to us as enjoying and suffering beings, then the poet will be ready to follow the steps of the man of science, and will regard his discoveries as proper objects of the poet's art. "If the time should ever come when what is now called science, thus familiarized to men, shall be ready to put on, as it were, a form of flesh and blood, the Poet will lend his divine spirit to aid the transformation, and will welcome the Being thus produced, as a dear and genuine inmate of the household of man." It is such a function as this that the religious spirit has now to fulfil with reference to the results of historical science in the study of the Bible. The pursuit of science here, as in other regions, lies apart from common human life; and the knowledge thus gained "is a personal and individual acquisition, slow to come to us, and by no habitual and direct sympathy connecting us with our fellow-beings." The knowledge of men of science cannot be made the common possession of men,—that is, the common people cannot be made to rejoice in it and live by it,—through mere popularizations. The results of scientific research must not only be put in untechnical language and brought down to the level of the average intelligence, they must be translated into something living and human, lifted up to the level of the universal and the spiritual; and this transformation, in the case of such a literature and history as the Bible contains, can be accomplished only by the religious spirit. Religion, therefore, has something of its own to do with the outcome of the historian's work before truth of science can become truth rejoiced in as "our visible friend and hourly companion," truth that can be sung in a song in which all human beings can join. We have efforts enough from the side of science to popularize its discoveries, but not yet efforts enough, or efforts free and creative enough, from the side of religion, to give to these discoveries spiritual significance and so common interest and value to humanity. It is no doubt true that this can be done only so far as the results of scientific study are secure and generally accepted and familiar. Perhaps therefore the task that rests

upon our generation is that of reaching assured results, and letting them be generally known, accustoming the people to the facts as fast as they are ascertained. But the search for spiritual values cannot be postponed without spiritual danger and loss. We are not doomed to an exclusively intellectual use of the Bible, nor are we justified in leaving the religious interpretation of the book to a coming generation which shall inherit the knowledge our own has gained. Religion should follow closely the steps of science, and should be ever at its side, "carrying sensation into the midst of the objects of the science itself."

It is evident enough that for his own sake, for the sake of a sound and whole human nature, the scientific student should be at the same time a man of religion. But it is not so evident that this union of religious with scientific interests is required also for the sake of science. Has our experience of religious values the right, at any point and in any measure, to influence our decisions as to matters of fact? The poets have not always followed the advance of knowledge; sometimes they have taken the lead and anticipated by the foresight of genius that which science has afterward discovered or experience confirmed. Such prophetic forecasts need not, indeed, be regarded as simply miraculous. The poet may be only more conscious than other men of the deeper movements of human development, a keener and more sensitive observer of the signs of the times. Moreover the poet's vision enters into human life as itself a reality, and works as an ideal and a motive toward its own actualization. Is there, then, anything analogous to this in the religious use of the Bible? Has the sense of religious value any proper power of its own to detect reality, any right to influence the historian's judgment as to facts?

There are those even among modern thinkers who hold to the right of religious faith to decide at some crucial point questions of historical fact. One of the most notable instances of this appeal is the well-known position of Professor Herrmann, defended in his *Communion of the Christian with God* and in other writings. The fact of Jesus of Nazareth, he argues, the historical reality of his personality or inner life, is so far a part of the present experience of one who finds God and forgiveness through

the reading of the gospels, that it can be affirmed by such a person on the ground of such an ethical and religious experience, in advance and independently of historical research. Herrmann's interest is to free religion from dependence on the uncertain results of the historical criticism of the gospels; but many who sympathize with this aim hesitate to say that at this one point only in human history a question of historical fact can be decided apart from the study of historical evidence, that here the past becomes present and can be experienced as real in a sense and by a process that has no parallel elsewhere. How far, it will at once be asked, can such inner assurance go? How many facts, and just what facts, go to make up that picture of the inner life of Jesus which religious faith can of itself affirm to be historical? Can it affirm the fact of the resurrection? Can it decide the authenticity of the words, "Come unto me all ye that labor," or, "In my Father's house are many mansions"? This event and these words have entered deeply into religious experience, yet history will certainly not in the end confess that it has no duty to weigh evidence and no right to reach a decision as to their historical character. In regard to such questions of bare fact as these,—did this thing take place as it is written, or not? were these words spoken by this man, or by another?—religious experience can hardly be allowed to take the lead and go forward alone to the end. Yet it cannot fairly be urged that the influence which religious feeling inevitably exerts in such cases is altogether out of place and ought simply to be overridden. The religious value of a record of historical persons and events is itself an historical fact. That the record has such power over us today is due to the power which the facts had over the writer. That power is something with which the historian must reckon. It is an actual historical force, a cause which is not only needed for the explanation of its effects, but requires an adequate cause for its own explanation. It may be, therefore, that in some cases the power of a story is valid evidence of the actuality of events. Besides this purely historical consideration it may be affirmed that we are not obliged as historians to renounce our assumption as theists that the good and the true belong together, that a belief of which the effect is more good than bad must have in it more truth



than error. We must, however, guard against the natural mistake of assuming that the truth which the good we experience attests is truth to fact; for it may often be rather the truth of ideals, poetic truth even if expressed in the form of an historical record, truth which the facts symbolize, rather than truth which depends upon the facts for the validity. The inference from the goodness and power of the effect of a narrative upon us to the actuality of the facts narrated is therefore one that ought not to be made upon the impulse of feeling but only after careful consideration. Not when to religion itself its experience appears to rest upon the actuality of an historical fact, but only when to a fair historical and psychological judgment the power actually exerted by a recorded fact is evidence of the reality and nature of the fact itself, does religious experience have this sort of right to help science to its decisions. The historian should receive and use the testimony of religion, but religion should not attempt to predetermine the conclusions of history.

The distinction thus suggested is one which we make with little difficulty in the case of nature and the science of nature. That it has its application to literature is clear, and though it presents peculiar difficulties in the case of the Bible, its right application there is also peculiarly important. When science has gone forward to great and secure discoveries, such as the Copernican astronomy, or the laws of gravitation and evolution, the poet and the man of faith must follow with their effort to find spiritual meaning in these new conceptions of the universe, and to give them spiritual value. But our enjoyment of a sunset does not follow after our understanding of it. It is not through the intellect that we experience this joy, and yet it is an experience through which we come into touch with a great reality, Beauty. There are two things that science can do in such a case. It can attempt a physical explanation of the sunset, and set forth the conditions of atmosphere and the laws of light that account for it. In this it goes its own way quite independently of aesthetic enjoyment, and with very little influence upon it. But science can also attempt to describe and explain our enjoyment of the sunset, and to analyze and define our sense of beauty. This is a higher thing than the other because the enjoyment is a higher

kind of reality than the objective fact; or, rather, our sense of beauty is a higher faculty than our sense of sight. Yet in this case science follows, while feeling leads the way. The task of science is of secondary importance, and if the pursuit of it dulls the feeling itself, the loss is greater than the gain.

We have already given a place to the cases in which it is the task of religion to follow science in its greater and surer achievements, and to make the new knowledge helpful to the higher life. But how are we to define the cases in which religious feeling naturally takes and rightly keeps the first place? What are those feelings experienced by the human spirit in the reading of the Bible, which remain independent of anything that historical science can do with the objects which call forth this experience, and superior to anything that psychological science can do with the experience itself? Illustrations will answer these questions better than generalizations. The Old Testament is an intensely national literature, yet in it the stories of the heroes of Israel and the fortunes of the nation are so told that they have been enjoyed by many nations through many ages. This means that men have seen in these stories a mirror of human life. The greatness of the Old Testament consists in the transformation by which in these books particular and local matters have become the symbol of the faiths and hopes of humanity. This is the region in which religion has independence and superiority.

To suggest somewhat more definite illustrations, let us look at the great action which the Bible records, and at the great characters depicted in it. The action in the presence of which we seem almost everywhere in this book to stand has God and man as its persons, a holy God and sinful man, and consists in their relations to each other. It involves two tragedies, the punishment of the sinner, which is tragic because the power of sin and the weakness of human nature make his punishment appear almost to be his destiny; and the suffering of the good, which, tragic though it is, and often an oppressive burden upon the human spirit, becomes endurable and even satisfying when it is seen to be a suffering of good for evil, vicarious and redeeming in its effect, a suffering which, as the free offering of love, may even reach the supreme height of virtue, and impress our souls

as nothing less than the suffering of the divine. This action, not of the New Testament only, but of the Old Testament as well, the historian is likely either not to see at all or to regard as a theory imposed upon the facts; and since he finds it also in other religions, he may explain the theory as ultimately a mere myth. But sinning and suffering human beings have always understood its truth; and men of humane culture and poetic sense, finding it not only in this book but in the great epics and tragedies of literature, will be more inclined to assent to it as poetic truth than to set it aside either as speculative dogma or as mythology. In such a matter as this, which is no mere question of fact, religious feeling may take the lead before historical research. Although it is not a question of mere fact, yet it does concern realities. Sin and redemption, suffering and love, are not less real because it is not by our scientific reason that we can grasp them.

In the case of the great characters of the Bible, as in the case of its great action, the greater value and the higher reality may be of a sort that escapes the understanding and imparts itself to the soul. The picture of the character may have its purpose and real significance in the ideal truth which it embodies, and this we cannot expect the pure intellect to discern. If it be objected that this looks in the direction of allegory, the reply must be that allegory has in fact borne witness, over against literalism, to the qualities in the Bible that move the heart and impart joy, and to the freedom which is our right in the reading of great books. The mistake of allegory is that it is itself too intellectual and literalistic; that it attempts to set forth poetry in scientific forms, and thereby strikes a path which is as far from the true appreciation of the Bible as poetry as it is from the right understanding of its original meaning and of the facts of history which it records.

It is in the gospels that we find the greatest difficulty in distinguishing between fact and truth, between the rights of science and those of religion. It is commonly urged by scholars that our four gospels are all products of Christian faith and devotion, and that if we would recover the historical Jesus it must be in part by detecting and eliminating from the gospel narratives

just those traits and that coloring which betray the idealizing influence of reverence and love. That this critical effort is inevitable we must confess. That some of its results remove obstacles which stand in the way of a spiritual appreciation of Jesus is beyond doubt. But two things must be evident to the most ardent critic: that the historical problems presented by the gospels are so complex that differences and uncertainties must always remain as to many important matters of fact in the life and teaching of Jesus; and that no synopsis of the gospels, no reconstruction of sources, no critical life of Jesus, no exposition of his teachings has, or can ever have, the religious power that the gospels themselves possess. Is it impossible, then, that these books should be read for their religious greatness even by those who study them also as historical documents? Is it necessary to lose the value of the books as they are, even though we are assured that in searching out the facts beneath the records we are making our way down from great to still greater treasures? May not a part of the help here so urgently needed come from a freer recognition of the character and worth of these books as literature, that is, from a fuller and more confessed, a less apologetic and more grateful sense of the value of the faith and feeling, the reverence and love, that shaped and that inspire the gospel pictures of Christ? This does not mean that religious feeling or faith is to pronounce at will upon matters of outward fact as to the deeds and words of Jesus, least of all that in so doing it may take advantage of insufficient evidence and the consequent hesitations or disagreements of historians. The things about which as facts faith can decide are things which our eyes could not have seen nor our scientific observations have verified, however near we had stood to them. Faith has now the same rights and responsibilities that it had then with reference to questions of truth and of fact. It has now the right and the duty to determine those realities which, if we had been present, we could have perceived only upon religious conditions, not by sight but by reverence and love. In reference, for example, to the resurrection of our Lord,—the empty tomb, the fortunes of the body of Jesus, the number and order of the appearances, and even their nature are matters which belong to historical research

and to psychological interpretation. In all these matters there is more danger of our being misled by religious presumptions and wishes than likelihood of our being helpfully guided by religious insight and experience. But on the other hand the reality of a life after death is not, and in spite of the assurances of some men of science I should wish to affirm that it never will be, a matter for science to determine, never a matter that we can either experience by means of our senses or demonstrate by reasoning. This was as true when Peter and Paul saw the risen Christ as it is today. What belongs to religious experience now belonged to it then. The fact that historical evidences are conflicting or obscure does not justify religious interests in attempting to close questions which the evidence leaves open.

Questions of the authorship of books and the authenticity of sayings are also, of course, primarily questions for historical study to decide. These are questions to which, if we had been present, our senses could have given answer. They are questions of this world, not of that other world the consciousness of which is religion. The eternal beauty and truth of a saying religion can attest, but not any outward fact about it, not when or by whom it was spoken or written. Yet this is a point at which a certain effect of religious faith may be inevitable and within faith's proper sphere. If we had heard Jesus speak, as his disciples heard him, our ability to repeat his words would have been partly limited, as theirs was, by our understanding of his meaning; and this would have been conditioned by the closeness of our sympathy with his character and purposes, by our reverence and our love. But these conditions are the very substance of that other world in which religion has the first place. If a religious condition would then, in a measure, have determined the truth of our memory and report of the words of Jesus, a religious condition may now, in the same measure, influence our judgment as to the truth of the report of his words in the gospels. The influence of the total impression of the accounts of Jesus upon our decision of matters of detail as to what he did or said is of course perfectly valid in a purely historical study; but one would hardly venture to say that a sharing in some measure of the religious experience of Jesus, or an attitude of religious

reverence toward him, cannot deepen a man's appreciation of his character and increase the purity and truth of that total impression by which even questions of fact are affected. Even here, however, the difference between truth and fact must be kept clear. The saying, "Come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest," may be fully true as an expression of the mind of Christ toward men even if it was not spoken by Jesus himself. The Fourth Gospel need not be by a personal follower of Jesus, and need not be, as a whole, a record of words which he actually spoke, in order to justify us in the feeling that this book brings to light, in some directions, greater depths of the actual consciousness of Jesus than the other three, or gives on certain matters a more adequate account of what his life and words actually signified in human experience. If the thirteenth chapter of First Corinthians had come to us not in a letter of Paul but in a gospel, no one would have doubted that it truly expressed the mind of Christ, whatever judgment may have been passed as to its origin. Standing as it does in Paul's epistle, Christ is nevertheless its author; it is a genuine utterance of the spirit of Christ, as Paul would be the first to affirm.

The greatness of the Bible as a book among books has been proved by the only tests that determine the greatness of any book, by the quality and extent and permanence of its influence, by the kind and degree of joy that it has produced in men. It is natural therefore to suppose that it possesses the qualities that make other books great. But the greatness of great books depends little upon their accuracy as records of facts. It depends chiefly on the universal human truth which has transfigured the facts, on the ideals and inner experiences of which, through the power of a great spirit, the facts have become symbols and embodiments. The Bible is surely in its greater parts, and indeed as a whole, no mere record of historical facts. It is already, throughout, a religious transfiguration of facts, and has in this its power and value. When as historians we pursue our task of removing the interpretations with which the facts are overlaid, we are often sacrificing the greater for the less. It is better to see the facts as prophets and apostles saw them, trans-

figured by faith and vitalized by passion, than to see them just as they happened. It is indeed only because they were so transfigured that the facts had their permanence and power in human history. We must get behind the transformation and set the facts again in the light of common day if we would understand how they came to pass; but we must let them be reclothed again in the bright garments of passion and reverence if we would even understand their influence upon the course of events, still more if we would make our own their spiritual value. Whenever, then, in the Bible this inner light is of more importance than the facts it illumines, religion may rightly claim the first place, before historical study, in the reading of the book.

The order of change in our religious use of the Bible may then prove to be something like this. In the first place is the stage out of which we have come, at which the past as the book records it is imposed upon the present as an external authority, the assumption being that this past, these facts and this record and interpretation of them, belong not to this world but to the other, not to the world of science but to that of faith. Then comes the stage through which we are passing, when science, and particularly historical science, brings forcible deliverance from that bondage, and teaches us to view the past as past. Here the assumption is that this history is like other histories and this book like other books. Then should follow a further stage, at which, while the rights and achievements of historical criticism are freely accepted, the power that lives in the book itself is once more felt. Then religious feeling and imagination will make the past again present, and we become able to make our own the faith and vision of the writers of the book, and in their spirit, though in our own way, to conquer our own world by faith. We shall then, in a sense, return from the study of sources and facts to the enjoyment of the book as it is, and read it with that union of transport and reverence with which the greatest products of the human spirit should be read; with transport as if the words were our own, and with reverent wonder because of their divine excellence and power.

*JESUS THE SON OF GOD*

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## I. THE LOGION MT. 11 25-27, LK. 10 21-22, AND ITS PARALLELS.

No passage of the Synoptic Gospels throws so much light upon Jesus' sense of his own mission as that which deals with Knowing the Father and Being Known of Him in Mt. 11 25-27, Lk. 10 21-22. It belongs to the common element of Matthew and Luke unknown in Mark, and in the judgment of the great majority of critics must therefore be referred to a common source of high antiquity. In short, as respects attestation, its claims to authenticity are unexcelled. As respects content, it deals with the all-important matter of Jesus' doctrine of divine sonship, and yet it seems to stand alone among Synoptic sayings, and to be paralleled only by utterances ascribed to Jesus by the fourth evangelist. But the Johannine discourses give every indication of having been composed by the evangelist himself in order to expound in dialogue form his own deutero-pauline Christology. The only instance in all Synoptic tradition of anything comparable to this apposition of "the Son . . . the Father," is Mk. 13 32, Mt. 24 36.

Of that day or that hour knoweth no one, not even the angels in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father.

But this Markan saying cannot be employed to prove the super-human consciousness of Jesus; for in the Lukan version of the same saying, Acts 1 7,

It is not for you to know times or seasons, which the Father hath set within his own authority,

the apposition disappears, and, in view of Mark's freedom in the composition of the eschatological chapter (Mk. 13), and of his individual Christology as reflected at the beginning and end of his gospel (Mk. 1 1 and 15 39),<sup>1</sup> it is more reasonable to attribute to the evangelist the reference to "the Son" in Mk. 13 32. The

<sup>1</sup> The paraphrase of Is. 5 1-7 in Mk. 12 1-9 reflects the same standpoint and is better understood as an allegorical composition of the evangelist than as an authentic parable of Jesus, though a parable somewhat resembling this is inserted by Mt. just before it (Mt. 21 28-32).



original saying was, then, no parallel to our logion, and the latter remains unique. It is the sole unshakable utterance of Jesus to which the doctrine of his divine sonship can be referred. And yet, even after the most drastic application of both textual and higher criticism, it does remain unshaken; and it well deserves its description as "the Johannine passage," for it forms, however interpreted, a true link of connection between Synoptic and Johannine Christology.

We are bound, nevertheless, by all sane principles of criticism, and of exegesis as well, to prefer that form of text and that interpretation which leave the saying in harmony with the rest of Synoptic tradition rather than a text and interpretation whose affinities are all with the Fourth Gospel. Such a form and interpretation may reveal a root from which the later developed Christology might spring; any other could give us no more than an erratic block, in which the geologist must see violent displacement from its original bed.

Harnack<sup>2</sup> has recently submitted the textual evidence to a searching examination. Since it is not our present object to test his results, but to present an interpretation applicable whether these results be accepted or not, it will suffice merely to indicate by square brackets the material he omits, and by marks of parenthesis the altered readings which he introduces.

Mt. 11 25-27

25 At that season Jesus answered and said, I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that thou didst hide these things from the wise and understanding, and didst reveal them unto babes: 26 yea, Father, for so it was well-pleasing in thy sight. 27 All things have been delivered unto me of [my] Father: and no one knoweth the Son, save the Father; neither doth any know the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal *him*.

Lk. 10 21-22

21 In that same hour he rejoiced in the Holy Spirit and said, I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that thou didst hide these things from the wise and understanding, and didst reveal them unto babes: yea, Father, for so it was well-pleasing in thy sight. 22 All things have been delivered unto me of [my] Father: and no one (hath recognized) [who the Son is save the Father; and] who the Father is, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son [willeth to] reveal (eth) *him*.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Sprüche und Reden Jesu, 1907, Exkurs I, pp. 189-211.

<sup>3</sup> In the extract only Harnack's positive results are exhibited. He leaves it doubtful, for example, whether the order in Mt. 11 27 should not be "the Father . . .

From a comparison of these emended texts of Mt. and Lk. Harnack concludes that the common source (Q) represented by their coincident material read as follows:

At that season Jesus answered and said, I thank thee, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that thou didst hide these things from the wise and understanding, and didst reveal them to babes; yea Father, for such was thy good pleasure. All things were delivered to me by the Father, and no one hath known the Father [or who the Father is] save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son maketh the revelation.

We ourselves are not so much concerned with the sense given to the passage by our first and third evangelists, as with the sense it bore in their common source, now commonly designated Q.<sup>4</sup> It may well be, as has recently been declared by no less weighty and unprejudiced an authority than Jülicher, that

The evangelist who makes Jesus exclaim, No one knoweth the Son save the Father and likewise no one knoweth the Father save the Son (Mt. 11 27; cf. Lk. 10 22), surely presupposes in him a consciousness derived from another world and period.<sup>5</sup>

An evangelist demonstrably dependent on Mark, one who takes over and improves upon the "high" Christology of his predecessor, and who seems even to have adapted this very logion to the form of a post-resurrection commission to the apostles to make converts of all the nations (Mt. 28 18), may well have accepted a Pauline Christology with all its implications of pre-existence. But the inquirer into the pre-pauline conceptions, the historian of the doctrine, who would know what Jesus himself felt to be

the Son . . . the Son . . . the Father," and whether in the last clause we should not read "revealeth," as in the emended Lk., instead of "willeth to reveal." As these are merely possible changes and make no practical difference to the sense, they are not indicated.

<sup>4</sup> So the Germans generally and Salmon (*The Human Element in the Gospels*, 1907). The designation is better than L (W. C. Allen, *International Critical Comm.*, 1907) or A (H. J. Holtzmann, *Synoptische Evangelien*, 1863), for it does not prejudice the question of the relation of this Mt.-Lk. source to the Matthaean "Logia of the Lord" mentioned by Papias. Burton and Sharman of Chicago University employ the letters G (Galilean document) and P (Perean document) for the respective intercalations of Lk. 6 20-8 8 and 9 51-18 14, which other critics designate together as Q.

<sup>5</sup> Paulus und Jesus, 1907, p. 31.

implied in his own "sonship," will not delay over secondary and derived information when primary sources are accessible. Mark and the first evangelist show the form of the tradition current in the period 70-90 A.D.; for the period 40-60 A.D. we are able to use as a standard of comparison the Pauline epistles and the reported utterances of Jesus himself in the material drawn from Q and common to Matthew and Luke.<sup>6</sup>

In this earlier material we are fortunately not devoid of parallels for either portion of the logion. Even if we grant the cogency of Harnack's textual argument for attributing to our first evangelist, and not to Q, the clause "no one knoweth the Son save the Father," yet the Pauline epistles will furnish evidence, as we hope to show, that this supposed addition is no invention of the evangelist, but is itself an expression of the spirit of Jesus. Besides Q and the Pauline epistles we have a further resource in the contemporary Jewish literature. Of all these aids we must avail ourselves in order to determine in what sense utterances concerning "the Son," "the Father," would be understood by Jesus' auditors, and must therefore, since he had no purpose to mislead, have been intended by himself.

Harnack<sup>7</sup> very justly indorses the judgment of Pfeiderer in finding in 1 Cor. 1 19 21 a Pauline parallel to our logion so close in thought and to some extent even in language as to suggest direct literary dependence:

For it is written,

I will destroy the wisdom of the wise,  
And the prudence of the prudent will I reject.

. . . For seeing that in the wisdom of God the world through its wisdom knew not God, it was God's good pleasure through the foolishness of the preaching to save them that believe.

<sup>6</sup> That this common Mt.-Lk. discourse material (Q) is not derived by one of these evangelists directly from the other has been conclusively demonstrated by Wernle (*Synoptische Frage*, 1899, pp. 40-80), and is an accepted result of New Testament science. Even Allen pleads only for an "influence" of Matthew upon Luke. Advocates of oral tradition (A. Wright) make their oral source the equivalent of a document, since its form is so stereotyped as to make the resemblance of Mt. to Lk. closer in the portions not shared by Mk. than in the parts taken by each from this admittedly written source.

<sup>7</sup> *Sprüche und Reden Jesu*, p. 210, note 1.

On the question whether Paul is dependent on the logion or Q influenced by Paul, there is disagreement. Harnack rejects Pfeleiderer's decision in favor of the latter alternative, on the ground that "babes" (νήπιοι) "is not Pauline."<sup>8</sup> And yet in the same context, scarcely more than a score of verses further on (1 Cor. 3 1) Paul applies this very term "babes" (νήπιοι) to his Corinthian converts as recipients of the revelation.

Important as this matter of the relation of Paul to Q undoubtedly is, we may still leave the question of priority undecided. The essential point for the interpreter is the existence of the relation, and this becomes the more apparent the more closely we scrutinize the two contexts.

As regards the setting of the logion in Q, accepting Harnack's textual results, we can go no further than the coincidence of Matthew and Luke allows. As this comprises, however, all the evidence we have, and as all bears in one direction, there is no likelihood of contradiction for Harnack's conclusion<sup>9</sup> that in the source it stood between the Woes on the Unrepentant Cities of Galilee and the Denunciation of the Scribes who Blasphemed the Spirit and demanded a sign from Heaven. Pursuing the sequence a little further back it would appear that the Woes against the Unrepentant Cities followed upon the Complaint against the Generation which was satisfied neither with the "wailing" of the Baptist's disciples nor the "piping" of the followers of Jesus, and this in turn came after the Mission of the Twelve, which itself was preceded by the incident of the Centurion whose faith put to shame the unbelief of Israel. Certainly one cannot fail to perceive the dominant motive in this sequence, particularly as it reappears so strongly both in Paul (Rom. 9-11) and in all our canonical evangelists (Mt. 4 1-25, 12 1-12, 13 1-23, 21 33-43, Lk. 4 16-30, 24 44-49, Acts *passim*, Jn. 12 20-43). The author of Q treated the logion as a rebuke of the dull ears and blind eyes of unbelieving Israel, in this respect following the lead of Paul, and being followed by all our evangelists.

<sup>8</sup> Yet our passage furnishes the only occurrence of the word in the gospels (save the quotation from Ps. 8 3 in Mt. 21 16) against eleven occurrences in the Pauline epistles.

<sup>9</sup> Sprüche und Reden Jesu, p. 126.

In 1 Cor. 1 18, 2 16 the flesh which "glories before God (1 29) is not indeed, as in Rom. 2 17-20, the Jew who claims to "know God" and to be "a teacher of babes," but the wise in their own esteem generally. In the logion as originally intended it is of course "the wise and understanding" of Israel, the scribes, who are meant, and their oppressive yoke is contrasted with that of Jesus in the invitation framed by Matthew as an appendix to it from Eccus. 6 28, 51 26 ff.<sup>10</sup> Only the compiler, to whom is due the context of Q's sequence, seems to have had in mind the peculiar pretensions and the signal rejection of Israel as a whole. With the evangelists and Paul alike we have here an application, now wider, now narrower, of the passage Is. 29 9-24, a favorite passage of Paul<sup>11</sup> and also used more than once in Q.<sup>12</sup> In representing the "babes" as the choice of God's "good pleasure" to receive revelation, Paul is only extending to the spiritually disinherited of the gentile world the assurance which Jesus had given to his "little flock" of repentant sinners and synagogue outcasts. He bases it explicitly on the Isaian passage which tacitly underlies the logion.

## II. THE REVELATION GIVEN TO THE LOWLY.

The comparison of Paul's rhapsody over "the word of the cross," "the foolishness of the preaching," with Jesus' exultation over the revelation given to his "little ones," and the connection of both with their common Old Testament basis, is much more than a mere vindication of the authenticity of the saying. It already goes far toward determining its sense; and this in turn, as it becomes clearer, will enable us to detect parallels perhaps hitherto unsuspected.

The fundamental point of agreement of all three witnesses, the logion, the Isaian passage, and the Pauline, is the vindication of

<sup>10</sup> Mt. 11 28-30, which fails to appear in Luke, seems, beautiful as it is, to be of the evangelist's composition from phrases derived from the Wisdom-literature. See W. C. Allen, *ad loc.*, in *Internat. Crit. Commentary*, 1907, and Bousset, *Religion des Judentums*, p. 338, for the parallels.

<sup>11</sup> Rom. 11 8, Col. 2 2, 1 Cor. 1 29 30, 3 19, Rom. 9 20 21, 2 Tim. 2 20 21. 2 Cor. 1 3 4, 7 6, 1 Thess. 3 7, 4 18, 5 14.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. besides the present passage Mt. 11 5, Lk. 4 18, 7 22.

the revelation given to the unlearned, the lowly, the plain people, against the usurpations of ecclesiastical authority. In the time of Amos God had been free to choose as the bearer of his message a herdsman, a dresser of sycamore trees, in preference to the prophet by avocation, if it so pleased him (Am. 7 14 15). Isaiah already felt the pressure of hierocratic usurpation, and followed the lead of Amos in pouring scorn upon the prophets "whose eyes are closed," the seers "whose heads are covered," the learned to whom "all vision is become as the words of a book that is sealed," so that God turns to "the meek" and "the poor," making the children to sanctify his name, and erring spirits and "stammering lips to utter peace."<sup>18</sup> Since the extinction of the voice of prophecy, and the establishment of the exclusive authority of the synagogue and the written law, the usurpations of the professional religionist had become in Jesus' time immeasurably more intolerable still. A coterie of scribes with a few thousand Pharisaic followers had arrogated to themselves alone the spiritual inheritance of Israel. Sitting in Moses' seat with their prerogative of the interpretation of the written law, they held the keys of the kingdom of heaven. They entered not in themselves, and the masses that would enter in by the broad door of the baptism of John and the proclamation of forgiveness and adoption by Jesus they hindered. They had made it impossible for the average son or daughter of Abraham to expect any "part in the world to come"; for this phrase had come to be the current expression for a share in the common national inheritance, the birthright of the sons of Abraham, the messianic hope. As the Gracchi in Rome became the champions of the lowly against the usurpation of the common domain by the aristocracy, so John the Baptist and Jesus resisted the usurpation of the common spiritual inheritance in Israel. To Jesus the baptism of John had been a sign from heaven (Mt. 21 23-25). John himself had been an Elias, the "restorer of the tribes" (Ecclus. 48 10), having as his mission not merely the "great repentance" (Mal. 4 5 6), but the turning of fathers to children and children to their fathers, in the sense of restoring those who had been excluded by violence and wrongfully, and excluding those who had usurped the place of

<sup>18</sup> Is. 29 9-24 (LXX).

the sons and daughters of Abraham.<sup>14</sup> As such a sign the Baptist's warning of "wrath to come" had been "a greater matter" than the preaching of Jonah to the Ninevites, and the generation which rejected it were bringing on themselves greater condemnation (Mt. 12 41).<sup>15</sup>

The Isaian basis of our logion, the Pauline parallel, the gospel affinities, the context and internal evidence of the logion itself, all combine to show that we must interpret it in the light of this championship by Jesus of the cause of the lost sheep, and of the lost son against the grudging elder brother. The "weary and heavy laden" to whom is given the invitation, "Take my yoke upon you and learn of me," which Matthew appropriately appends, are those that have been learning of the scribes in Moses' seat, those scribes who make the yoke of the law more and more grievous and intolerable, "binding heavy burdens and grievous to be borne, which they themselves did not touch with one of their fingers." The "revelation to babes" for which the supreme Lord is thanked, is the sight and knowledge granted to the pure in heart (Mt. 5 8), more than offsetting the unused "key of knowledge" in the hand of the professional exponent of Mosaism (Mt. 23 13, Lk. 11 52). The spirit of the context is that of the promise of Jer. 31 34 of the days of the new covenant, when

They shall teach no more every man his neighbor, and every man his brother, saying, Know the LORD: for they shall all know me, from the least of them unto the greatest of them, saith the LORD: for I will forgive their iniquity, and their sin will I remember no more.

In the light of these connected passages it is manifest that those expositors are right who point out that the word here ren-

<sup>14</sup> Mt. 11 12-15. This obscure passage is illuminated by the rabbinic tradition, Edujoth viii, 7, where on the authority of Johanan ben Zakkai the function of Elijah as restorer of the tribes is declared to be, "not to pronounce clean or unclean, to exclude or receive in general, but only to receive those who had been excluded by violence, and to exclude those who had been received by violence." See Bacon, "Elias and the Men of Violence," Expositor, sixth series, xxxi (July, 1902), and W. C. Allen, Intern. Crit. Comm. on Mt., *ad loc.*

<sup>15</sup> On the reference to "the baptism of John" in this answer of Jesus to the demand for a sign from heaven, which Matthew and Luke in contradictory ways endeavor to apply to Jesus himself, see Bacon, Sermon on the Mount, p. 232, and cf. the parallel demand for a sign and its answer, Mt. 21 23-25; also the combination of the two in Jn. 2 18-21.

dered "delivered" (*παρεδόθη*) is not the same as that used in the utterance of Mt. 28 18, "All authority hath been given (*ἐδόθη*) unto me in heaven and on earth," but is the technical term for the conveyance of authoritative doctrine (*παράδοσις*). If the post-resurrection commission (Mt. 28 18) is framed, as seems probable, on our logion, the evangelist has extended the sense beyond the original intention. In reality the logion is more justly paralleled in Jn. 7 16 17, "My teaching is not mine, but his that sent me." Against the "traditions (*παράδοσις*) of the scribes" Jesus sets the tradition of his Father, which is "hidden from the wise and understanding, but revealed (by the Father) to babes." We are reminded how in a closely connected Lukan passage, denouncing as blind leaders of the blind the scribes and Pharisees who had demanded of him a sign from heaven, he had referred his hearers to "the light that is in thee" as a guide which no other can replace (Lk. 11 34-35). If we penetrate through the setting to the intrinsic sense of the parable of the Good Samaritan, we shall perceive there too a vindication of the inner law against the written. The Samaritan stands contrasted with priest and Levite because in his simple obedience to "the righteousness of God" he puts to shame the professional expounders of Mosaism. It is in the name of himself and his "little ones," then, that Jesus "rejoices in the Holy Spirit," when he thanks the "Lord of heaven and earth" that the scribe has no monopoly of the knowledge of God. The title "Lord of heaven and earth" is chosen, as Amos had chosen equivalent titles (Am. 9 5 6), in protest against a clique of ecclesiastics who imagined themselves able to monopolize knowledge of the Infinite One. Paul delineates for us this would-be monopolizer of the "Lord of heaven and earth." For Paul it is of course not merely the scribe, but the Jew generally in contrast with the untaught gentile, who

rests upon the law and glories in God, having the knowledge of his will, discriminating in matters of casuistry, being instructed out of the law, confident that he himself is a guide of the blind, a light of them that are in darkness, an instructor of the foolish, a teacher of "babes," having in the law the pattern of knowledge and of the truth.

But Paul's expressions belong to a time when the issue regarding inheritance of the kingdom had widened. Jesus' exultation is the



declaration of independence of the old prophetic spirit so long enslaved. It is a reassertion of the rights of the spiritually disinherited of Israel. Paul is the champion of the gentiles, who without the law are a law unto themselves. Both rest ultimately on the same basis. In both cases the appeal is to the awakening Spirit of adoption that witnesseth with our spirit that we are born of God, teaching us to cry, Abba, Father.

### III. RELATION OF THE SAYING TO MARK 4 11.

With this recognition of the bearing of the earlier part of our logion must follow a recognition of certain hitherto unsuspected affinities.

On the surface there is little to indicate the affinity of this saying with that attributed to Jesus in Mk. 4 11,

To you is given the mystery of the kingdom of God, but for them that are without all things are done in parables.

We believe this Markan saying, however, to be a genuine variant of our logion. Our second evangelist is notably free in his citations of logia, adapting them to his own purposes, and frequently, as in Mk. 1 15, giving them a tincture of Pauline phraseology. The use here of the Pauline term "the mystery" for "the revelation," and the adaptation of the logion to a theory of the teaching in parables which is obviously the evangelist's own creation, though also based on Paul,<sup>16</sup> has obscured the relation. But Clement of Alexandria has fortunately preserved for us from an

<sup>16</sup> Mk. 4 11 12 is an editorial insertion quite out of harmony with the context, which presupposes that not merely the parable of the sower, but "all the parables" have preceded (vs. 13), and expresses surprise that explanation should be needed (vs. 13). In vss. 10 and 13 the sense of the question about the parables is not, as assumed in vss. 11 and 12, "Why use this method?" but "What is the meaning of the symbolism?" Vss. 11 12 with their Isaian proof-text apply the Pauline doctrine of the hardening of Israel (Rom. 11 7 8) to the fact that Jesus had taught in "parables," the "parable" being erroneously regarded as an enigma, riddle, or dark saying. Mark doubtless applied the parable of the sower to the hardening of Israel much as Ep. Barn. 9 5 (cf. Heb. 6 8) applies the common prototype of Jer. 4 3, "Sow not upon thorns, break up the fallow ground." But Mark did not *invent* a logion to justify his theory of the parables as a preaching of judgment. He adapted that now under consideration to suit his Pauline theory.

unknown gospel a middle link. In his *Stromata*, v. 10, 69, he declares that he found "in a certain gospel" the saying,

My mystery belongs to me and to the sons of my household.

In the Clementine Homilies xix, 20 the same logion is quoted in a form reminding us of the exclusive spirit of Mt. 7 6,

Keep the mysteries for me and for the sons (*uiols*) of my household.

In these agrapha we are manifestly dealing with the same logion that appears in Mk. 4 11 in a form adapted to Mark's theory of the parabolic method. The reservation of "my mystery" is an unmistakable point of connection with Mark; but the reversion in the latter half of the agraphon to "me and the sons of my household" as the antithesis to "outsiders" shows equally close connection with our logion, indicating that Mark has merely adapted it, after the example of Paul, to the wider issue of his own time, and embodied in it the protest of the spiritual seed of Abraham against Jewish pretensions. Mark has paved the way for this adaptation by introducing immediately before the Teaching in Parables, and between it and the Choosing of the Twelve, the saying in which Jesus declares these to be the "sons of his household,"

And looking round about upon those who were sitting in a circle about him he saith, Behold my mother and my brethren; for whosoever doeth the will of God, he is my brother and sister and mother.

It is a matter of no small significance that our second gospel, in striking contrast to the other two synoptists, entirely excludes the great exhibition of Jesus' teaching delivered to the masses, the Sermon on the Mount, and at the corresponding point introduces a deliverance of "the mystery of the kingdom of God" to the inner circle of Jesus' spiritual kindred, while "to those who are without all things are done in enigmas." We should greatly mistake the intention of this most democratic of all the evangelists if we conceived him to suggest a new spiritual aristocracy, with the apostles as trustees of "the mystery." We must understand the inner circle just as he defines it (Mk. 3 31-35). The "mystery" is given to the believing and obedient (cf. Jn. 7 3-5 17

with Mk. 3 31-35); the preaching to the Jewish people generally is to him a mere "sowing upon thorns."<sup>17</sup>

On the other hand Mark does not wholly neglect to justify his drastic theory of the hiding of the revelation from the unbelieving Jewish "outsiders" whom he refuses to call "wise and understanding." At the close of his parenthetical discussion of the reason for Jesus' teaching in parables, he resumes the saying at which he turned aside, "If anyone hath ears to hear, he is the one that shall hear" (Mk. 4 9 and 23), and introduces another logion<sup>18</sup> to qualify the seeming harshness of his doctrine,

For it (the mystery) is not hid but only that it might become known; nor was it concealed but only that it might come to light.

In fact this whole paragraph, Mk. 4 21-25, beginning with the comparison of the lamp that "comes" not to be hidden, but to be lifted up,<sup>19</sup> and ending with the warning to the unreceptive that they will be deprived of their prerogative, can only be appreciated when it is read with reference to this great issue of the first century between Jewish particularism and Christian universalism. Whatever the original sense, to Mark the parable of the good and bad soil and the appended sayings constitute a protest against Jewish claims to monopolize the knowledge of God and the messianic hope.

There can be little doubt in view of these various lines of connection that our second (Roman) evangelist, in his section on the Choosing and Training of the Twelve, extending from Mk. 3 7 to 6 13, has adapted our logion on the Hiding of the Revelation from the wise and understanding and the delivering of it to babes to the special case of the hardening of Israel, the case so vividly brought into the foreground in Paul's great epistle to the Romans. Fortunately we have in 1 Cor. 1 18-3 1, and especially in the

<sup>17</sup> For Mark's estimate of the Jewish people generally and their religious character see Mk. 7 3 4 6 7.

<sup>18</sup> Mk. 4 22 is given twice in Luke. Lk. 8 17=Mk. 4 22; Lk. 12 2=Mt. 10 26.

<sup>19</sup> Commentators differ as to whether in the evangelist's application "the lamp" stands for the Messiah, who is destined to occupy the throne of glory (cf. Rev. 21 23), or, as originally intended, for the gospel message. Either interpretation would suit our contention.

common Isaian basis, Is. 29 9-24, a standard by which to measure the degree of departure from the original sense.

As a guide to the original occasion of the utterance, Mark's setting has but little value. It is true that Matthew also places in the same relation to the parables a saying which Luke sub-joins to our logion as part of the congratulation addressed "to the disciples privately":

Blessed are the eyes which see the things which ye see. For I say unto you that many prophets and kings (*Mt.* righteous men) desired to see the things which ye see, and saw them not, and to hear the things which ye hear, and heard them not.

In *Mt.* 13 16-17 this utterance is separated from the logion on the Hiding of the Revelation and appended to the Markan digression on the Parables as a Hiding of the Mystery. It illustrates the saying, "He that hath ears let him hear" (*Mt.* 13 9, *Mk.* 4 9). But this displacement is almost certainly due to the influence of Mark. Probably, then, the full content of the saying as it stood in the common source of Matthew and Luke (*Q*) was as given in *Lk.* 10 21-24, which we give again in Harnack's reconstruction:

At that season he said, I praise thee, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that thou didst hide these things from the wise and understanding, and didst reveal them unto babes. Yea, Father, for such was the good pleasure before thee. All things (matters of revelation) were delivered to me by the Father, and no one hath recognized (*ἐγνώ*) [the son save the Father, nor hath any recognized] the Father save the son, and he to whomsoever the son willet to give the revelation. Blessed are your eyes for they see, and [your] ears for they hear; [for verily] I say unto you, many prophets [and kings] desired to see the things which ye see, and saw them not, and to hear the things which ye hear, and heard them not.

Our previous discussion of the context in *Q* has indicated a tendency already apparent even in this primitive compilation to apply the saying to the wider issue between Jew and gentile.

#### IV. KNOWING AND BEING KNOWN OF GOD.

That which mainly interests the modern student in this so-called "Johannine" saying is its bearing on the messianic consciousness of Jesus, and it is highly significant that all the affinities of the passage, whether in the Old Testament or the New,

make it a protest against the spiritual disinheritance of the common people at the hands of the professional religionist. In the light of this circumstance it is impossible to suppose that Jesus is speaking either of a "revelation" or of a "sonship" which is his in an exclusive sense. He speaks of himself simply as the leader and champion of those who have no claim to sonship but the ethical, whose only pretension to be "sons of the Father in heaven" and "children of the Highest" rests on their exhibition of that divine spirit of unlimited, disinterested goodness, which "is kind even to the unthankful and the evil" (Mt. 5 43-48, Lk. 6 27-36), who "know the will" as the Good Samaritan knew it. But it was the ancient prerogative of Israel as a people to be "the beloved son" of God, "the first born and only-begotten"; whereas God had said of "the other nations which also come of Adam, that they are nothing," and had "likened them to a drop that falleth from a vessel."<sup>20</sup> According to the rabbis the evidence of Israel's special prerogative was that Israel had "knowledge of the law."<sup>21</sup> Whom indeed of mankind does the Creator destine to inherit his world, if not those to whom he has made the revelation of how and why he created it,<sup>22</sup> and of how he wills that men should live in it? No wonder if in the eyes of scribes and Pharisees the people of the land who "knew not the law," and did not so much as lend themselves to the guidance of its authoritative expounders, were "accursed" and worthy of no "share in the world to come." The privilege of the "publicans and sinners" could only be that which Paul later ascribed to the "sinners of the gentiles," not "a righteousness of their own, even that of the law," but the right to "become imitators of God as beloved children and walk in love, even as Christ had loved them and given himself for them" (Eph. 5 1).

But if such be the general bearing of the passage, we may well ask by what right the English versions write "Son" with a capital letter. The true parallel to the use which our logion makes of the term "the son" is Jn. 8 35,

<sup>20</sup> 2 Esdr. 6 55-59, referring to Gen. 1 26 27 and Is. 40 15. Cf. Psalms of Solomon 17 30, "He shall take knowledge of them that they be all the sons of their God."

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Deut. 4 6-8.

<sup>22</sup> Ass. Mos. 1 14.

The bondservant abideth not in the house forever; the son abideth forever.

Here no one thinks of writing with a capital, because the sense is obviously, "Any one who is a son." The fourth evangelist is reproducing Gal. 4 30, and we have only to turn to that passage to find Paul using both elements of the saying about Knowing God and Being Known (recognized, acknowledged as a son) of God, and then a little further on referring to the law as a "yoke of bondage." If in addition we find this use of the term "the son" to be justified by contemporary Jewish application of these complementary ideas of knowing God and being known of him, it will appear that such is certainly the intention of the logion itself, whatever later evangelists may have made of it.

If we accept the fuller Matthaean form, which is also the Lukan in all forms of the text except Codex Vercellensis,<sup>22</sup> the combination of the reciprocal sayings is paralleled by Paul in his own vindication of the sonship and heirship of the "sinners of the gentiles" without the "yoke of bondage." The disposition of his Galatian converts to take up the yoke of Mosaic ordinances is met with a passionate adjuration to remember the Spirit of adoption which they had received,

Because ye are sons, God sent forth the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying, Abba, Father. So that thou art no longer a slave but a son; and if a son, an heir also through God. . . . But now, having come to know God, or rather to be known (acknowledged, recognized as sons) by God, how turn ye back into bondage. . . . Be not held again in a yoke of bondage.

Knowing and being known come into the same antithesis again in 1 Cor. 13 12,

Then shall I know (have the gift of *gnosis*) even as also I have been known (acknowledged).

We may leave the question unsettled whether it is Paul who has set the example of this antithesis to our canonical Matthew, or the logion which suggests it to Paul. The decision will depend upon the solution of the problem of the text. More important

<sup>22</sup> Cod. Vercell. gives in Lk. (not Mt.), *Omnia mihi tradita sunt a patre, et nemo nobis quis est pater nisi filius, et cuicumque voluerit filius revelavit.*

than the question whether the saying about Being Known (i.e. recognized, acknowledged as a son) by God, was or was not originally connected with the one on the Knowledge of God, is the question of the meaning the former saying was intended to convey. What was the current application of the phrase "to be known (*γνωθῆναι*) by God"?

On this point we have the testimony of a collection of logia still older, apparently, than that referred to by Papias. The Pastoral Epistles, attributed to Paul, and in some parts admittedly Pauline, make repeated reference to "faithful sayings," and especially to "the wholesome words (*λόγοι*), even the words of our Lord Jesus Christ," as the standard of doctrine (1 Tim. 6 3). Among the quoted sayings of these epistles are two which together are said to constitute the "seal" of God's foundation, the Church,

The Lord hath acknowledged (*ἔγνω*) those that are his own, and, Let every one that nameth the name of the Lord depart from iniquity (2 Tim. 2 19, cf. Mt. 7 21-23).

The context shows that the writer has in mind the same complementary principles as are illustrated in the parable of the great supper with its Matthaean appendix of the guest unprovided with the wedding garment.<sup>24</sup> God's spiritual building has this twofold basis; on the one side no exclusion of those whom God himself accredits, "as many as are led by the Spirit of God are sons"; on the other no inclusion of the morally discredited, "by their fruits ye shall know them." Because

God said, I will dwell in them and walk in them, . . . therefore  
Come ye out from among them, and be ye separate, saith the Lord,  
And touch no unclean thing,  
And I will receive you,  
And be to you a Father,  
And ye shall be to me sons and daughters, saith the Lord Almighty  
(2 Cor. 6 16-18).

These complementary principles of the older Paulinism are now embodied in the "seal" of the "foundation of God," just quoted.

The foregoing examples from the Pauline writings, which show

<sup>24</sup> Cf. the two kindred parables, also peculiar to Matthew, of the tares and the net full of fishes, Mt. 13 24-30 36-43 47-50.

what was the primitive treatment of the complementary principles of "knowing" and "being known of" God, should be our guide to the historic sense of the logion, or logia, of Mt. 11 25-27, 13 16-17 = Lk. 10 21-24. To the scribes' contention that no man can claim to be a son who does not "know" the God whom he claims as his Father, and who has no revelation of his will (Rom. 2 18), reply is made by Jesus, in words which rest on Is. 29 14, that the little ones, whom he welcomes as his brother, sister, and mother because they hear the will of God and do it, have a better, fuller "knowledge" than "the wise and understanding." This is the good pleasure (*εὐδοκία*) of the "Lord of heaven and earth," and it behooves us to be glad and rejoice that the deepest knowledge of God is not intellectually but morally conditioned. Those "know his will" who perceive and imitate his spirit of unstinted, universal goodness "even to the unthankful and the evil." These, and not scribes, nor priests and Levites, official custodians and interpreters of the law, are qualified to "make revelation" to others as widely as they will. Jesus expresses this in the pregnant, epigrammatic phrase so characteristic of him,

It is the son who is competent to give revelation of the Father; but this knowledge is not that of the wise and understanding, it is such as is given to those who are simple-hearted as babes.

#### V. RELATION OF THE SAYING TO THAT ON THE KEYS OF THE KINGDOM, MT. 16 19.

Since the complementary idea of being known of God is not certainly found in both gospels, we cannot be sure that it is not a reflection of that great experience of the Church for which Paul has given us the term "the witness of the Spirit of adoption." From the stammering lips of those who prayed as the Spirit gave them utterance Paul takes down the cry *Abba, Abba*,<sup>25</sup> appealing to it as a superhuman testimony that through faith we are made

<sup>25</sup> The parallel to the above-quoted passage (Gal. 4 6 7) in Rom. 8 14-16 26-27 shows that the reference is to the charisma of tongues. Those who "prayed in a tongue," amid their inarticulate groanings and utterances intelligible only to God (Rom. 8 26, 1 Cor. 14 14-17), stammered forth the infant's cry, *Abba, Abba*.



sons and heirs of God. This one thing only need be known, if any arise to dispute the right of gentiles to be reckoned heirs of the promise. Received they the Spirit? If God have recognized as a son, who dare dispute the title? In this sense of recognition the principle was admitted as decisive in all branches of the Church. Since Pentecost it had been a "seal of the foundation," for "the Lord accrediteth them that are his." But the earliest struggle against the Jewish spirit of exclusiveness was earlier than Pentecost. To Jesus also the very essence of his mission had been to break down the artificial barriers which excluded publicans and sinners from the inheritance of sons, to resist the usurped prerogative of the "power of the keys." The scribes claimed authority to "bind and loose." By virtue of their occupation of Moses' seat they held "the key of knowledge," and used it to hinder the entrance of the repentant masses into the kingdom. Though preserved in late and variant form, the utterance attributed to Jesus which bestows this usurped power of the keys on the brotherhood of his disciples, or on their leader and representative, is a genuine echo of his championship of the people's cause, and similar parallels to the saying, "The Lord hath accredited them that are his," are to be found in Mt. 18 18,

Verily I say unto you, What things soever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven: and what things soever ye shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.

and in Mt. 16 17-19,

On this rock I will build my Church. . . .

I will give unto thee (Peter) the keys of the kingdom of heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.

These reported sayings of Jesus, before they were perverted into the decretals of a new ecclesiastical despotism, were themselves a declaration of the liberty and independence of the "little flock." Instead of suffering the little ones to be excluded from the synagogue by those who held the keys, claiming power to bind and loose, making the son or daughter of Abraham who resisted their tyranny "as the gentile and the publican," he that hath the key of David restores it to his own. The key of knowledge, the key

of authority, the key of admission or exclusion, the keys of the kingdom of heaven, are given to the Church itself or to the Church in the person of Peter as its leader. Alas that the Church only repeated under the name of Peter the old-time tyranny of the scribes! These several appeals to a saying of Jesus of this type show that he was understood to have protested against the scribes' usurpation of this power, and that the references in the Pauline writings to God as the sole accreditor of his own sons have an authentic basis. Even were the reference to the son's being known of the Father held to be borrowed from Paul, yet Jesus himself had in substance established it as a "seal of the foundation of God" that not man but the Lord accrediteth them that are his.

In fact the commission of Peter in Mt. 16 17-19, with its significant reference to "the gates of Hades" which had closed upon the crucified Leader, is closely related to the commission to "Peter and the twelve" which forms the central feature in all forms of the resurrection story. God gave him to be made manifest unto them in order that *forgiveness of sins* through repentance and faith in his name might be preached unto all the gentiles, beginning from Jerusalem (Lk. 24 47-49). The authority of their commission is the authority to "loose" from sins. Its token is baptism. Its seal is the outpoured Spirit. Cf. Mt. 28 18 19, Jn. 20 21-23.

#### VI. BEARING OF THE SAYING ON THE MESSIANIC CONSCIOUSNESS OF JESUS.

But we are more concerned with that portion of the logion which is certainly attested by both Matthew and Luke, and which vindicated the claim of the "babes" to have that true knowledge of God without which one cannot be deemed a son. Here if anywhere we can discover the secret of the messianic consciousness of Jesus. The title "Son of man" which has been called his "favorite self-designation," and to which many turn as the principal source of first-hand knowledge on this vital point, is doubly open to question. On philological grounds it is doubtful if the phrase could have existence in the Aramaic spoken by

Jesus. If it did, that very existence was owing to connotations most foreign to the sane and well-poised quality of Jesus' character and teaching. His fundamental conception of his calling is not the apocalyptic, and appears not in the eschatological sayings but in the Sermon on the Mount. The apocalyptic notions of his mission and destiny may easily have been superimposed upon his own conception in the superheated atmosphere of the primitive Church, while the reverse is inconceivable. Jesus was not a visionary. The Danielic figure looms large to the vision of post-resurrection prophets and seers, but not on the mental and spiritual horizon of the Carpenter of Nazareth, least of all as offering a career for himself. The phrase which is really and demonstrably characteristic of him, the title which in the oldest documents of Christianity is universally pervasive, as against not one single occurrence of the term Son of man, is that of Son of God. In any case we may say that as certainly as the conception of Exodus and Hosea that Israel is God's son (to say nothing of the as yet unethicized common Semitic idea) is antecedent to the apocalyptic figure of Daniel, Enoch, and 2 Esdras, just so certainly is the conception of sonship to God in Jesus' mind antecedent to that of Son of man, whatever may have been the apocalyptic dreams to which he turned under the growing certainty of martyrdom. It is true that we give small notice to this humble title "son of God" except when the translators assist our vision with a capital letter, or when in some way its simple ethical sense is transcended; but that which really concerns Jesus and Paul is "the inheritance of sons," by which they both mean "sons of the Highest," "sons and daughters of the Lord Almighty."<sup>28</sup> It is also true that a Roman gospel, admittedly of the second generation, gives something more than an ethical meaning to this designation "the son of God," which in our logion Jesus applies to himself only as representative, leader, and champion of those whose sonship required to be vindicated. In Mark the title "the Son of God" has already a special and peculiar sense allied to the Pauline metaphysics. The outcome of this process of apocalyptic transcendentalizing appears in the vision-story of the Transfiguration, a typical apocalypse, wherein the rabbinic device of

<sup>28</sup> Mt. 5 45 = Lk. 6 35, 2 Cor. 6 18.

the *bath qol*, or voice from heaven, is employed to set forth along with the characteristic imagery of this type of literature the author's Pauline or quasi-Pauline Christology. For the author of this vision-story the real being of Jesus was revealed when the eyes of his intimates had been enlightened to pierce the veil of his flesh and to behold the Son of God, not in the ethical, but in the apocalyptic sense, even the Beloved, of pre-existent glory. The same device of the voice from heaven and the same phraseology are employed in the preliminary narrative which Mark prefixes to his gospel. His doctrine of Jesus the pre-existent Son of God is intelligible to us, and was acceptable to his own and later generations. The Gospel of Mark became the very framework of gospel tradition. But if we look at the references to divine sonship which pervade that other source, which nearly all critics admit to be an older and better authority, we shall find the term "son of God" to bear a far different sense. Jesus is still "the son," but only as "the first-born of many brethren." This sense is as little "theocratic" as it is metaphysical. It is historic, ethical, and religious. It finds its affiliations not with the crude metaphysics of the Roman gospel, nor with the profounder and subtler speculations of the Ephesian, but in the familiar subject of dispute in the Pauline epistles, the demand for the admission to the Abrahamic inheritance of those who have no title under the law, the question whether our inspired cry of Abba, Father, is or is not a sufficient earnest of our sonship. Most of all it finds its attestation in the common background of current Jewish interpretation of the messianic hope.

## VII. THE MESSIANIC HOPE FROM THE PROPHETS TO THE PHARISEES.

It is an utter misapprehension of this national expectation in its origin to regard it as having had primarily to do with royalty. The passage which in modern times is commonly taken as its very foundation, the promise to David of a successor to his throne,<sup>27</sup> finds scarcely an echo in the entire New Testament. In reality the hope is far older, far broader, far more fundamental. Not

<sup>27</sup> 2 Sam. 7 13, Ps. 132 11, referred to in Acts 2 30.

David's successor primarily, but Israel itself is God's son. The fundamental passage is Ex. 4 22,

Thou shalt say unto Pharaoh, Thus saith the Lord, Israel is my son, my first-born; and I have said unto thee, Let my son go, that he may serve me; and thou hast refused to let him go: behold I will slay thy son, thy first-born.

God first adopted the people,

When Israel was a child, then I loved him, and called my son out of Egypt (Hos. 11 1).

If in later times he became a Father to their king, it was for the people's sake.

Professor F. C. Porter has very properly reminded us that the prophets represent themselves not as creators, but as critics of the messianic hope. The hope itself was as old as Israel. It partook in its earliest form of the crudity of the common Semitic conception of the divinity of a land as the progenitor of its population. Jahveh, however, unlike neighboring divinities, had not begotten Israel, but "adopted" him, when he was a bond-slave in Egypt. This made the relation ethical and spiritual.<sup>28</sup> "You only have I known (acknowledged)" is Jahveh's word through Amos, but this acknowledgment was the free choice of a "Lord of heaven and earth," who directs all the nations and rules them under a law of righteousness. Amos became the first great critic of this national hope by subjecting it to ethical conditions. He ethicized the doctrine of election.

In the time of Jesus the messianic hope, in spite of all its transformations and refinements, had by no means lost its fundamental significance. The experiences of the monarchy had caused it to crystallize around the theocratic figure of the son of David; the experiences of national disintegration and admixture with the world had clothed this figure with mythological attributes and widened the programme of his activity. Most of all, life under the law had profoundly modified the conception of its conditions. But even in Jesus' time the messianic hope remained fundamentally what it had always been. Israel is God's son and heir, Israel must possess God's land, that is the world. The destruction of

<sup>28</sup> Budde, *Israel before the Exile*, 1897.

Jerusalem by Titus only elicits from a groaning patriot and believer the cry,

O Lord, thou hast said that for our sakes thou madest this world. . . . And now, O Lord, behold these nations which are reputed as nothing be lords over us and devour us. But we thy people, whom thou hast called thy first-born, thy only-begotten and thy fervent lover (beloved?), are given into their hands. If the world now be made for our sakes, why do we not possess for an inheritance our world? How long shall this endure? (2 Esdr. 6 56-59).

Many were the forms under which the old belief in the adoption and the inheritance survived, from the cry of the Zealot for national hegemony to the philosopher's academic demonstration that the truly wise man is the "heir of the things belonging to God."<sup>29</sup> Of these many developments we are concerned with but one, the religious. Pharisaism had withdrawn from the nationalistic movement against the forcible hellenization of Antiochus Epiphanes, as soon as that movement degenerated into a mere struggle for self-aggrandizement on the part of the successors of Simon the Maccabee. The Pharisees became the Puritans of the first century B.C. by eliminating worldly ambition from the messianic programme. Israel's calling was to be the people of the law. Righteousness, "even that which is of the law," was to be its work and ambition in the world. Its reward was to be in a new heaven and a new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness. This was the deepest and most fruitful movement of the times in the bosom of a people whose genius had ever been religious. Its purest expression appears in the so-called Psalms of the Pharisees, nearest in sentiment of all uncanonical writings to the canticles of Luke.

In true Pharisaism, of the type which produced the noblest and greatest of the followers of Jesus, sonship in the religious sense became the very essence of the messianic hope and the true prerogative of Israel. To be the son of God by knowing and doing his will is the Pharisee's ideal for his people. The Christ, when he comes, "shall take knowledge of them that they be all the sons of their God." (Ps. Sol. 17 30). Many generations earlier we have the same ideal in the same phraseology

<sup>29</sup> Philo, *Quis rerum divinarum heres?*

from the son of Sirach. The Great Repentance of Mal. 4 6 here became a turning in mutual reconciliation not of mere earthly families, but "of the Father (God) to the son (Israel) and of the son to the Father," thus restoring the tribes of Israel (Ecclus. 48 10). A century later than Sirach the author of the Wisdom of Solomon delineates "the righteous man" in traits that acknowledge no ethnic limitation, but he has in reality Israel—a Pharisaic Israel—to sit for the portrait.

Let us lie in wait for the righteous man,  
 Because he is of disservice to us,  
 And is contrary to our works,  
 And upbraideth us with sins against the law. . . . .  
 He professeth to have knowledge of God, . . . . .  
 And nameth himself son (*παις*) of the Lord. . . . .  
 And he abstaineth from our ways as from uncleannesses.  
 The latter end of the righteous he calleth happy,  
 And vaunteth that God is his Father.  
 Let us see if his words be true,  
 Let us try what shall befall in the ending of his life;  
 For if the righteous man is God's son, he will uphold him (Wisdom of Solomon 2 12-18).

An earlier contemporary of the same Alexandrian school claims it as a testimony of the wise Egyptian priests that the Jews are

men of God, a name which belongs not to others, but only to him who worships the true God. For these others are men of food and drink and clothing; for all their thought is taken for these things. But those who are of our faith give no heed to these things, but their whole life long they are concerned with searching out the works of God (Aristeas 140, ca. 90 B.C.).

These Alexandrian Jewish writers of the first century B.C. seem indeed "not far from the kingdom of God," with their ideal of Israel's destiny and prerogative. But we must come down to the writing of a Palestinian Pharisee almost contemporary with Jesus himself for the nearest approximation to the Sermon on the Mount in an expression of the messianic hope. He hopes for nothing less than the outpouring of a spirit of righteousness, God's Spirit, who by communicating his nature makes Israel indeed his son, and thereby exalted, as in the Pauline writings, "over every angel and spirit."

And Moses fell upon his face and prayed, and said: O Lord, my God, forsake not thy people and thy heritage, that it should walk in the error of its own heart, and deliver them not over into the hands of the gentiles, that these may not rule over them and compel them to sin against thee. Let thy mercy be exalted over thy people, and create in them a right disposition and let not the spirit of Belchor (Belial) rule in them, to accuse them before thee and to seduce them from all paths of righteousness, that they should perish far away from thy countenance. For they are thy people and thine heir, whom thou didst save by thy great might out of the hand of the Egyptians. Create in them a clean heart and a holy spirit and let them not be entangled in their sin henceforth and forever.

And God said unto Moses, I know their contrariness and their (evil) disposition and their stiff neck, and they will not hearken until they acknowledge their sin and the sins of their fathers. After that they will return unto me in all uprightness, with all their heart and all their soul. And I will circumcise the foreskin of the hearts of their children, and will create in them a holy spirit and make them pure, so that they shall no more turn away from me from that day to all eternity. And their soul shall follow me and all my law, and they shall do according to my commandment, and I will be a father to them, and they shall be my children. And they shall be called the children of the living God. And all angels and all spirits shall know that they are my children and that I am their Father in truth and righteousness and that I love them (Jubilees 1 19-25).

It is a Puritanism of this noble type which is represented in its degeneracy by the synagogue-system of scribe and Pharisee in the time of Jesus. After the downfall of the Maccabees reaction against Zealot nationalistic fanaticism on the one side and Sadducean worldliness on the other had thrown back the religious-minded upon the orthodoxy of the written law. The Pharisee became a blind follower of the scribe, his blind guide. Insistence on the letter of a deified law, whose ideal was separation from the ceremonially unclean,<sup>30</sup> carried exclusiveness to a degree unmatched even by the Puritanism of Scotland or New England. For the "people of the land," the "publicans and sinners," the ordinary peasant or fisherman or handicraftsman of half-heathen Galilee, the Mosaic ideal of separation was utterly impracticable, its prescriptions "a yoke which neither we nor our fathers were able to bear" (Acts 15 10), the scribes' interpretations of its requirements were a "binding of heavy burdens and grievous to be borne which they themselves touched not with one of their

<sup>30</sup> Ex. 33 16, Jer. 51 45, Ez. 20 34, 41 Is. 52 11, 2 Cor. 6 17.



fingers." The poor man, the unlettered, the ordinary artisan and father of a family saw himself under this odious and hypocritical tyranny gradually excluded from all share in the world to come. He too was a son of Abraham, but by decree of the scribes he saw himself deprived of his Abrahamic inheritance in favor of the little coterie of the Pharisees (the "separated"), whose legalistic righteousness was only too often mercenary and external. There were but two classes, the *chaberim*, or consistent devotees of the law, a religious caste withdrawing from the defiling contact even of their kindred and coreligionists of less strict observance, and the *am ha-aretz*, the out-caste who had "no share in the world to come."

The religious centre of gravity cannot be permanently swung to this social extreme. The reaction, when it came, was correspondingly sweeping and profound. John the Baptist and Jesus revived the old prophetic spirit of religious democracy. They led a rebellion of the simple Israelite against the usurpation of the Abrahamic inheritance by the scribes and Pharisees. Like another Elijah John led a "great repentance,"<sup>81</sup> the token of which was the new rite of baptism, self-evident in meaning, unknown to legal prescription. The publicans and sinners flocked to him; the scribes and Pharisees held aloof. His martyrdom could not check the movement. In the Carpenter of Nazareth it found a new and greater leader, who himself sought out the lost sheep of the house of Israel in Galilee, and defended the lost son against the grudging elder brother. His fisherman followers he taught to cast nets for the scattered wanderers from the kingdom.<sup>82</sup> Like a trustee for an orphan defrauded of his inheritance, Jesus demanded restoration to the "little ones" of their rightful part in Israel's spiritual inheritance. He insisted upon the full content of this inheritance, and on that which is of primary importance, the spiritualities, before the temporalities. The conflict with the intrenched power of scribes and Pharisees was a war to the knife. Since the days of John the Baptist—the

<sup>81</sup> This was the function of Elias redivivus in contemporary legend, cf. Mal. 4 6 resting on 1 Kings 18 37. See Bacon, "Elias and the Men of Violence," *Expositor*, sixth series, xxxi (July, 1902).

<sup>82</sup> Mk. 1 17, resting on Jer. 16 16.

Elias who should come as a "restorer of the tribes" to "admit those who had been wrongfully excluded and to exclude those wrongfully admitted" to Israel's inheritance <sup>22</sup>—the kingdom of heaven had suffered violence, and men of violence were now prepared to take it by force. Jesus was unsparing in his invective against this one class, and this only; and he has not neglected to tell us why. He told them to their faces that the law and the prophets, as the charter of their monopoly, could endure only "until John." He predicted (Mt. 23) that they would not spare him; and they did not.

It was his championship in this conflict which first gave to Jesus his right to be called the Son of God. It was for the sake of his little flock that he demanded it, and for them that he defended it with his life. Sonship to God was the vital element of that religious inheritance of which the synagogue-system, the legalism of scribe and Pharisee, sought to rob the simple Israelite by its usurpation of the key of knowledge and its pretence of doing the will of the Father. Therefore it is that Jesus thanks the infinite Lord of heaven and earth that the knowledge of him is no monopoly of the wise and understanding, that it is not the learned in the law that know him, but the little ones, the babes, if so be that they have the spirit of sons in kindness even to the unthankful and the evil. Such knowledge, such inward light, he claims to have in his own person, the tradition not of dead authorities, but of his Father, and he maintains that they who are qualified to give "revelation" are those who are sons in this sense. A good Samaritan is a better teacher than a selfish and cowardly priest or Levite.

More than this, he disputes also the scribal usurpation of the power to "bind and loose," to admit and to exclude. Who is the son? John the Baptist had said, "God is able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham," and the publicans and sinners had repented at his word. None denied the Pharisees' right to the name. But Jesus had promised salvation to the repentant publican, "forasmuch as he also is a son of Abraham." Which has the better title to the inheritance of the sons of God? Jesus puts the question in the form of the parable of the two sons.

<sup>22</sup> So Edujoth viii, 7, resting on Ecclus. 48 10.

Whether of these twain did the will of the Father, he that said, I go, sir, and went not; or he that afterward repented and went? . . . Therefore the publicans and harlots go into the kingdom of heaven before you.

When Paul lays it down as the token of sonship that one be "led by the Spirit of God" (Rom. 8 14), he is adapting the ancient principle of the foundation of the Church, that "the Lord (by the 'seal' of the Spirit) acknowledgeth them that are his," to Jesus' more strictly ethical test, "Whosoever doeth the will of my Father, the same is my brother and sister and mother." In an earlier writing he enunciates his principle in a more primary form. In the Galatian parallel to Rom. 8 15<sup>34</sup> he defines the divine "acknowledgement" to be the sending forth into our hearts of the Spirit of his Son teaching us as sons the cry Abba, Father. Whosoever receiveth the Spirit is a son. According to Jesus, "whosoever doeth the will," were it publican, harlot, or Samaritan, is "known of God," and "doing the will" is exemplified, not in the Pharisees with their yoke of bondage, but in those whose inward disposition is akin to the Father's. Paul is not original, but only a follower of Jesus, as he claimed to be, in meeting the pretensions of intrenched and traditional authority by the self-evidencing testimony of the Spirit, which makes foolish the wisdom of the wise and gives its revelation to babes. By no other conceivable course was it possible to meet the authority of the scribes; for with them in pre-eminent degree knowledge was indeed power. Unless he were ready to abandon the cause of the disinherited "little ones," whose leader and champion he had become since John was shut up in prison, Jesus had no alternative but to maintain, "No man knoweth the Father save the son." In opposition to the "violence" which made the key of knowledge an instrument for excluding from the kingdom the repentant "publicans and harlots," while none but submissive bearers of the yoke of the law as interpreted by themselves were recognized as sons, Jesus had no alternative but to appeal to a binding and loosing that has validity in heaven. This is the principle implied, if not directly expressed, in the saying,

No man knoweth who the son is (who is a son) save the Father.

<sup>34</sup> Gal. 4 6.

## VIII. LATER DEVELOPMENT.

Our oldest and most trustworthy source has but this single instance in which Jesus seems to claim messianic honors for himself. We have agreed that it may well be called "the Johanne passage," for it forms a manifest point of departure for the later theological and metaphysical interpretations of the title Son of God which reach their culmination in the Fourth Gospel. But the metaphysics is not from Jesus. In the passage from Q, historically interpreted, there is not one trace of this. There is not even the exclusive sense in which our second evangelist in two or three instances has employed the title. Jesus is simply championing the cause of the disinherited sons and daughters of Abraham, when he maintains that if any

Professeth to have knowledge of God,  
And nameth himself son (*υιός*) of the Lord, . . .  
And vaunteth that God is his father,

he must be a "son of the Highest," because he has that kind of spirit which the Father manifests. He is continuing the work of him who had said, "God is able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham," as John himself was consciously continuing the message of Amos, the prophet of ethical election. Jesus speaks simply as leader, defender, and representative of the "babes," when he thanks the "Lord of heaven and earth" for the revelation that is "delivered" to those that have eyes to see and ears to hear, though it be "hid from the wise and understanding." There is no pretension in this to superhuman, or even to messianic, dignity for his own person; and the utterance was not so understood by his hearers. Nevertheless it would logically lead to this if the conflict with the oligarchy of scribes and Pharisees were maintained. And so it was.

## IX. RELATION TO THE CLAIM OF MESSIAHSHIP.

A pivotal point of the Petrine tradition embodied in our second gospel (Mk. 8 29) is the tendering to Jesus by Peter, with the support of the eleven disciples, of the title "the Christ." This

was during a temporary lull in the conflict. The great collision in Capernaum with "the scribes who came down from Jerusalem" had issued in Jesus' exile from the scene of his early popularity, and in the permanent interruption of his public teaching in Galilee. There remained, besides Samaria, which he felt no call to evangelize, only Judaea beyond Jordan, and Jerusalem. Toward these he set his face, with Jerusalem as his goal. The odds against him and his little flock would now be doubled. If he proposed to reclaim for them full rights in the temple as well as the synagogue, he would have to issue his challenge to an alliance of the priestly hierarchy with the already hostile scribal oligarchy. No wonder he predicted for himself a fate like John's. But consistency allowed no other alternative. He had either to desert the cause of the disinherited sons, or else to present their claims at the doors of the temple itself, protest against the abuses of the high-priestly clique, and demand a restoration of the temple to the uses of a house of prayer for all the people.

Under what other rôle could one become the champion of the lost sheep of the house of Israel against the faithless shepherds who had served themselves of the flock, than as the true Shepherd of Ezekiel's vision?

He shall feed them, even my servant David; he shall feed them, and he shall be their shepherd. And I, the Lord, will be their God, and my servant David prince among them (Ez. 34 23-24).

If the Pharisees had not themselves led the way in cancelling all political significance from the messianic hope, Jesus could never have consented to be called the Christ. As it was, the title is to him the least acceptable of all possible descriptions of his mission. In spite of his utmost endeavor to prevent being forced into the false position of a leader of Zealot nationalistic agitation, it furnished to his enemies their best opportunity for misrepresentation, nay, the very snare by which they actually compassed his death. Palpably, manifestly, it was a crown of thorns that Peter was ignorantly offering him at Caesarea Philippi. And yet in some sense he must take it, or be recreant to the trust that the God of these lost sheep and lost sons had imposed upon him. Their inheritance was the full inheritance of sons. He was not at lib-

erty to compound with the usurpers for a part. They had no other leader or representative. The knowledge of sonship had been delivered to him. Now to these "babes" also had come something more than that revelation of the Father, and of their own sonship which he had awakened in them. They had received now a revelation on their own account. It came not from flesh and blood but from the Father himself when they now perceived that vindication of their sonship depended upon him as "the Son," the Christ.

The movement of Pharisaism had had this great merit, that it had changed the perspective of the messianic hope. Israel was first to become God's son by knowing and doing his revealed will. Afterwards it should receive its inheritance. The spirit of censorious exclusiveness, admitting to participation in the inheritance not those whose sonship was evinced by a spirit kindred to the Father's, but those only who submitted to the yoke of legal prescriptions, had shown the fatal unfitness of the Pharisees' method of attaining the messianic hope, but had left the ideal itself in broader, distincter outline and nobler proportions than ever before. The Pharisees' method was that of the Puritans of all ages.

Come ye out from among them and be ye separate, saith the Lord,  
And touch no unclean thing.

Their ideal was:

And I will receive you,  
And will be to you a Father,  
And ye shall be to me sons and daughters, saith the Lord Almighty.

For this ideal of the messianic hope there is but one title which can appropriately be applied to the personality which becomes its leader. Such a leader must designate himself "the Christ, the Son of the living God."

R. H. Charles has called our attention to a phenomenon which confirms Professor Porter's far-reaching observation that the prophets are not creators but critics of the messianic hope. It is that the manifold titles applied to the Messiah in the literature of this period, particularly the apocalyptic literature, wherein the

figure of the Messiah plays so large a part, such titles as "the Elect," "the Just," "the Saint," "the Beloved," "the Servant," "the Heir," are in almost every instance derived from the titles bestowed on Israel as the people of God. The Messiah is "the Elect" as representative and head of the elect people, "the Just" as head and representative of "the just," "the Saint" as representing "the people of the saints of the Most High," "the Beloved"—and we may rightfully add in view of the passage cited above from Second Esdras, "the Only-begotten"—as representing the people whom God had "called his beloved, his only-begotten," "the Heir" as representing their claim to the inheritance of God's creation. It is so also with the title "the Son." For one whose ideal of the messianic hope is that of the passages quoted from Ecclesiasticus, Aristeeas, Wisdom, the Psalter of Solomon, and Jubilees, who shares the prophetic ideal as enlarged and refined by the experiences of the exile, the return, the Maccabean revolt, and the Pharisean reaction against the later Hasmonaeans, there is no title so expressive of the work to be achieved by this Friend of publicans and sinners as "the Son." Not because in some peculiar and metaphysical sense he taketh hold upon the nature of God, but because "he taketh hold on the seed of Abraham" to bring them to their inheritance, because he is "made in all points like unto his brethren," because he is "the first-born of many brethren." It is in this sense that Jesus the Son of God was willing also to become the Christ for his brethren and companions' sakes. When we go back to his own words, his claim appears in its true historical light as a sacrifice of his life to win back for the disinherited "little ones" of Israel their "right to be called the sons of God." Paul's invincible logic applied the principle to the disinherited sons of all humanity, and made Jesus known as "the Saviour of the world." When, a generation later, the Roman disciple of a disciple undertakes to relate "the gospel of Jesus, the Christ, the Son of God," he manifests the disposition we should expect. What he is eager to prove is that Jesus was endowed with this distinction in his own right by a voice from heaven, that he contended for it and was vindicated in it by a life of wonder-working power and goodness, and by a supernatural resurrection from the dead. Fortunately even Paul,

eager as he is to exalt the divinity of his Redeemer, and ready with a doctrine of his descent from pre-existent messianic glory, does not pervert the doctrine of "sonship" into something which appertains to Christ in distinction from us, but loyally presents it as that which he possesses on our behalf, and as our representative;

When the fulness of the time came God sent forth his Son, born of a woman, born under the law, that he might redeem them which were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons. And because ye are sons, God sent forth the Spirit of his Son into our hearts, crying Abba, Father. So that thou art no longer a bond-servant but a son; and if a son, then an heir, through God. Howbeit, at that time, not knowing God, ye were in bondage. . . . But now that ye have come to know God, or rather to be known of God, how turn ye back again? . . . For freedom did Christ set you free. Be not entangled again in a yoke of bondage (Gal. 4 4-9, 5 1).



*A BASIC PRINCIPLE FOR THEOLOGY*

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There have been times in the history of architecture when style was inevitable. In the classic period of Greece or in the Gothic period of northern Europe no architect raised the question as to the style in which he should construct a building. That was decreed for him. And we shall perhaps not go astray if we suggest that the inevitableness of that decree was determined by two factors. One was the purpose to be served by the building, the other was the control over the materials. The one factor determined the contents, the other the form in which those contents were to be expressed. The contents depended on the social and spiritual ideals of the time. The form depended on the nature of the building material and on the mechanical ability to use it.

Now in the great building periods mentioned, both these elements, contents and form, were comparatively simple. Both the Greek and the mediaeval mind had something definite to express. And the form of expression was dictated by the building material and by the knowledge of mechanics. And even in the marvellous product of Gothic art, the principle of construction and support in all its variety was simplicity itself.

At present no such state of things prevails. An architect for a cathedral, a bank, a State capitol, looks about for a style. There is nothing inevitable. And the reason is not far to seek. Both in contents and in form, variety and complexity rule in the place of simplicity. The modern world has grown with a rapidity that staggers us. It is infinitely complex. Whether in social life or in spiritual aspiration there is no clear norm. And with the progress of science a whole new set of materials has come to hand. New methods of building, new forms of construction, have arisen. There are no limits to the possibilities of mechanical control. And the result is that we are in an age which at present has not given itself architectural expression. The Parthenon and the

cathedral of Amiens owe their greatness to their inevitableness. Who shall find inevitableness in architecture today?

Nevertheless the problem is pressing, and is no doubt being solved. Some day the modern world will find itself, both in contents and in form. Some day the architect will arise who will express the twentieth, or it may be the twenty-first, century as logically as the cathedral of Amiens expresses the thirteenth, or the Parthenon the age of Pericles. There are already signs of such a consistent modern architecture. But the problem waits for anything like a full solution.

The above is an allegory. *De theologia fabula*. I speak concerning theology. The system of theology is today in much the same condition as architecture. It is not inevitable. There is no controlling principle. There have been times when Systematic Divinity had the stamp of inevitableness. We need only suggest Augustine, Aquinas, and Calvin. In all three the conditions were present out of which the body of doctrine reared itself in self-consistent form. But that situation exists no longer. Neither in the contents nor in the form of present-day theology is there given the simplicity that can inevitably express itself in a system of Christian doctrine. In contents the moral and spiritual world is many-sided and complex. Social problems have become vastly enriched in content. There is a deeper demand for the rights of the individual. Democracy is coming into its own. The moral outlook includes the whole race, giving a much greater sweep in extent to the moral problem. All this moral material demands theological expression. Into our theology there must be carried the full demands of moral and personal life. The contents for a theology are indefinitely complex.

Again, as to a formal principle of theology, the difficulty is as great. The authority of infallible Scripture has given way before criticism. The infallible Church has yielded to the belief in development. Moreover, there is the whole new world of modern science, to which theology must be brought into relation. The supplanting of Ptolemy by Copernicus was the beginning of a radical change in the concept of the universe, a change to which theology is still being called on to adjust itself. And this great new universe is ruled by Law, unvarying, absolute, and including

in its sway both man and the farthest realm of the distant stars. It is not surprising that, with such changes both in contents and in form, theology like architecture waits in vain for a systematic expression that shall be inevitable.

Some of the theological results of this situation are easily seen. There is but little interest in a system of theology. There is indeed interest in theological questions, an interest that is widespread, if not always deep. But it is piecemeal. It must needs be so. For example it is noticeable that while a large part of present theology is concerned with apologetic problems, yet there is little systematic "Apologetics" that is worthy of the name. The world has moved so fast that the systematic apologete is left behind. He may indulge in guerilla warfare, but he knows not how to marshal an army. So it is with theology itself. We have an enormous amount of theological material. Biblical criticism, the history of dogma, the social and psychological nature of religion, all these arouse interest, and good results are being achieved. Yet when the attempt is made to put this material into a distinct systematic form, we feel at once a lack of the clearness and definiteness and convincing character that attend the allied work of the critic, the historian, or the psychologist.

Doubtless it is for this reason that ever since Schleiermacher almost the dominant question in theology has been that of method. Men are afraid to theologize until they are sure they know the proper way to do it. I need only mention the names of Schleiermacher, Hegel, and Ritschl to suggest the manifold attitudes towards the question of method. And in the attempt to find a method that shall benefit by all these attempts, one is reminded of the German school-boy, who, when his teacher after a prolonged mathematical explanation turned to him with the question, "Is it now clear?" answered, "Es ist noch nicht ganz dunkel," "It is not yet entirely obscure."

Yet such a condition cannot be permanent if theology is to hold its own. Indeed it cannot be permanent if Christian belief is to hold its own. For the world is a unity, and we must needs think it as a unity. The sense of law dominates our thinking. No department of thought or life can maintain itself in isolation. Christian belief demands the assent of the intellect as well as of

the will. And a mere congeries of theological data will not satisfy the intellectual demand. There must be a systematic theology if Christian thinking is to command the allegiance of intellectual men.

Doubtless the accomplishment of such a task is far off. But the first step to it is the winning of a basic principle. If theology is to express itself in systematic form there must be some legitimate starting-point for its construction. What is the proper starting-point for a system of theology today?

I mean by such a principle a truth or idea that lies within the contents of Christian faith or Christian experience. Out of the discussion as to proper methods, this much seems clear, that the approach to Christian doctrine cannot be by a principle that itself lies outside the realm of Christian faith. The contents of the system of belief are not to be intellectually demonstrated by a process of speculation. The fall of systems constructed on that basis is sufficient warning not to renew the attempt. Of course I do not mean that Christian belief is to refuse intellectual test, or to fail to bring itself into relation with the general contents of man's intellectual life today. To do so would be to turn one's back on the intellectual life altogether. But what I do mean is that any such vindication must start from within the field of Christian experience and not outside. This demand is simply in the line of all scientific procedure. The science of geology does not rest on a speculative theory derived from *a priori* reasoning. That was the method of mediaevalism. The modern science of geology begins with knowledge of the earth derived through observation, experience. On the basis of that experience the science of geology is formed and is brought into relation with other fields of experience, thus forming a part of the whole body of scientific truth. The systematic study of Christian doctrine must use the same method. It must begin within the field of Christian experience, and must systematize that experience. Then and not till then can it bring that field into relation with other experience, and thus give a sound vindication of Christian truth. The basic principle which we seek must then be a Christian concept, one that shall be fertile; that is, one that stands in essential relation to the body of Christian

truth. What part of Christian doctrine can best serve as such a basic principle?

I suggest two requirements for such a principle. In the first place it must be true; that is, it must form an integral part of Christian belief. It must not be extraneous or forced. It must be an essential element of the Christian faith. Indeed this requirement is perhaps the only one that is absolutely imperative. For various starting-points are possible, and from any concept which is an integral part of Christian truth the whole truth might conceivably be developed. It was said that Agassiz from one bone could reconstruct the entire fish; it mattered not what bone it was. Thus the primary and only absolutely imperative requirement for a basic principle is that it should be true.

Yet another requirement is practically necessary. In order that the construction should be effective it must be based on a principle that is in close accord with present methods of thought. It must be in the terms of the present day. While it is conceivable that a logical system should be built upon nearly any principle that is itself true, yet it will lack strategic value for the task of theology unless that principle be truly contemporaneous. We may call this second requirement adaptability.

I need only mention in passing several principles that have been or may be suggested. The doctrine of the fatherhood of God has been emphasized in such a way as almost to reconstruct our present theology. In England through Robertson and Maurice and in America through Bushnell and Phillips Brooks it was almost a new gospel in its contrast to Calvinism. Nevertheless we can hardly find in it our needed principle. In itself the doctrine is liable to be ambiguous. Much depends upon the concept of fatherhood. And the modern thought of parentage with its tendency to weak indulgence and good-natured indifference is too often put in place of the New Testament thought of the Father, which includes the concept of authority and power as well as the moral element of creative love. Perhaps it is on account of this possible degeneration that there are signs that the preaching of the divine fatherhood is beginning to lose power. There is a demand for the sterner elements of righteousness and law. And while these elements are strictly included in the Chris-

tian doctrine of fatherhood, yet they are not strategically arrived at in the best way on the basis of that concept.

The same may be said of the doctrine of divine love. With all the completeness that may and should be given to the doctrine, it yet tends to degenerate, in popular use, into undue softness. Love that is self-consistent must itself have the elements of righteousness and law, but these elements will not be well guaranteed by the popular idea as to what love is.

I have from time to time been much attracted to the doctrine of creation as the starting-point. There is much to be said for it. Historically it carries us deep into the Old Testament, and to the radical distinction between the religion of Israel and that of the pagan world in general. It serves as a basis for a true concept of the transcendence and the immanence of God. In the New Testament the belief in God as Father finds its roots in the Old Testament belief in the creator, a belief now carried into the moral sphere. Thus God the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ is the Creator God of Hebrew prophecy completely moralized. Christ himself is the expression of that moral creatorship as the founder of the kingdom of God. The doctrines of atonement, and of justification, lend themselves readily to treatment as vitally related to the belief in the creative love. And the very beginnings of the development of Christian dogma after New Testament times are closely connected with the relation between such a belief in creation, and the Greek concept of the relation between God and the world. For many reasons, genetically and logically, the concept of creation commends itself as the basic principle of Christian theology.

Nevertheless this principle hardly meets the strategic requirement. The word "creation" carries with it today a heavy load. We may clearly recognize that evolution is not identical with an unconscious emanation, but may and indeed must be treated as the expression of the divine will. Nevertheless the concept of evolution is so all-dominating that even the appearance of opposition to it must be avoided at any cost. The relation to evolution of the creative concept of God can best be arrived at as a result. To make it the starting-point requires too much explanation. And although that explanation may be very clear and

simple to the theologian, yet theology must today come from the closet into the street. It must not handicap itself with a concept that to the ordinary modern man seems at any rate uninteresting and of little importance, even if not contradictory to his scientific thought. With reluctance then the concept of creation must be abandoned as the basic principle for a theology today. It lacks the second requirement, adaptability.

What does this test of adaptability demand? I suggest two elements of our thought today, both of which are demanded by this requirement. The first is the overwhelming importance put on the social problem. This is perhaps the dominant interest of our time. It is so many-sided that to describe it is to describe the modern world. From the period of Kant's *Critique* and from the French Revolution the social question has pressed ever more to the front. The outburst of philanthropy, the overthrow of the slave trade, the destruction of slavery, above all, the growth of democracy, these were characteristic of the nineteenth century. And throughout that movement a deepened sense of the value of the individual and a stronger emphasis on the organic forms of social life went hand in hand. As the undermost man demands to be recognized at his full worth, so also is a social fabric demanded in which righteousness shall rule. The State as the guardian of justice is more and more looked on as the final guarantee of the rights of the individual. Our interests then are dominantly ethical. They are concerned with the upbuilding of a society in which righteousness is the law, and in which the individual can enter fully into his heritage.

And a second characteristic of our thought today is what the Germans call *Wirklichkeitssinn*, a sense of reality. All truth must be brought to the hard test of fact. Men are not interested in speculation or fancies. Truth is to be got not through metaphysical speculation but through the experience that comes from actual contact with reality. Science finds its teacher in the given world which it is to explore. The scientific imagination differs widely from speculative metaphysics. The latter finds its truth within itself by the test of self-consistency. The former finds its truth in its relation to fact and in its ability to interpret that fact. Induction has set aside speculation. Neither religion nor

theology nor philosophy will interest the man of today unless it has vital relation to the world of fact.

We can then lay down the following criteria for the basic principle that we seek. First, it must be true; it must be a genuine, constituent, integral part of Christian belief. Secondly, it must be adaptable; it must be in touch with the conditions of life today. And this requirement itself has two sides; the principle must be primarily social, ethical, rather than metaphysical, and it must meet the test of reality, it must be in immediate contact with the facts of life.

In suggesting the Christian doctrine of the kingdom of God as a basic principle for theology calculated to meet these requirements, of course I make no new suggestion. The fundamental importance of the kingdom of God as a Christian concept is widely recognized, and ever since Ritschl there has been a tendency to make it the leading principle in theology. Yet its importance is far from being fully perceived, and its value as a constructive principle of theology is certainly not fully appreciated. And we are far from having a system of theology worked out with any inevitableness from this concept. It seems therefore in place to direct attention to it as a concept of which much more use will be made in the future than has been made in the past.

First of all, this concept meets the test of being an integral part of Christian belief. Genetically it is the starting-point of our Lord's preaching. And it forms the immediate connection of his teaching with its Old Testament foundation. In both Old and New Testament it is vitally connected with the Christ. Moreover, and here we come to the most important point, the further consideration of this concept as an integral part of Christian faith immediately brings us to our second requirement, that of the adaptability of our basal principle to present problems. Those present problems we saw to be primarily social, ethical. And the kingdom of God is essentially a condition of society ruled by the divine will, and therefore revealing and manifesting the divine character. In that kingdom is therefore revealed both the nature of God as its ruler, and also the nature of men as members of a society founded on the divine Name. The kingdom of God as an ethical society is at once the heart of Christian



belief, and also the means of bringing that Christian belief into vital relation with our social problems.

I am aware that here I touch a question that is now the subject of heated discussion. It is maintained by some that the kingdom of God in the New Testament is not ethical but eschatological, that the concept is not that of a society manifesting the divine will in righteousness, but is a condition of things to be brought about by a purely divine, supernatural act. Man cannot hasten it by his action. All that he can do is to fit himself and others for entrance into it when it comes. In reference to this contention I can make here only two suggestions. In the first place it is impossible to overestimate the social emphasis of the teaching of Christ and of the New Testament in general. The relation to the neighbor, the manifestation of the divine spirit of forgiveness and love to him, is set on an equal basis with the relation to God. Indeed it is just in and through the one that the other is expressed. Whoever minimizes the ethical element in the fundamental teaching of Jesus leaves out its essential contents.

But it is contended that this ethical teaching does not set forth the ethics of the kingdom but only a condition for entrance to the kingdom. It is an *Interimsethik*, an ethic for the short time before the coming of the supernatural event. It is a condition, like that of repentance, required for acceptance when the kingdom comes. But this leads us to the second suggestion. It is inconceivable that to the mind of Jesus the morality demanded as a preparation for the kingdom should be different from the law of the kingdom itself. Jesus knows no arbitrary rewards and punishments. The judgment will come in exact relation to the inner life of the man to be judged and in relation to his conduct to his neighbor. Therefore it follows necessarily that the ethics taught by Jesus are essentially the ethical laws of the kingdom of God. And this is all we need for the contention that, whatever the original use of the phrase "kingdom of God," "kingdom of heaven," the laws of that kingdom are at the heart of true human society. I need hardly add to this the evidence of St. Paul, to whom, with all his eschatology, the life of justification cannot be separated from present membership in the body of Christ, nor that of St. John, who says in most unequivocal

cal language that if a man say, I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar. Throughout the New Testament the relation of a man to God is expressed in and mediated by his relation to his fellows. And that is the essential principle of the kingdom of God.

The concept of the kingdom of God as the expression of a true moral society commends itself then in its adaptability to the present social problems. And it commends itself no less in its relation to the sense of reality, the demand for facts, that is characteristic of our time. For a theology built on this concept as a basic principle stands firmly on the earth. It claims that the revelation of God is to be found in and through the principles that rule society. We need not say, "Who shall ascend into heaven? (that is, to bring Christ down:) or, Who shall descend into the abyss? (that is, to bring Christ up from the dead.)" The word is nigh, for the word of faith is the principle of society itself. He who will find God must perforce find him through the social life of man. To the question of Nathanael, Can any good thing come out of Nazareth? we answer, Come and see. We do not ask the modern man to go out of the city in which he dwells. Rather we try to show him that in order to understand that city he must seek its Maker and Builder in God.

The concept of the kingdom of God meets our requirements for a basal principle in that it is true, an integral part of the Christian faith, and in that it is adaptable to present needs; it rests on the ethical foundation and it appeals for verification to the facts of life.

There remains to suggest by way of example the application of this basal principle to some definite theological problems. And first let us point out the double-sidedness of the concept. The kingdom of God is on one side the gift of God. Therein is the eschatological element and its permanent value. It is on the other side the moral task of men, to be brought about in the conduct of human life. That is its ethical contents. But these two are the same. For us the coming of Christ to usher in the kingdom cannot be separated from the work of the Holy Spirit in the life of man. The kingdom of God is the unity of religion and morality. It is the religious principle itself, revealed

in the life of man as the constituent force of human society. Religion and morality have always been closely connected. The individualistic view of religion misses its historical essence. From its earliest beginnings religion has been a social fact, entering as a building-force into the social fabric. Yet the union of religion and morality has never been complete or free from aberrations except in Christianity. If one were forced to give an abstract definition of the Christian religion apart from its historic contents, he would not go far astray to say that it is the absolute union of religion and morality. The relation to God and the relation to the neighbor meet together. God is to be found not in abstraction from the world but in immediate contact with human life. The Christ has authority to execute the divine judgment because he is the Son of Man. And "inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren ye have done it unto me." There is no other test.

I propose therefore the following thesis. No doctrine about God belongs to Christian theology unless it is capable of application to and expression in the life of man. Every truth about God is also a truth for human society. Every theological doctrine is capable of being translated into life. That is the difference between theology and metaphysics. Metaphysics may conceivably hold theories about God that have no bearing on human life. I say "conceivably," for in these days of Pragmatism such theories have even in metaphysics a somewhat doubtful validity. Whatever we may think of Pragmatism, Christian theology at any rate is pragmatic in essence; that is, its truth about God can be expressed in society, and indeed is drawn from society. God is known in and through the kingdom of God. To stand apart from that kingdom is *ipso facto* to stand apart from the Christian knowledge of God. Theology and ethics meet hand in hand. Theology is essentially ethical, for all truth about God must be revealed in and through society alone. The laws of human life are the laws of God its creator and source.

Let us glance very briefly at the application of this thought to the Christian doctrines of the Incarnation, the Trinity, and the Atonement. The doctrine of the Incarnation starts from the

truth that God has revealed himself in Jesus as the founder of the kingdom of God. The kingdom of God is a moral society. But as a moral society it is founded by the divine will. And therefore its founder in history must be looked at under a double aspect, as divine and human. As the revealer and founder of the kingdom of God he is divine. For that revelation and founding is a divine act, a divine act accomplished in him. He is God manifested to men. "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father." But also he is himself the full expression of that kingdom. He perfectly lives its life and manifests its laws. Therefore he is the Son of Man, the full expression of true humanity. The belief in the Incarnation is the belief that God is to be known in and through his society on earth established in Jesus Christ.

Take the doctrine of the Trinity. A sharp distinction is often drawn between the economical and the ontological Trinity, the Trinity of revelation and the Trinity of being. The former is concerned with belief in the divine Fatherhood revealed in Christ and communicated by the Spirit. The latter is the attempt to apply these elements of Christian experience to the life and being of God himself. Now I submit that the distinction has been overdrawn, and that the concept of the kingdom of God suggests the means by which it can be bridged. If the ontological Trinity means the attempt to interpret God in terms that are out of all relation to humanity, then it is not a part of Christian theology. It is at best a piece of philosophical metaphysics. But that is not to say that the Trinity of revelation cannot be truly ontological, that it is not concerned with the actual being of God. For the Trinity of revelation rests on the witness to God given through human society. God is the creative will, energizing in Jesus and giving himself in the society of men bound together by his Spirit. Through these social experiences we know God, for therein is the will of God revealed. But to know the divine will is to know the divine being, for will and being can be separated only by a false abstraction, an abstraction utterly impossible so long as we are dealing with ethical terms. The doctrine of the Trinity is the interpretation of God in the social, the ethical, terms that belong to human life. It is the interpretation of the King by means of his kingdom. If there be

the experience of trinitarian elements in the kingdom of God, we must ascribe these elements to him who is its King. The law of the kingdom is the law of its Master.

One other suggestion must suffice, the application to the doctrine of the Atonement. The Atonement is the expression of divine forgiveness through suffering. As such it becomes the law of the kingdom of God. The atoning work of Christ is carried on by his Spirit in the Church. "Bear ye one another's burdens, and so fulfil the law of Christ." The law of vicarious suffering, of forgiving love, is the law of the society founded on the divine Name. "Forgive us our trespasses as we forgive those who trespass against us." To be forgiven is to be a member of that society whose law is the law of forgiveness. To be forgiven is to have the law of forgiveness in our hearts. He who ceases to be a forgiving member of the kingdom ceases to have the forgiveness of God.

These are but suggestions. They are not intended to be of value in themselves. They are intended to suggest some of the applications of the concept of the kingdom of God as a basic principle for Christian theology.

*THE MARROW OF CALVIN'S THEOLOGY*<sup>1</sup>

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As every man has both generic and specific characteristics which are common to him with his kind and group, and also certain traits which constitute his individuality, so likewise every thoughtful man has ideas which are the intellectual staple of his age and race and also others which are in a peculiar sense his own. It does not therefore follow that these common ideas are untrue: on the contrary, they may be nearer the truth than those which are relatively unshared; or that they are unimportant, for, even if erroneous, they may furnish points of contact through which his more distinctive opinion finds its way into the popular mind; nevertheless, they may be disregarded in estimating his contribution to the history of thought. Accordingly, nothing will be said here of doctrines, those pertaining to Christ and the Trinity for instance, which Calvin held in substantial agreement with contemporary and traditional Christianity; nor shall we refer to theories concerning the Church, its officers and sacraments, which, although highly significant both at the time and as shaping subsequent ecclesiastical history, have but slight connection with the ideas which make up the distinctively Calvinistic system of theology. We shall restrict ourselves therefore to Calvin's system within his system, to a definite, consistent nexus of ideas, relating principally to sin and salvation, which are, so to speak, the marrow of his body of divinity. And with reference to these, we shall undertake to present them as they appear in the definitive edition of the *Institutes*, without attempting to trace their relations, of dependence, resemblance, or difference, to ideas of his theological predecessors, like Augustine and Gottschalk, or contemporaries like Luther, Zwingli, Melancthon, or Bucer; still less shall we essay to follow a possible process of his own

<sup>1</sup>A lecture given in the Lowell Institute Course at King's Chapel, Boston, Feb. 1, 1909.

thought through the successive editions and enlargements of the *Institutes*. These are fascinating and fruitful fields of inquiry but they are outside our present task. It should go without saying that Calvin's system, or even the marrow of it, was not his own in the sense that he invented it: on the contrary, he simply made more explicit, and carried more consistently to their logical conclusions, ideas which had been practically universal in Christian theology since the days of Paul. The system was his not by origination, but by vital and organic appropriation. Nor are we concerned here with criticism: it would indeed be profitable to trace the course of the inner dialectic of the system, particularly in its development by the New England theologians, and mark its "collapse" because of inability to answer its own questions and fulfil the ethical ideal itself had nourished, but at present we have to do neither with criticism nor with appreciation, but solely with exposition, and—since Calvinism is now almost everywhere spoken against—with sympathetic exposition, which shall at least attempt to indicate why the system proved persuasive with so many successive generations of right-minded and right-hearted men.

It is always necessary, however, if we would justly comprehend a man's thought to see what interests prompted it and what purposes sought fulfilment in it. Calvin's supreme task was to consolidate the sentiment of the Reformation into an intellectual system as firm and coherent as that of the Roman Catholicism against which it was arrayed. Manifestly, the strategic point of this controversy was the doctrine of redemption. Luther preached justification by faith as a saving power; Calvin taught salvation by grace as a cardinal doctrine. The former emphasized a human experience, the latter the divine efficiency, but both were presenting the same truth, viewed in the one case on the manward, in the other on the Godward side. Under Luther, it might have been held that the agencies of the Church were effectual, perhaps indispensable, to the production of faith or as mediating the saving grace, but Calvin sought to prove that since salvation is wholly and exclusively the effect of God's grace, exercised in accordance with his eternal decree and directly upon the souls of the elect, the Church has no direct and effective

function with respect to salvation, nor has the individual man any co-operative part therein. Manifestly, if this could be proved, the Church would be put permanently out of commission as a means of salvation. But, while Romanism was Calvin's foe in front, there was an enemy on the left flank which menaced the Reformed churches quite as seriously—the Anabaptists. With these outlaws, as they were then deemed, the Romanists sought to identify all the Reformed,—an identification which was not difficult because they actually did maintain many of the unacknowledged conclusions of Reformation principles logically developed, and consequently attracted many thorough-going Protestants to their guerilla-like band. Such identification was, however, pre-eminently dangerous because of the abhorrence in which Anabaptists were held by civil rulers without whose strong and continued support the whole Reformation movement would have been endangered. Indeed, the letter to King Francis which introduced the first edition of the *Institutes*, expressly declared that one object of the treatise was to demonstrate that the identification of Protestants with Anabaptists, which had already given occasion for persecution, was false and malicious. Hence, in opposing the Papacy, Calvin was obliged most carefully to ward off all suspicion of Anabaptism, and at several points it is plain that his doctrinal line of battle was refused against this ever-present menace.

This appears, for example, in his treatment of the Bible, the authority of which was accepted by Romanist and Protestant alike. The argument of the former, however, was that the Bible was the Church's book, produced and made canonical by it, and therefore resting ultimately upon its authority, and dependent upon it for true interpretation. Of course, Calvin could not accept this view, but it obliged him to establish the authority of Scripture apart from the Church. Calvin adduces the antiquity of the Bible, its dignity in substance and style as contrasted with the humble character of its reputed authors, its frankness, the miracles and prophecies attesting its divine origin, its endurance of the assaults of enemies, and its fitness to the needs of Christendom, but he openly acknowledges that these considerations alone can never establish the convincing author-



ity of Scripture. There is indeed a congruity between the Word and the works of God which confirms faith in the identity of authorship—but the revelation of God in his works is dim and obscure, to be read only by those who use his revelation in the Word as spectacles through which alone the revelations of nature become legible. Ultimately, therefore, Calvin rests his assurance of the authority of Scripture upon the secret testimony of the Holy Spirit in the heart of the believer. The Word, he affirms, will never gain full credit in the hearts of men, unless it be confirmed by the internal testimony of the Spirit. To those in whom the Spirit abides, the Scripture exhibits as clear evidence of its truth as white and black things do of their color, or sweet and bitter things of their taste. Plainly, with this emphasis upon the Spirit, Calvin came dangerously near Anabaptism, and therefore he guards himself against the manifest peril by emphatically declaring that the voice of the Spirit in the Word must be the decisive test of all alleged private revelations. The Anabaptists claim direct communications from the Spirit:—To the law and the testimony!—if they speak not according to this rule there is no light in them. “He [the Spirit] is the author of the Scriptures: he cannot be mutable and inconsistent with himself. He must therefore perpetually remain such as he has there discovered himself to be” (*Inst.* i, 9. 2). Hence “the office of the Spirit . . . is not to feign new and unheard of revelations, or to coin a new system of doctrine . . . but to seal to our minds the same doctrine which the Gospel delivers” (*Inst.* i, 9. 1). The function of the Spirit, then, is not to continue a progressive revelation, but solely to give inner witness to the divine certainty of one already given in the Word, final and complete. That is to say, the Spirit is invoked to prove the Scripture and then the Scripture becomes the criterion of the Spirit. But it should be observed that on this ground Calvin accepts the decisive authority of Scripture. It is true that we do not find in him the extravagances of post-reformation Scholasticism—he was too sane and knew his Bible too well for that. He is no stickler for absolute infallibility, but, while he acknowledges historical slips, he never permits minor inaccuracies to shake his faith in the substantial ethical and religious finality of the Bible. Yet it must be borne

in mind that only the regenerate, in whom the Spirit dwells, can have this first-hand vital assurance: the Bible does not engender faith; faith attests the Bible; and faith is the fruit of the Spirit in the heart of man. Belief in the Bible cannot contribute to a man's salvation, since only the regenerate man can really and heartily have this belief.

Notwithstanding the preference which Calvin has for the Word over the works of God, we shall find it better to approach his system by what, undoubtedly, he would have deemed a meaner way. Whether we look out upon the world or within upon our own hearts nothing is more certain and impressive than the universality of sin. Literature bears witness to the appalling fact, observation of contemporary life and the struggles of our own souls alike confess it. So far, then, as knowledge, observation, and experience establish anything, it is the world-wide and age-long presence and power of sin. What, then, is the explanation of this fact? For so universal an effect an equally universal cause must be sought. No cause operating solely upon individuals as such could produce so constant and uniform a result. If it be said that universal sin is due to the exercise of man's own will, the question arises why man's will universally and invariably determines itself in this particular way. Edwards puts the argument strikingly in his *Doctrine of Original Sin* (Pt. 1, ch. 1, sect. ix):

If their wills are in the first place as free to Good as Evil, what is it to be ascribed to, that the world of mankind, consisting of so many millions, in so many successive generations, without consultation, all agree to exercise their freedom in favor of evil? . . . How comes it to pass, that the free will of mankind has been determined to evil, in like manner before the Flood, and after the Flood; under the Law and under the Gospel; among both Jews and Gentiles, under the Old Testament; and since that, among Christians, Jews, Mahometans; among Papists and Protestants; in those nations where civility, politeness, arts, and learning most prevail, and among the negroes and Hottentots in Africa, the Tartars in Asia, and Indians in America, towards both the poles and on every side of the Globe; in greatest cities, and obscurest villages; in palaces, and in huts, wigwams, and cells under ground? Is it enough to reply, It happens so, that men everywhere and at all times choose thus to determine their own wills and so to make themselves sinful, as soon as ever they are capable of it, and to sin constantly as long as they live, and universally to choose never to come up half-way to their duty?

A similar indictment is found in a well-known and often quoted passage in Newman's *Apologia*, and as Edwards infers that there must be a steady cause to account for so steady an effect, so Newman argues that the human race must be implicated in some terrible aboriginal calamity which has put it out of joint with the purposes of its Creator. To Calvin also, this conclusion seemed quite inevitable. For did not the Bible also testify to this frightful and universal fact? "All have sinned . . . there is none that doeth good; no, not so much as one." And the Bible thus recognizing the condition offers also its explanation: "Through one man sin entered into the world." Here, then, in the fall of Adam, from whom all men are descended, is the explanation of the universal fact. By his sin he lost certain gifts with which he had been endowed, lost them not only for himself but for his posterity, even as a father who squanders his estate robs his children of their rightful patrimony. And there was not only deprivation but also depravity, since, having lost his original divine endowment, Adam went ever deeper into sin, thus vitiating his nature, which in its corrupt and depraved state was transmitted to his offspring. If a father weakens himself by vice, does not his son inherit the consequences in a defiled body and an enfeebled will?

Here then is the doctrine of original sin, or of depravity, based on facts of observation and experience, recognized by the Bible, and accounted for in a perfectly intelligible way by the sin of our first ancestor which resulted in the loss of godlike powers and in the acquisition of a corrupt nature, both of which consequences passed through to his posterity. Calvin would have agreed with Newman—"The doctrine of what is theologically called original sin becomes to me almost as certain as that the world exists and as the existence of God" (*Apol.* c. 5). In his own emphatic words, "Let us hold this, then, as an undoubted truth, which no opposition can ever shake—that the mind of man is so completely alienated from the righteousness of God, that it conceives, desires, and undertakes everything that is impious, perverse, base, impure, and flagitious; that his heart is so thoroughly infected by the poison of sin, that it cannot produce anything but what is corrupt; and that if at any time men do anything apparently good,

yet the mind always remains involved in hypocrisy and fallacious obliquity, and the heart enslaved by its inward perverseness" (*Inst.* ii, 5. 19).

Since, then, all men are sinners, all are under the wrath of God and liable to the penalty which he has decreed against sin. That penalty is death—physical and spiritual, temporal and eternal. Since, within the sphere of our observation, the temporal punishment is universally inflicted, we have every reason to believe that the invisible and eternal penalty also follows. And this indeed is inevitable, since all men come into life sinful and hence exposed to the just punishment of sin. The universality of physical death is valid symbol and sign of the universality of spiritual doom. It should be observed, however, that we are not punished as the penalty of Adam's sin: the punishment is solely for our own personal pollution of nature, made ours because of connection with our first ancestor. Unless, therefore, some way of salvation can be found, the sin of Adam will have plunged all mankind in utter and awful destruction.

It is manifest, however, that such salvation cannot be wrought out by man. "Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean? Not one." Upon the tree of a corrupt and depraved nature no good fruit can grow. On account of the depraved condition of man, it is impossible that he should produce any works well-pleasing to God. If any are to be saved, therefore, the saving influence must come from without. This, which is the plain teaching of reason, is again amply confirmed by Scripture, which teaches unmistakably that God has provided a way by which alone some out of the ruined mass of mankind are to be saved through the operation of his regenerating spirit. In this work of regeneration, God alone is active, man is wholly passive. As this is for Calvin the vital point of the whole discussion, he uses his utmost endeavors to rule out man's possible activity, even by way of co-operation, in the saving process. Church-membership does not avail, for, while the present work of the Spirit is restricted to those who are within the circle of the visible Church, it by no means follows that because one belongs to the external and visible Church he is therefore numbered among those who make up the Church invisible, composed only of the regenerate. Nor can

what are usually called good works profit; for, if they proceed not from a heart purified by faith, they are not good in the sight of God. But surely faith is man's act and his faith co-operates with God's grace, making it individually effective: by no means, for faith is not merely an intellectual acceptance—the devils so believe and tremble, and remain devils still—but consists in a fixed reliance upon God's promises, arising from union with Christ which is due to the operation of the Spirit alone. Only the regenerate, then, can exercise true faith, which is therefore the effect and not the cause of regeneration. Hence "the Scripture uniformly proclaims it [faith] to be the gratuitous gift of God" (*Inst.* ii, 3. 8). and, inasmuch as without faith it is impossible to please God, it follows that, without that which his grace supplies, nothing,—no works, however good to outward seeming,—can win his approval. But man's repentance is surely his own: not at all, for true repentance is wrought only by the activity of the Holy Spirit. It is not a single event antecedent to regeneration: it is a process continued through life, wrought by the Spirit in the souls of the regenerate. With scrupulous care Calvin closes every loophole through which man's activity could by any chance, or in even the slightest degree, enter into the work of salvation. God's grace alone, manifest in the operation of his Spirit, is the sole agency of salvation. Man in his sinfulness is doomed and absolutely helpless. Salvation is only by God's grace.

Inasmuch, however, as God alone is the effective cause of salvation, if some men are not saved must it not be solely because upon these God does not exert his saving influence? This certainly follows, and its plain statement is Calvin's doctrine of election and reprobation. For it is manifest that not all men are saved. The Christian Church, within which alone the redemptive forces play, comprises but an infinitesimal part of the great multitudes who have lived upon the earth or who are living now. The untold millions of heathendom, men, women, children, one and all have swept down into hell, necessarily, since they could not have believed in him of whom they had not heard. Calvin openly commits himself to the traditional doctrine that "the Church is the mother of all those who have Him for their Father"

(*Inst.* iv, 1. 1), saying in terms, "There is no other way of entrance into life unless we are conceived by her, born of her, nourished at her breast, and continually preserved under her care and government"; "Out of her bosom there can be no hope of remission of sins, or any salvation" (*Inst.* iv, 1. 4). Moreover, even in Christian lands the great majority die without giving evidence of regeneration, and these too are irremediably lost. This also is the testimony of Scripture, which beyond cavil speaks of an eternal punishment for human souls. Since, therefore, salvation is from God alone, and not all are saved, it follows that there are some upon whom he is pleased to exert his saving power, and others whom he simply leaves to their merited doom. And the reason for this discrimination cannot lie at all in the characters of those who belong to the one or the other class, for in that case the ultimate ground of salvation would be in man, not in God. Consequently the discrimination must be due to God's will alone. And this again the Bible teaches: "The children being not yet born, neither having done anything good or bad, that the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works but of him that calleth, it was said . . . Jacob have I loved, but Esau I hated. . . . For he saith to Moses, I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion, on whom I will have compassion. So then it is not of him that willeth nor of him that runneth, but of God that hath mercy. . . . So then he hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth" (Rom. 9 11-13).

Could anything be plainer or more explicit? Before even the creation of the world, out of the innumerable multitudes of men yet to be born, all of whom were to fall under the penalty of eternal death, God arbitrarily selected some whom he determined, in course of time, to visit with his Spirit unto regeneration and life, and, by choosing these, simply passed over the rest, leaving them to their just deserts. "*Quos deus praeterit reprobant.*" The choice was perfectly arbitrary; it was not determined by merit, else man would have a share in his own salvation, and furthermore is it not written that man is called *unto* holiness, not *because of* holiness? Nor is God's decree based upon his foreknowledge, for, since nothing can happen except by his will, his foreknowledge must be foreknowledge of his will. Conse-

quently foreknowledge rests on decrees, decrees do not rest on foreknowledge.

Let us then put in a single paragraph this part of his system. All men come into the world sinful because of their race-connection with Adam; and because sinful, exposed to eternal death. On account of their utterly base and undone condition not one of them can by any striving of his own win approval of God and deliverance unto life. Out of this helpless and hopeless state, therefore, none can escape save by the direct and irresistible act of God in regeneration, and, since it is evident that not all men are saved, it logically follows that it is not his will to visit all with his redeeming grace. What is the inevitable conclusion therefore but that, before the creation of the world, God chose out of the hosts of mankind yet to be born some whom he fore-ordained to eternal bliss. To these in the fulness of time he sends his prevailing grace with regenerating power. And the grace which is irresistible in regeneration is equally irresistible for maintenance: hence these cannot perish, and the perseverance of the saints logically follows. But those who are not thus elected, being involved in the guilt of Adam's sin and consequently totally without holiness or ability to help themselves, are never visited by the Spirit and hence go down to hell. This is the nerve of Calvinism.

We shall understand this better if we consider certain objections which have been urged against the system.

1. Is it true that all men are alike depraved and deserving of eternal punishment? Is it true that no men are better than others? Surely there are differences of character even among the unregenerate: surely Epictetus was a better man than Nero, and yet neither was aided by grace, if grace be restricted within the limits of the Church. Yes, Calvin acknowledges the difference but declares that it is due solely to the working of the restraining grace of God. There is common grace, which is manifest in the affairs of men in all ages and lands, but this is not the same as saving grace, which operates only within the limits of Christendom. And in order to carry out the divine purposes this common grace restrains men from the full exhibition of the utter depravity which lies at the heart of all. In the sight of

God, who seeth not as man seeth but looketh into the hearts of all, Epictetus was not a whit better than Nero. Their hearts were equally vile and corrupt, but for his own purposes God saw fit to restrain the expression of that wickedness in the former and not to restrain it in the latter. Hence in so far as the one appears better than the other it is mere appearance, and an appearance due to no merit in Epictetus, since it is solely the effect of God's restraining grace.

2. Does not this doctrine impeach the sincerity of God in giving to all men a law which it now appears only the regenerate can obey, and in offering to all men promises which only a few can accept? A crazy Methodist evangelist, somewhat notorious in his day, Lorenzo Dow by name, used to refer to contemporary Calvinists as the All-Part men and explained the epithet as meaning that, where the Bible spells *All*, they pronounce it *Part*. How can God sincerely demand an obedience to law which cannot be rendered, or hold out promises of salvation which only here and there one can embrace? Nevertheless, with reference to the Law, is it not the teaching of Paul himself that it was given to reveal sin, and even to increase sin, so that through his conscious helplessness man may be brought to the salvation of Christ? He himself had been unable to keep the Law; he therefore concluded that no man could, and hence that it was not given to be kept, but was intended only as a tutor to bring us to Christ. So Calvin teaches that the law "was placed far beyond our ability, in order to convince us of our impotence." How can one who holds Paul's teaching true find fault with Calvin? Moreover, if the Law cannot be kept by the unregenerate, it can by the regenerate, and is therefore of utmost service to them as revealing a way of life well-pleasing to God. And as for the promises, they could not be limited without revealing the elect, who exist only in the undisclosed purpose of God. There is a distinction to be drawn between the secret and the preceptive will of God; his will and grace are declared to all, although it is his secret will that only some should obey and accept. "Whosoever will, let him come": yes, whosoever will, may come, but no man can will to come except the Spirit draw him. The promises, that is, are always made conditionally, and the conditions are of such a nature that none can fulfil them apart from saving grace.



3. But is it not unjust in God thus to elect some and pass over others? Does not such a doctrine as this make God an infinitely unjust being? To this there are several replies, of which three may be presented.

(a) No one who believes in the divine government of the world can fail to see that in all its essential features this doctrine is true to the facts of human life. One child is born in squalor and sin, another in surroundings of comfort and to influences of goodness. Walk through the slums of a city and compare the deformed, diseased, doomed children sprawling on the door-steps and the sidewalks with the children of our own homes: is there not a difference? What chance of good and happy life have these children compared with ours? Is it the fault of these children of the slums that they are what they are? Did they choose the sin and wretchedness into which they are born? Are they responsible for being there? Yet they are there. And if God governs the world, if his will is revealed in the order of things, is it not in accordance with his will that they are there? Unless therefore one is ready to deny out of hand God's will in the world, he cannot deny the arbitrary discriminations of God. Furthermore, are not the separations of God recorded in sacred history? Did not God choose Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, in succession, not because of their desert but because of his own sovereign will? Did he not choose Israel out of all the nations of the earth? Did not Christ say to his disciples, "Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you"? In nature and in grace therefore the same principle is displayed. The differences of earth and time are but manifestations of the differences in eternal destiny,—expressions of the same principle. Beware lest, in protesting against election, you turn atheist.

(b) Wherein is the injustice of such discrimination? Is it not true, as matter of common observation and experience, that a spendthrift father deprives his son of his rightful patrimony, and do we complain of that law as unjust? Is it not true that a diseased father transmits the taint to his son,—is such inheritance unjust? But, whether it seem unjust or not, the fact is indubitable. And if we accept the principle in things visible and temporal, can we deny it in things invisible and eternal?

Are not both worlds under the one divine law? Is it, then, unjust that God should punish sin? If not, then men who are sinful in nature, and all men are, must be the deserving objects of God's wrath and hatred of sin. And, if all men are thus doomed and God wills to spare some, have those who are passed over any just cause for complaint? They get their deserts. If, for example, a conspiracy is discovered in a nation and all those implicated in it are condemned to death, to death justly deserved, is injustice done to others if the monarch wills to show clemency to a few? If indeed the discrimination were on the basis of previous good behavior, if the question of desert or ill desert were once raised, then those who go to their merited doom might justly complain, perhaps, that they were no less deserving of mercy than those who have been pardoned, but it has already been shown that in God's election the choice is absolutely without regard to merit and proceeds from arbitrary will alone. All men are justly doomed; but in God is mercy as well as justice, and how can mercy be shown save in the salvation of some under just condemnation, and arbitrarily selected, since, if merit enters, mercy is cancelled. God's justice is revealed in the condemnation of all, his clemency in the salvation of some; but those who justly die cannot charge God with injustice because they are passed over while others likewise under sentence of death are mercifully spared. With this plea Calvin might well have been content, for the logic is inexorable and the alternatives are unavoidable. Is it unjust that all Adam's posterity should suffer loss and incur corruption because of his sin? The same principle operates before our very eyes in the processes of human life, and are not those processes in accordance with the will of God? To deny God's responsibility for the facts of human life is atheism. If, on the other hand, the principle is justified here, it cannot be pronounced unjust with reference to spiritual concerns. Calvinist or atheist, which? Is there discrimination here in the case of children born in favorable or unfavorable conditions? Then there are but two alternatives—either God has naught to do with temporal discriminations or the principle justified here cannot be denied in things eternal. Again, atheist or Calvinist? Furthermore, does not the Bible distinctly teach that all men are

sinners because of Adam's sin, that all are under condemnation, that God foreknows and calls whom he wills, and that the rest go down to hell; and do you believe the Bible? Here the alternatives are Calvinism or infidelity. And it does not avail to say that the Bible teaches also an opposite doctrine, for even if that were granted, the reply would be that it unmistakably teaches this, and it is for man to accept what God plainly declares and leave Him to do the reconciling. And to reject some teachings of the Bible on account of others which seem contradictory is to reject the Bible altogether as final authority, for an authority which permits one to exercise preferences among its declarations is no longer an authority in any just sense of the word.

(c) But Calvin has yet another argument in reply to the objection we are now considering, namely: God is just, his will is right; there is no higher standard of justice than his will. That this is his will is not only revealed in the facts of human life as it comes under our observation, but also declared in his unimpeachable Word; therefore it is and must be just, whether we can see it so or not. Who are we to sit in judgment on him who inhabiteth eternity? What colossal conceit and impudence to presume to set our standard of justice, born of our ignorance and depravity, over against the eternal wisdom and holiness! Nay, just because of our moral depravity, a system which should thoroughly commend itself to our unregenerate moral sense would be presumably untrue to the ethics of heaven. Who art thou, O man, that repliest against God? One cannot help feeling that here Calvin ultimately rested. He was not insensible to the awfulness of the teaching. "I inquire again," he says, arguing with his opponents, "how it came to pass that the fall of Adam, independent of any remedy, should involve so many nations with their infant children in eternal death, but because such was the will of God. It is an awful decree, I confess—"*Decretum quidem horribile, fateor*" (*Inst.* iii, 23. 7). But the facts of observation and experience religiously interpreted and the explicit affirmations of Scripture left no alternative. "If your mind is disturbed," he says, "embrace without reluctance the advice of Augustine: 'You, a man, expect an answer from me who am also a man? Let us both therefore hear him who

says, O man, who art thou? Faithful ignorance is better than presumptuous knowledge. Seek your deserts, you will find nothing but punishment. O the depth! Peter denies, the thief believes; O the depth! Do you seek a reason, I will tremble at the depth. Reason, if you will. I will wonder. Dispute, if you will, I will believe. I see the depth. I reach not the bottom. Paul was at rest because he found wonder. He calls the judgments of God unsearchable, and are you come to scrutinize them? He says, his ways are past finding out, and are you come to investigate them?' We shall do no good by proceeding further: it will not satisfy their petulance; the Lord needs no other defence than what he has employed by his Spirit speaking by the mouth of Paul: and we forget to speak well, when we cease to speak with God" (*Inst.* iii, 23. 5).

"A horrible decree, I confess," yet to it as to the counsel of God Calvin felt himself driven in fidelity to the works and the interpreting Word of God. Before the awful majesty of the Eternal, whose ways are not as our ways, whose thoughts are not as our thoughts, he laid his hand upon his mouth and in awed silence wondered at the depth. It is and must be the Lord's will, yet there is no injustice in Him: better to deny our poor human sense of justice than to impugn the justice of God. Yea, let God be true and every man a liar. So the Scripture and so Calvin.

4. But there is still one other objection which leaves Calvin face to face with a dreadful dilemma. Is God the author of sin, or, to put it otherwise, did God decree Adam's fall and by his decree effect it? Calvin earnestly protests that Adam alone of all mankind had free will, and endowments which enabled him not to sin. Did God simply fail to sustain him with the power of perseverance, so rendering him liable to sin? Then is not God, who withdraws support, responsible for the fall? Did God leave this cardinal event of all human history to chance? That were a preposterous supposition, since Calvin has argued convincingly against the presence of chance in the world, and especially since God's decrees all depended on Adam's sin, which therefore must have been itself decreed. Did then God merely foreknow that Adam would fall? It was impossible for Calvin to

take refuge in such an idea, since he had argued that knowledge depends on decrees and not the reverse. Did, then, God simply permit, by not preventing, the fall? This too is a perfectly impossible plea for one who like Calvin has argued that the will of God is influential and not merely permissive. "He declares that he creates light and darkness, that he forms good and evil, and that no evil occurs which he has not performed" (*Inst.* i, 18. 3). "Providence consists in action" (i, 16. 4). No, however Calvin may protest, his logic leads to but one issue: God decreed the fall of Adam and by his effective will became thus the ultimate cause of sin. "God not only foresaw the fall of the first man and his posterity in him, but also arranged all by the determination of his own will. . . . For the first man fell because the Lord had determined it was so expedient. The reason for this determination is unknown to us. Yet it is certain that he determined thus only because he foresaw that it would tend to the just illustration of the glory of his name" (*Inst.* iii, 23. 7-8). It is true that Calvin goes on to say that by his own wickedness Adam corrupted the nature he had received pure from the Lord, but he does not inform us whence the wickedness came into that pure nature, and his final refuge as before is in the inscrutableness of God. "To be ignorant of things which it is neither possible nor lawful to know is to be learned. An eagerness to know them is a species of madness" (*Inst.* iii, 23. 8). This then is Calvin's terrible dilemma between his ethical sense and his intellectual logic. A synthesis of thought cannot be attained by the mere juxtaposition of contradictory statements however emphatically made. It is simply impossible to follow the logic of Calvin without reaching at last the conclusion that God was the effective cause of Adam's sin and all the fearful consequences that follow from that sin. Is not this the *reductio ad absurdum* of Calvinism? Just because of its own rigorous logic it is condemned by its own inner dialectic before the judgment-seat of ethics.

It must not be forgotten, however, that this system, rigorous as it is, horrible as it seems, was rich in comfort and peace to Calvin and his contemporaries. They had come out from the ancient Church in which they had been born and bred; its traditions and ways were stamped upon their minds and hearts. Although

they had formally renounced it, feelings are more persistent than intellectual convictions. Who could be sure that after all the Church did not hold the keys to the kingdom of heaven? Perhaps salvation did depend upon sacramental grace which the Church alone could mediate. Perhaps the authority of the Church denied, the rites of the Church neglected, would sink them at last in perdition. Fear not, said Calvin's system, salvation is of God's grace alone; the Church has, and can have, nothing to do with it. You are in God's hands and salvation does not depend upon rites performed or good deeds done, upon your worthiness or merit, but upon his sovereign will alone. And, if any troubled soul inquired how he could be sure that he was numbered among the elect, the answer was ready. He had been called out of Romanism by the Spirit of God, and that fact was all-sufficient evidence that he was led by the Spirit and included among the elect whose salvation was sure. Nor need Protestant believers fear persecution, or peril of sword or stake, for God's irresistible grace would prevail to carry them through the fiery trial beyond which was the eternal and glorious bliss of the redeemed. They were in his mighty hand, subject to his will, which controlled for his greater glory and their greater bliss even the malicious fury of their foes. So they were made equal to every event, saying to potentates of church and state, with the serene confidence of their Master,—“You could have no power over me at all except it were given you from above,” and hence well assured that neither death nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come could separate them from the love of God, which through all the distresses and persecutions of the present time was leading them to certain triumph and eternal glory, while as for their merciless persecutors—well, they too were in the hands of God, and their fate had been determined before the foundation of the world.

*THE ALEVIS, OR DEIFIERS OF ALI*

STEPHEN VAN RENSSELAER TROWBRIDGE

AINTAB, TURKEY

A religion different from Islam, centring about the person and teaching of Ali, the adopted son of Muhammed, is steadily gaining ground in certain sections of the Turkish Empire. The believers are called Alevis both by themselves and by the Muslims. The name Kuzul Bash (*u* as in "cut"), which means "Red Head" and is often used as a term of reproach, is said to have originated at the battle of Siffin. Ali said, "Tie red upon your heads, so that ye slay not your own comrades in the thick of the battle." In Persia the community is known by the name of Ali Ilâhi, and has commonly been regarded as a sect of Muhammedanism.

The object of this study is to investigate the true nature of this faith with as much accuracy as an oriental religion permits, and to consider the relations of the Alevi brotherhood with Islam and Christianity. The information has been gathered through a long series of conversations with a well-known teacher. For verification most of these statements have been independently referred to other Alevi believers, with the result that the significant features have been confirmed. The extreme reticence of most Alevis makes a free conversation possible only after long acquaintance. But the estimates of Alevi population have tallied closely with those made by a Christian physician of wide experience. This community began during the life of Ali, but has not grown to large dimensions until recent years. The teachings have always been secret, and there has been no inspired book to make known in written form what is handed on from believer to believer.

Let us then inquire as to the *Person and Mission of Ali*. There are four kinds of men in relation to him. First, those people who think Ali the worst sort of a tyrant, especially the Jews of these regions, who curse one another by him and regard him about as Muslims do Satan. Second, the orthodox Muslims, or

Ehl-i-Sunnat, who call him the fourth caliph. "Ali, the wise and virtuous among men," they say. Third, the Shi'is, who believe that Ali performed all miracles, thousands of which are narrated, and that he was appointed successor and executor to the prophet. Fourth, the Alevis, who regard Ali as the spirit existing in all prophecy and as the incarnation of God.

"Do the Alevis believe in atonement?"

"Yes, in the sense of intercession through Ali."

"Not through Jesus?"

"Yes; because Ali is essentially the same as Jesus."

"Were Hasan and Husein martyrs?"

"The Shi'is believe that atonement may be hoped for through these martyrs, especially through Husein. But the Alevis believe, directly through Ali's life. Not by his life so much, nor by his death, nor by his testimony, but by his person, his spirit. He also died a martyr's death. He had a great truth and a great hope, for which he died. There was no desire for personal renown. He was the holy incarnation of the Spirit of God."

"Have you no written life of Ali?"

"We have manuscripts of great value, which are cherished like gems, seldom sold, and are not given to any but Alevis."

"How are these procurable?"

"Only by becoming an Alevi. There are about fifteen different books, all in manuscript. The first group gives Ali's teaching, and is wholly made up of his own words. The second narrates his life as lived among his disciples. The third is composed of the praises and honors of those who came after him and loved him. These books are not trusted to every disciple. They are for the *Urefa*, those who are thoroughly acquainted with the mysteries of our religion. The books are never trusted to the publicity of any printing-press. You will understand that Ali established a new religion if you consider his definition of a Muslim: 'A Muslim is he who by his hand and tongue is true.'"<sup>1</sup>

The genesis of this religion was with Ali, thirty years after the commencement of Islam. He did battle to defend his rights. He chose from the people the most able and suitable men. These

<sup>1</sup> *Almuslimu man salima-l-nāsu 'an yadihi walisānihi.* [The Muslim is one from whose hand and tongue men are safe.—A well-known tradition of Muhammed.]



he formed into the Special Council. Later he formed the General Council, consisting of all the men who followed him. There is a section of the Alevi known as Nuseiri. They are chiefly in Persia, but a great many are in the villages of Antioch. Nuseir, one of Ali's pupils, said to him, "Thou art God," and Ali accepted this avowal.

In the course of history three men rendered conspicuous service in the spread of the faith. Seyyid Jelal-ed-din, being Veli-Ullah, was of the descendants of Ali. He lived about A.H. 660 (A.D. 1262/62), and during his lifetime converted a great proportion of the Magians and many of the Shi'is. He was the founder of the order of Jelali dervishes, which has ever since continued to teach and promote his convictions.

Haji Bektash Veli was born about A.H. 730 (A.D. 1329/30) in the city of Nishabur. He was the son of Imam Riza, and a direct descendant of Ali. When he journeyed into Ottoman territory, he brought the Alevi faith for the first time into Asia Minor. He lived to see five hundred converts; and before his death, near the city of Angora, instituted the order of dervishes which is known as Bektashi. The members of this order are all of his faith, and they earnestly preach this teaching as they go about the country. Celibacy is the rule of this order.

The third historic character was neither ascetic nor preacher, but a king. Shah Sefi Sultan was the first Alevi to sit upon the throne of Persia. He brought about a renaissance of the faith after the cruel persecution by the Afghan conquerors. Four Alevi Shahs followed him, among them Shah Abbas. But since then Sunnis and Shi'is have been upon the throne. Shah Sefi Sultan sent criers out upon the highways to witness for Ali and to redeem the down-trodden cause. He succeeded in bringing great honor to the name of Ali, and throughout his reign proved himself a just and noble shah.

*The Geographical Centre* of this religion is in the town of Kirind, Kermanshah province, Persia. Four of Ali's male descendants now reside in Kirind. They are by name, Seyyid Berake, Seyyid Rustem, Seyyid Essed Ullah, Seyyid Farraj Ullah. Seyyid is correctly said only of Ali's descendants. These men send representatives throughout Asia Minor and northern Syria for preach-

ing and for the moral training of their followers. All gatherings are very secret, no inquirers being admitted except by the most reliable introductions.

In Arabia and Egypt this faith has scarcely made any progress. But in Persia and Mesopotamia there are from two to three million Alevis. There are about fifty thousand in the province of Aleppo, but none south of the city of Aleppo. In the Adana, Diarbekir, Smyrna, Salonica, and Caesarea provinces there are tens of thousands. Haji Bektash, where descendants of Ali live, eighteen hours from Caesarea, is an important point. Constantinople is not a centre, but in Macedonia a large portion of the population have become disciples. In the city of Aintab there are about five hundred Alevi homes and two thousand individual believers. In Antioch there are scarcely any, except for the Nuseiri villages. The villages of Marash and the town and region of Albustan should be specially mentioned. In the Surūj plain the people are Sunnis. Most of the Aintab villages are Sunni, as Burj and Kuzul Hissar. Kuchdam is chiefly Yezid. But beyond Sazghun to the south are many Alevi villages centring around Kharar. The population of the Kilis country is chiefly Arab and unfriendly to outsiders. But the tent-dwellers are Alevi. In Birejik about one hundred and fifty of the Turkish people belong to this faith. In the city and villages of Urfa there are few; in Aleppo few; in Antioch perhaps two hundred houses. The most thoroughly converted district is that of Dersim, in the Erzingan vilayet. The length of this district is fifteen days' horse-back ride.

*Essential Teaching concerning Prophecy.* In the world there is one Truth. This Truth possesses great power. There is no power existing greater than this. The Power is in itself, not dependent upon any person. All other existing things get their light and might from this one truth. This Power "doeth what it wisheth and judgeth what it willeth."

Nothing can attack and overturn this Power. In the process of time the Power brought to light the charges and commandments that were necessary for that period. For instance, in the time of Moses what was necessary for the people was said by Ali by means of Moses.

"Then you believe in the pre-existence of Ali?"

"Yes, indeed."

"Have you considered the statements in the Gospel of John, in the first chapter, regarding the pre-existence of Christ?"

"We are aware of the similarity. Since the world began until the present day, however many prophets have invited the people to the truth, all these have taken their office from Ali, every one inviting separately, in form to himself but in meaning to Ali. The commander being one, however much the officers differ in degree, their meaning and duty<sup>2</sup> is one. Because all the prophets invite to one truth, they cannot be differentiated essentially. From the time of Adam to the time of Muhammed all the prophets must be one, though in name they are different. Each prophet teaches a new lesson by a new method, and each prophet is higher than the preceding ones. As Ali is pre-existent, so he is even now existing and manifested and known<sup>3</sup> to his people. To those not his people he is veiled, covered.<sup>4</sup>

"How is he manifested to his own people?"

"By the Holy Spirit's influence. So much for the present as to the means of manifestation."

"Do the Alevis accept the Holy Spirit's personal influence?"

"Yes. But this needs a free and full discussion. If we understood the question of the Holy Spirit, other difficulties would naturally solve themselves."

The teacher illustrated his own conviction about the Holy Spirit as follows: "The Holy Spirit is as the light which shines into a room, the sun itself not being visible. But you cannot say that the light which we enjoy is the sun itself; it is only a result."

*The Pre-existence and Survival of Human Personalities.* "At every time that the First Point appeared, we like a circle came around him."

The true servants of Jesus are identical with those who came faithfully to Moses' call. Jesus rebuked the Pharisees because they had disobeyed Moses. By this rebuke he meant that they had also lived in Moses' time and had disobeyed Moses then. There is in this connection a term used only among Alevis: Active Return.<sup>5</sup> If you live the life of Paul, never mind your distinct

<sup>2</sup> wazifah.

<sup>3</sup> makshūf, ma'lūm.

<sup>4</sup> mastūr.

<sup>5</sup> raj'at fi'fi.

name, you are none other than Paul. You continue his life. There are, then, hundreds of Pauls. His life has multiplied. He has many spiritual children. Observe what he says regarding Onesimus in the letter to Philemon, "I beseech thee for my son Onesimus whom I have begotten in my bonds." You are finishing the actions that others began. The action never dies. Therefore the man cannot die. Your true nature is not your bones and flesh, but the good action which is immortal.

*Concerning Immortality.* This world has another. This life is to the next as a drop to the ocean. But in this world whatever is gained in good deeds is not gained for this world, but for the next. Here is only the planting; there is the harvest. Man suffers no death. There is only a change of life. Heaven is not a particular place. But wherever believers live is heaven, even on this earth. And wherever godless men live is hell, here or hereafter. What mean the good deeds done in this life? As the child in his mother's womb knows not the use of eyes, ears, and mouth, but is growing stronger all the time, so there will be a use, made clear to us later, of all good actions done.

*The Manifestation of God.* The Muslims describe Allah by negatives, by denial of members and all human notions. Alevis describe God by positive attributes and by the great teaching of incarnation. God exists in his sovereignty (*mulk*). For this a body (*jasad*) is necessary. At no time has the face of the earth been empty of God. So now he is existent. And he will always be in the world, not in any imaginary sense, but in a literal sense. Every Alevi has seen the incarnate Ali, has talked with him in question and answer regarding the so-called "unanswerable" questions of life; has touched him, seen him, and with his every sense realized Ali's existence and presence. The object of this manifestation is to bring all men into the truth of God.

"What is the condition of thus interviewing the divine Incarnation?"

"The condition is hard, and the process of preparation takes a long time—seven or eight years of regular service and learning of the essentials. Then, if the seeker proves himself fit, he may be received as a member by the Dede from Dersim and hence by all Alevis. In this probation time he cannot have any direct

relation with Ali, that is he can never see him or learn from him."

"Can the believer meet with Ali when he wills?"

"No. Not at his own pleasure but at Ali's. The time and place are never known beforehand. The experience is sensible and self-controlled. It is not a condition of trance. It may be when a believer is alone or when he is with other disciples, but never when strangers are present. No Alevi can bring about such a vision, but Ali may will it at any time."

"Tell me more about this."

"Beyond this they would beat me if I told you."

"What is the difference between the doctrine of the Hidden Mahdi and this?"

"We believe that, although the Mahdi, Muhammed, and Messiah are different in name and body, they are one in light and truth. But we have no faith in those who, during the past century, have claimed to be the Mahdi."

*Private and Public Worship.* Among the Alevis prayer forms a part of both private and public worship. The prayers are not formal, nor appointed to be said at fixed times and at fixed places. Nor must they be preceded with preliminary washings.

"In the Koran are not all believers bidden to wash hands and arms to the elbows, and to anoint the head and wash the feet?"

"All Alevis are aware of that command, but it is not binding for them. Our prayer is spontaneous; we believe in intercessory prayer, and we have no ceremonial or formula."

"Does the reading of any holy book form a part of your worship?"

"We respect and study the five sacred books of Abraham, Moses, David, Jesus, and Muhammed. But we do not depend upon them. Our teaching is from believer to believer and from father to father."

"Do you believe in the confession of sin?"

"To God Most High."

"Do you believe in sacrifice?"

"Not like the sacrifice of the Month of Pilgrimage, when all Sunni Muslims must offer one animal. Our duty is once in a

lifetime, when the Dede comes on his circuit. The Pirs, or Dedes, are our honored teachers. The throat of the lamb or of the kid must be cut by the Pir himself."

"What is the object of this single sacrifice?"

"First, a remembrance of the offering of Ishmael [*sic*] by Abraham when God provided the ram. Second, to feed the poor, to whom portions are always given."

"What do you understand by self-sacrifice?"

"Suppose we are four hundred Alevis in a town. Any one will suffer, even to the death, for any other of the brotherhood or for confession of his faith. In the early days of our faith there were hundreds who suffered martyrdom."

"Do you have places of congregation corresponding to mosques and churches?"

"We have no such buildings, but groups of believers meet for worship regularly in private homes. God is more holy than the temple. He lives in the inner life of man. It is better to spend for persons in need the moneys that would go for mortar and stone. We have congregations, however, to the membership of which only those approved by the Dede from Kirind may be received."

"Who are your leaders and teachers?"

"Our Khojas have no religious function. They are the teachers of day-schools. There are local Dedes and those who travel from Kirind throughout all these countries."

"What is the form of service?"

"We gather in councils for the remembrance of Ali's teachings, for reading from the Law, the Psalms, the Gospel, and the Koran, for interpretation and prayer, and for conversation about the love of God and about brotherly love. There are no public sacrifices like those of the ancient Hebrews, but at the private sacrifice many believers are naturally present. We observe the fast of Muharram 'Āshūra, which lasts ten days. During that time one may eat lightly once in three days; if that is impossible, once in twenty-four hours; if that again proves impossible, once in twelve hours. The object of the fast is meditation and purification."

*Social Conditions.* "Do you differ essentially from the Sunnis regarding marriage?"

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"There is no command concerning polygamy in Ali's teaching. Our custom is that a man shall have one wife. In case of a wife's becoming insane or incapable of taking care of the household, a second wife may be taken. But never more than two. We hold no slaves, and believe that that unjust practice will finally be done away with."

"Do you believe that the system of polygamy is coming to an end in Islam?"

"That would require another Muhammed."

"What is woman's position among the Alevis?"

"In spirit and love there is no distinction between man and woman. They are equal in that sense. In intellect and management, which ever is uppermost and best, the command is his or hers. For instance, it may be that a ruthless, good-for-nothing man marries a capable, noble woman. Mind manages the world today. Alevis have no purchased slaves. That is accounted wrong. But slaves that have been taken in war or raid may be so used, though this has not happened often in modern times. We believe in educating our daughters. We have not any right to command our wives, for example, about veiling. The right is wholly left to the women. But the strict usage of this country compels them to veil like other women. Ali said to Husein, 'When abroad, respect and obey the customs of the country.'"

"Do you believe in the paradise taught by the Sunnis?"

"No."

"Is that a sensual paradise, and are the houris promised to the believers by the Imams today?"

"That sort of heaven is sometimes shamelessly proclaimed by the Imams in the mosques."

"How are you taught to deal with those who rob and deceive you?"

"Forbear as far as you can, but finally retaliate rather than be crushed by your enemies."

"What shall be your answer if you are cross-questioned as to your faith?"

"If by an intelligent assembly or in the presence of a governor, confess your faith. But if by an ignorant assembly or by a small one, whose intention is mockery or despite, you may deny your

connection, because your conviction would not be respected or appreciated."

"Then is it ever right to lie, as suggested in one of the traditions of the Prophet?"

"The tradition is false, as are many others. A father once taught his son ten thousand traditions, and when the young man with infinite patience had memorized them all, the father said: 'Now these are the false ones, believe anything else you please!' But to deny among ignorant or mocking people our being Alevis is not falsehood."

"Do the Alevis ever persecute for religious reasons?"

"There is no slavery in our faith. I may become a Magian or a Christian as I please. This is natural. We have left Islam; why should we not be free?"

"How are the orphans, the sick, and the poor cared for?"

"Privately in our homes."

"Do you believe in Jihad or in any war?"

"We believe in the inner war with the kafirs (infidels) that are in our hearts. Ali said: 'It is better for you to die in trying to do my will than for you to kill any one in the attempt at coercion.' We believe in actual war only as self-defence. But we believe thoroughly in self-defence rather than in turning the cheek to him who strikes."

*Relations with the Shi'is, the Babis, and the Behais.* Between the Alevis and the Shi'is there is this fundamental difference. The latter know Ali as the vicegerent of Muhammed. No other caliph is to be recognized. He is the successor, the executor. The Alevis know Ali as the incarnation of God. They are agreed with the Shi'is in the following respects: they do not recognize the Sultan of Turkey as Khalifa; they do not recognize the Sheikh-ul-Islam; they do not recognize the Ulemas nor the Khojas. Again, the Alevis are entirely separate from the Babis and Behais. None of them have gone over to follow Mirza Muhammed Ali or Beha Ullah. They do not believe the claims and pretensions of these men, nor have they the notion of a hidden Imam.

*Relations to Jesus Christ and the New Testament.* "Do the Alevis accept the incarnation of Jesus?"

"Not in the sense that he is the only incarnation, nor in the

sense that he fully succeeded in showing forth the character and nature of God. He had this divinity, but men could not perfectly appreciate it, and cannot to this day. In the sense that the Son of God or God himself entered human life as Jesus of Nazareth and lived his divine life in Palestine, we do believe in the Christian incarnation. We frequently speak of Jesus as the Son of Man, or the perfect man; we also speak of him as the Son of God."

"Do you accept the crucifixion and the death of Christ?"

"No. Because Jesus was an immortal spirit and could never be put to death."

"But his body?"

"Yes. But that did not contain his personality. The oppression of Jesus was greater than that of the other prophets, and his humility was greater than theirs. God loves self-sacrifice, and therefore the intercession of Jesus is reckoned by God more worthy than that of the other prophets. Jesus is preferred above all who came before him, because those who preceded him could not declare the word which he declared. But in their surrender to the will of God each in some way suffered by the people. For example, Hud, Salih, and Noah."

"Do you believe in the resurrection of Jesus?"

"This is a point of great difficulty among us. The spirit after it has separated from the earthly body cannot reunite. We do not feel obliged to accept what we do not understand; but we do not deliberately deny the resurrection."

"Do you regard the New Testament as inspired of God?"

"Yes."

"Equally with the Koran?"

"We believe in five equally inspired books: *Ṣuḥuf* (revealed to Abraham, and now extant in Mesopotamia), *Tevrat*, *Zabur*, *Injil*, *Qur'an*.<sup>6</sup> We regard the books of Job, Samuel, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and so forth, as of a lower order."

"Do you believe in the annulling of previous revelations?"

"In fundamentals, no. In ramifications, yes."

"What is your expectation regarding Christianity? Will it yield and become Alevi?"

<sup>6</sup>[I.e. The Books of Abraham (Koran 87, end), the Law (Torah), Psalms, Gospels (Euangelion), Koran.]

"The two faiths will unite at the point of justice, each relinquishing extreme positions."

"What about the Sunnis?"

"They are far behind! Their affair is certainly hard. They are very far off from such a union."

"What do you understand by the words of Jesus, 'There shall be one flock and one shepherd'?"

"These words are the essence of civilization. Unity is the final desire of God for us. The world is in childhood and has not yet self-control. The world does not yet comprehend the will of God."

*Regarding the System of Islam.* "Do the Alevis regard the Hajj (the pilgrimage) as binding?"

"Not at all."

"Do they feel bound to give the Zekyat (the legal alms)?"

"No."

"Do they perform the Namaz (the prostration)?"

"No."

"Do they keep the fast of Ramazan?"

"No."

"Do they make the saying of the Creed a condition to faith?"

"No."

"Do not the Shi'is keep these 'five pillars' of Islam?"

"Yes, with certain modifications."

*Regarding Muhammed Himself.* "Do you accept any one book like the *Siyer-en-Nebi* as a standard for the biography of Muhammed?"

"No. But we have our own accounts of his career and prophethship. We believe in him as the last of the five great prophets. We look upon him as intercessor. And in the same way we regard all the holy prophets. But the real wisdom and justice of decision is with God."

"Is Muhammed final?"

"Yes, in the sense that he is the seal of the prophets."

"Did he predict or appoint Ali?"

"Yes, in the desert at a great assembly. After Muhammed's death, for practical reasons, the Muslim convocation agreed 'to

set aside the impetuous and high-spirited Ali for the mild and conservative Abu Bekr.”

“What do you consider the historical relations of Ali and Muhammed?”

“Their fathers were brothers. Afterwards Ali became Muhammed’s son-in-law. He was the first believer. He was appointed to become the first caliph.”

“Do you regard the revelation through Ali as the last word of God to men?”

“You should not say ‘first and last.’ The same spirit is through all, just as in the days of the week there is really only one day, but the names are different. If you unite the lives of the prophets, then the Alevis agree with you. If you disintegrate and differentiate, then you will fall out of sympathy with us.”

*Conclusions.* 1. Here is a religion other than Islam, recognizing and accepting Muhammed.

2. The religion has for a centre, not a shrine, but a missionary movement. And the movement is not declining but growing.

3. The intimate relation with Persian and Turkish classic poetry, especially with the Mesnevi of Mevlana Jelal-ed-din-i-Rumi, should not be overlooked. In other words, the mysticism and pantheism of the Orient are here found, not as literary theories or philosophies, but as the elements of a religion with which increasing multitudes are seeking to satisfy the yearnings and instincts of the soul.

4. A fundamental difference and separation from Islam exists in the belief in incarnation. Turkey is being stirred, notwithstanding monarchy and caliphate and Sunni traditions, by as radical a movement as Indian Islam has known.

5. The exaltation of ethics over formalism is proved by the abrogation of “the five pillars.”

6. The respect and liberty which are to be accorded to women among Alevis are largely unrealized because of the powerful environment of Muhammedan law and custom. But this ideal of a wife’s equal share with her husband in life and in eternal life is prophetic of the day when there shall be true homes and a pure basis for society in the Orient.

7. By their own confession Alevis are closer to Christianity than to Islam. They expect an eventual compact with Christianity but not with Sunni Muhammedanism.

8. They accept the entire present New Testament. But how can they do this and consistently hold to the Koran as equally inspired?

9. The words of our Saviour, "There shall be one flock and one shepherd," are in truth "the essence of civilization," for He is indeed "drawing all men unto Himself."

*WHAT HAVE FACTS TO DO WITH FAITH?*

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The question, "What have facts to do with faith?" expresses a rather widely prevalent suspicion regarding the religious value of the facts recorded in the gospels and summarized in the creeds; and it deserves consideration by every one who has religious interests at heart, since it brings up vital problems concerning the possibility of revelation and the value of the Christian faith. Two allied questions have been much debated recently in this country, although they were pretty well threshed out in Germany a decade or two ago; first, what obligations rest upon a man who subscribes to the Christian creeds; and, secondly, whether it is not desirable that the creeds should be so changed, or be given such meanings, that no one would be obliged in confessing his faith to make any assertion concerning matters of historical fact. Back of these questions lies a more fundamental and more practical one: What value have facts for our religious faith? Of what value for our religious life is it to affirm in our creeds the truth of such historical happenings as, "He suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, dead and buried; the third day He rose again from the dead"? Of what value is it to read or hear such Scriptures as those which tell us that Christ healed the palsied man let down through the roof, and the blind man who called to him from the wayside; or raised the widow's only son; or had compassion on the multitudes, and fed them? It must be granted, we are told, that doubts may always arise about historical events, since historical knowledge rests on human testimony with all its weaknesses; and granted, too, that events seem but a dry and cold substitute for the living faith craved by our hearts. Would it not, then, be well, we are asked, to omit from our creeds matters of fact (or alleged fact), and to reduce our gospels to "the Words of the Christ"? If not, some sound reason ought to be given for retaining the gospel narra-

tives of our Lord's marvellous deeds, which are stumbling-stones to many feet seeking the path of righteousness, and for affirming in the creeds the most notable events of his life instead of simply calling him Master.

That "the unnecessary is usually evil" is a wise saying. If facts are unnecessary and useless so far as faith is concerned, it is almost certainly harmful to insist that Christians should accept either the few great events of Christ's life mentioned in the creeds, or the many others of a wonderful sort narrated in the gospels. Even though we can establish their actual occurrence, they will inevitably be sloughed off by Christendom, unless they really have something to do with faith. We ought, then, to show plainly that there is a vital connection between faith and facts; or else lay upon the table the much discussed question what legal and moral obligation to accept the gospel facts, as summarized in the creeds, rests upon those who confess the Christian faith. In that case the problem of framing a creed free from any assertion regarding events would have to be taken up seriously. Only, before this course is adopted, we ought to be quite clear that Christendom has been wrong with an almost unanimous consistency in finding value for faith in facts.

The reason commonly urged for revising the Christian creeds is that men long for simple, spiritual truth which appeals to the heart. They long to hear, and are willing to believe, it is often said, the facts of God's fatherhood, the Saviour's love, and the power in human life of the divine Spirit; but they do not want metaphysical statements and discussions. For example, they desire to hear, and they accept, a preaching which sets forth the fact of man's immortal life; whereas they do not want, and will not attend to, metaphysical assertions concerning the reality of Christ's resurrection.

Now this suggests the need of saying what is meant properly by "fact," a word which has purposely been used so far in the rather vague, ambiguous way in which it is commonly employed. For much current discussion is inconclusive because we generally have no clear idea as to what we mean when we talk about "facts." Shall we call such statements as the following, statements of fact? God is love and is our father; Jesus of Naza-



reth is the Christ, the Saviour of men; the divine Spirit is a power for righteousness in human life; there is forgiveness for our sins; we are immortal. It is customary to call these truths "facts," in order to express the universal Christian conviction of their certainty. But, granting their certain truth, this is surely an inappropriate use of the term, especially when "metaphysical statement" is contrasted with "fact." For properly "fact" should be used to denote an occurrence, a phenomenon, that which our eyes can see and our hands handle. "Fact" (or, if any one please, alleged fact) is properly used to denote such an event as that the palsied man stood up and carried his bed home; that the widow's son who had been dead sat up and began to speak; that Jesus of Nazareth was nailed to the cross, died thereon, and was laid in Joseph's tomb; that the grave was empty on the first Easter morning. "Fact," in short, ought not to be used for "truth," but for "event" or "phenomenon."

Again, by a "metaphysical statement" we can properly mean only the statement of some truth (or alleged truth) which is above the phenomenal, the visible, audible, and tangible, some truth that is not a section of the physical world, though it may be known to us through what we see, hear, and touch, and may be a legitimate inference from some series of facts. Thus the statements that nature is a unity, working always according to unvarying laws, that man is morally free, that God exists, are metaphysical. Still more is it a metaphysical statement to assert not merely that God is, but that his nature is love; that he is the father of all, who will have all men to be saved and to come to a knowledge of the truth; or to say that Jesus of Nazareth is the Son of God, who by his death and resurrection has overcome sin and death; or that our impulses toward good are the result not simply of our heredity and environment but of the workings of the Holy Spirit in our hearts; or that in the life to come justice will be done to all who have not found justice here, and that it will be a life of happiness, lived in close relation to God. Such statements are to the Christian not less but more certainly true than such matters of fact as that this table is hard and this paper white; but they are, nevertheless, truths which do not belong to the sphere of the phenomenal, which we can test and be sure

of by ear, eye, and hand. Above all, forgiveness of sins and communion with God are as far removed from sense-experience, as any truths that could be named. And yet they are most necessary for religious life, joy, and peace, and should have their place in Christian teaching always. To sum up the matter, the high truth that God is love and brings us into union with himself is simple, spiritual truth, which appeals to the heart and answers the heart's deepest needs, and yet it is undoubtedly metaphysical.

Are we able, then, to grasp such truth as this? And if we are able, shall those of us who are inwardly certain of God's love and of our mystical union with him through Christ, say to the man who wishes to share in our knowledge and love of God: Our faith rests upon the authority of the Bible; or, upon the authority of the Church; or, upon an inner mysterious experience; or, upon our developing within ourselves, after the example of Jesus, a consciousness that we are sons of God? Valuable as any of these answers may be to the question how we may know God and serve him, a simpler and yet far more profound reply is given by St. John. "That which was from the beginning, that which we have heard, that which we have seen with our eyes, that which we beheld, and our hands handled, concerning the Word of life (and the life was manifested, and we have seen, and bear witness, and declare unto you the life, the eternal life, which was with the Father, and was manifested unto us); that which we have seen and heard declare we unto you also, that ye also may have fellowship with us; yea, and our fellowship is with the Father and with his Son Jesus Christ."

Fellowship with God—that is religion; fellowship with the Father and his Son Jesus Christ, the Word of life, the eternal life which was with the Father and was manifested unto us—that is Christianity. This fellowship is the sublime result of faith. And faith is aroused through the personal appearing among men of the Son of God in human guise, so that men heard him speak, saw him act, and could declare to the world what kind of person this was whom they knew as a man knows his friend. Seeing him, they saw the Father; knowing what Jesus Christ is, they knew what God is. In some such way as this we might

state the view regarding Christian faith and the relation to it of fact, which is given us by St. John.

When we assert the fatherhood of God and his love, man's immortality, and the operation of God's Holy Spirit in the world, it is reasonable for men to ask in regard to any one of these assertions, "Why do you make it?" If there are no facts to prove it, the only answer must be, "Because I feel like it." Now for this attitude of mind there is some justification. The felt needs of human nature make their satisfaction probable, and the antecedent probability of revelation and redemption enable us to accept testimony as to God's dealings with men. But the answer does not of itself carry conviction, or even challenge investigation. Suppose the apostles, when they went about preaching the gospel, had only been able to say in answer to inquiries, "We believe, and urge all men to believe, because we like the ideas we preach." This would never have made the deep impression upon the whole world that was made by the method they actually used. They proclaimed the righteousness and love of God, and called men to repentance and a new life. Why? "God so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten Son." Why "only-begotten Son"? Because Jesus Christ was "declared to be the Son of God with power, according to the spirit of holiness, by the resurrection from the dead." And when inquiry was made regarding the stupendous assertion, "On the third day he rose from the dead," their reply was, "We are witnesses of his resurrection." They staked everything on this central fact. "If Christ hath not been raised, then is our preaching vain; your faith also is vain." Their preaching could have convinced no one, had it not been based on such an appeal to facts as this: "Jesus of Nazareth, a man approved of God unto you by mighty works and wonders and signs, which God did by him in the midst of you, even as ye yourselves know, him, being delivered up by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye by the hand of men without the law did crucify and slay; whom God raised up, having loosed the pangs of death. . . . This Jesus did God raise up, whereof we all are witnesses." These facts were appealed to as a basis for all the inductions of faith. Precisely the same basis is needed for the inductions of

faith now. Indeed it is more needed in this age, so habituated to the methods of scientific inference from observed phenomena.

St. Paul's great sermon to the Athenians, declaring to them the unknown God, exemplifies the apostolic method. He set before them first the truth that God gives to all life and breath and all things, and has made of one every nation of men, that they should seek God, if haply they might feel after him and find him, though he is not far from each one of us. And then he declared that, while God had overlooked the times of ignorance in which he was unknown, "now he commands men that they should all everywhere repent; inasmuch as he hath appointed a day in which he will judge the world in righteousness by the man whom he hath ordained; whereof he hath given assurance unto all men, in that he raised him from the dead." This is the point his sermon was intended to drive home. His theme is summed up in the simple words, "He preached Jesus and the resurrection." What was the effect of his message? "When they heard of the resurrection of the dead, some mocked; others said, we will hear thee concerning this again. But certain clave unto him and believed." Such must always be the outcome of preaching the Christian message—some will mock, some may inquire further, and perhaps only a few will believe. But the preacher of the gospel must set forth the message as St. Paul did: "I make known unto you that which also I received, how that Christ died for our sins according to the scriptures; and that he was buried; and that he hath been raised on the third day according to the scriptures; and that he appeared to Cephas, then to the twelve; then he appeared to above five hundred brethren at once, of whom the greater part remain until now, but some are fallen asleep; then he appeared to James, then to all the apostles." For we may bid men look upon nature as God's work, and upon man with his reason and conscience as the image of God, and bid them seek God, if haply they may feel after and find him who enfolds and sustains all men and the whole earth and sky; but still they will worship him, if at all, in ignorance, and declare that he is to them unknown, or even unknowable. They may see in the world of struggle and suffering no certitude of his fatherly love; and discern no evidence

that he really dwells in their hearts and brings to pass what is good in them. But if the Cross is held up before them as the witness of God's love, and the Resurrection as the manifestation of his life-giving power, some *will* believe, and have fellowship with the Father and with his Son Jesus Christ.

Men need to be convinced of the Father's ever-present love and care, actually guiding all things for good, of the Saviour's redemptive work as truly freeing them from sin, and of the Holy Spirit's influencing them with such reality that purity, honesty, and loving-kindness are the actual fruits of the life he imparts. That is, a living gospel must proclaim the Father, Redeemer, and Sanctifier as working out the divine purpose for our true well-being in the sphere of present-day actuality. Consequently it must preach God as made known through events of like actuality. To take a particular instance, we can no more be sure of Christ's living existence and power now, if we are not convinced that he actually left the tomb and manifested himself as risen to his disciples, than we can affirm that he died for the sake of mankind, if we say that we do not know or care whether he actually suffered under Pontius Pilate, expired on the cross, and was buried. Let any man ask himself whether he can have an assurance of the Saviour's love, if he doubts whether Jesus Christ died willingly for men; and whether he can know God as love, unless it is true that the cross so reveals him. And if we need to have the love of God and the forgiveness of our sins set forth by the cross as a reality, we equally need the manifestation of the living power of God and of our vital union with him to be set forth by the rising of his Son from the dead.

It is a brave attitude that some would have Christians take, when they bid us hold all knowledge of truth concerning God to be impossible metaphysics, irrelevant to essential religion, and all reliance upon historical facts to be vain; it is admirably brave to say, as religious men we will disregard all else, and will take the attitude towards life that Jesus took. But the man who would be wise as well as brave must feel that he can take only such an attitude towards life as is justified by the real nature of the world, and ought to follow the example of Jesus only if he is truly the Wisdom of God and the Lord of life. If the world

we know and use is not so constituted and guided by the God of righteousness that moral worth can express itself in ultimately effective action, then the attitude of Jesus towards life may be magnificent, but it means death now and no future victory for one's self or for others.

If Christianity is to reach the man in the pew and draw to the pew the man in the street, it must hold fast to the comprehensible facts upon which its inductions are founded. The plain man must base the truth by which he is to live and die on facts that come within view of human senses; and his theology must be simply "a determined effort to think clearly" concerning data upon which the human mind can lay hold. Above all, he must not leave out of his Christianity the Christ who manifested his glory before the plain people. And so most Christians find it a privilege, not a burden, to affirm as of high value the facts stated in the gospels and the creeds, just because they cannot be satisfied with metaphysical speculations in place of faith, and because they see that God's revelation, coming through historical events, gives them not a series of philosophical generalities concerning God and immortality, but a living faith in the Father, with whom they may have fellowship.

The great, simple truths, then, which the human heart needs, and of which the appearing of Jesus Christ gives us certainty, are indeed metaphysical truths, but they are not speculative abstractions. They are made known through occurrences in time, on our earth, which were observed by plain, straightforward men who used their eyes and ears; they do not come through some occult, hypothetical means of attaining knowledge. Like scientific truths, they are based on data that have been experienced; and, like scientific principles, they are truths more general than can be given by any single experience. Only as such can they be adequate to our needs. They are, we claim, as truly inductions from facts that have been observed as the determined and successful efforts of scientists to think clearly about nature are inductions from observed phenomena; and they have been worked out by gradual steps of careful thinking, similar to those by which scientific doctrines are reached. It is beyond the scope of this paper to justify the assertion that the gospel facts

actually occurred and were correctly observed, or to defend the soundness of the conclusions drawn by Christendom from these accepted facts. To do so would require a consideration of historical problems and of biblical theology too extensive to be summarized here. Our endeavor so far has been to show the soundness of a method which aims at giving due place to facts; and it is now our purpose to suggest how facts can be a basis for spiritual faith.

In considering this point it will be well to remind ourselves of the way in which the faith of Christ's first disciples grew up. They came to believe in him as the Son of God through the experience of being with him and learning to know what manner of person they followed. He did not often declare in set words who he was, but he showed it by his life. His chosen witnesses heard his teaching, saw his mighty works, watched his every act, gesture, and expression during months of closest companionship with him. "Of the men that have companied with us all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out among us, beginning from the baptism of John, unto the day that he was received up from us, of these must one become a witness with us of his resurrection." So St. Peter stated the qualifications of an apostle when it was necessary to fill the place from which Judas fell. The disciples had ample opportunity of knowing what their Master was. They were not held aloof by any of the formalities that sometimes give fictitious dignity and importance to eminent men. Following him as he went up and down the country, they saw him under all the circumstances in which even a man of high character and genius will show weakness, irritability, or selfishness; they saw him in great moments, when he was in the public eye; and they saw how he faced the uttermost crises of life and death. It is evident that they were profoundly impressed with the perfection of his character, and filled with reverence for him whom they knew in such intimate and constant companionship. They perceived that his teaching showed the deepest insight into human nature, and that, while it was so simple in form that the common people heard him gladly, its depth of meaning could be sounded by no one. They witnessed his mighty works, manifesting complete control over the forces

of nature and over human health and life. They saw him use his powers with wonderful self-restraint, resolutely refusing to employ them for his own advantage or fame, so that his use of them only for the highest benefit of others, for the wisest purposes of healing and help, showed forth his love no less than his power. Furthermore they beheld his perfect self-sacrifice in its culmination on the cross. And finally they were convinced that, after he had been laid in the grave, undoubtedly dead, the grave upon the third day was found empty, and that during forty days he repeatedly appeared and talked with them, and at last ascended in their sight into heaven. From the observation of these facts, visible to their eyes, tangible to their hands, audible to their ears, his disciples drew their conclusions concerning him.

Their convictions, as the gospel story shows us, were arrived at only by gradual steps. Indeed they came so slowly to understand their Master that whoever looks back now, from the standpoint of those who see his whole revelation of himself, must feel astonished at their slowness. But it is to be remembered that they had before them the most wonderful person whom the world has ever seen, and that the inference they were to draw concerning him was more stupendous and overpowering than any other that men have ever had to draw, even in the face of the most striking phenomena, the most marvellous discovery, or the highest manifestation of human wisdom and goodness.

But if their progress towards complete faith in him was gradual, they came in due course to the great conviction that he was the Son of God. The stages of this progress are indicated by the various confessions of faith to which the disciples gave utterance. When St. Andrew first met with Jesus, he confessed his belief that he would prove to be the Messiah for whom men were hoping. Later St. Peter said in the name of the twelve, "We have believed and know that thou art the Holy One of God." After the feeding of the five thousand, and the appearance of the Lord walking upon the sea, the disciples in the boat worshipped him, saying, "Of a truth thou art the Son of God." And finally, after months of living and working with him, the conviction to which they had come was voiced in the great confession of faith, spoken by St. Peter, "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God."



During these months their knowledge of him had been deepened and their love for him strengthened, as his personality exerted its ever-increasing influence upon their minds and hearts, until finally there resulted this climax of faith and this solemn assertion of their full belief in him as their personal Lord Christ. Thus they began with facts, and their gradual, perhaps unconscious, induction from what they observed led naturally to the most intense spiritual faith.

It is too commonly assumed that induction belongs only to the study of nature, and the truth is overlooked that Christian thought largely follows this method. In reality the knowledge of God differs from scientific knowledge not so much in its method as in its object. And the difference between the objects of religious and of scientific knowledge consists chiefly in this: science seeks to know natural forces and laws; religion, to know a personal Being. Now there is a realm of vitally important knowledge which gives us the true point of view for understanding faith. This is the knowledge of human persons, which plays so large a part in all our practical concerns. Indeed it is as widely used and quite as indispensable as our science.

How, then, do we know other persons? We observe the face and expression, the voice and manner, the words and actions, of those with whom we are associated; and from such observations we draw, often unconsciously, our inferences as to the kind of persons they are. Then we have opportunities to see how they act in crises, face dangers, withstand temptations, and whether they live up to the highest requirements of friendship. Our judgments are built up from a large number of data, obtained by observation. This is incomplete in most cases, to be sure, and is subtle and delicate in all. Yet we do form judgments of this sort, and the universal conviction of mankind, as shown in action, is that such judgments must be made and can be reliable. Now it is to be remembered that these conclusions are based upon facts observed, even where our judgments rise to the practical certainty of love or friendship; and that even our firmest convictions regarding other persons can never be independent of facts. Thus a man's belief in the faithfulness of his wife, in his paternity, or in the fidelity of a friend, involves

a conviction that certain events have or have not occurred in the phenomenal world.

But though our judgments regarding other persons are intimately dependent upon facts in the physical order, these judgments, and the personal relations resulting from them, may rise to the highest spiritual levels. It is possible for our belief in others to be so strong, and to have such firm foundations, that not the least doubt remains in our minds, or ought to remain. A friend will be trusted with everything a man owns, or with carrying out some duty that involves a man's reputation, honor, and all he holds dearest. A soldier will trust his companion with his life. And the stories of Othello and of Elsa and Lohengrin illustrate the way in which the soundest common sense of mankind condemns lack of trust in those in whom a man ought to believe. Our judgments of others are necessarily more subtle and complex than the most difficult scientific inductions, and yet they may be profoundly reasonable and reliable.

If our knowledge of human persons is thus dependent always upon facts, and yet may be spiritual knowledge of the highest and most secure kind, surely there need be no fear that the simple, spiritual truth concerning God and our relation to him, which the human heart requires, should be lost because faith tries to make use of facts. The data observed by the chosen witnesses of our Lord's life can be employed by us, no less than they were used by them, as the basis for inferring far-reaching spiritual truths, which directly appeal to the heart and affect practically the whole life. The knowledge of God attained by faith proceeds by the method which we might call "personal induction." That is, as our everyday knowledge of men and women begins with outward manifestations, given in the body, and rises thence to the faithful trust and communion of friendship, so our religious knowledge rises from actual historical happenings in our world of human deeds to the closest spiritual union with God. Viewed from this standpoint, the events through which God's revelation has been given do not remain dry, cold facts, but become the outward, visible signs of what God is, who is made known through his Son. They become alive and warm with meaning and with the mightiest appeal to the heart.

*FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ANTICHRIST, SUPERMAN,  
AND PRAGMATIST*

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One of the most striking and pathetic figures of the nineteenth century was Friedrich Nietzsche. A radical aristocrat, a radical enemy of religion, a prophet, he shared the fate of the prophet and the radical man. He was a poet rather than a philosopher, not one calmly to weigh the issues of his mind. He was a zealot with a mission, a fiery genius, whose torch, unsteady at times, flared into madness in his latter years. So great was the strain of thought that his mind was literally consumed by his zeal for a vast, a revolutionary cause.

The events of his life were few. A series of ministers' families had intermarried for two generations; Nietzsche's father was a minister, and his mother the daughter of a minister. As in the case of our own Emerson, the family of Friedrich Nietzsche was thus one in which the intellectual life had predominated for several generations. At Röcken, a little German town not far from the battlefield of Lützen, on Oct. 15, 1844, Friedrich was born. His mother took complete charge of his instruction up to the time when he was sent to the so-called Fürstenschule at Pforta in the Thuringian mountains. After graduation there he continued his studies for some years at the Universities of Bonn and Leipzig. Ritschl was the dominating factor in his life at Leipzig, as Heinze had been at Pforta. The latter, still professor of philosophy at Leipzig, told me that Friedrich Nietzsche excelled in whatever field of work he set his heart on, though there was nothing to mark him as a genius save his taciturnity, his love of the beautiful, his hatred of the vulgar.

As a student, he had already distinguished himself as a master of the ancient languages and as a musician, and by virtue of certain essays he had published while an undergraduate the University

of Basel offered him an extraordinary-professorship of philology. He was then twenty-five. But languages were not his chief interest; and the publication of his first larger work on Greek tragedy proved that he was destined to be a thinker on the ultimate problems of life. His ten years as professor at Basel (1869-1879) were a continuous inner struggle. The teaching of language militated against the will which bade him think upon subjects of life and death; ill health limited a pen which seemed inexhaustible; and among his one-time friends the feeling against his radical theories left him standing more and more alone. The students worshipped him at first, but when they learned of his revolutionary principles, left him to lecture to vacant seats. He broke with his best friends—among whom was Richard Wagner—for the sake of his theories; and finally, well-nigh alone and friendless, broken in health at thirty-five, he resigned his professorship, accepting, however, a pension from the University. From this date until his death eight years ago the story of his life is that of a wandering thinker—*fugitivus errans* he called himself—alone, save for his faithful dog; now on the heights of Swiss mountains, now among the Italian lakes, now in the misty north of Germany; indefatigable, producing work after work with a golden pen, prophetic in tone, but, alas, often philosophically illogical, contradictory, absurd.

A few of the more important of his writings may be mentioned here. First in point of significance is his *Also sprach Zarathustra; ein Buch für Alle und Keinen*. Zarathustra is, of course, Zoroaster, and the mouth-piece of the writer himself. The book is written in a style of rare beauty, very much in the tone of the Biblical prophets, only the call is to objects wholly earthly. Secondly, *Menschliches, allzu Menschliches; ein Buch für freie Geister*, which consists, as does *Zarathustra*, very largely of aphorisms. *Morgenröte* and *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft* tell of the dawn of a new science and new values; while *Jenseits von Gut und Böse*, the most logical and consistent of the works I have read, seeks to advance, as the title indicates, beyond the concepts of a traditional ethics. *Der Antichrist* summarizes in relatively the most connected manner his objections to the Christian religion. Theologians and metaphysicians alike are warred upon; the doctrines

of the New Testament are discussed from a cultural, biological standpoint, and found wanting. Finally, *Der Wille zur Macht*, in which is contained a kind of will-metaphysic and a Pythagorean theory of the eternal recurrence of what has been. Philosophy was to Nietzsche largely personal experience. And if our thinking, like our bodies, is subject to evolution, it must show a growth, an overcoming of the old self, a rising to a new and broader field of vision. Thus we may in a measure forgive many of the seeming inconsistencies.

Ten years, then, as a professor in Basel, ten years as a wandering thinker, impelled as it were by fate, until, in 1889, he was picked up in the streets of Turin, hopelessly insane. He had overworked his brain in ceaseless thinking night and day, and to his death, in 1900, he had to be cared for by Christian charity—Christian charity, which in health had been the object of his bitterest attack. He was buried without funeral rites, save for one German student who came from afar and made an oration at his grave.

How was it now that Nietzsche so soon became a leader, for many, indeed, a prophet? How is it that no one who now considers problems of government, morality, or religion, can escape him?

Let us examine the chief elements of his philosophy, presenting so far as we may that which was true for him throughout, and more particularly his later thought. First, let us note that, as in the case of Socrates, Nietzsche's whole philosophy centres about ethics. The adage, γνῶθι σεαυτόν, is again proposed, not through ethics to attain a new basis for philosophic thought, but, as it were, by ethics of a radical kind to rise superior to the ultimate problems which so trouble us. Man's concerns are of this earth; what has he to do with other worlds? Let him look to this life and make the most of it. The study of man is thus the paramount issue, to find in man himself not only the explanation of psychological fact, but a solution for all the phases of thought and action; in other words, to explain the various systems of philosophy, the religions of mankind, as well as our own ideas and ideals of morality, by a scientific, historical, and psychological method; presuming nothing, and rigidly excluding what seems improbable in our own immediate personal experience. "All that

we need is a chemistry of moral, religious, aesthetic concepts," says Nietzsche; and in an attempt to provide such an analysis he comes to the conclusion that metaphysics concerns itself with a world of dreams. Dreams are, indeed, sufficient to explain for him the origin of metaphysics. "Without dreams, one would never have found occasion to separate the real world from another world." So the division of human beings into body and soul—another dream—started the religious concepts of philosophy, and brought men from ghosts to spiritual essences, spiritual bodies, other lives than the present. Thus, as it were by inspiration, he tries to shut the gates of mercy on all metaphysics. He deliberately denies the validity and significance of the very problems and concepts of transcendental philosophy. God is dead, he boldly exclaims, there are no things in themselves, souls, world orders, *logoi*, paracletes. These are none of them given in experience; therefore they do not exist.

What concerns us, then, is man as a developing being in the present, as possibly a higher type in future generations. Thus it came that Nietzsche's first investigations, growing out of his philological studies—principally Greek—were, broadly speaking, cultural, going back almost invariably to Greek ideals. The Greeks were pre-eminently the people of freedom, each man a positive force, every life its own life, every will its own. They rose to native dignity as men, a type with which no later civilization can be compared. Rejoicing in the present, physically and intellectually free spirits, without the shackles of any presupposition or bias whatsoever, fearing nothing, with an art which assuaged the soul by true nobility and rose to Dionysiac exaltation, to intoxication of beauty and delight.

Nietzsche considers this an ideal to which we must return if the human race is to advance; and Schopenhauer, as the great exponent of dominant will, is to him the one who can teach men anew this principle of individuation, this positing of one's own will and carrying it through to the end. Schopenhauer, as is well known, found the principle at the basis of all being and action, not in intelligence and love, as the theologians maintained, but in a blind will, akin to the wills we find within ourselves. Finding all nature motivated by this stupid, unreasoning, blind force,

Schopenhauer proposed as man's best solution, in a world as miserable as a world could possibly be, the overcoming, the subjection of that force. Subjectively, Schopenhauer's solution, as we all know, was the ideal of negation, the Buddhist's Nirvana, the willing not to will. At this point Nietzsche breaks with his master. He is for overcoming a will which is blind—we can also say, a character which has no ends and aims—not for the purpose of attaining Nirvana, but, on the contrary, that we may develop our dead selves to stronger personalities by the effort and struggle to assert ourselves physically, intellectually, and morally as higher types of men.

Here we meet with the central concept, the watchword of the Nietzschean philosophy, Superman, or Overman—*Uebermensch*. It was Goethe who coined the word, but Nietzsche has made it pregnant with possibility; indeed, it might well become the object of religion if we are eventually to be reduced to a merely moral religion, the positivist's concept of a glorified humanity.

Who, now, is the Overman? He is, as the word implies, a being higher than anything to which mankind has yet attained or will attain, physically, intellectually, and morally. He is the ever retreating limit of evolution. He is the sense and salt of the earth. He is the one for whom all mankind must live and die. He is the distinguished aristocrat, of extraordinary power and ability, who moulds the destiny of men at large. He gives tone, direction, dignity, and ends to society. He is the head, we are the members; and we exist only to further that head.

But have we not leaders who give tone, direction, dignity, and ends to society? And is not mankind evolving from higher to higher planes? No, replies our philosopher, we are like sheep without a shepherd, without purposes and ends. Ask men what is the purpose of their lives, and see how many will find one there at all! Indeed, so wholly sapless and devoid of meaning seems this present life that they look to a future world to make up for the senselessness of earthly life. No, men are like sheep without a shepherd, says our philosopher; and, moreover, they will not have any shepherd. Let a man of higher type arise among them, a man physically and intellectually superior, what is the attitude of men at large toward him? Will they allow him to carry out

exalted purposes, will they recognize his leadership? No, the whole tendency of our democratic times is to make men like one another, to look upon all men as equal, to keep all on the same level, and see to it that no man obtains predominating influence or expresses his genius.

Thus Nietzsche was the arch-enemy of democratic institutions. For him, they detracted from the dignity of life, and reduced its higher values to mere commonplace, to vulgarity. One rabble beckons to another, and, though a god were to appear among them, they would still beckon one to the other, "We are all equal." They are flies in the market-place, exclaims Nietzsche, they suck the blood of him who comes from the mountains, they crucify him who speaks of higher values. There are no higher men, there can be no genius, say they who will not recognize the principle of distinguished leadership, who have lost all sense of personality and individuality. Democracy can be but a spiritless dead level, a feeble mediocrity.

It thus behooves the Superman and him who loves the Superman to leave the market-place and find himself a higher sphere. Let the Superman assert his will and carry out his ends and purposes. Thus only can the dead level of mediocrity be overcome. May those who can, rise, and in the struggle let the strongest survive; only thus can weakness be done away with! In the strongest possible words Nietzsche calls upon his followers—of whom there were none at that time—to create some high purpose, some end for human life, something that shall arouse the enthusiasm of men and make them content with an earthly destiny. He believes the rearing of supermen to be the end in which all men should find their Dionysiac delight. Then would earth have a sense, a meaning.

But how about those who are not supermen—how about us? we instinctively inquire. Nietzsche's bold response is this: Every man his own neighbor. I am not my brother's keeper. Let every man work out his own salvation. Let us have the struggle and the combat. Then the weak will die, and those who yearn for other worlds. And yet all men should seek to foster that which might enslave them. Again instinctively we ask, Should not the Superman be bullet-proof?



But perhaps we are too concrete here. It is in an ethical sense, primarily, that Nietzsche speaks to us; and his emphasis of the higher man, the man, that is, who asserts his individuality, is an attack upon traditional concepts of morality. He desires to present new tables of evolutionary law, at least to have them reckoned with, and so release mankind perhaps from the shackles of convention and mere tradition. His evolutionary law is indeed revolutionary law. For him moral sanctions become a function of will—individual will—the exact antipode of Kant's categorical imperative. Spinoza anticipates him here: "According to the highest right of Nature, it is permitted to every man unconditionally to do that which according to his judgment will result in his own benefit."<sup>1</sup> Again, "To attain that which will redound to our own salvation and peace, we have need of no other principle than that we consider well what redounds to our own advantage."<sup>2</sup> And yet the deductions of Spinoza are quite different, as we shall see, since to him natural law and ethical law are both phases of the divine law.<sup>3</sup>

Nietzsche reasons thus: There was a time when men were physical slaves, bodily subject to masters. And though they overcame the fleshly bondage, they remained for many centuries intellectual slaves—scholastics of the Middle Age, bearing the yoke of a traditional philosophy. The time came when men awakened to find themselves free in mind as well—that was the renaissance of free thought, the dawning anew of a Greek ideal. But the process has not yet reached its conclusion; for we are still under the bondage of moral despotism, not having learned that our moral sanctions are themselves the products of our own minds. It is we ourselves who create the concepts good and evil. Therefore, they cannot have fixed values, and there are theoretically as many concepts, good and evil, as there are individuals. What, then, can hinder the establishment of new values for the categories good, right, etc.? Why not overturn the old evaluations of men's actions and set new standards, which may be more natural, and so contribute to the advancement of the race, particularly of its higher

<sup>1</sup>Ethica, Part iv, App. 8.

<sup>2</sup>Concerning True Freedom.

<sup>3</sup>Of Natural Right.

type? This "*Umwertung aller Werte*" is what Nietzsche then attempts to do, deliberately setting aside public opinion, and challenging every ideal whatsoever, boldly proclaiming new standards and new ideals. The development of a higher type of man, and the overturning of what he is pleased to call this rabble-life of the present age, becomes for him a sort of holy zeal, a religion.

We all know that his main object here was to overturn, if possible, what he considered the effete ethical concepts of traditional Christianity. The system, he maintains, is one which grew out of Asiatic despotism, and contrasts with Greek enlightenment and the cultivation of virtue as its own filthy Jewish rags compare with the unspotted brightness of the unclouded heavens. The fundamental fallacy of the Christian ethics is to him its negation of the individual, its denial of the essentially human. If virtue is but filthy rags, and there is no cleanliness in us, how can we exult in earth and sky and the free play of every bodily function? If we must ever deny ourselves, how can the individual evolve? If our highest moral obligation becomes service, it cannot but result in servility, limitation, degradation. Altruism is thus a disease, and all its negative virtues are held to thwart the progress of evolution. The new and higher type of man will therefore never will to pity his fellow. 'Tis charity, and weakens him who gives and him who takes. The Superman will unlearn the idea of sacrifice, which degrades both giver and recipient. He, the rich in spirit, will not impoverish himself that the weak, the halt, the blind, the poor in spirit, the aimless, may drag themselves through an aimless existence. He will be strong and demand strength, thus inciting all to rouse themselves out of lazy weakness and moral beggary. He will resist evil—that is, whatever militates against his own higher development; never for one moment will he cease to raise himself, if possible, above his own dead self. Morally, then, the Superman will be his own self-sufficient arbiter, he will express his nature to the full, he will posit his own personality. He will posit his reason, and develop to the full every mental faculty. Here, too, he will rejoice in strength, he will accept no conditions, he will find that inner life and end in itself. Physically, he will strive to become like the "*blonde Bestie*" of the old German forests, with a body undaunted

by heat and cold, at home on land or sea, exulting in every natural function, every organ of his frame ruddy with life.

Let me, at this point, quote from the *Morgenröte*, by way of anticipating perhaps a serious criticism. The Superman as the type of the egoist, the "blond beast," who travels with inevitable will, devoid of sympathy or charity, with virtues all of his own making, has in him something to inspire fear. In justice to Nietzsche, however, we must remember that as a radical thinker he sought constantly to emphasize his thoughts by striking presentation. If, for instance, instead of calling the physical side of his Superman "*die blonde Bestie*," he had, with Hegel, spoken of an "approximate degree of bodily health which should enable a man to sustain a high degree of development, with consistent co-ordination of mind and physical functions," there would have been less discussion of the subject. Before we pass judgment, therefore, let us take into consideration Nietzsche's conception of the way the Superman would come to the end of his earthly course. He is comparing him with a bird of passage flying over the Western sea:

All these keen birds that fly afar to the farthest coast, surely somewhere they will be able to go no more, and they will limp down upon a mast or some barren cliff and be thankful for the support. But who can say that ahead of them, beyond them, there is not a free, a boundless course—that they have flown as far as they can fly? All our great masters and forerunners came to a stand, and it is not the noblest nor the most gracious mien with which fatigue stands still. So it will go with me and you. But how can that concern us? Other birds will fly beyond. And this our insight, our faith, flies in a race with them upwards and onwards; this our faith rises straight above our head and above its helplessness, it gazes out from thence into the distance and sees the hosts of far mightier birds, mightier than we are, who are going to strive for the same goal whither we sought to fly, and where all is yet sea, sea, sea.

If now the question presents itself, How about the advent of a second Superman, or perhaps a confederation of weaker wills for self-protection? we shall have to make allowance for a measure of justifiable hyperbole. For Nietzsche speaks here of slaves and masters, and of a master-morality and a slave-morality.

So great was his zeal for development that to him the Superman becomes the goal to which all nature turns. As the human species, the highest exemplification of life, depends for its sustenance upon the lower creation of animal and plant life, so it becomes a necessary correlate that the lower races of mankind should become subordinate to the purposes of those who stand for exalted ideals. The masses of mankind, the rabble, can be only a means to an end. And thus the beginning of a new era will see, first of all, a greater importance placed upon the highest types of men, and the factors that make for progress will not be sacrificed for the weak-minded, the mediocre, the halt, and those who possess a mere existence without a spark of the higher life. The Christian ethics and democracy are one in this emphasis of the commonplace, the lame, the passable, the merely existing, the many-too-many. They would be, nay, they are, the masters of human destiny, servants—they whose highest aim is a beggar's paradise, who "ask, and ask anew, how can a man keep on existing best, how can he live longest and most pleasantly."<sup>4</sup> Democracy has millions for reformatories, homes, asylums, and never once inquires whether its exalted spirits live or perish. Comfort, the external conveniences of life, the faint happiness of the greatest number, a mendicant mediocrity, the sacrifice of the truly distinguished for those who know not for what purpose they be, the supermen for slaves—such is for Nietzsche the spirit of our times. Yet in his prophetic exaltation he sees a better time to come. Then supermen will be the glory of the race, and the many will find their reason for existence in cherishing and sustaining the highest types of men. They will recognize the fact that they are properly slaves, without independent thought and initiative, and so properly under the direction of such as can provide form and dignity, ends and purposes, an upward and onward movement for all.

Thus a double standard of morality results, one for supermen, another for those dependent upon their guidance. Manifestly, the virtues of exalted character positing its own law are other than those of obedience to authority. And there can be no hope for supermen if one slave equals one superman. Therefore, while

<sup>4</sup> Also sprach Zarathustra, p. 419.

the latter holds his intelligent will to be the only law, "everything being allowed while nothing is true" (*nichts ist wahr, alles ist erlaubt*), the dependent personality will still cherish the self-denying, sacrificing, pitying, poor-in-spirit service-morality.

Christianity, like democracy, makes the fundamental error of supposing all men to be equal. "Man is man before God, we are all alike,"<sup>5</sup> says the Christian, and the principle is one which brings our philosopher to express himself as never man did before, to my knowledge, in the bitterest tones of derision and contempt for our most cherished hopes and beliefs. All religion he holds to be the fabric of dreams, even as pure philosophy arose from delusion and the failure to see distinctly. The other self appearing in dreams gave rise to the belief in souls and future existence. Cowardice and fear for moral principles started the fiction of rewards and punishments and final judgments. All religious phenomena Nietzsche believes explicable as psychological aberration and reading into experience what is not to be found there. Thus auto-suggestion produces the consciousness both of sin and deliverance from sin and of the efficacy of prayer. For Zarathustra, who is of course Nietzsche himself, God is dead; God, too, was, and is, a delusion. Our philosopher, wandering through the earth, meets in a far-off wood a holy man who is singing praises to God as in loneliness he climbs his mountain-side. He is intoning ancient psalms and muttering to himself. "Can it be," exclaimed Zarathustra, "this old saint has not yet heard in his wood that God is dead?" "Such are despisers of life," he continues, "decaying men, such as have poisoned themselves, and of whom the earth is weary." "I beseech you, my brethren, remain true to earth, and do not believe such as speak of hopes for other worlds. They are poisoners, whether they know it or not."<sup>6</sup> Thus our concerns are confined entirely to earth; and bitterly does our atheist curse those who yearn for other worlds. "May they pass hence, earth is weary of these weaklings; let them have their eternal reward," he cries in derision. "We," he calls to his disciples, of whom there were none at that time, "we shall be satisfied with earth," with its seas and skies and green grass, with its struggles and joys, and, best of all, its glorious end.

<sup>5</sup> Also sprach Zarathustra, p. 417.

<sup>6</sup> Also sprach Zarathustra, p. 12.

Christianity is for Nietzsche the very type of Asiatic despotism, which still holds sway over the minds of men like a blight. Its fabled concepts might, as such, be quite harmless if it were not for the fact that their moral influence is degrading to the personality, inasmuch as they set forth self-denial, self-sacrifice, humiliation, dependence, the delusion of sin, depravity, and the feeble yearning for a world where there shall be a compensation for present weakness and meanness of spirit. He reviles the gentle carpenter's son who taught for the poor in spirit, the halt, the blind, babes and sucklings, and those who long for other worlds. "Strange," he exclaims, "that a crucified Jew these many centuries ago should have made so great a stir in the world." The time will come, Nietzsche maintains, when men will be brave enough to face the fact that our destiny is irretrievably bound up with earth, and that it is futile to hope for heaven, or a resurrection, or the horror of everlasting life, or the justice of a God whom mankind have themselves created. The time will come when man himself, or rather the Superman, will become an object of religion.

This is the religion of the future, of which we hear so much in Germany today. "See, I teach you the Superman," says Nietzsche. "Man is something that must be overcome. What have you done to overcome him? All beings heretofore have created something higher than themselves, and would you be the ebb of this great flood and rather go back to the beast than overcome the human? What is an ape to a man? A derision or a poignant shame. Just that a man should be to the Superman—a derision or a poignant shame." Conversion to this evolutionary religion is a sort of recognition of depravity, for "it is the hour of scorn, the hour in which your fortune becomes despicable, likewise your reason and your virtue. The hour in which you say, 'What is there in my fortune? It is poverty and filth and a beggarly complacency.' The hour in which you say, 'What is there in my reason? Does it demand knowledge as the lion its food? It is poverty and filth and a beggarly complacency.' The hour in which you say, 'What is there to my virtue? It has not yet made me to exult with ecstasy. How weary am I of my Good and my Evil. All that is poverty and filth and beggarly complacency."

gency.' Have ye thus spoken? Have ye thus cried? Ah, that I had heard you crying thus! It is not your sin: it is your self-satisfaction which clamors to the heavens. Where is the lightning that may lick you with its tongue? Where is the inner intoxication with which you may be inoculated? See, I teach you the Superman; he is this lightning, he is this inner intoxication, he is the sense of the earth!"

This is the kind of religion, this the style of its sacred book. Is it a wonder that in our age of transition both the ideas and the fervid diction should have fascinated all young Germany? Before we consider Nietzsche's influence, however, let us examine the ideas more critically, and first of all ask ourselves the question, Upon what basis does the author frame his judgments? Doubtless it will be an interesting surprise to many American and English pragmatists to learn that Nietzsche has anticipated all their principal doctrines. He argues:<sup>7</sup> Formerly one asked how truth might be possible and knowledge attainable; the Sphinx's questions being meanwhile accepted as something original, absolute, and requiring no justification. He proposes to ask the Sphinx a question, namely, "Why answer your questions?" In other words, what is the cause of this desire for truth, and wherein lies the value of it? Why choose "truth" rather than "falsehood," and why not rather the latter than the former? He finds them by no means opposites, since that which makes truth valuable is a quality which may be held in common by falsehood. For the criterion of value requires us to measure judgments from the standpoint of the furtherance and maintenance of life, biologically speaking; and, psychologically, that which produces satisfaction is "true." With the knowledge of things, therefore, the "truth" has nothing to do. Indeed, Nietzsche maintains "that the falsest judgments (among which are synthetic judgments *a priori*) are most indispensable for us; that without granting the validity of logical fictions, or without measuring reality with a fancied world, the 'equal to itself,' the 'absolute,' . . . life under the present conditions would not be possible, that a surrender of false judgments would be a surrender of life, a diminution of life"; and therefore "the falsity of a judgment is no objection to it." Life provides

<sup>7</sup> Vol. vii, pp. 9-22 (1884).

for itself, and chooses the form of knowing which it needs. And thus it is a biological necessity for us to accept the space-time-cause character of our surroundings and the (possibly false) axiom that appearance is correlated with the laws of thought. The concept "truth" is therefore contradictory, since truth cannot extend to the relation of knowing to being, but is necessarily restricted to the relationships of the knowers to one another and to their presentations. In the sense of a correspondence of knowing with reality, there is, then, for Nietzsche no truth. His "truth" becomes Schiller's practical value, utility, James's "what we want," Dewey's psychological satisfaction—that which furthers the life of the individual, the species, the race. What is injurious to life is false for us. And since life for Nietzsche is the "will for power," that which serves the latter is true. Similarly, the test of truth lies in the practical operation of it. "That by which I am thwarted or destroyed is not true for me. It means a false relationship of my being to other things. For there are only individual truths; an absolute relationship is nonsense."<sup>8</sup> Again, he emphasizes the social, linguistic, national, racial elements, which by utility determine the relative truth or falsity of judgments. Truth is a subconscious phenomenon—nothing more.<sup>9</sup> Nor is there need of an absolute truth; it will suffice for life that we believe ourselves in the possession of truth. Life requires illusions: man is not primarily a knowing being; his intellect is but a means for the maintenance of his life.<sup>10</sup>

We may say, therefore, that in so far as Nietzsche was a philosopher, he was a philosopher of culture. His judgments are largely aesthetic, biological, judgments of practical value; and concepts such as the "*Wille zur Macht*," the "*Ewige Wiederkunft*," and other distinctly metaphysical theories seem incorporated in spite of himself. And, doubtless, in questions which are properly pragmatic, the only answer is the testing. So that culture does in reality become largely a function of the will. So far, then, Nietzsche was justified in striving to inspire enthusiasm for his ideal of the Superman. Only history would tell whether or not he were in the right. And criticism, from the very nature of the case, must needs be aesthetic or historical.

<sup>8</sup> Vol. xi, Aphor. 6, 208.

<sup>9</sup> Vol. x, p. 185.

<sup>10</sup> Vol. x, pp. 161, 186.



With reference, then, to the positing of individuality, the central doctrine in the "*Umwertung aller Werte*," and the desire of Nietzsche to inoculate modern life with more of the Greek spirit, those who are acquainted with its heritage will say that this was a laudable end. Yet he failed to see that his modification of Schopenhauer's Will is quite at variance with Greek form, poise, self-restraint. With all the hundreds of personally striking men, individuals whose influence has spread throughout the world of European culture, I know of none, except perhaps Callicles as presented in Plato's *Gorgias*, who deliberately inflicted his personality upon his times. Among Athenian citizens, where were individual initiative, the liberty of mind and body, and the most favorable conditions the world has yet seen for the free exercise of activity, exulting in physical, intellectual, and artistic pursuits, the result was not the assertion of self, but the exact opposite, the *mesotes*, the happy mean, of Aristotle. Thus we have in Attic life, with all the intensity of that life, not supermen, consciously rejoicing in their strength, every man a would-be exponent of will, determined to assert himself, but rather a constant feeling of self-restraint in conduct, of modesty with reference to knowledge and ability, of form with reference to art.

In a similar way we can prove upon historical grounds that master-and-slave morality, in the sense of license and submission, contains its own disintegrating factors. From the very nature of circumstances, our wills may no more be licensed than our heads may soar above our bodies. Nor have moral principles generally, any more than words and grammar, been the creations of strong wills who said, "Go to." Ethics, like language, is an absurdity when reduced to the individual, apart, of course, from religious presuppositions. The moral genius and the man of letters, great as their influence may be, are not the creators of language, nor of the sense of what is right. Nietzsche erred here through passionate enthusiasm for the Lord and Hero, and his moral liberty is but licensed anarchy. Grant, however, that as fellow-men we share our moral antecedents, and that if we live together we are bound to live as men, just as we communicate by means of common terms, then—stripped of hyperbole—supermen might well become saviours of society. For, spiritually interpreted, this superior man,

by positing ends and ideals, might help to overcome the rabble in the sense of mediocrity, vulgarity, and lust of material power. Dignity of life and institutions, the imperatives of evolution, all the elements which stimulate our aspirations for the higher values of thought and feeling, are largely a function of exalted leadership. That democracy stands in the way of evolution by conditioning these highest individuals is manifestly false where a free field and no favor obtains. Only a democracy in which material ends are the highest good profanes the individual. Two types of supermen should therefore be differentiated. If he whose aim is but to have and to hold is a danger in proportion to his power, he whose aristocracy consists of disinterested and pre-eminent ability is a public boon. Give us such supermen, and let them assume their proper sphere as leaders. Such are, indeed, the only hope against rabble-democracy.

Nietzsche's individual ethics thus becomes a possible school for dignity, if we distinguish rightly between license and liberty, between libertines and lovers. The passionate poet of a higher humanity, arch-foe of weaklings, dependents, and pharisees, spake his Laconian nature in fire which is dangerous to our whole social structure. And yet the fire of this gentlest and kindest of men serves a purpose, if properly directed, on the hearthstone of our inner life. For our moral judgments are as much our own as are the apples of our eyes. And, after all, we are men, not cells; persons, not colonists, without dignity, undifferentiated. Nietzsche's revolt was against the modern volvox type of life, where men are mere cells in the communal lump. He prophesied for personalities, for independent thinkers, for men who feared no law as such, each imagination with its own Atlantis. And such can but add new values to our lives.

The religion of the Superman will need no lengthy discussion. From Nietzsche's moral theory it would not be difficult to surmise that religion, in any phase whatsoever, was necessarily abhorrent to him as a form of slavery to transmitted ideas. So far did his absolute individuality carry him that, like Oscar Wilde, if he discovered his own thoughts held in common by others, he was loath to retain them. Thus arose the defiant atheism which saw in all religious experience a stupendous emotional delusion. With

his positing of the individual, pious men must needs be to him like Don Quixote, who underestimated himself because he had constantly in mind the heroic deeds of the knights of romance. Thus, too, a fabled God whose essence was love and pure altruism, held up as a foil to man's necessarily egoistic actions, gave birth to feelings of shortcomings and distress, with the pangs of conscience and need of salvation. And similarly, if men could have realized that the concept of a being purely unegoistic is absurd (how could an ego act without an ego),—could men have compared themselves one with the other, and not with a thing more fabulous than the phoenix, they would have had a greater respect for themselves. Sin would be no more. And with the elimination of responsibility could but come the philosophic conviction that every act is unconditionally necessary. Thus it was that this prophet of individualism sought to confine the interests of men to earth, and bade them boldly face extinction nor hope for other reward.

But let us for a moment inquire how a "false psychology, a fantastic explanation of motives and experiences," could have seduced and degraded even to pusillanimity a "necessarily egoistic" human nature. How came comparison with others and with the "fabled God" in a race where altruism is but a disease? A "necessarily egoistic" nature must have found it equally necessary to compare itself with others and to adjust itself accordingly, for thence arose, we are told, our altruistic motives, our craving for the higher life beyond. And since our ancestors felt this need of a higher Being for their salvation and inner satisfaction, we have to deal with psychic facts as basic as any egoism. So that the question then becomes, Is the common yearning a disease, or may the isolated self-worship possibly be a form of egomania? "If there were gods, how could I endure it not to be one? Therefore there are none!" is an individualist's argument, based upon at least an exalted opinion of one's self. It was to Nietzsche's inner satisfaction to find in whatever contributed to the "*Wille zur Macht*," to the will of the individual man, nothing but truth; and so whatever conditioned the progress of his assumed Superman must of necessity be false. We need, therefore, fear no evil from his negation of religion. For, manifestly, where fundamen-

tal concepts are not to be decided by approximation with reality, a counter-judgment of value will suffice for our satisfaction. So that we need but to render unto the pragmatist the things which are his to retain our logical self-respect.

A few words will have to suffice with reference to Nietzsche's influence. The sudden expansion of the cult was and is one which well justifies the call of conservative men for "police, colleagues, government authorities." The spread of the theories which I have attempted to describe among the educated classes in Germany and France is comparable only to that of their opposite, socialism, among the third estate. France had, indeed, anticipated the Titan man and his individuality. La Rochefoucauld, long before, deprived Nietzsche of a possible claim to originality, and Renan was as much a hater of the dead level as ever man was. The factors which explain the sudden fashion into which Nietzsche sprang about 1890 are thus very complex. Among them we may note, in the first place, Schopenhauer's fundamental pessimism, crabbed and relentless, softened, indeed, in certain quarters by von Hartmann's rose-water, but generally despairing of any good in civil, educational, religious institutions; a spirit which revolts, to quote Otto Ludwig, against "our time of levelling, when everyone fears to show himself different from the others, when in reality the law of necessity prevails, since from childhood up the passions are deadened, and there are fast-bound arrangements with police on every hand . . . when individual intentions are adjusted to those of the common average man . . . and character shows itself only in its effects." Natural enough, with such a view of affairs, that individuality should seek to avenge itself. And in Germany it had been seeking to do so, according to Karl Lamprecht,<sup>11</sup> for sixty years or more of the "*subjektivistische Periode*." The age of Bismarck, Moltke, blood-and-iron, was culminating, and giving increased zeal to both socialist and Titan-man. Both were, and are, dissatisfied with aught but radical measures. There must be revolutionary readjustments, though the state be removed for the individual (Paul Heyse), or the higher classes be despoiled for the third estate (Karl Marx). The explosive violence and passionate diction of our poet well suited such a time. I think it

<sup>11</sup> Deutsche Geschichte, xi, p. 310.

no exaggeration to say that there are hundreds of young men in Germany today who echo the sentiment of their master, "If there were gods, how could I endure it not to be one?" At the universities, courses of lectures are now devoted to this philosopher. The publications of the *Archiv* at Weimar, in large and expensive editions, are sold in very unusual numbers. In addition to the exhaustive life published by his sister, a dozen men might be named who have written biographical works concerning him. The number of those who have written about his philosophy is legion; and almost without exception these books have been published since 1895. Höffding's and Windelband's Histories of Philosophy—the former published in 1900, the latter in 1891—never so much as mention his name. Yet Friedrich Nietzsche is now the prophet of a new age; *Also sprach Zarathustra* is to be its Bible. "Young Germany" finds the Fatherland in a condition of rapid decay; the new life will be for them the basis of a new culture. A new art, a new state or none, a new faith, a rejuvenation of the native spirit of the people—all these are supposed to be a function of the development of personality. Weinberg, Langbehn, Stephen George, Scharf, Conradi—such are, in varying degrees of intensity, supermen. In the winter of 1905, I attended a series of lectures given by Dr. Ernest Horneffer in Albert Hall, Leipzig. Thousands assembled there to listen to lectures and discussions on Nietzsche, and the meetings lasted usually from eight in the evening till midnight or later. In that hall one night, as the clock was striking twelve, the lecturer sent forth the following challenge, "Let those who no longer find the idea, God, necessary, rise to their feet, and so declare their native dignity as men." The scene which followed was tragic. Perhaps two thousand declared by stamping of feet and shouting and waving of hands that they approved of the speaker's proposition.

In art it would be by no means difficult to show the relation between Richard Strauss's deliberate infliction of unmitigated perversity and Young Germany's "Express thyself unconditionally." Nor can there be another motive, it seems to me, when Max Klinger paints "*Die blaue Stunde*"—a blue seashore, blue rocks, girl-forms by no means beautiful, nude and blue, blue fire;

it is, indeed, the expression of individuality. But we cannot go afield here. Suffice it that by way of example in literature we characterize Ludwig Scharf and his *Lieder eines Menschen*. His battle is against reality; he will have his "Beyond Good and Evil" applied there. He rages against the thousand-year-old prejudice—morality—and insists that the common right of man permits him to enjoy whatever his heart desires—after us the flood! So he is determined with clenched fist to declare the evil of religion, of any cult whatsoever, of any state, of any occupation, of any civilization. He will express himself once for all, and enjoy himself. We can hear plainly enough the cause of all this bitterness and revolt. If it had been possible for him, for his pure ego and for no one else, to sit comfortably in his chariot and be drawn in triumph by his contemporaries, if his individuality could but have been recognized, all would have been otherwise. And it is not difficult to see that it is only his tragic want of energy which conditions his practical exemplification of the Superman. And Scharf feels it plainly enough, but he *will* not know it, he *will* not admit it. *Ab uno disce ceteros.*

Max Nordau considers all this one of twenty-five or more insanities; Raoul Richter, clear-headed professor of philosophy at Leipzig, finds Nietzsche the Dionysiac embodiment of a coming *Weltanschauung*; Doctor Rudolf Eisler, of Vienna, sees in him a naturalistic pantheist, who might well be the John the Baptist for a voluntaristic panentheist; Arthur Moeller-Bruck speaks of him as the *candāla* Nietzsche; Professor Karl Lamprecht recognizes in him the culmination of the Carlyle-Emerson hero-worship, the destruction of pessimism by joyful affirmation of this life and of creative will, the turning-point to a new religion of yearning for higher values and eternal life through the course of nature and will. As for us, when this age of transition is past, let us hope that there may be more religion, less individuality, greater consistency, and, if possible, greater love of the beautiful, than are found in the works of Friedrich Nietzsche.

## BOOKS RECEIVED

- A VALID CHRISTIANITY FOR TODAY. *By Charles D. Williams.* 8vo, pp. 12+289. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1909. \$1.50 net.
- REGINALD PECOCK'S BOOK OF FAITH; A FIFTEENTH CENTURY THEOLOGICAL TRACTATE. *Edited from the MS. in the Library of Trinity College, Cambridge, by J. L. Morison.* 8vo, pp. 315. Glasgow: James Maclehose & Sons. 1909. 5 Shillings.
- THE FAITH AND WORKS OF CHRISTIAN SCIENCE. *By the Writer of "Confessio Medici."* 8vo, pp. 12+232. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1909. \$1.25 net.
- VALUATION ITS NATURE AND LAWS; BEING AN INTRODUCTION TO THE GENERAL THEORY OF VALUE. *By Wilbur Marshall Urban.* 8vo, pp. 18+433. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1909. \$2.75 net.
- CHRIST AND THE EASTERN SOUL; THE WITNESS OF THE ORIENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS TO JESUS CHRIST. *By Charles Cuthbert Hall.* 8vo, pp. 42+208. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1909. \$1.37.
- THE TEACHING OF JESUS ABOUT THE FUTURE, ACCORDING TO THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS. *By Henry Burton Sharman.* 8vo, pp. 14+382. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1909. \$3.00.
- LES CHRÉTIENS ET L'EMPIRE ROMAIN À L'ÉPOQUE DU NOUVEAU TESTAMENT. *Par Maurice Goguel.* 8vo, pp. 32. Paris: Librairie Fischbacher. 1908.
- THE LEXICOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL STUDY OF Διαθήκη FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE END OF THE CLASSICAL PERIOD. *By Frederick Owen Norton.* (Historical and Linguistic Studies, Series II., Vol. 1, part 6.) 8vo, pp. 71. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1908. 79 cents.
- THE IRENAEUS TESTIMONY TO THE FOURTH GOSPEL—ITS EXTENT, MEANING, AND VALUE. *By Frank Grant Lewis.* (Historical and Linguistic Studies, Series II., Vol. 1, part 7.) 8vo, pp. 64. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1908. 54 cents.

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- STUDIES IN MYSTICAL RELIGION.** *By Rufus M. Jones.* 8vo, pp. 38+518. London: Macmillan and Company. 1909. \$3.50.
- MISERY AND ITS CAUSES.** *By Edward T. Devine.* 8vo, pp. 12+274. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1909. \$1.25 net.
- ARTAXERXES III., OCHUS, AND HIS REIGN.** *By Noah Calvin Hirschy.* 8vo, pp. 6+85. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1909. 81 cents.
- SPINOZA'S SHORT TREATISE ON GOD, MAN AND HUMAN WELFARE.** *Translated from the Dutch by Lydia Gillingham Robinson.* 8vo, pp. 24+178. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company. 1909. 50 cents.
- THE PAPACY; THE IDEA AND ITS EXPONENTS.** *By Gustav Krüger.* (Crown Theological Library.) 8vo, pp. 277. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1909. \$1.50 net.
- THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE BIBLE.** *By Ferdinand S. Schenck.* 8vo, pp. 428. New York: The Board of Publication of the Reformed Church in America. 1909. \$1.50 net.





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As students in this summer's School of Theology you have attended a series of lectures on fluctuations in religious interest, on the frequent occurrence of religious declines followed soon by recoveries or regenerations both within and without the churches, on the frequent attempts to bring the prevalent religious doctrines into harmony with new tendencies in the intellectual world, on the constant struggle between conservatism and liberalism in existing churches and between idealism and materialism in society at large, on the effects of popular education and the modern spirit of inquiry on religious doctrines and organizations, on the changed views of thinking people concerning the nature of the world and of man, on the increase of knowledge as affecting religion, and on the new ideas of God. You have also listened to lectures on psychotherapy, a new development of an ancient tendency to mix religion with medicine, and on the theory of evolution, a modern scientific doctrine which within fifty years has profoundly modified the religious conceptions and expectations of many thinking people. You have heard, too, how the new ideas of democracy and social progress have modified and ought to modify not only the actual work done by the churches, but the whole conception of the function of churches. Again, you have heard how many and how profound are the

<sup>1</sup>A lecture delivered at the close of the Eleventh Session of the Harvard Summer School of Theology, July 22, 1909.

religious implications in contemporary philosophy. Your attention has been called to the most recent views concerning the conservation of energy in the universe, to the wonderful phenomena of radio-activity, and to the most recent definitions of atom, molecule, ion, and electron—human imaginings which have much to do with the modern conceptions of matter and spirit. The influence on popular religion of modern scholarship applied to the New Testament has also engaged your attention; and, finally, you have heard an exposition of religious conditions and practices in the United States which assumed an intimate connection between the advance of civilization and the contemporaneous aspects of religions, and illustrated from history the service of religion—and particularly of Christianity—to the progress of civilization through its contributions to individual freedom, intellectual culture, and social coöperation.

The general impression you have received from this comprehensive survey must surely be that religion is not a fixed, but a fluent thing. It is, therefore, wholly natural and to be expected that the conceptions of religion prevalent among educated people should change from century to century. Modern studies in comparative religion and in the history of religions demonstrate that such has been the case in times past. Now the nineteenth century immeasurably surpassed all preceding centuries in the increase of knowledge, and in the spread of the spirit of scientific inquiry and of the passion for truth-seeking. Hence the changes in religious beliefs and practices, and in the relation of churches to human society as a whole, were much deeper and more extensive in that century than ever before in the history of the world; and the approach made to the embodiment in the actual practices of mankind of the doctrines of the greatest religious teachers was more significant and more rapid than ever before. The religion of a multitude of humane persons in the twentieth century may, therefore, be called without inexcusable exaggeration a "new religion,"—not that a single one of its doctrines and practices is really new in essence, but only that the wider acceptance and better actual application of truths familiar in the past at many times and places, but never taken to heart by the multitude or put in force on a large scale, are new. I shall

attempt to state without reserve and in simplest terms free from technicalities, first, what the religion of the future seems likely not to be, and secondly, what it may reasonably be expected to be. My point of view is that of an American layman, whose observing and thinking life has covered the extraordinary period since the *Voyage of the Beagle* was published, anaesthesia and the telegraph came into use, Herbert Spencer issued his first series of papers on evolution, Kuenen, Robertson Smith, and Wellhausen developed and vindicated Biblical criticism, J. S. Mill's *Principles of Political Economy* appeared, and the United States by going to war with Mexico set in operation the forces which abolished slavery on the American continent—the period within which mechanical power came to be widely distributed through the explosive engine and the applications of electricity, and all the great fundamental industries of civilized mankind were reconstructed.

(1) The religion of the future will not be based on authority, either spiritual or temporal. The decline of the reliance upon absolute authority is one of the most significant phenomena of the modern world. This decline is to be seen everywhere,—in government, in education, in the church, in business, and in the family. The present generation is willing, and indeed often eager, to be led; but it is averse to being driven, and it wants to understand the grounds and sanctions of authoritative decisions. As a rule, the Christian churches, Roman, Greek, and Protestant, have heretofore relied mainly upon the principle of authority, the Reformation having substituted for an authoritative church an authoritative book; but it is evident that the authority both of the most authoritative churches and of the Bible as a verbally inspired guide is already greatly impaired, and that the tendency towards liberty is progressive, and among educated men irresistible.

(2) It is hardly necessary to say that in the religion of the future there will be no personifications of the primitive forces of nature, such as light, fire, frost, wind, storm, and earthquake, although primitive religions and the actual religions of barbarous or semi-civilized peoples abound in such personifications. The mountains, groves, volcanoes, and oceans will no longer be inhabited by either kindly or malevolent deities; although man will still look

to the hills for rest, still find in the ocean a symbol of infinity, and refreshment and delight in the forests and the streams. The love of nature mounts and spreads, while faith in fairies, imps, nymphs, demons, and angels declines and fades away.

(3) There will be in the religion of the future no worship, express or implied, of dead ancestors, teachers, or rulers; no more tribal, racial, or tutelary gods; no identification of any human being, however majestic in character, with the Eternal Deity. In these respects the religion of the future will not be essentially new, for nineteen centuries ago Jesus said, "Neither in this mountain, nor in Jerusalem, shall ye worship the Father. . . . God is a Spirit; and they that worship him must worship in spirit and truth." It should be recognized, however, first, that Christianity was soon deeply affected by the surrounding paganism, and that some of these pagan intrusions have survived to this day; and secondly, that the Hebrew religion, the influence of which on the Christian has been, and is, very potent, was in the highest degree a racial religion, and its Holy of Holies was local. In war-times, that is, in times when the brutal or savage instincts remaining in humanity become temporarily dominant, and goodwill is limited to people of the same nation, the survival of a tribal or national quality in institutional Christianity comes out very plainly. The aid of the Lord of Hosts is still invoked by both parties to international warfare, and each side praises and thanks Him for its successes. Indeed, the same spirit has often been exhibited in civil wars caused by religious differences.

"Now glory to the Lord of Hosts, from whom all glories are!  
And glory to our sovereign liege, King Henry of Navarre!"

It is not many years since an Archbishop of Canterbury caused thanks to be given in all Anglican churches that the Lord of Hosts had been in the English camp over against the Egyptians. Heretofore the great religions of the world have held out hopes of direct interventions of the deity, or some special deity, in favor of his faithful worshippers. It was the greatest of Jewish prophets who told King Hezekiah that the King of Assyria, who had approached Jerusalem with a great army, should not come into

the city nor shoot an arrow there, and reported the Lord as saying, "I will defend this city to save it, for my own sake, and for my servant David's sake." "And it came to pass that night, that the angel of the Lord went forth, and smote in the camp of the Assyrians an hundred fourscore and five thousand: and when men arose early in the morning, behold, they were all dead corpses." The new religion cannot promise that sort of aid to either nations or individuals in peril.

(4) In the religious life of the future the primary object will not be the personal welfare or safety of the individual in this world or any other. That safety, that welfare or salvation, may be incidentally secured, but it will not be the prime object in view. The religious person will not think of his own welfare or security, but of service to others, and of contributions to the common good. The new religion will not teach that character is likely to be suddenly changed, either in this world or in any other,—although in any world a sudden opportunity for improvement may present itself, and the date of that opportunity may be a precious remembrance. The new religion will not rely on either a sudden conversion in this world or a sudden paradise in the next, from out a sensual, selfish, or dishonest life. It will teach that repentance wipes out nothing in the past, and is only the first step towards reformation, and a sign of a better future.

(5) The religion of the future will not be propitiatory, sacrificial, or expiatory. In primitive society fear of the supernal powers, as represented in the awful forces of nature, was the root of religion. These dreadful powers must be propitiated or placated, and they must be propitiated by sacrifices in the most literal sense; and the supposed offences of man must be expiated by sufferings, which were apt to be vicarious. Even the Hebrews offered human sacrifices for generations; and always a great part of their religious rites consisted in sacrifices of animals. The Christian church made a great step forward when it substituted the burning of incense for the burning of bullocks and doves; but to this day there survives not only in the doctrines but in the practices of the Christian church the principle of expiatory sacrifice. It will be an immense advance if twentieth-century Christianity can be purified from all these survivals of barbarous, or

semi-barbarous, religious conceptions, because they imply such an unworthy idea of God.

(6) The religion of the future will not perpetuate the Hebrew anthropomorphic representations of God, conceptions which were carried in large measure into institutional Christianity. It will not think of God as an enlarged and glorified man, who walks "in the garden in the cool of the day," or as a judge deciding between human litigants, or as a king, Pharaoh, or emperor, ruling arbitrarily his subjects, or as the patriarch who, in the early history of the race, ruled his family absolutely. These human functions will cease to represent adequately the attributes of God. The nineteenth century has made all these conceptions of deity look archaic and crude.

(7) The religion of the future will not be gloomy, ascetic, or maledictory. It will not deal chiefly with sorrow and death, but with joy and life. It will not care so much to account for the evil and the ugly in the world as to interpret the good and the beautiful. It will believe in no malignant powers—neither in Satan nor in witches, neither in the evil eye nor in the malign suggestion. When its disciple encounters a wrong or evil in the world, his impulse will be to search out its origin, source, or cause, that he may attack it at its starting-point. He may not speculate on the origin of evil in general, but will surely try to discover the best way to eradicate the particular evil or wrong he has recognized.

Having thus considered what the religion of the future will not be, let us now consider what its positive elements will be.

The new thought of God will be its most characteristic element. This ideal will comprehend the Jewish Jehovah, the Christian Universal Father, the modern physicist's omnipresent and exhaustless Energy, and the biological conception of a Vital Force. The Infinite Spirit pervades the universe, just as the spirit of a man pervades his body, and acts, consciously or unconsciously, in every atom of it. The twentieth century will accept literally and implicitly St. Paul's statement, "In Him we live, and move, and have our being," and God is that vital atmosphere, or incessant inspiration. The new religion is therefore thoroughly mono-

theistic, its God being the one infinite force; but this one God is not withdrawn or removed, but indwelling, and especially dwelling in every living creature. God is so absolutely immanent in all things, animate and inanimate, that no mediation is needed between him and the least particle of his creation. In his moral attributes, he is for every man the multiplication to infinity of all the noblest, tenderest, and most potent qualities which that man has ever seen or imagined in a human being. In this sense every man makes his own picture of God. Every age, barbarous or civilized, happy or unhappy, improving or degenerating, frames its own conception of God within the limits of its own experiences and imaginings. In this sense, too, a humane religion has to wait for a humane generation. The central thought of the new religion will therefore be a humane and worthy idea of God, thoroughly consistent with the nineteenth-century revelations concerning man and nature, and with all the tenderest and love-liest teachings which have come down to us from the past.

The scientific doctrine of one omnipresent, eternal Energy, informing and inspiring the whole creation at every instant of time and throughout the infinite spaces, is fundamentally and completely inconsistent with the dualistic conception which sets spirit over against matter, good over against evil, man's wickedness against God's righteousness, and Satan against Christ. The doctrine of God's immanence is also inconsistent with the conception that he once set the universe a-going, and then withdrew, leaving the universe to be operated under physical laws, which were his vicegerents or substitutes. If God is thoroughly immanent in the entire creation, there can be no "secondary causes," in either the material or the spiritual universe. The new religion rejects absolutely the conception that man is an alien in the world, or that God is alienated from the world. It rejects also the entire conception of man as a fallen being, hopelessly wicked, and tending downward by nature; and it makes this emphatic rejection of long-accepted beliefs because it finds them all inconsistent with a humane, civilized, or worthy idea of God.

If, now, man discovers God through self-consciousness, or, in other words, if it is the human soul through which God is revealed, the race has come to the knowledge of God through knowledge



of itself; and the best knowledge of God comes through knowledge of the best of the race. Men have always attributed to man a spirit distinct from his body, though immanent in it. No one of us is willing to identify himself with his body; but on the contrary every one now believes, and all men have believed, that there is in a man an animating, ruling, characteristic essence, or spirit, which is himself. This spirit, dull or bright, petty or grand, pure or foul, looks out of the eyes, sounds in the voice, and appears in the bearing and manners of each individual. It is something just as real as the body, and more characteristic. To every influential person it gives far the greater part of his power. It is what we call the personality. This spirit, or soul, is the most effective part of every human being, and is recognized as such, and always has been. It can use a fine body more effectively than it can a poor body, but it can do wonders through an inadequate body. In the crisis of a losing battle, it is a human soul that rallies the flying troops. It looks out of flashing eyes, and speaks in ringing tones, but its appeal is to other souls, and not to other bodies. In the midst of terrible natural catastrophes,—earthquakes, storms, conflagrations, volcanic eruptions,—when men's best works are being destroyed and thousands of lives are ceasing suddenly and horribly, it is not a few especially good human bodies which steady the survivors, maintain order, and organize the forces of rescue and relief. It is a few superior souls. The leading men and women in any society, savage or civilized, are the strongest personalities,—the personality being primarily spiritual, and only secondarily bodily. Recognizing to the full these simple and obvious facts, the future religion will pay homage to all righteous and loving persons who in the past have exemplified, and made intelligible to their contemporaries, intrinsic goodness and effluent good-will. It will be an all-saints religion. It will treasure up all tales of human excellence and virtue. It will reverence the discoverers, teachers, martyrs, and apostles of liberty, purity, and righteousness. It will respect and honor all strong and lovely human beings,—seeing in them in finite measure qualities similar to those which they adore in God. Recognizing in every great and lovely human person an individual will-power which is the essence of the personality, it will naturally and inevitably attribute

to God a similar individual will-power, the essence of his infinite personality. In this simple and natural faith there will be no place for metaphysical complexities or magical rites, much less for obscure dogmas, the result of compromises in turbulent conventions. It is anthropomorphic; but what else can a human view of God's personality be? The finite can study and describe the infinite only through analogy, parallelism, and simile; but that is a good way. The new religion will animate and guide ordinary men and women who are putting into practice religious conceptions which result directly from their own observation and precious experience of tenderness, sympathy, trust, and solemn joy. It will be most welcome to the men and women who cherish and exhibit incessant, all-comprehending good-will. These are the "good" people. These are the only genuinely civilized persons.

To the wretched, sick, and downtrodden of the earth, religion has in the past held out hopes of future compensation. When precious ties of affection have been broken, religion has held out prospects of immediate and eternal blessings for the departed; and has promised happy reunions in another and a better world. To a human soul, lodged in an imperfect, feeble, or suffering body, some of the older religions have held out the expectation of deliverance by death, and of entrance upon a rich, competent, and happy life,—in short, for present human ills, however crushing, the widely accepted religions have offered either a second life, presumably immortal, under the happiest conditions, or at least peace, rest, and a happy oblivion. Can the future religion promise that sort of compensation for the ills of this world, any more than it can promise miraculous aid against threatened disaster? A candid reply to this inquiry involves the statement that in the future religion there will be nothing "supernatural." This does not mean that life will be stripped of mystery or wonder, or that the range of natural law has been finally determined; but that religion, like all else, must conform to natural law so far as the range of law has been determined. In this sense the religion of the future will be a natural religion. In all its theory and all its practice it will be completely natural. It will place no reliance on any sort of magic, or miracle, or other violation

of, or exception to, the laws of nature. It will perform no magical rites, use no occult processes, count on no abnormal interventions of supernal powers, and admit no possession of supernatural gifts, whether transmitted or conferred, by any tribe, class, or family of men. Its sacraments will be, not invasions of law by miracle, but the visible signs of a natural spiritual grace, or of a natural hallowed custom. It may preserve historical rites and ceremonies, which, in times past, have represented the expectation of magical or miraculous effects; but it will be content with natural interpretations of such rites and ceremonies. Its priests will be men especially interested in religious thought, possessing unusual gifts of speech on devotional subjects, and trained in the best methods of improving the social and industrial conditions of human life. There will always be need of such public teachers and spiritual leaders, heralds, and prophets. It should be observed, however, that many happenings and processes which were formerly regarded as supernatural have, with the increase of knowledge, come to be regarded as completely natural. The line between the supposed natural and the supposed supernatural is, therefore, not fixed but changeable.

It is obvious, therefore, that the completely natural quality of the future religion excludes from it many of the religious compensations and consolations of the past. Twentieth-century soldiers, going into battle, will not be able to say to each other, as Moslem soldiers did in the tenth century, "If we are killed today, we shall meet again tonight in Paradise." Even now, the mother who loses her babe, or the husband his wife, by a preventable disease, is seldom able to say simply, "It is the will of God! The babe—or the woman—is better off in heaven than on earth. I resign this dear object of love and devotion, who has gone to a happier world." The ordinary consolations of institutional Christianity no longer satisfy intelligent people whose lives are broken by the sickness or premature death of those they love. The new religion will not attempt to reconcile men and women to present ills by promises of future blessedness, either for themselves or for others. Such promises have done infinite mischief in the world, by inducing men to be patient under sufferings or deprivations against which they should have incessantly struggled. The

advent of a just freedom for the mass of mankind has been delayed for centuries by just this effect of compensatory promises issued by churches.

The religion of the future will approach the whole subject of evil from another side, that of resistance and prevention. The Breton sailor, who had had his arm poisoned by a dirty fish-hook which had entered his finger, made a votive offering at the shrine of the Virgin Mary, and prayed for a cure. The workman today, who gets cut or bruised by a rough or dirty instrument, goes to a surgeon, who applies an antiseptic dressing to the wound, and prevents the poisoning. That surgeon is one of the ministers of the new religion. When dwellers in a slum suffer the familiar evils caused by overcrowding, impure food, and cheerless labor, the modern true believers contend against the sources of such misery by providing public baths, playgrounds, wider and cleaner streets, better dwellings, and more effective schools,—that is, they attack the sources of physical and moral evil. The new religion cannot supply the old sort of consolation; but it can diminish the need of consolation, or reduce the number of occasions for consolation.

A further change in religious thinking has already occurred on the subject of human pain. Pain was generally regarded as a punishment for sin, or as a means of moral training, or as an expiation, vicarious or direct. Twentieth-century religion, gradually perfected in this respect during the last half of the nineteenth century, regards human pain as an evil to be relieved and prevented by the promptest means possible, and by any sort of available means, physical, mental, or moral; and, thanks to the progress of biological and chemical science, there is comparatively little physical pain nowadays which cannot be prevented or relieved. The invention of anaesthetics has brought into contempt the expiatory, or penal, view of human pain in this world. The younger generations listen with incredulous smiles to the objection made only a little more than sixty years ago by some divines of the Scottish Presbyterian church to the employment of chloroform in childbirth, namely, that the physicians were interfering with the execution of a curse pronounced by the Almighty. Dr. Weir Mitchell, a physician who has seen much of mental pain

as well as of bodily, in his poem read at the fiftieth anniversary of the first public demonstration of surgical anaesthesia, said of pain:

“What purpose hath it? Nay, thy quest is vain:  
Earth hath no answer: If the baffled brain  
Cries, 'Tis to warn, to punish, Ah, refrain!  
When writhes the child, beneath the surgeon's hand,  
What soul shall hope that pain to understand?  
Lo! Science falters o'er the hopeless task,  
And Love and Faith in vain an answer ask.” . . .

A similar change is occurring in regard to the conception of divine justice. The evils in this world have been regarded as penalties inflicted by a just God on human beings who had violated his laws; and the justice of God played a great part in his imagined dealings with the human race. A young graduate of Andover Theological Seminary once told me that when he had preached two or three times in summer in a small Congregational church on Cape Cod, one of the deacons of the church said to him at the close of the service, “What sort of sentimental mush is this that they are teaching you at Andover? You talk every Sunday about the love of God; we want to hear about his justice.” The future religion will not undertake to describe, or even imagine, the justice of God. We are today so profoundly dissatisfied with human justice, although it is the result of centuries of experience of social good and ill in this world, that we may well distrust human capacity to conceive of the justice of a morally perfect, infinite being. The civilized nations now recognize the fact that legal punishments usually fail of their objects, or cause wrongs and evils greater than those for which the punishments were inflicted; so that penology, or the science of penalties, has still to be created. It is only very lately that the most civilized communities began to learn how to deal with criminal tendencies in the young. In the eyes of God human beings must all seem very young. Since our ideas of God's modes of thinking and acting are necessarily based on the best human attainments in similar directions, the new religion cannot pretend to understand God's justice, inasmuch as there is no human experience of public justice fit to serve as the foundation for a true conception of God's. The new religion will

magnify and laud God's love and compassion, and will not venture to state what the justice of God may, or may not, require of himself, or of any of his finite creatures. This will be one of the great differences between the future religion and the past. Institutional Christianity as a rule condemned the mass of mankind to eternal torment; partly because the leaders of the churches thought they understood completely the justice of God, and partly because the exclusive possession of means of deliverance gave the churches some restraining influence over even the boldest sinners, and much over the timid. The new religion will make no such pretensions, and will teach no such horrible and perverse doctrines.

Do you ask what consolation for human ills the new religion will offer? I answer, the consolation which often comes to the sufferer from being more serviceable to others than he was before the loss or the suffering for which consolation is needed; the consolation of being one's self wiser and tenderer than before, and therefore more able to be serviceable to human kind in the best ways; the consolation through the memory, which preserves the sweet fragrance of characters and lives no longer in presence, recalls the joys and achievements of those lives while still within mortal view, and treasures up and multiplies the good influences they exerted. Moreover, such a religion has no tendency to diminish the force in this world, or any other, of the best human imaginings concerning the nature of the infinite Spirit immanent in the universe. It urges its disciples to believe that as the best and happiest man is he who best loves and serves, so the soul of the universe finds its perfect bliss and efficiency in supreme and universal love and service. It sees evidence in the moral history of the human race that a loving God rules the universe. Trust in this supreme rule is genuine consolation and support under many human trials and sufferings. Nevertheless, although brave and patient endurance of evils is always admirable, and generally happier than timid or impatient conduct under suffering or wrong, it must be admitted that endurance or constancy is not consolation, and that there are many physical and mental disabilities and injuries for which there is no consolation in a literal sense. Human skill may mitigate or palliate some of them, human sympathy and kindness may make them more

bearable, but neither religion nor philosophy offers any complete consolation for them, or ever has.

In thus describing the consolations for human woes and evils which such a religion can offer, its chief motives have been depicted. They are just those which Jesus said summed up all the commandments, love toward God and brotherliness to man. It will teach a universal good-will, under the influence of which men will do their duty, and at the same time, promote their own happiness. The devotees of a religion of service will always be asking what they can contribute to the common good; but their greatest service must always be to increase the stock of good-will among men. One of the worst of chronic human evils is working for daily bread without any interest in the work, and with ill-will towards the institution or person that provides the work. The work of the world must be done; and the great question is, shall it be done happily or unhappily? Much of it is today done unhappily. The new religion will contribute powerfully toward the reduction of this mass of unnecessary misery, and will do so chiefly by promoting good-will among men.

A paganized Hebrew-Christianity has unquestionably made much of personal sacrifice as a religious duty. The new religion will greatly qualify the supposed duty of sacrifice, and will regard all sacrifices as unnecessary and injurious, except those which love dictates and justifies. "Greater *love* hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends." Self-sacrifice is not a good or a merit in itself; it must be intelligent and loving to be meritorious, and the object in view must be worth its price. Giving up attractive pleasures or labors in favor of some higher satisfaction, or some engrossing work, is not self-sacrifice. It is a renunciation of inferior or irrelevant objects in favor of one superior object; it is only the intelligent inhibition of whatever distracts from the main pursuit, or the worthiest task. Here, again, the new religion will teach that happiness goes with dutifulness even in this world.

All the religions have been, to a greater or less extent, uplifting and inspiring, in the sense that they raised men's thoughts to some power above them, to some being or beings, which had

more power and more duration than the worshippers had. When kings or emperors were deified, they were idealized, and so lifted men's thoughts out of the daily round of their ordinary lives. As the objects of worship became nobler, purer, and kinder with the progress of civilization, the prevailing religion became more stimulating to magnanimity and righteousness. Will the future religion be as helpful to the spirit of man? Will it touch his imagination as the anthropomorphism of Judaism, polytheism, Islam, and paganized Christianity have done? Can it be as moving to the human soul as the deified powers of nature, the various gods and goddesses that inhabited sky, ocean, mountains, groves, and streams, or the numerous deities revered in the various Christian communions,—God the Father, the Son of God, the Mother of God, the Holy Ghost, and the host of tutelary saints? All these objects of worship have greatly moved the human soul, and have inspired men to thoughts and deeds of beauty, love, and duty. Will the new religion do as much? It is reasonable to expect that it will. The sentiments of awe and reverence, and the love of beauty and goodness, will remain, and will increase in strength and influence. All the natural human affections will remain in full force. The new religion will foster powerfully a virtue which is comparatively new in the world—the love of truth and the passion for seeking it, and the truth will progressively make men free; so that the coming generations will be freer, and therefore more productive and stronger than the preceding. The new religionists will not worship their ancestors; but they will have a stronger sense of the descent of the present from the past than men have ever had before, and each generation will feel more strongly than ever before its indebtedness to the preceding.

The two sentiments which most inspire men to good deeds are love and hope. Religion should give freer and more rational play to these two sentiments than the world has heretofore witnessed; and the love and hope will be thoroughly grounded in and on efficient, serviceable, visible, actual, and concrete deeds and conduct. When a man works out a successful treatment for cerebro-spinal meningitis—a disease before which medicine was absolutely helpless a dozen years ago—by applying to the



discovery of a remedy ideas and processes invented or developed by other men studying other diseases, he does a great work of love, prevents for the future the breaking of innumerable ties of love, and establishes good grounds for hope of many like benefits for human generations to come. The men who do such things in the present world are ministers of the religion of the future. The future religion will prove, has proved, as effective as any of the older ones in inspiring men to love and serve their fellow-beings,—and that is the true object and end of all philosophies and all religions; for that is the way to make men better and happier, alike the servants and the served.

The future religion will have the attribute of universality and of adaptability to the rapidly increasing stores of knowledge and power over nature acquired by the human race. As the religion of a child is inevitably very different from that of an adult, and must grow up with the child, so the religion of a race whose capacities are rapidly enlarging must be capable of a corresponding development. The religion of any single individual ought to grow up with him all the way from infancy to age; and the same is true of the religion of a race. It is bad for any people to stand still in their governmental conceptions and practices, or in the organization of their industries, or in any of their arts or trades, even the oldest; but it is much worse for a people to stand still in their religious conceptions and practices. Now, the new religion affords an indefinite scope, or range, for progress and development. It rejects all the limitations of family, tribal, or national religion. It is not bound to any dogma, creed, book, or institution. It has the whole world for the field of the loving labors of its disciples; and its fundamental precept of serviceableness admits an infinite variety and range in both time and space. It is very simple, and therefore possesses an important element of durability. It is the complicated things that get out of order. Its symbols will not relate to sacrifice or dogma; but it will doubtless have symbols, which will represent its love of liberty, truth, and beauty. It will also have social rites and reverent observances; for it will wish to commemorate the good thoughts and deeds which have come down from former generations. It will have its saints; but its canonizations will be

based on grounds somewhat new. It will have its heroes; but they must have shown a loving, disinterested, or protective courage. It will have its communions, with the Great Spirit, with the spirits of the departed, and with living fellow-men of like minds. Working together will be one of its fundamental ideas,—of men with God, of men with prophets, leaders, and teachers, of men with one another, of men's intelligence with the forces of nature. It will teach only such uses of authority as are necessary to secure the coöperation of several or many people to one end; and the discipline it will advocate will be training in the development of coöperative good-will.

Will such a religion as this make progress in the twentieth-century world? You have heard in this Summer School of Theology much about the conflict between materialism and religious idealism, the revolt against long-accepted dogmas, the frequent occurrence of waves of reform, sweeping through and sometimes over the churches, the effect of modern philosophy, ethical theories, social hopes, and democratic principles on the established churches, and the abandonment of churches altogether by a large proportion of the population in countries mainly Protestant. You know, too, how other social organizations have, in some considerable measure, taken the place of churches. Millions of Americans find in Masonic organizations, lodges of Odd Fellows, benevolent and fraternal societies, granges, and trades-unions, at once their practical religion, and the satisfaction of their social needs. So far as these multifarious organizations carry men and women out of their individual selves, and teach them mutual regard and social and industrial coöperation, they approach the field and functions of the religion of the future. The Spiritualists, Christian Scientists, and mental healers of all sorts manifest a good deal of ability to draw people away from the traditional churches, and to discredit traditional dogmas and formal creeds. Nevertheless, the great mass of the people remain attached to the traditional churches, and are likely to remain so,—partly because of their tender associations with churches in the grave crises of life, and partly because their actual mental condition still permits them to accept the beliefs they have inherited or been taught while young. The new religion

will therefore make but slow progress, so far as outward organization goes. It will, however, progressively modify the creeds and religious practices of all the existing churches, and change their symbolism and their teachings concerning the conduct of life. Since its chief doctrine is the doctrine of a sublime unity of substance, force, and spirit, and its chief precept is, Be serviceable, it will exert a strong uniting influence among men.

Christian unity has always been longed for by devout believers, but has been sought in impossible ways. Authoritative churches have tried to force everybody within their range to hold the same opinions and unite in the same observances, but they have won only temporary and local successes. As freedom has increased in the world, it has become more and more difficult to enforce even outward conformity; and in countries where church and state have been separated, a great diversity of religious opinions and practices has been expressed in different religious organizations, each of which commands the effective devotion of a fraction of the population. Since it is certain that men are steadily gaining more and more freedom in thought, speech, and action, civilized society might as well assume that it will be quite impossible to unite all religiously-minded people through any dogma, creed, ceremony, observance, or ritual. All these are divisive, not uniting, wherever a reasonable freedom exists. The new religion proposes as a basis of unity, first, its doctrine of an immanent and loving God, and secondly, its precept, Be serviceable to fellow-men. Already there are many signs in the free countries of the world that different religious denominations can unite in good work to promote human welfare. The support of hospitals, dispensaries, and asylums by persons connected with all sorts of religious denominations, the union of all denominations in carrying on Associated Charities in large cities, the success of the Young Men's Christian Associations, and the numerous efforts to form federations of kindred churches for practical purposes, all testify to the feasibility of extensive co-operation in good works. Again, the new religion cannot create any caste, ecclesiastical class, or exclusive sect founded on a rite. On these grounds it is not unreasonable to imagine that the new

religion will prove a unifying influence, and a strong reinforcement of democracy.

Whether it will prove as efficient to deter men from doing wrong and to encourage them to do right as the prevailing religions have been, is a question which only experience can answer. In these two respects neither the threats nor the promises of the older religions have been remarkably successful in society at large. The fear of hell has not proved effective to deter men from wrongdoing, and heaven has never yet been described in terms very attractive to the average man or woman. Both are indeed unimaginable. The great geniuses, like Dante and Swedenborg, have produced only fantastic and incredible pictures of either state. The modern man would hardly feel any appreciable loss of motive-power toward good or away from evil if heaven were burnt and hell quenched. The prevailing Christian conceptions of heaven and hell have hardly any more influence with educated people in these days than Olympus and Hades have. The modern mind craves an immediate motive or leading, good for today on this earth. The new religion builds on the actual experience of men and women, and of human society as a whole. The motive powers it relies on have been, and are, at work in innumerable human lives; and its beatific visions and its hopes are better grounded than those of traditional religion, and finer,—because free from all selfishness, and from the imagery of governments, courts, social distinctions, and war.

Finally, this twentieth-century religion is not only to be in harmony with the great secular movements of modern society—democracy, individualism, social idealism, the zeal for education, the spirit of research, the modern tendency to welcome the new, the fresh powers of preventive medicine, and the recent advances in business and industrial ethics—but also in essential agreement with the direct, personal teachings of Jesus, as they are reported in the Gospels. The revelation he gave to mankind thus becomes more wonderful than ever.

*WHAT IS VITAL IN CHRISTIANITY?*<sup>1</sup>

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I do not venture to meet this company as one qualified to preach, nor yet as an authority in matters which are technically theological. My contribution is intended to present some thoughts that have interested me as a student of philosophy. I hope that one or another of these thoughts may aid others in formulating their own opinions, and in defining their own religious interests, whether these interests and opinions are or are not in agreement with mine.

My treatment of the question, What is vital in Christianity? will involve a study of three different special questions, which I propose to discuss in order, as follows:

1. What sort of faith or of practice is it that can be called vital to any religion? That is, By what criteria, in the case of any religion, can that which is vital be distinguished from that which is not vital?

2. In the light of the criteria established by answering this first question, what are to be distinguished as the vital elements of Christianity?

3. What permanent value, and in particular what value for us today, have those ideas and practices and religious attitudes which we should hold to be vital for Christianity?

## I

The term *vital*, as here used, obviously involves a certain metaphor. That is vital for a living organism without which that organism cannot live. So breathing is a vital affair for us all. That is vital for an organic type which is so characteristic of that

<sup>1</sup>Three addresses given at the Phillips Brooks House, Harvard University, March 18 and 25 and April 1 1909.

type that, were such vital features changed, the type in question, if not altogether destroyed, would be changed into what is essentially another type. Thus the contrast between gill-breathing and lung-breathing appears to be vital for the organic types in question. When we treat the social and mental life which is characteristic of a religion as if it were the life of an organism, or of a type or group of organisms, we use the word vital in accordance with the analogies thus indicated.

If, with such a meaning of the word vital, we turn to the religions that exist among men, we find that any religion presents itself to an observer as a more or less connected group, (1) of religious practices, such as prayers, ceremonies, festivals, rituals, and other observances, and (2) of religious ideas, the ideas taking the form of traditions, legends, and beliefs about the gods or about spirits. On the higher levels, the religious ideas are embodied in sacred books, and some of them are emphasized in formal professions of faith. They also come, upon these higher levels, into a certain union with other factors of spiritual life which we are hereafter to discuss.

Our first question is, naturally, What is the more vital about a religion, its religious practices, or its religious ideas, beliefs, and spiritual attitudes?

As soon as we attempt to answer this question, our procedure is somewhat different, according as we dwell upon the simpler and more primitive, or on the other hand upon the higher and more reflective and differentiated forms or aspects of religion.

In primitive religions, and in the religious lives of many of the more simple-minded and less reflective people of almost any faith, however civilized, the religious practices seem in general to be more important, and more vital for the whole structure of the religious life, than are the conscious beliefs which accompany the practices. I say this is true of primitive religions in general. It is also true for many of the simple-minded followers even of very lofty religions. This rule is well known to the students of the history of religion in our day, and can easily be illustrated from some of the most familiar aspects of religious life. But it is a rule which, as I frankly confess, has frequently been ignored or misunderstood by philosophers, as well as by others who have been

led to approach religions for the sake of studying the opinions of those who hold them. In various religious ideas people may be very far apart, at the same moment when their religious practices are in close harmony. In the world at large, including both the civilized and the uncivilized, we may say that the followers of a cult are, in general, people who accept as binding the practices of that cult. But the followers of the same cult may accompany the acceptance of the cult with decidedly different interpretations of the reason why these practices are required of them, and of the supernatural world which is supposed to be interested in the practices.

In primitive religions this rule is exemplified by facts which many anthropologists have expressed by saying that, on the whole, in the order of evolution, religious practices normally precede at least the more definite religious beliefs. Men come to believe as they do regarding the nature of some supernatural being largely in consequence of the fact that they have first come to follow some course of conduct not for any conscious reason at all but merely from some instinctive tendency which by accident has determined this or that special expression. When the men come to observe this custom of theirs, and to consider why they act thus, some special religious belief often arises as a sort of secondary explanation of their practice. And this belief may vary without essentially altering either the practice or the religion. The pigeons in our college-yard cluster about the benevolent student or visitor who feeds them. This clustering is the result of instinct and of their training in seeking food. The pigeons presumably have no conscious ideas or theories about the true nature of the man who feeds them. Of course, they are somehow aware of his presence, and of what he does, but they surely have only the most rudimentary and indefinite germs of ideas about what he is. But if the pigeons were to come to consciousness somewhat after the fashion of primitive men, very probably they would regard this way of getting food as a sort of religious function and would begin to worship the visitor as a kind of god. If they did so, what idea about this god would be to them vital? Would their beliefs show that they first reasoned abstractly from effect to cause, and said, "He must be a being both powerful and benevolent, for otherwise

his feeding of us in this way could not be explained"? Of course, if the pigeons developed into theologians or philosophers, they might reason thus. But if they came to self-consciousness as primitive men generally do, they would more probably say at first: "Behold, do we not cluster about him and beg from him and coo to him; and do we not get our food by doing thus? He is, then, a being whom it is essentially worth while to treat in this way. He responds to our cooing and our clustering. Thus we compel him to feed us. Therefore he is a worshipful being. And this is what we mean by a god, namely, some one whom it is practically useful to conciliate and compel by such forms of worship as we practice."

If one passes from this feigned instance to the facts of early religious life, one easily observes illustrations of a similar process, both in children and in the more primitive religions of men. A child may be taught to say his prayers. His early ideas of God as a giver of good things, or as a being to be propitiated, are then likely to be secondary to such behavior. The prayers he often says long before he sees why. His elders, at least when they follow the older traditions of religious instruction, begin by requiring of him the practice of saying prayers; and then they gradually initiate the child into the ruling ideas of what the practice means. But for such a stage of religious consciousness the prayer is more vital than the interpretation. In primitive religions taboo and ritual alike precede, at least in many cases, those explanations of the taboos and of the ritual practices which inquirers get in answer to questions about the present beliefs of the people concerned. As religion grows, practices easily pass over from one religion to another, and through every such transition seem to preserve, or even to increase, their sacredness; but they get in the end, in each new religion into which they enter, a new explanation in terms of opinions, themselves producing, so to speak, the new ideas required to fit them to each change of setting. In this process the practices taken over may come to seem vital to the people concerned, as the Mass does to Catholics. But the custom may have preceded the idea. The Christmas and Easter festivals are well-known and classic examples of this process. Christianity did not initiate them. It assimilated them. But it



then explained why it did so by saying that it was celebrating the birth and resurrection of Christ.

It is no part of my task to develop at length a general theory about this frequent primacy of religious practice over the definite formulation of religious belief. The illustrations of the process are, however, numerous. Even on the higher levels of religious development, where the inner life comes to be emphasized, the matter indeed becomes highly complicated, but still, wherever there is an established church, the term "dissenter" often means in popular use a person who will not attend this church, or who will not conform to its practices, much more consciously and decidedly than it means a person whose private ideas about religious topics differ from those of the people with whom he is willing to worship, or whose rules he is willing to obey.

Nevertheless, upon these higher levels a part of the religious requirement very generally comes to be a demand for some sort of orthodoxy. And therefore, upon this level, conformity of practice is indeed no longer enough. However the simple-minded emphasize practice, the religious body itself requires not only the right practice, but also the acceptance of a profession of faith. And on this higher level, and in the opinion of those concerned with the higher aspect of their religion, this acceptance must now be not only a formal act but a sincere one. Here, then, in the life of the higher religions, belief tends to come into a position of primacy which results in a very notable contrast between the higher and the simpler forms and aspects of religious life. When religions take these higher forms, belief is at least officially emphasized as quite equivalent in importance to practice. For those who view matters thus, "He that believeth not shall be damned," an unbeliever is, as such, a foe of the religion in question, and of its gods and of its worshippers. As an infidel he is a miscreant, an enemy not only of the true faith but perhaps of mankind. In consequence, religious persecution and religious wars may come to seem, at least for a time, inevitable means of defending the faith. And those who outgrow, or who never pass through, this stage of warlike propaganda and of persecution may still insist that for them it is faith rather than practice which is the vital element of their religion. To what heights such a view of

the religious life may attain, the Pauline epistles bear witness "Through grace are ye saved." And grace comes by faith, or in the form of faith.

## II

So far, then, we have two great phases or stages of religious life. On the one stage it is religious practice, as such, that is for the people concerned the more vital thing. Their belief is relatively secondary to their practice, and may considerably vary while the practice remains the unvarying, and, for them, vital feature. On the other and no doubt higher, because more self-conscious, stage it is faith that assumes the conscious primacy. And on this second stage, if you believe not rightly, you have no part in the religion in question. That these two stages or phases of the life of religion are in practice closely intermingled, everybody knows. The primitive and the lofty are, in the religious life of civilized men, very near together. The resulting entanglements furnish endlessly numerous problems for the religious life. For in all the higher faiths those who emphasize the inner life make much of faith as a personal disposition. And this emphasis, contending as it does with the more primitive and simple-minded tendency to lay stress upon the primacy of religious practice, has often led to revolt against existing formalism, against ritual requirements, and so to reforms, to heresies, to sects, or to new world-religions. Christianity itself, viewed as a world-religion, was the outgrowth of an emphasis upon a certain faith, to which its new practices were to be, and were, secondary. On the other hand, the appeal that every religion makes to the masses of mankind is most readily interpreted in terms of practice. Thus the baptism of a whole tribe or nation, at the command of their chief, has been sometimes accounted conversion. A formal profession of a creed in such cases has indeed become an essential part of the requirements of the religion in question. But this profession itself can be regarded, and often is regarded by whole masses of the people concerned, as a ceremony to be performed obediently, and no doubt willingly, rather than as an expression of any highly conscious inner conviction. In consequence, an individual worshipper may come to repeat the creed as a more or less magic charm, to ward

off the demons who are known not to like to hear it; or, again, the individual may rise and say the creed simply because the whole congregation at a certain point of the service has to do so.

In particular, since the creeds of the higher faiths relate to what are regarded as mysteries, while the creed must be repeated by all the faithful, the required belief in the creed is often not understood to imply any clear or wise or even intelligent ideas about what the creed really intends to teach. Even in emphasizing belief, then, one may thus interpret it mainly in terms of a willing obedience. The savage converted to the Roman Catholic Church is indeed taught not only to obey, but to profess belief, and as far as possible to get some sort of genuine inner belief. But he is regularly told that for his imperfect stage of insight it is enough if he is fully ready to say, "I believe what the church believes, both as far as I understand what the church believes and also as far as I do not understand what the church believes." And it is in this spirit that he must repeat the creed of the church. But his ideas about God and the world may meanwhile be as crude as his ignorance determines. He is still viewed as a Christian, if he is minded to accept the God of the church of the Christians, even though he still thinks of God as sometimes a visible and "magnified and non-natural" man, a corporeal presence sitting in the heavens, while the scholastic theologian who has converted him thinks of God as wholly incorporeal, as not situated *in loco* at all, as not even existent in time, but only in eternity, and as spiritual substance, whose nature, whose perfection, whose omniscience, and so on, are the topics of most elaborate definition.

Thus, even when faith in a creed becomes an essential part of the requirements of a religion, one often meets, upon a much higher level, that primacy of the practical over the theoretical side of religion which the child's prayers, and the transplanted festivals, and the conceivable religion of the pigeons illustrate. The faithful convert and his scholastic teacher agree much more in religious practices than in conscious religious ideas.

Meanwhile this very situation itself is regarded by all concerned as by no means satisfactory. And those followers of the higher faiths who take the inner life more seriously, are never

content with this acceptance of what seems to them merely external formalism. For them faith, whether it is accompanied with a clear understanding or not, means something essentially interior and deep and soul-transforming. Hence they continually insist that no one can satisfy God who does not rightly view God. And thus the conflict between the primacy of the practical and of the right faith constantly tends to assume new forms in the life of all the higher religions. The conflict concerns the question whether right practice or right belief is the more vital element in religion. Well-known formulae, constantly repeated in religious instruction, profess to solve the problem once for all. But it remains a problem whose solution, if any solution at all is reached, has to be worked out afresh in the religious experience of each individual.

### III

Some of you, to whom one of the best-known solutions of the problem is indeed familiar enough, will no doubt have listened to this statement of the conflict between the primacy of religious practice and the primacy of religious belief with a growing impatience. What right-minded and really pious person does not know, you will say, that there is only one way to overcome this opposition, and that is by remembering that true religion is never an affair either of mere practice, apart from inner sincerity, or of theoretically orthodox opinions, apart from other inner experiences and interests? Who does not know, you will say, that true religion is an affair of the whole man, not of deeds alone, nor of the intellect alone, but of the entire spiritual attitude,—of emotion and of trust,—of devotion and of motive,—of conduct guided by an inner light, and of conviction due to a personal contact with religious truth? Who does not know that about this all the best Christian teachers, whether Catholic or Protestant, are agreed? Who does not know that the Roman Catholic theologian who converts the savage regards his own personal salvation as due, in case he wins it, not to the theoretical accuracy of his theological formulations, but to the direct working of divine grace, which alone can prepare the soul for that vision of God which can never be attained by

mere reasonings, but can be won only through the miraculous gift of insight prepared for the blessed in heaven? Who has not learned that in the opinion of enlightened Christians the divine grace can for this very reason be as truly present in the humble and ignorant soul of the savage convert as in that of his learned and priestly confessor? Who, then, need confound true faith with the power to formulate the mysteries of the faith, except in so far, indeed, as one trustingly accepts whatever one can understand of the teachings of the church? It is indeed, you will insist, grace that saves, and through faith. But the saving faith, you will continue, is, at least in the present life, nothing theoretical. It is itself a gift of God. And it is essentially a spiritual attitude,—at once practical and such as to involve whatever grade of true knowledge is suited to the present stage of the soul in question. Herein, as some of you will say, the most enlightened and the most pious teachers of various religions, and certainly of very various forms of Christianity, are agreed. What is vital in the highest religion is neither the mere practice as external, nor the mere opinion as an internal formulation. It is the union of the two. It is the reaction of the whole spirit in the presence of an experience of the highest realities of human life and of the universe.

If any of you at this point assert this to be the solution of the problem as to what is vital in religion, if you insist that such spiritual gifts as the Pauline charity, and such emotional experiences as those of conversion, and of the ascent of the soul to God in prayer, and such moral sincerity as is the soul of all good works, are regarded by our best teachers as the really vital elements in religion,—you are insisting upon a solution of our problem which indeed belongs to a third, and no doubt to a very lofty phase of the religious consciousness. And it is just this third phase or level of the religious consciousness that I am to try to study in these conferences. But were such a statement in itself enough to show every one of us precisely what this vital feature of the higher religions is, and just how it can be secured by every man, and just how our modern world, with all its doubts and its problems, is related to the solution just proposed, I should indeed have no task in these lectures but to repeat the well-known

formula, to apply it briefly to the case of Christianity, and to leave the rest to your own personal experience.

#### IV

But as a fact, and as most of you know by personal experience, the well-known proposal of a solution thus stated is to most of us rather the formulation of a new problem than the end of the whole matter. If this higher unity of faith and practice, of grace and right-mindedness, of the right conduct and the clear insight, of the knowledge of what is real and the feeling for the deepest values of life,—if all this is indeed the goal of the highest religions, and if it constitutes what their best teachers regard as vital, how far are many of us at the present day from seeing our way towards adapting any such solution to our own cases! For us, the modern world is full of suggestions of doubt regarding the articles of the traditional creeds. The moral problems of our time, full of new perplexities, confuse us with regard to what ought to be done. Our spiritual life is too complex to be any longer easily unified, or to be unified merely in the ways useful for earlier generations. Our individualism is too highly conscious to be easily won over to a mood of absorption in any one universal ideal. Our sciences are too complicated to make it easy for us to conceive the world either as a unity, or as spiritual. The church is, for most of us, no longer one visible institution with a single authoritative constitution, but a variety of social organizations, each with its own traditions and values. The spirit of Christianity, which even at the outset Paul found so hard to formulate and to reduce to unity, can no longer be formulated by us precisely in his terms. Hence some of us seek for some still simpler, because more primitive, type of Christianity. But when we look behind Paul for the genuinely primitive Christianity, we meet with further problems, one or two of which we are soon to formulate more precisely in this discussion. In brief, however vital for a religion may be its power to unify the whole man, outer and inner, practical and intellectual, ignorant and wise, emotional and critical, the situation of our time is such that this unification is no longer so presented to us by any one body of religious teach-

ing, that we can simply accept it from tradition (since in the modern world we must both act and think as individuals for ourselves), nor that we can easily learn it from our own experience, since in these days our experience is no longer as full of the religiously inspiring elements as was the experience of the times of Jonathan Edwards, or of the Reformation, or of the founders of the great mediaeval religious orders, or of the early Christian church. If this unity of the spiritual life is to be reconquered, we must indeed take account of the old solutions, but we must give to them new forms, and adopt new ways, suited to the ideas and to the whole spirit of the modern world. Hence the proposed solution that I just rehearsed is simply the statement of the common programme of all the highest religions of humanity. But how to interpret this programme in terms which will make it of live and permanent meaning for the modern world,—this is precisely the religious problem of today.

To sum up, then, our answer to the first of my three problems, namely, What form of faith or of practice can be called vital to any religion? I reply: In the case of any one of the more primitive religions it is, in general, the religious practices that are the most vital features of that religion, and these practices, in general, are vital in proportion as they are necessary to the social life of the tribe or nation amongst which they flourish, so that, when these vital practices die out, the nation in question either dwindles, or is conquered, or passes over into some new form of social order. Secondly, in the higher religions, because of the emphasis that they lay upon the inner life, and especially in the world-religions such as Buddhism, Mohammedanism, and Christianity, belief tends to become a more and more vital feature of the religions in question, and the beliefs—such as monotheism, or the acceptance of a prophet, or of a longer or shorter formulated creed—are vital to such a religion in ways and to degrees which the preachers and the missionaries, the religious wars and the sectarian conflicts of these faiths illustrate,—vital in proportion as the men concerned are ready to labor or to die for these beliefs, or to impose them upon other men, or to insist that no one shall be admitted to the religious community who does not accept them.

But thirdly, as soon as religious beliefs are thus emphasized as

over against religious practices, the religious practices are not, thereby, in general set aside or even discouraged. On the contrary, they generally grow more numerous, and often more imposing. And consequently, in the minds of the more ignorant, or of the less earnest, of the faithful there appears throughout the life of these higher religions a constant tendency to revert to the more primitive type of religion, or else never, in fact, to rise above that type. Hence, even in the religions wherein conformity is understood to imply a sincere orthodoxy, the primacy of ritual or of other practice over against faith and the inner life constantly tends to hold its own. There arises in such religions the well-known conflict of inner and outer, of faith and merely external works. This conflict remains a constant source of transformations, of heresies, and of reforms, in all these higher religions, and is in fact an irrepressible conflict so long as human nature is what it is. For a great mass of the so-called faithful, it is the conformity of practice that thus remains vital. But the teachers of the religion assert that the faith is vital.

And now, fourthly, the higher religions, especially as represented in their highest type of teachings, are deeply concerned in overcoming and in reducing to unity this conflict of formal observance with genuine faith, wherever the conflict arises. The proposed solution which is most familiar, most promising, if it can be won, and most difficult to be won, is the solution which consists in asserting and of showing, if possible, in life, that what is most vital to religion is not practice apart from faith, nor faith apart from practice, but a complete spiritual reaction of the entire man,—a reaction which, if possible, shall unite a right belief in the unseen world of the faith with the inner perfection and blessedness that ought to result from the indwelling of the truth in the soul, and with that power to do good works and to conform to the external religious requirements which is to be expected from one whose soul is at peace and lives in the light. In a word, what this solution supposes to be most vital to the highest religion is the union of faith and works through a completed spirituality.

Meanwhile, as we have also seen, just our age is especially beset with the problem: How can such a solution be any longer an object of reasonable hope, when the faiths have become uncertain,



the practices largely antiquated, our life and our duty so problematic, and our environment so uninspiring to our religious interests? So much, then, for the first of our three problems.

## V

It is now our task to consider the second of our questions. How does this problem regarding what is vital to a religion appear when we turn to the special case of Christianity?

Our review of the sorts of elements which are found vital upon the various levels of the religious consciousness will have prepared you to look at once for what is most vital about Christianity upon the third and highest of the three levels that I have enumerated. It is true that in the minds of great masses of the less enlightened and less devoted population of the Christian world certain religious practices have always been regarded as constituting the most vital features of their religion. These practices are especially those which for the people in question imply the obedient acceptance of the sacraments of the church. Of course for such, faith is indeed a condition for the efficacy of the sacraments. But faith expresses itself especially through and in one's relation to these sacraments. Such emphasis upon religious practices is inevitable, so long as human nature is what it is. But Christianity is obviously, upon all of its higher levels, essentially a religion of the inner life; and for all those in any body of Christians who are either more devout or more enlightened the problem of the church has always included, along with other things, the problem of finding and formulating the true faith; and such faith is, to such people, vital to their religion. In consequence of its vast successes in conquering, after a fashion, its own regions of the world, Christianity has had to undertake upon a very large scale, and over a long series of centuries, the task of adapting itself to the needs of peoples who were in very various, and often in very primitive, conditions of culture. Hence, in formulating its faith and practice, it has had full experience of the conflict between those who in a relatively childlike and primitive way regard religious practice as the primal evidence and expression of the possession of the true religion, and those who, on the contrary, insist primarily upon right

belief and a rightly guided inner life as a necessary condition for such conduct as can be pleasing to God. Where, as in the case of the Roman Catholic Church, the effort to reconcile these two motives has the longest traditional expression, that is, where the most elaborate official definition of the saving faith has been deliberately joined with the most precise requirements regarding religious practice, the conflict of motives here in question has been only the more notable as a factor in the history of the church,—however completely for an individual believer this very conflict may appear to have been solved. In the Catholic doctrine of the sacraments, in the theory of the conditions upon which their validity depends, and of their effects upon the process of salvation, the most primitive of religious tendencies stand side by side with the loftiest spiritual interests in glaring contrast. On the one hand the doctrine of the sacraments appeals to primitive tendencies, because certain purely magical influences and incantations are in question. The repetition of certain formulae and deeds acts as an irresistible miraculous charm. On the other hand the life of the spirit is furthered through the administration of these same sacraments by some of the deepest and most spiritual of influences, and by some of the most elevated forms of inner life which the consciousness of man has ever conceived. That there is an actual conflict of motives involved in this union of primitive magic with spiritual cultivation, the church in question has repeatedly found, when the greater schisms relating to the validity or to the interpretation of her sacraments have rent the unity of her body, and when, sometimes within her own fold, the mystics have quarrelled with the formalists, and both with the modernists, of any period in which the religious life of the church was at all intense.

Most of you will agree, I suppose, as to the sort of solution of such conflicts between the higher and lower aspects of Christianity which is to be sought, in case there is to be any hope of a solution. You will probably be disposed to say: What is vital in Christianity, if Christianity is permanently to retain its vitality at all in our modern world, must be defined primarily neither in terms of mere religious practice nor yet in terms of merely intellectual formulation, but in terms of that unity of will and intellect that may be expressed in the spiritual disposition of the whole man. You will

say, What is vital in Christianity must be, if anything, the Christian interpretation of human life, and the life lived in the light of this interpretation. Such a life, you will insist, can never be identified by its formal religious practices, however important, or even indispensable, some of you may believe this or that religious practice to be. Nor can one reduce what is vital in Christianity merely to a formulated set of opinions, since, as the well-known word has it, the devils also believe, and tremble, and, as some of you may be disposed benevolently to add, the philosophers also believe, and lecture. No, you will say, the Christian life includes practices, which may need to be visible and formal; it includes beliefs, which may have to be discussed and formulated; but Christianity is, first of all, an interpretation of life,—an interpretation that is nothing if not practical, and also nothing if not guided from within by a deep spiritual interest and a genuine religious experience.

So far we shall find it easy to agree regarding the principles of our inquiry. Yet, as the foregoing review of the historical conflicts of religion has shown us, we thus merely formulate our problem. We stand at the outset of what we want to do.

What is that interpretation of life which is vital to Christianity? How must a Christian undertake to solve his problem of his own personal salvation? How shall he view the problem of the salvation of mankind? What is that spiritual attitude which is essential to the Christian religion? Thus our second problem now formulates itself.

## VI

Amongst the countless efforts to answer these questions there are two which in these discussions we especially need to face. The two answers thus proposed differ decidedly from each other. Each is capable of leading to various further and more special formulations of opinion about the contents of the Christian religion.

The first answer may be stated as follows: What is vital about Christianity is simply the spiritual attitude and the doctrine of Christ, as he himself taught this doctrine and this attitude in the body of his authentic sayings and parables, and as he lived all this out in his own life. All in Christianity that

goes beyond this,—all that came to the consciousness of the church after Christ's own teaching had been uttered and finished, either is simply a paraphrase, an explanation, or an application of the original doctrine of Christ, or else is not vital,—is more or less unessential, mythical, or at the very least external. Grasp the spirit of Christ's own teaching, interpret life as he interpreted it, and live out this interpretation of life as completely as you can, imitating him—and then you are in essence a Christian. Fail to comprehend the spirit of Christ, or to live out his interpretation of life, and you in so far fail to possess what is vital about Christianity. This, I say, is the first of the two answers that we must consider. It is an answer well known to most of you, and an emphasis upon this answer characterizes some of the most important religious movements of our own time.

The second answer is as follows: What is vital about Christianity depends upon regarding the mission and the life of Christ as an organic part of a divine plan for the redemption and salvation of man. While the doctrine of Christ, as his sayings record this doctrine, is indeed an essential part of this mission, one cannot rightly understand, above all one cannot apply, the teachings of Christ, one cannot live out the Christian interpretation of life, unless one first learns to view the person of Christ in its true relation to God, and the work of Christ as an entirely unique revelation and expression of God's will. The work of Christ, however, culminated in his death. Hence, as the historic church has always maintained, it is the cross of Christ that is the symbol of whatever is most vital about Christianity. As for the person of Christ as his life revealed it,—what is vital in Christianity depends upon conceiving this personality in essentially superhuman terms. The prologue to the Fourth Gospel deliberately undertakes to state what for the author of that Gospel is vital in Christianity. This prologue does so by means of the familiar doctrine of the eternal Word that was the beginning, that was with God and was God, and that in Christ was made flesh and dwelt amongst men. Abandon this doctrine and you give up what is vital in Christianity. Moreover, the work of Christ was essential to the whole relation of his own teachings to the life of men. Human nature being what it is, the teaching that

Christ's sayings record cannot enter into the genuine life of any one who has not first been transformed into a new man by means of an essentially superhuman and divine power of grace. It was the work of Christ to open the way whereby this divine grace became and still becomes efficacious. The needed transformation of human nature, the change of life which according to Christ's sayings is necessary as a condition for entering the kingdom of heaven, this is made possible through the effects of the life and death of Christ. This life and death were events whereby man's redemption was made possible, whereby the atonement for sin was accomplished. In brief, what is vital to Christianity includes an acceptance of the two cardinal doctrines of the incarnation and the atonement. For only in case these doctrines are accepted is it possible to interpret life in the essentially Christian way, and to live out this interpretation.

Here are two distinct and, on the whole, opposed answers to the question, What is vital in Christianity? I hope that you will see that each of these answers is an effort to rise above the levels wherein either religious practice or intellectual belief is over-emphasized. It is useless for the partisan of the Christianity of the prologue to the Fourth Gospel to accuse his modern opponent of a willingness to degrade Christ to the level of a mere teacher of morals, and Christianity to a mere practice of good works. It is equally useless for one who insists upon the sufficiency of the gospel of Christ simply as Christ's recorded sayings teach it, to accuse his opponent of an intention to make true religion wholly dependent upon the acceptance of certain metaphysical opinions regarding the superhuman nature of Christ. No, the opposition between these two views regarding what is vital in Christianity is an opposition that appears on the highest levels of the religious consciousness. It is not that one view says, "Christ taught these and these moral doctrines, and the practice of these teachings constitutes all that is vital in Christianity." It is not that the opposing view says: "Christ was the eternal Word made flesh, and a mere belief in this fact and in the doctrine of the atoning death is the vital feature of Christianity." No, both of these two views attempt to be views upon the third level of the religious consciousness,—views about the whole inter-

pretation of the higher life, and of its relation to God and to the salvation of man. So far, neither view, as its leading defenders now hold it, can accuse the other of lapsing into those more primitive views of religion which I have summarized in the earlier part of this paper. And I have dwelt so long upon a preliminary view of the relations between faith and practice in the history of religion, because I wanted to clear the way for a study of our problem on its genuinely highest level, so that we shall henceforth be clear of certain old and uninspiring devices of controversy. Both parties are really trying to express what is vital in the Christian conception of life. Both view Christianity as a faith which gives sense to life, and also as a mode of life which is centred about a faith. The true dispute arises upon the highest levels. The question is simply this: Is the gospel which Christ preached, that is, the teaching recorded in the authentic sayings and parables, intelligible, acceptable, vital, in case you take it by itself? Or, does Christianity lose its vitality in case you cannot give a true sense to those doctrines of the incarnation and the atonement which the traditional Christian world has so long held and so deeply loved? And furthermore, can you, in the light of modern insight, give any longer a reasonable sense to the traditional doctrines of the atonement and the incarnation? In other words: Is Christianity essentially a religion of redemption, in the sense in which tradition defined redemption? Or is Christianity simply that religion of the love of God and the love of man which the sayings and the parables so richly illustrate?

However much, upon its lower levels, Christianity may have used and included the motives of primitive religion, this our present question is not reducible to the terms of the relatively lower conflict between a religion of creed and a religion of practice. The issue now defined concerns the highest interests of religious life.

In favor of the traditional view that the essence of Christianity consists, first, in the doctrine of the superhuman person and the redemptive work of Christ, and, secondly, in the interpretative life that rests upon this doctrine, stands the whole authority, such as it is, of the needs and religious experience of the church of Christian history. The church early found, or at least felt, that

it could not live at all without thus interpreting the person and work of Christ.

Against such an account of what is vital in Christianity stands today for many of us the fact that the doctrine in question seems to be, at least in the main, unknown to the historic Christ, in so far as we can learn what he taught, while both the evidence for the traditional doctrine and the interpretation of it have rested during Christian history upon reports which our whole modern view of the universe disposes many of us to regard as legendary, and upon a theology which many of us can no longer accept as literally true. Whether such objections are finally valid, we must later consider. I mention the objections here because they are familiar, and because in our day they lead many to turn from the tangles of tradition with a thankful joy and relief to the hopeful task of trying to study, to apply, and to live the pure Gospel of Christ as he taught it in that body of sayings which, as many insist, need no legends to make them intelligible, and no metaphysics to make them sacred.

Yet, as a student of philosophy, coming in no partisan spirit, I must insist that this reduction of what is vital in Christianity to the so-called pure Gospel of Christ, as he preached it and as it is recorded in the body of the presumably authentic sayings and parables, is profoundly unsatisfactory. The main argument for doubting that this so-called pure Gospel of Christ contains the whole of what is vital in Christianity rests upon the same considerations that led the historical church to try in its own way to interpret, and hence to supplement, this gospel by reports that may have been indeed full of the legendary, by metaphysical ideas that may indeed have been deeply imperfect, but by a deep instinctive sense of genuine religious values which, after all, was indispensable for later humanity,—a sense of religious values which was a true sense. For one thing, Christ can hardly be supposed to have regarded his most authentically reported religious sayings as containing the whole of his message, or as embodying the whole of his mission. For, if he had so viewed the matter, the Messianic tragedy in which his life-work culminated would have been needless and unintelligible. For the rest, the doctrine that he taught is, as it stands, essentially incomplete. It is not a

rounded whole. It looks beyond itself for a completion, which the master himself unquestionably conceived in terms of the approaching end of the world, and which the church later conceived in terms of what has become indeed vital for Christianity.

As modern men, then, we stand between opposed views. Each view has to meet hostile arguments. Each can make a case in favor of its value as a statement of the essence of Christianity. On the one hand the Christ of the historically authentic sayings,—whose gospel is, after all, not to be understood except as part of a much vaster religious process; on the other hand the Christ of legend, whom it is impossible for us modern men longer to conceive as the former ages of the church often conceived him. Can we choose between the two? Which stands for what is vital in Christianity? And, if we succeed in defining this vital element, what can it mean to us today, and in the light of our modern world?

Thus we have defined our problems. Our next task is to face them as openly, as truthfully, and as carefully as our opportunity permits.

## VII

Let us, then, briefly consider the first of the two views which have been set over against one another.

The teachings of Christ which are preserved to us do indeed form a body of doctrine that one can survey and study without forming any final opinion about the historical character of the narratives with which these teachings are accompanied in the three Synoptic Gospels. The early church preserved the sayings, recorded them, no doubt, in various forms, but learned to regard one or two of the bodies of recorded sayings as especially important and authentic. The documents in which these earliest records were contained are lost to us; but our gospels, especially those of Matthew, Mark, and Luke, preserve the earlier tradition in a way that can be tested by the agreements in the reported sayings as they appear in the different gospels. It is of course true that some of the authentic teachings of Christ concern matters in regard to which other teachers of his own people had already reached insights that tended towards his own. But nobody can doubt that the sayings, taken as a whole, embody a new and



profoundly individual teaching, and are what they pretend to be; namely, at least a partial presentation of an interpretation of life,—an interpretation that was deliberately intended by the teacher to revolutionize the hearts and lives of those to whom the sayings were addressed. Since a recorded doctrine simply taken in itself, and apart from any narrative, is an unquestionable fact, and since a new and individual doctrine is a fact that can be explained only as the work of a person, it is plain that, whatever you think of the narrative portions of the gospels, your estimate of Christ's reported teachings may be freed at once from any of the perplexities that perhaps beset you as to how much you can find out about his life. So much at least he was; namely, the teacher of this doctrine. As to his life, it is indeed important to know that he taught the doctrine as one who fully meant it, that while he taught it he so lived it out as to win the entire confidence of those who were nearest to him, that he was ready to die for it, and for whatever else he believed to be the cause that he served, and that when the time came he did die for his cause. So much of the gospel narrative is with all reasonable certainty to be regarded as historical.

So far, then, one has to regard the teaching of Christ as a perfectly definite object for historical study and personal imitation, and as, in its main outlines, an accessible tradition. It is impossible to be sure of our tradition as regards each individual saying. But the main body of the doctrine stands before us as a connected whole, and it is in its wholeness that we are interested in comprehending its meaning.

Now there is also no doubt, I have said, that this doctrine is intended as at least a part of an interpretation of life. For the explicit purpose of the teacher is to transform the inner life of his hearers, and thus to bring about, through this transformation, a reform of their individual outer life. It is, furthermore, sure that, while the teaching in question includes a moral ideal, it is no merely moral teaching, but is full of a profoundly religious interest. For the transformation of the inner life which is in question has to do with the whole relation of the individual man to God. And there are especially two main theses of the teacher which do indeed explicitly relate to the realm of the superhuman

and divine world, and which therefore do concern what we may call religious metaphysics. That is, these theses are assertions about a reality that does not belong to the physical realm, and that is not confined to the realities which we contemplate when we consider merely ethical truth as such. The first of these religious theses relates to the nature of God. It is usually summarized as the doctrine of the Fatherhood of God. In its fuller statement it involves that account of the divine love for the individual man which is so characteristic and repeated a feature of the authentic sayings. The other thesis is what we now call a judgment of value. It is the assertion of the infinite worth of each individual person,—an assertion richly illustrated in the parables, and used as the basis of the ethical teaching of Christ, since the value that God sets upon your brother is the deepest reason assigned to show why your own life should be one of love towards your brother.

### VIII

So much for the barest suggestion of a teaching which you all know, and which I have not here further to expound. Our present question is simply this: Is this the whole of what is vital to Christianity? Or is there something vital which is not contained in these recorded sayings, so far as they relate to the matters just summarily mentioned?

The answer to this question is suggested by certain very well-known facts. First, these sayings are, in the master's mind, only part of a programme which, as the event showed, related not only to the individual soul and its salvation, but to the reform of the whole existing and visible social order. Or, expressed in our modern terms, the teacher contemplated a social revolution, as well as the before-mentioned universal religious reformation of each individual life. He was led, at least towards the end of his career, to interpret his mission as that of the Messiah of his people. That the coming social revolution was conceived by him in divine and miraculous terms, that it was to be completed by the final judgment of all men, that the coming kingdom was to be not of this world, in the sense in which the Roman Empire was of this world, but was to rest upon the directly visible triumph of God's will through the miraculous appearance of the chosen

messenger who should execute this will,—all this regarding the conception which was in Christ's mind seems clear. But, however the coming revolution was conceived, it was to be a violent and supernatural revolution of the external social order, and it was to appear openly to all men upon earth. The meek, the poor, were to inherit the earth; the mighty were to be cast down; the kingdoms of this world were to pass away; and the divine sovereignty was to take its visible place as the controller of all things.

Now it is no part of my present task to endeavor to state any theory as to why the master viewed his kingdom of heaven, in part at least, in this way. You may interpret the doctrine as the church has for ages done, as a doctrine relating to the far-off future end of all human affairs and to the supernatural mission of Christ as both Saviour and Judge of the world; or you may view the revolutionary purposes of the master as I myself actually do, simply as his personal interpretation of the Messianic traditions of his people and of the social needs of his time and of the then common but mistaken expectation of the near end of the world. In any case, if this doctrine, however brought about or interpreted, was for the master a vital part of his teaching, then you have to view the resulting interpretation of life accordingly. I need not say, however, that whoever today can still find a place for the Messianic hopes and for the doctrine of the last judgment in his own interpretation of Christianity, has once for all made up his mind to regard a doctrine,—and a deeply problematic doctrine,—a profoundly metaphysical doctrine about the person and work of Christ, and about the divine plan for the salvation of man,—as a vital part of his own Christianity.

And now, in this same connection, we can point out that, if the whole doctrine of Christ had indeed consisted for him in regarding the coming of the kingdom of heaven as identical with the inner transformation of each man by the spirit of divine love, then that direct and open opposition to the existing social authorities of his people which led to the Messianic tragedy, would have been for the master simply needless. Christ chose this plan of open and social opposition for reasons of his own. We may interpret these reasons as the historical church has done, or we may view the

matter otherwise, as I myself do. In any case, Christ's view of what was vital in Christianity certainly included, but also just as certainly went beyond, the mere preaching of the kingdom of heaven that is within you.

But one may still say, as many say who want to return to a purely primitive Christianity: Can *we* not choose to regard the religious doctrine of the parables and of the sayings, apart from the Messianic hopes and the anticipated social revolution, as for us vital and sufficient? Can we not decline to attempt to solve the Messianic mystery? Is it not for us enough to know simply that the master did indeed die for his faith, leaving his doctrine concerning the spiritual kingdom, concerning God the Father, and concerning man the beloved brother, as his final legacy to future generations? This legacy was of permanent value. Is it not enough for us?

I reply: To think thus is obviously to view Christ's doctrine as he himself did not view it. He certainly meant the kingdom of heaven to include the inner transformation of each soul by the divine love. But he also certainly conceived even this spiritual transformation in terms of some sort of Messianic mission, which was related to a miraculous coming transformation of human society. In the service of this Messianic social cause he died. And now even in Christ's interpretation of the inner and spiritual life of the individual man there are aspects which you cannot understand unless you view them in the light of the Messianic expectation. I refer to the master's doctrine upon that side of it which emphasizes the passive non-resistance of the individual man, in waiting for God's judgment. This side of Christ's doctrine has been frequently interpreted as requiring an extreme form of self-abnegation. It is this aspect of the doctrine which glorifies poverty as in itself an important aid to piety. In this sense too the master sometimes counsels a certain indifference to ordinary human social relations. In this same spirit his sayings so frequently illustrate the spirit of love by the mention of acts that involve the merely immediate relief of suffering, rather than by dwelling upon those more difficult and often more laborious forms of love which his own life indeed exemplified, and which take the form of the lifelong service of a super-personal social cause.

I would not for a moment wish to over-emphasize the meaning of these negative and ascetic aspects of the sayings. Christ's ethical doctrine was unquestionably as much a positive individualism as it was a doctrine of love. It was also as genuinely a stern doctrine as it was a humane one. Nobody understands it who reduces it to mere self-abnegation, or to non-resistance, or to any form of merely sentimental amiability. Nevertheless, as it was taught, it included sayings and illustrations which have often been interpreted in the sense of pure asceticism, in the sense of simple non-resistance, in the sense of an unworldliness that seems opposed to the establishment and the prizing of definite human ties,—yes, even in the sense of an anarchical contempt for the forms of any present worldly social order. In brief, the doctrine contains a deep and paradoxical opposition between its central assertion of the infinite value of love and of every individual human soul on the one hand, and those of its special teachings on the other hand, which seem to express a negative attitude towards all our natural efforts to assert and to sustain the values of life by means of definite social co-operation, such as we men can by ourselves devise. Now the solution of this paradox seems plain when we remember the abnormal social conditions of those whom Christ was teaching, and interpret his message in the light of his Messianic social mission with its coming miraculous change of all human relations. But in that case an important part of the sayings must be viewed as possessing a meaning which is simply relative to the place, to the people, to the time, and to those Messianic hopes of an early end of the existing social order,—hopes which we know to have been mistakenly cherished by the early church.

I conclude then, so far, that a simple return to a purely primitive Christianity as a body of doctrine complete in itself, directly and fully expressed in the sayings of Christ, and applicable, without notable supplement, to all times, and to our own day,—is an incomplete and therefore inadequate religious ideal. The spiritual kingdom of heaven, the transformation of the inner life which the sayings teach, is indeed a genuine part,—yes, a vital part,—of Christianity. But it is by no means the whole of what is vital to Christianity.

## IX

I turn to the second of the answers to our main question. According to this answer, Christianity is a redemptive religion. What is most vital to Christianity is contained in whatever is essential and permanent about the doctrines of the incarnation and the atonement. Now this is the answer which, as you will by this time see, I myself regard as capable of an interpretation that will turn it into a correct answer to our question. In answering thus, I do not for a moment call in question the just-mentioned fact that the original teaching of the master regarding the kingdom of heaven is indeed a vital part of the whole of Christianity. But I do assert that this so-called purely primitive Christianity is not so vital, is not so central, is not so essential to mature Christianity as are the doctrines of the incarnation and the atonement when these are rightly interpreted. In the light of these doctrines alone can the work of the master be seen in its most genuine significance.

Yet, as has been already pointed out, the literal acceptance of this answer to our question, as many still interpret the answer, seems to be beset by serious difficulties. These difficulties are now easily summarized. The historical Christ of the sayings and the parables, little as we certainly know regarding his life, is still a definite and, in the main, an accessible object of study and of interpretation, just because, whatever else he was, he was the teacher of this recorded interpretation of life,—whether or not you regard that recorded interpretation as a fully complete and rounded whole. But the Christ whom the traditional doctrines of the atonement and of the incarnation present to us appears in the minds of most of us as the Christ of the legends of the early church,—a being whose nature and whose reported supernatural mission seem to be involved in doubtful mysteries—mysteries both theological and historical. Now I am not here to tell you in detail why the modern mind has come to be unwilling to accept, as literal reports of historical facts, certain well-known legends. I am not here to discuss that unwillingness upon its merits. It is enough for my present purpose to say first that the unwillingness exists, and, secondly, that, as a fact, I myself believe

it to be a perfectly reasonable unwillingness. But I say this not at all because I suppose that modern insight has driven out of the reasonable world the reality of spiritual truth. The world of history is indeed a world full of the doubtful. And the whole world of phenomena in which you and I daily move about is a realm of mysteries. Nature and man, as we daily know them, and also daily misunderstand them, are not what they seem to us to be. The world of our usual human experience is but a beggarly fragment of the truth, and, if we take too seriously the bits of wisdom that it enables us to collect by the observation of special facts and of natural laws, it becomes a sort of curtain to hide from us the genuine realm of spiritual realities in the midst of which we all the while live. Moreover, it is one office of all higher religion to supplement these our fragments of experience and ordinary notions of the natural order, by a truer, if still imperfect, interpretation of the spiritual realities that are beyond our present vision. That is, it is the business of religion to lift, however little, the curtain, to inspire us, not by mere dreams of ideal life, but by enlightening glimpses of the genuine truth which, if we were perfect, we should indeed see, not, as now, through a glass darkly, but face to face.

All this I hold to be true. And yet I fully share the modern unwillingness to accept legends as literally true. For it is not by first repeating the tale of mere marvels, of miracles,—by dwelling upon legends, and then by taking the accounts in question as literally true historical reports,—it is not thus that we at present, in our modern life, can best help ourselves to find our way to the higher world. These miraculous reports are best understood when we indeed first dwell upon them lovingly and meditatively, but thereupon learn to view them as symbols, as the products of the deep and endlessly instructive religious imagination,—and thereby learn to interpret the actually definite, and to my mind unquestionably superhuman and eternal, truth that these legends express, but express by figures,—in the form of a parable, an image, a narrative, a tale of some special happening. The tale is not literally true. But its deeper meaning may be absolutely true. In brief, I accept the opinion that it is the office of religion to interpret truths which are in themselves perfectly definite,

eternal, and literal, but to interpret them to us by means of a symbolism which is the product of the constructive imagination of the great ages in which the religions which first voiced these truths grew up. There are some truths which our complicated natures best reach first through instinct and intuition, through parable and legend. Only when we have first reached them in this way, can most of us learn to introduce the practical and indeed saving application of these truths into our lives by living out the spirit of these parables. But then at last we may also hope, in the fulness of our own time, to comprehend these truths by a clearer insight into the nature of that eternal world which is indeed about and above us all, and which is the true source of our common life and light.

I am of course saying all this not as one having authority. I am simply indicating how students of philosophy who are of the type that I follow, are accustomed to view these things. In this spirit I will now ask you to look for a moment at the doctrines of the Incarnation and of the Atonement in some of their deeper aspects. It is a gain thus to view the doctrines, whether or no you accept literally the well-known miraculous tale.

There has always existed in the Christian church a tradition tending to emphasize the conception that the supernatural work of Christ, which the church conceived in the form of the doctrines of the incarnation and the atonement, was not a work accomplished once for all at a certain historical point of time, but remains somehow an abiding work, or, perhaps, that it ought to be viewed as a timeless fact, which never merely happened, but which is such as to determine anew in every age the relation of the faithful to God. Of course, the church has often condemned as heretical one or another form of these opinions. Nevertheless, such opinions have in fact entered into the formation of the official dogmas. An instance is the influence that such an interpretation had upon the historic doctrine of the Mass and of the real presence,—a doctrine which, as I have suggested, combines in one some of the most primitive of religious motives with some of the deepest religious ideas that men have ever possessed. In other less official forms, in forms which frequently approached, or crossed, the boundaries of technical heresy, some of the mediaeval



mystics, fully believing in their own view of their faith, and innocent of any modern doubts about miracles, were accustomed in their tracts and sermons always and directly to interpret every part of the gospel narrative, including the miracles, as the expression of a vast and timeless whole of spiritual facts, whereof the narratives are merely symbols. In the sermons of Meister Eckhart, the great early German mystic, this way of preaching Christian doctrine is a regular part of his appeal to the people. I am myself in my philosophy no mystic, but I often wish that in our own days there were more who preached what is indeed vital in Christianity in somewhat the fashion of Eckhart. Let me venture upon one or two examples.

Eckhart begins as follows a sermon on the text, "Who is he that is born king of the Jews" (Matthew 22): "Mark you," he says, "mark you concerning this birth, where it takes place. I say, as I have often said: This eternal birth takes place in the soul, and takes place there precisely as it takes place in the eternal world,—no more, no less. This birth happens in the essence, in the very foundation, of the soul." "All other creatures," he continues, "are God's footstool. But the soul is his image. This image must be adorned and fulfilled through this birth of God in the soul." The birth, the incarnation, of God occurs then, so Eckhart continues, in every soul, and eternally. But, as he hereupon asks: Is not this then also true of sinners, if this incarnation of God is thus everlasting and universal? Wherein lies then the difference between saint and sinner? What special advantage has the Christian from this doctrine of the incarnation? Eckhart instantly answers: Sin is simply due to the blindness of the soul to the eternal presence of the incarnate God. And that is what is meant by the passage: "The light shineth in the darkness, and the darkness comprehendeth it not."

Or again, Eckhart expounds in a sermon the statement that Christ came "in the fulness of time"; that is, as people usually and literally interpret the matter, Christ came when the human race was historically prepared for his coming. But Eckhart is careless concerning this historical and literal interpretation of the passage in question, although he doubtless also believes it. For him the true meaning of the passage is wholly spiritual. When,

he asks in substance, is the day fulfilled? At the end of the day. When is a task fulfilled? When the task is over. When, therefore, is the fulness of time reached? Whenever a man is in his soul ready to be done with time; that is, when in contemplation he dwells only upon and in the eternal. Then alone, when the soul forgets time, and dwells upon God who is above time, then, and then only, does Christ really come. For Christ's coming means simply our becoming aware of what Eckhart calls the eternal birth; that is, the eternal relation of the real soul to the real God.

It is hard, in our times, to get any sort of hearing for such really deeper interpretations of what is indeed vital in Christianity. A charming, but essentially trivial, religious psychology today invites some of us to view religious experience simply as a chance play-at-hide-and-seek with certain so-called subliminal mental forces and processes, whose crudely capricious crises and catastrophes shall have expressed themselves in that feverish agitation that some take to be the essence of all. Meanwhile there are those who today try to keep religion alive mainly as a more or less medicinal influence, a sort of disinfectant or anodyne, that may perhaps still prove its value to a doubting world by curing dyspepsia, or by removing nervous worries. Over against such modern tendencies,—humane, but still, as interpretations of the true essence of religion, essentially trivial,—there are those who see no hope except in holding fast by a literal acceptance of tradition. There are, finally, those who undertake the task, lofty indeed, but still, as I think, hopeless,—the task of restoring what they call a purely primitive Christianity. Now I am no disciple of Eckhart; but I am sure that whatever is vital in Christianity concerns in fact the relation of the real individual human person to the real God. To the minds of the people whose religious tradition we have inherited this relation first came through the symbolic interpretation that the early church gave to the life of the master. It is this symbolic interpretation which is the historical legacy of the church. It is the genuine and eternal truth that lies behind this symbol which constitutes what is indeed vital to Christianity. I personally regard the supernatural narratives in which the church embodied its faith simply as symbols,

—the product indeed of no man's effort to deceive, but of the religious imagination of the great constructive age of the early church. I also hold that the truth which lies behind these symbols is capable of a perfectly rational statement, that this statement lies in the direction which Eckhart, mistaken as he often was, has indicated to us. The truth in question is independent of the legends. It relates to eternal spiritual facts. I maintain also that those who, in various ages of the church, and in various ways, have tried to define and to insist upon what they have called the "Essential Christ," as distinguished from the historical Christ, have been nearing in various degrees the comprehension of what is vital in Christianity.

## X

What is true must be capable of expression apart from legends. What is eternally true may indeed come to our human knowledge through any event that happens to bring the truth in question to our notice; but, once learned, this truth may be seen to be independent of the historical events, whatever they were, which brought about our own insight. And the truth about the incarnation and the atonement seems to me to be statable in terms which I must next briefly indicate.

First, God, as our philosophy ought to conceive him, is indeed a spirit and a person; but he is not a being who exists in separation from the world, simply as its external creator. He expresses himself in the world; and the world is simply his own life, as he consciously lives it out. To use an inadequate figure, God expresses himself in the world as an artist expresses himself in the poems and the characters, in the music or in the other artistic creations, that arise within the artist's consciousness and that for him and in him consciously embody his will. Or again, God is this entire world, viewed, so to speak, from above and in its wholeness as an infinitely complex life which in an endless series of temporal processes embodies a single divine idea. You can indeed distinguish, and should distinguish, between the world as our common sense, properly but fragmentarily, has to view it, and as our sciences study it,—between this phenomenal world, I

say, and God, who is infinitely more than any finite system of natural facts or of human lives can express. But this distinction between God and world means no separation. Our world is the fragmentary phenomenon that we see. God is the conscious meaning that expresses itself in and through the totality of all phenomena. The world, taken as a mass of happenings in time, of events, of natural processes, of single lives, is nowhere, and at no time, any complete expression of the divine will. But the entire world, of which our known world is a fragment,—the totality of what is, past, present, and future, the totality of what is physical and of what is mental, of what is temporal and of what is enduring,—this entire world is present at once to the eternal divine consciousness as a single whole, and this whole is what the absolute chooses as his own expression, and is what he is conscious of choosing as his own life. In this entire world God sees himself lived out. This world, when taken in its wholeness, is at once the object of the divine knowledge and the deed wherein is embodied the divine will. Like the Logos of the Fourth Gospel, this entire world is not only with God, but is God.

As you see, I state this doctrine, for the moment, quite summarily and dogmatically. Only an extensive and elaborate philosophical discussion could show you why I hold this doctrine to be true. Most of you, however, have heard of some such doctrine as the theory of the Divine Immanence. Some of you are aware that such an interpretation of the nature of God constitutes what is called philosophical Idealism. I am not here defending, nor even expounding, this doctrine. I believe, however, that this is the view of the divine nature which the church has always more or less intuitively felt to be true, and has tried to express, despite the fact that my own formulation of this doctrine includes some features which in the course of the past history of dogma have been upon occasion formally condemned as heresy by various church-authorities. But for my part I had rather be a heretic, and appreciate the vital meaning of what the church has always tried to teach, than accept this or that traditional formulation, but be unable to grasp its religiously significant spirit.

Dogmatically, then, I state what, indeed, if there were time, I ought to expound and to defend on purely rational grounds.

God and his world are one. And this unity is not a dead natural fact. It is the unity of a conscious life, in which, in the course of infinite time, a divine plan, an endlessly complex and yet perfectly definite spiritual idea, gets expressed in the lives of countless finite beings and yet with the unity of a single universal life.

Whoever hears this doctrine stated, asks, however, at once a question,—the deepest, and also the most tragic question of our present poor human existence: Why, then, if the world is the divine life embodied, is there so much evil in it,—so much darkness, ignorance, misery, disappointment, warfare, hatred, disease, death?—in brief, why is the world as we know it full of the unreasonable? Are all these gloomy facts but illusions, bad dreams of our finite existence,—facts unknown to the very God who is, and who knows, all truth? No,—that cannot be the answer; for then the question would recur: Why are these our endlessly tragic illusions permitted? Why are we allowed by the world-plan to be so unreasonable as to dream these bad dreams which fill our finite life, and which in a way constitute this finite life? And that question would then be precisely equivalent to the former question, and just as hard to solve. In brief, the problem of evil is the great problem that stands between our ordinary finite view and experience of life on the one hand and our consciousness of the reasonableness and the unity of the divine life on the other hand.

Has this problem of evil any solution? I believe that it has a solution, and that this solution has long since been in substance grasped and figured forth in symbolic forms by the higher religious consciousness of our race. This solution, not abstractly stated, but intuitively grasped, has also expressed itself in the lives of the wisest and best of the moral heroes of all races and nations of men. The value of suffering, the good that is at the heart of evil, lies in the spiritual triumphs that the endurance and the overcoming of evil can bring to those who learn the hard, the deep but glorious, lesson of life. And of all the spiritual triumphs that the presence of evil makes possible, the noblest, is that which is won when a man is ready, not merely to bear the ills of fortune tranquilly if they come, as the Stoic moralists required their followers to do, but when one is willing to suffer

vicariously, freely, devotedly, ills that he might have avoided, but that the cause to which he is loyal, and the errors and sins that he himself did not commit, call upon him to suffer in order that the world may be brought nearer to its destined union with the divine. In brief, as the mystics themselves often have said, sorrow,—wisely encountered and freely borne,—is one of the most precious privileges of the spiritual life. There is a certain lofty peace in triumphing over sorrow, which brings us to a consciousness of whatever is divine in life, in a way that mere joy, untroubled and unwon, can never make known to us. Perfect through suffering,—that is the universal, the absolutely necessary law of the higher spiritual life. It is a law that holds for God and for man, for those amongst men who have already become enlightened through learning the true lessons of their own sorrows, and for those who full of hope still look forward to a life from which they in the main anticipate joy and worldly success, and who have yet to learn that the highest good of life is to come to them through whatever willing endurance of hardness they, as good soldiers of their chosen loyal service, shall learn to choose or to endure as their offering to their sacred cause. This doctrine that I now state to you is indeed no ascetic doctrine. It does not for a moment imply that joy is a sin, or an evil symptom. What it does assert is that as long as the joys and successes which you seek are expected and sought by you simply as good fortune, which you try to win through mere cleverness—through mere technical skill in the arts of controlling fortune,—so long, I say, as this is your view of life, you know neither God's purpose nor the truth about man's destiny. Our always poor and defective skill in controlling fortune is indeed a valuable part of our reasonableness, since it is the natural basis upon which a higher spiritual life may be built. Hence the word, "Young men, be strong," and the common-sense injunction, "Be skilful, be practical," are good counsel. And so health, and physical prowess, and inner cheerfulness, are indeed wisely viewed as natural foundations for a higher life. But the higher life itself begins only when your health and your strength and your skill and your good cheer appear to you merely as talents, few or many, which you propose to devote, to surrender, to the divine order, to what-

ever ideal cause most inspires your loyalty, and gives sense and divine dignity to your life,—talents, I say, that you intend to return to your master with usury. And the work of the higher life consists, not in winning good fortune, but in transmuting all the transient values of fortune into eternal values. This you best do when you learn by experience how your worst fortune may be glorified, through wise resolve, and through the grace that comes from your conscious union with the divine, into something far better than any good fortune could give to you; namely, into a knowledge of how God himself endures evil, and triumphs over it, and lifts it out of itself, and wins it over to the service of good.

The true and highest values of the spiritual world consist, I say, in the triumph over suffering, over sorrow, and over unreasonableness, and the triumph over these things may appear in our human lives in three forms: First, as mere personal fortitude,—as the stoical virtues in their simplest expression. The stoical virtues are the most elementary stage of the higher spiritual life. Fortitude is indeed required of every conscious agent who has control over himself at all. And fortitude, even in this simplest form as manly and strenuous endurance, teaches you eternal values that you can never learn unless you first meet with positive ills of fortune, and then force yourself to bear them in the loyal service of your cause. Willing endurance of suffering and grief is the price that you have to pay for conscious fidelity to any cause that is vast enough to be worthy of the loyalty of a lifetime. And thus no moral agent can be made perfect except through suffering borne in the service of his cause. Secondly, the triumph over suffering appears in the higher form of that conscious union with the divine plan which occurs when you learn that love, and loyalty, and the idealizing of life, and the most precious and sacred of all human relationships, are raised to their highest levels, are glorified, only when we not merely learn in our own personal case to suffer, to sorrow, to endure, and be spiritually strong, but when we learn to do these things together with our own brethren. For the comradeship of those who willingly not merely practise fortitude as a private virtue but as brethren in sorrow is a deeper, a sweeter, a more blessed

comradeship than ever is that of the lovers who have not yet been tried so as by fire. Then the deepest trials of life come to you and your friend together, and when, after the poor human heart has indeed endured what for the time it is able to bear of anguish, it finds its little moment of rest, and when you are able once more to clasp the dear hand that would help if it could, and to look afresh into your friend's eyes and to see there the light of love as you could never see it before,—then, even in the darkness of this world, you catch some faint far-off glimpse of how the spirit may yet triumph despite all, and of why sorrow may reveal to us, as we sorrow and endure together, what we should never have known of life, and of love, and of each other, and of the high places of the spirit, if this cup had been permitted to pass from us. But thirdly, and best, the triumph of the spirit over suffering is revealed to us not merely when we endure, when we learn through sorrow to prize our brethren more, and when we learn to see new powers in them and even in our poor selves, powers such as only sorrow could bring to light,—but when we also turn back from such experiences to real life again, remembering that sorrow's greatest lesson is the duty of offering ourselves more than ever to the practical service of some divine cause in this world. When one is stung to the heart and seemingly wholly overcome by the wounds of fortune, it sometimes chances that he learns after a while to arise from his agony, with the word: "Well then, if, whether by my own fault or without it, I must descend into hell, I will remember that in this place of sorrow there are the other souls in torment, seeking light; I will help them to awake and arise. As I enter I will open the gates of hell that they may go forth." Whatever happens to me, I say, this is a possible result of sorrow. I have known those men and women who could learn such a lesson from sorrow and who could practise it. These are the ones who, coming up through great tribulation, show us the highest glimpse that we have in this life of the triumph of the spirit over sorrow. But these are the ones who are willing to suffer vicariously, to give their lives as a ransom for many. These tell us what atonement means.

Well, these are, after all, but glimpses of truth. But they show us why the same law holds for all the highest spiritual



life. They show us that God too must sorrow in order that he may triumph.

Now the true doctrine of the Incarnation and of the Atonement is, in its essence, simply the conception of God's nature which this solution of the problem of evil requires. First, God expresses himself in this world of finitude, incarnates himself in this realm of human imperfection, but does so in order that through finitude and imperfection, and sorrow and temporal loss, he may win in the eternal world (that is, precisely, in the conscious unity of his whole life) his spiritual triumph over evil. In this triumph consists his highest good, and ours. It is God's true and eternal triumph that speaks to us through the well-known word: "In this world ye shall have tribulation. But fear not; I have overcome the world." Mark, I do not say that we, just as we naturally are, are already the true and complete incarnation of God. No, it is in overcoming evil, in rising above our natural unreasonableness, in looking towards the divine unity, that we seek what Eckhart so well expressed when he said, Let God be born in the soul. Hence the doctrine of the incarnation is no doctrine of the natural divinity of man. It is the doctrine which teaches that the world-will desires our unity with the universal purpose, that God will be born in us and through our consent, that the whole meaning of our life is that it shall transmute transient and temporal values into eternal meanings. Humanity becomes conscious God incarnate only in so far as humanity looks godwards; that is, in the direction of the whole unity of the rational spiritual life.

And now, secondly, the true doctrine of the atonement seems to me simply this: We, as we temporally and transiently are, are destined to win our union with the divine only through learning to triumph over our own evil, over the griefs of fortune, over the unreasonableness and the sin that now beset us. This conquest we never accomplish alone. As the mother that bore you suffered, so the world suffers for you and through and in you until you win your peace in union with the divine will. Upon such suffering you actually depend for your natural existence, for the toleration which your imperfect self constantly demands from the world, for the help that your helplessness so often needs. When you sorrow, then, remember that God sorrows,—sorrows in you, since in all

your finitude you still are part of his life; sorrows for you, since it is the intent of the divine spirit, in the plan of its reasonable world, that you should not remain what you now are; and sorrows, too, in waiting for your higher fulfilment, since indeed the whole universe needs your spiritual triumph for the sake of its completion.

On the other hand, this doctrine of the atonement means that there is never any completed spiritual triumph over sorrow which is not accompanied with the willingness to suffer vicariously; that is, with the will not merely to endure bravely, but to force one's very sorrow to be an aid to the common cause of all mankind, to give one's life as a ransom for one's cause, to use one's bitterest and most crushing grief as a means towards the raising of all life to the divine level. It is not enough to endure. Your duty is to make your grief a source of blessing. Thus only can sorrow bring you into conscious touch with the universal life.

Now all this teaching is old. The church began to learn its own version of this solution of the problem of evil when first it sorrowed over its lost master; when first it began to say: "It was needful that Christ should suffer"; when first in vision and in legend it began to conceive its glorified Lord. When later it said, "In the God-man Christ God suffered, once for all and in the flesh, to save us; in him alone the Word became flesh and dwelt among us," the forms of its religious imagination were transient, but the truth of which these forms were the symbol was everlasting. And we sum up this truth in two theses: First, God wins perfection through expressing himself in a finite life and triumphing over and through its very finitude. And secondly, Our sorrow is God's sorrow. God means to express himself by winning us through the very triumph over evil to unity with the perfect life, and therefore our fulfilment, like our existence, is due to the sorrow and the triumph of God himself. These two theses express, I believe, what is vital in Christianity.

*MODERN METHODS IN NEW TESTAMENT PHILOLOGY*

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The language of the Greek New Testament has been under the continual search-light of criticism since the early part of the seventeenth century, when the keen debate between the Purist and the Hebraist produced a copious literature. The former laid a very heavy burden on his own shoulders. Although he could easily argue for his thesis of the "purity" of the New Testament language by citing numberless parallels between it and the best Greek writers, it was hard to account for the many points of divergence, and consequently the Hebraist steadily gained ground. Antecedent probability, as well as common sense, seemed to be on the side of the latter. For the New Testament was akin to the Septuagint, and that was regarded as a treasure-house of Semitisms. Moreover most of the writers of the New Testament were Jews, and nothing seemed more natural than that their Greek should be deeply tinged with the idioms of their native tongue. Accordingly Hebraism was granted large concessions, and under it were included not only the Greek expressions which happened to have sister-constructions in Hebrew or Aramaic, but also many usages peculiar to Greek but unusual in the days of the best Attic. These Semitisms were supposed so to affect syntax, vocabulary, and style as to make the result un-greek.

The victory of the Hebraists led finally to another view which for long hindered New Testament philology. Enthusiasts regarded the New Testament language as in every sense sacred, too sublime to submit to rules, governed by laws of its own caprice. They were so impressed with the treasures conveyed to them that they came to deem the conveying vessel divine. In other words, they canonized the language as well as the subject-matter. In 1860 Rothe used the oft-quoted words: "It is indeed proper to speak of a 'language of the Holy Spirit'; for the Bible offers

ocular demonstration of the way in which the divine Spirit has fashioned a unique religious dialect out of the languages of each of those communities that formed the scene of His revealing activity,"—words which were repeated by Cremer in the ninth edition of his *Biblisch-theologisches Wörterbuch* (1902).

On the other side the classical scholar too often flouted the language of the New Testament as a mere jargon, unworthy of attention beside the studied art of classicism. For him it was a stone of stumbling, it contravened all rules by which he wrote his own artificial prose, and it offered an amusing field for pedantic correction. At a glance he could see that New Testament Greek is decidedly "unclassical." His eyes were fixed upon the stately style of Thucydides, the rounded phrases of Attic oratory, the majesty of Athenian drama, or the prose poetry of Plato, and he failed to see the different, but no less striking, merits of the New Testament writers.

The modern era in New Testament philology began about the end of the first quarter of the last century when G. B. Winer published (1822) the first edition of his New Testament Greek Grammar. The ancient Sanskrit literature had been brought to the knowledge of European scholars in the closing decades of the eighteenth century, and in the beginning of the nineteenth the new science of comparative philology had been founded. This put an end to much of the superficial empiricism of earlier methods, and gave a new impetus to linguistic study. Philology was no longer an incomplete and mechanical process of compilation of examples and exceptions. Thorough scientific and comparative sifting was necessary before proper deductions could be drawn and rules laid down; and language had now to be viewed as a living organism evolving itself according to psychological and physical conditions. No arbitrary external standards might be imposed upon it, its laws could be inferred only from an investigation of its internal constitution.

It was Winer's merit to realize to some extent what this new science meant for New Testament Greek, and he was able to give a wider outlook, and to inaugurate a period of immense activity in the philological study of the New Testament. Many editions and translations of his grammar appeared during his

lifetime and after his death; and the awakened interest was promptly directed to lexicographical work, and to the study of synonyms and the making of concordances. But New Testament Greek still retained its isolation, neither emancipated from the shackles of Hebraism nor elevated above the scorn of the classicist. It was still customary to speak of New Testament, or Biblical, or Christian, Greek as something specifically independent, uncorrelated with the contemporary secular language of its time. The dogma of verbal inspiration was so understood as to chill scientific appreciation. Christianity was supposed to have made for herself a select language as well as a peculiar people.

But the nineteenth century accumulated a great store of new materials for study in this field. Since the day when August Böckh launched his huge *Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum* (1828) a vast wealth of inscriptions has been brought to us from all parts of the once far-extending Greek world. Even more significant have been the surprising finds of thousands of unlitrary and literary papyri preserved to us by the dry climate and sand of Egypt. From the rubbish heaps of the same country, and of its southern neighbor, large numbers of inscribed potsherds, or "ostraca," have found their way into our hands. With the use of this material the present generation has seen the beginning of still a third period of New Testament philology, in which have come profoundly important changes in method and point of view.

Until the present generation even epigraphy scarcely affected New Testament study, Böckh's great collection of inscriptions being mainly ignored by students of the New Testament. It is now demonstrated that the New Testament vocabulary did not stand isolated, but was one with the vernacular of its day, the so-called Koinê, or "common dialect" of the Hellenistic-Roman world in which it had its origin. In it the influence of many contemporary political and religious conceptions not connected with the Old Testament can be clearly recognized. To Adolf Deissmann<sup>1</sup> belongs the credit of inaugurating this new era and of

<sup>1</sup> Bibelstudien, Beiträge zumeist aus den Papyri und Inschriften zur Geschichte der Sprache, des Schrifttums und der Religion des hellenistischen Juden

opening a great future for the further prosecution of New Testament philology by showing the lexical connection of the New Testament with the inscriptions, the papyri, and the writers of the Koinê.

The next requisite was a more exact knowledge of the contemporary Koinê, and the philologist Albert Thumb has now depicted for us the origin and nature of this type of Greek and its true place in the history of the Greek language. He confirmed Deissmann's position and went further, by bringing to bear both on the Koinê and on New Testament Greek a wide knowledge of modern popular Greek, by the aid of which, among other things, he strengthened the case against Hebraisms.

With these scholars should be named James Hope Moulton, *patris laborum heres*, now professor of Hellenistic Greek in Victoria University, Manchester. He supplemented Deissmann's discoveries from collections of inscriptions and papyri previously unused, and has now in the field of New Testament grammar demonstrated<sup>2</sup> that the accidence and syntax of the New Testament are substantially those of the vernacular Koinê. His work is the more valuable because, following Thumb's example, he has availed himself of the evidence to be drawn from modern Greek.

That the progress of philology has thus broken down the wall of partition for the language of the New Testament and removed its erstwhile isolation is a great service to the right understanding of the book's contents. The result has been not to impoverish but to enrich the meaning of many words, as we come to see their origin and significance in the contemporary pagan world. Thus we now know that such words and expressions as *σωτήρ*, *κύριος*, *υἱὸς θεοῦ*, *εὐαγγέλιον*, *κυριακὴ ἡμέρα*, and many others, are not of Christian coinage, but are taken from the religious language of the surrounding heathen or Jewish world. As Christianity came

tums und des Urchristentums, 1895; Neue Bibelstudien, Sprachgeschichtliche Beiträge zumeist aus den Papyri und Inschriften zur Erklärung des Neuen Testaments, 1897 (English translation in one volume, Bible Studies, 1901, <sup>2</sup>1903); New Light on the New Testament, 1907; The Philology of the Greek Bible, 1908; Licht vom Osten; das Neue Testament und die neuentdeckten Texte der hellenistisch-römischen Welt, 1908.

<sup>2</sup> A Grammar of New Testament Greek, vol. i, Prolegomena, 1906, <sup>2</sup>1906, <sup>3</sup>1908.

at first to "the poor ones," "the meek," and "the little ones" of this world, she did not disdain their language, but sought to make herself intelligible in the every-day speech of the common man. Her language is the natural, unaffected language of the heart, quite at one with that of the lower and middle classes and always intelligible to them. Its place is with the spoken rather than with the written Koinê. The authors of the New Testament, taken as a whole, had no thought of fame or of distant ages, but wrote for the need of the time in which they lived, the while their thoughts were occupied with the supposedly near approach of the Parousia. The New Testament has become literature, has produced literature, and has dominated literature in spite of the fact that it was not primarily intended for literature. The classical period of Attic Greek was one of beauty in outward things and of form, one in which art was cherished for its own sake; the classical excellence of New Testament Greek lies in its simplicity and direct forcefulness, the beauty is of the matter. The great literary achievement of the New Testament is the fact that it has made literature out of common colloquial speech and reared an eternal monument of the language of the lower strata of society.

The principal uncial MSS. in which our New Testament text has been preserved were written between 300 and 500 A.D., in a time of atticizing tendency. We should therefore expect that a popular or plebeian character of the autographs would not always be strictly preserved. They were in fact "corrected," not modernized but archaized, or atticized, in details. Wellhausen<sup>3</sup> maintains that Codex Bezae often preserves the more plebeian character of the original text. Even in the days of the autographs this tendency was in some degree present; we find Matthew, and to a still greater extent the more elegant Luke, correcting or removing plebeianisms of Mark. The tendency toward greater elegance in language naturally increased when Christianity conquered her former oppressors and made herself recognized as the established religion of the Roman Empire. Luke, as just said, set the example in the preparation of his works for "his Excellency, Theophilus," and when Christianity gained her place of

<sup>3</sup> Einleitung in die drei ersten Evangelien, 1905, p. 13.

power at the courts of potentates and began to reside in palaces (both royal and episcopal), she began to pay more attention to outward form and to array herself in court-dress.<sup>4</sup>

No one maintains that Christianity was able to pour all her new concepts into the old lexical vessels. It is not to be denied that distinctively Christian words sprang up, but these are much less numerous than was supposed a few years ago. Kennedy<sup>5</sup> calculated that about 550 out of the 5000 words in the New Testament were "Biblical," that is about twelve per cent. On the other hand Deissmann reckons<sup>6</sup> that not more than fifty new formations, or one per cent, are to be found, for "primitive Christianity was a revolution of the inmost life of man, but not a revolution of the Greek lexicon." Christianity did little in her early days to increase the number of words to be registered in a Greek lexicon; her work was to enrich and deepen their meaning. Later on, in the ecclesiastical period of dogma and apologetics, the word-minting capacity of the church was considerably increased.

Upon Semitisms, including both Hebraisms and Aramaisms, the flood-gates of advancing New Testament philology have been opened wide, and this once stately edifice has now fallen to ruins. On the same principle on which the Semitists collected their array of Semitisms, we might now take almost any civilized language, English, German, or French, and by comparing it with the Greek of the New Testament find enough coincidences to justify, if priority in time permitted, a claim of Anglicisms, Teutonisms, or Gallicisms. The search for Semitisms has been carried to high degrees of absurdity. Even at the present day it is still well represented in the grammatical works of the Abbé Viteau,<sup>7</sup> who describes *un énorme mélange d'hébraïsmes*. Viteau, however, is

<sup>4</sup> Cf. E. Schwyzer, *Die Weltsprachen des Altertums in ihrer geschichtlichen Stellung*, 1902, p. 32.

<sup>5</sup> *Sources of New Testament Greek*, 1895, pp. 60-83, and p. 93.

<sup>6</sup> *Expositor*, Jan. 1908, pp. 70, 71. Cf. also Licht vom Osten, p. 47, "In der religiös schöpferischen Urzeit ist die wortbildende Kraft des Christentums bei weitem nicht so gross, als seine begriffsumbildende Wirkung."

<sup>7</sup> *Étude sur le Grec du Nouveau Testament; Le verbe, syntaxe des propositions*, 1893; *Sujet, complément et attribut*, 1896.



reasonable as compared with A. Schlatter,<sup>8</sup> who has laboriously compared the language of the Fourth Gospel word for word and sentence for sentence with the Hebrew of a Rabbinical commentary on Exodus, and finds Hebraisms in such natural and colorless expressions as *οὐ τίς εἶ*; and *πᾶς ἄνθρωπος*. Neither Deissmann nor Moulton would deny that Semitic influence is to be found in the language of the Septuagint<sup>9</sup> and New Testament, but they hold that it was exerted chiefly in the realm of style and of ideas. The Septuagint is naturally more "Hebraic," being "translation Greek." Its thoughts were first cast in old Hebrew forms and later recast in those of the Hellenistic language, and of necessity it has retained the marks of its oriental origin.

In the New Testament we must differentiate those parts which are free Greek from those which were composed or translated from Aramaic originals. Some of the New Testament writers were more Jews than Hellenists;<sup>10</sup> their minds worked in Aramaic, and it would be impossible that such men should write as good idiomatic Greek as a native Hellenist. They did not use many wholly un-greek expressions, but, as Moulton phrases it, over-worked possible, but unidiomatic, Hellenistic expressions when they happened to correspond with Semitic usage. "A Semitism which definitely contravenes Greek syntax" is rare. It is wrong to ascribe to Semitic influences every breach in concord and every reminder of the fact that the New Testament was not primarily written for the schools. A residuum of real Semitisms, though small, cannot be denied, especially in view of the work of Dalman<sup>11</sup> and Wellhausen.<sup>12</sup> There is no occasion in the ardor of recent

<sup>8</sup> *Die Sprache und Heimat des vierten Evangelisten*, 1902; see Thumb's withering criticism in *Archiv für Papyrusforschung*, 1906, p. 461.

<sup>9</sup> Jean Paichari in a learned "Essai sur le Grec de la Septante," in the *Revue des études juives*, April, 1908, points out by way of protest against Deissmann and Moulton certain Hebraisms to be detected by the use of modern popular Greek.

<sup>10</sup> A notable exception is Paul, who, though a Hebrew of Hebrews, spoke Greek like a second mother-tongue, and thought in Greek. See, however, Zahn, *Einleitung in das Neue Testament*, 3d ed., i, p. 33; cf. the literature noted by Milligan, *Commentary on Thessalonians*, p. lv, and Jülicher, "Hellenism," in *Encyclopaedia Biblica*.

<sup>11</sup> *Die Worte Jesu*, 1898, English translation, 1902.

<sup>12</sup> *Einleitung in die drei ersten Evangelien*, 1905, pp. 1-43.

conversion for us to carry the reaction too far. Nevertheless, a safe attitude will be that recommended by an unknown anti-semitic letter-writer of August 4, A.D. 41,<sup>13</sup> καὶ σὺ βλέπε σατὸν ἀπὸ τῶν Ἰουδαίων.

Closely allied to Semitisms, and even more completely laid than they, is the ghost of a Jewish or Judaeo-Christian Greek, the existence of which as a special and separate idiom of the Koinê is maintained by Zahn<sup>14</sup> and Viteau and, under the name of *hellenistisches Idiom*, by Winer-Schmiedel.<sup>15</sup> The idea is built largely on hypothesis, and the corresponding facts are wanting. As between the home-keeping Palestinian Jews and the Jews of the Diaspora the former were, it is true, the more conservative in language, as in customs and religion. Palestine in the first century was certainly bi-lingual, and the existence of two languages side by side no doubt caused interaction, which would be felt especially by the weaker language. Aramaic was spoken by our Lord, as by Palestinian Jews in general when at home or in company with their fellow-countrymen. But although Palestine was not so thoroughly hellenized as Syria, Egypt, or Asia Minor, the language of Hellenism surrounded Aramaic on all sides. It was the language of culture, and occupied an eminent position as the language of the Roman government, so that the people must in some measure have become acquainted with it. It was also the language of commerce, and wherever any commercial advantage is to be gained by the knowledge of another tongue the Jew has never allowed it to be lost. But because a Palestinian Jew may have spoken this foreign tongue unidiomatically, that does not prove that there was a current Jewish-Greek dialect. Of any peculiar Jewish pronunciation of Greek we have no trace,<sup>16</sup> although we do know of a Syrian pronunciation.

<sup>13</sup> Aegyptische Urkunden aus den kgl. Museen zu Berlin: Griechische Urkunden, vol. iv, 1907, no. 1079; quoted also in Licht vom Osten, p. 82, footnote 6.

<sup>14</sup> "Die griechische Sprache unter den Juden," Einleitung in das Neue Testament<sup>2</sup>, i, pp. 24-52.

<sup>15</sup> G. B. Winer's Grammatik des neutestamentlichen Sprachidioms, 8th ed., 1894, p. 25.

<sup>16</sup> Thumb, op. cit., p. 177.

Outside Palestine there is still less reason to speak of a specific Jewish Greek. The Jew, whenever he left the home-land, became hellenized. No doubt the average new-comers from Palestine did not speak with the facility of those who had been longer and in more immediate contact with Greek. But among the cosmopolitan Jews Greek gained ground and Aramaic was gradually forgotten, so that in the third century B.C. a Greek translation of the Scriptures was called for in Egypt. In fact, wherever outside of Palestine the Jew settled, even the language of his religion and of the synagogue, in which we should expect to find most conservatism, became Greek. In Jerusalem itself there were Greek synagogues where the Hellenistic Jews and proselytes worshipped. Of great interest is the broken lintel-inscription found at Corinth /ΤΩΓΗΒΡ/, which is to be completed as ΣΥΝΑΓΩΓΗ ΕΒΡΑΙΩΝ, and may well have belonged to the Jewish synagogue in which Paul preached (Acts 18 4).<sup>17</sup>

The extant unliterary Koinê is not the only evidence against Semitisms and Jewish Greek. It is just possible that the ubiquitous Jew or roving Semite, when he found himself with his compatriots in distant parts of Egypt or Asia Minor, or in the cities of Greece, there spoke and wrote his Greek with a few not quite obliterated Semitic peculiarities disagreeable to his neighbors. But when we find the evidence of inscriptions, papyri, and ostraca borne out by the popular Greek of the present day, when we find these quondam Semitisms leading their own natural life in the colloquial language of the villages of modern Greece, we have a conclusive argument against the theory that magnifies coincidences into Semitisms.

The protagonist of the use of modern Greek to support this argument is Thumb. He points out, for example, that *ὄνομα* in the signification of "person" (found in the papyri) is exactly the modern Greek *νομᾶται*.<sup>18</sup> He parallels the *hébraïsme pur* of Viteau, καὶ ὁ οἶκος οὗτος ὁ ὑψηλός, πᾶς ὁ διαπορευόμενος αὐτὸν ἐκστῆσεται (LXX, 2 Chron. 7 21) from a fifteenth-century poem, where no one will suspect Hebraism: ἡ πόλις ἡ ἀγάπη σου, ἐπῆραν

<sup>17</sup> Now in the Museum of Corinth. See *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, xviii, 1898, p. 333; *American Journal of Archaeology*, 1903, pp. 60-61.

<sup>18</sup> Op. cit., p. 123.

τὴν οἱ Τοῦρκοι.<sup>19</sup> Similarly Psichari has made large use of modern Greek, as has Moulton in his *Prolegomena*.

The New Testament language in its phonetics, morphology, syntax, and vocabulary, is thus seen to be a living plastic language, with a life of its own quite independent of Hebrew or Aramaic. One finds practically all the same phenomena in contemporary Greek.

Besides the books already named other works in New Testament philology must be more briefly mentioned. Thus the writings of W. M. Ramsay of Aberdeen have shown in a very practical way how the New Testament text may be studied, both historically and philologically, in the light of ancient Greek inscriptions.

A great service has been rendered by the New Testament concordances of Bruder (1842, '1888) and of Moulton and Geden (1897), the former of which is to appear in a new edition revised by Schmiedel. Bruder's has the practical advantage for students that it gives the full Greek text of the references in the case of all the prepositions and even for the particles *καί* and *δέ*. It has the disadvantage of being mainly based on the Textus Receptus, although the last edition takes account of the principal deviations of Tregelles and of Westcott and Hort. The concordance of Moulton and Geden omits *καί* and *δέ* altogether, and for some words gives lists of mere references without the Greek text; prepositions, for instance, which always govern the same case are "treated compendiously." It has the advantage that it gives "the text of the Greek Testament as set forth in the latest and best critical editions," Westcott and Hort's text being taken as a standard with which are compared the texts of the eighth edition of Tischendorf and of the English Revisers.

In the field of grammar Winer has formed the groundwork

<sup>19</sup> Op. cit., p. 131, cf. p. 127, "Bevor jemand von der biblischen Gräcität behauptet, 'l'hébreu a donc exercé une influence profonde sur l'emploi des voix et sur leur signification,' sollte er sich die mittel- und neugriechische Grammatik genau ansehen; denn es geht schlechterdings nicht mehr ohne deren Studium, wenn man die Sprache der griechischen Bibel beurteilen will." A careful study of Hatzidakis, *Einleitung in die neugriechische Grammatik*, 1892, Thumb, *Handbuch der neugriechischen Volkssprache*, 1895, and Dieterich, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der griechischen Sprache von der hellenistischen Zeit bis zum X. Jahrhundert nach Christo*, 1898, will shake the faith of any believer in Semitisms.

for most New Testament grammars since published. In its English translations by J. H. Thayer (1869) and W. F. Moulton (1870) it has presided over the exegesis of nearly half a century in England and America. In 1859 appeared the not-yet-forgotten grammar of Alexander Buttmann (English translation by Thayer, 1873), which carried on the traditions of Winer. A better known work is the grammar of F. Blass,<sup>20</sup> the first edition of which appeared while Blass still labored under the shackles of the old theories, so that he writes of New Testament Greek that it is "a special idiom, following its own laws," and among the phenomena of the language finds many Semitisms. In the second edition his point of view had slightly changed; he took a more cautious position on the burning question of Semitisms, and called in modern Greek to his service, acknowledging that New Testament Greek shows "an intermediate stage on the road from ancient to modern Greek."

Two years earlier than Blass, in 1894, began to appear the eighth edition of Winer, revised and enlarged by P. W. Schmiedel,<sup>21</sup> and it is still in progress. This is a work of decided merit, in which the reviser bravely endeavored to bring to bear modern philological science. Unfortunately for his work, he began a little too early for the use of the new papyri. Deissmann remarks that there is "too much Winer and too little Schmiedel."

Burton's work, *Syntax of the Moods and Tenses in New Testament Greek* (1888, '1900), has remained the best authority in its department to the present day. The appearance of a translation into Dutch (1906) with additions by de Zwaan bears testimony to its merits.

The two volumes of the *Étude sur le Grec du Nouveau Testament* by Viteau are top-heavy and destined to fall under the weight of the *énorme mélange d'hébraïsmes*. Viteau is enslaved entirely to the old school, he sees in the Greek of the New Testament (and Septuagint) almost as many Hebraisms as Schlatter.

<sup>20</sup> *Grammatik des neutestamentlichen Griechisch*, 1896, <sup>2</sup> 1902, English translation, 1898, second edition, revised and enlarged, 1905.

<sup>21</sup> I. Theil, *Einleitung und Formenlehre*, 1894; II. Theil, *Syntax*, 1. Heft, 1897, 2. Heft, 1898. Schmiedel's attention having been diverted to other subjects, E. Schwyzer will assist in the completion of this long-delayed publication.

Moreover analogy will account for a great many of the sins of his "Judaean-Christian" Greek. In his works, however, we have a useful collection of material and many suggestive remarks.

Finally we come to the *magnum opus* of recent New Testament grammatical work, the *Prolegomena* of Professor James Hope Moulton, a book of great timeliness, which has been heartily welcomed by scholars. Moulton's grammar is based firmly on the new foundations, and is beyond doubt the most independent New Testament grammar that has appeared since Winer's first edition. His first volume, which prefaces the systematic grammar with "a general sketch of Hellenistic language and the position of the New Testament writers in its development," is mainly devoted to a singularly successful attempt at "a readable account of the history and characteristics of Common Greek, bringing in . . . the newly available evidence which might assist the New Testament scholar," and leaves the conviction behind "that the New Testament from the linguistic point of view stands in the most vital connection with the Hellenistic world surrounding it." All who are interested in New Testament study must eagerly await the appearance of a second volume from the same careful pen.

Another New Testament grammar has been for some time in preparation by L. Radermacher, known from his contributions to classical journals, and is to appear as the opening part of the first volume of Lietzmann's *Handbuch zum Neuen Testament*.<sup>22</sup>

In the department of New Testament Lexicography no such high point of excellence has yet been attained as in that of grammar. Over the existing lexicons it may fairly be said that *hic jacet* has already been written. Grimm's revision of Wilke's *Clavis Novi Testamenti philologica* (1862-68, '1903) did good service in its day. It was translated, improved, and granted a longer life in the two editions of J. H. Thayer's *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament* (1886), which remains to this day admittedly the best lexicon available. H. Cremer's

<sup>22</sup> In his preface to *A Short Grammar of the Greek New Testament*, New York, 1908, A. T. Robertson announces that he has already written a number of chapters of a "larger grammar of the Greek New Testament on the scale of Winer," which he will finish as rapidly as possible.

*Biblisch-theologisches Wörterbuch der neutestamentlichen Gräcität* (1866, <sup>9</sup>1902) is a laborious collection of valuable material, but was unscientific from the beginning.

From Dutch scholars come two lexicons which, though not directly or solely devoted to the New Testament, can be used with advantage. Especially commendable is van Herwerden's *Lexicon Graecum suppletorium et dialecticum*, with the *Appendix* to the same.<sup>23</sup> These volumes give us a useful collection of material, considerably extending our knowledge of Hellenistic Greek; no New Testament student can afford to neglect them.<sup>24</sup> The *Grieksch-theologisch woordenboek hoofdzakelijk van de oud-christelijke letterkunde* of J. M. S. Baljon (1895-99) covers not only the New Testament but also the Septuagint and the early Christian literature. It is said to be virtually a translation of Cremer, and to be deficient in philological accuracy and over-attentive to belated and useless etymologies.

A new Lexicon for the New Testament and early Christian literature by E. Preuschen has for some time been in progress, and three parts have appeared.<sup>25</sup> One purpose of Preuschen's work is to render a concordance practically unnecessary, but since we already possess reliable concordances, this is a doubtful merit. References are given for the usages of New Testament words in the apocryphal writings, while references from profane literature and from the later ecclesiastical writers are lacking. A decided demerit is the silence as to papyri and inscriptions. It promises but little advance on existing New Testament lexicons.

Here should be mentioned the "Lexical Notes from the Papyri" by J. H. Moulton and G. Milligan, begun in the *Expositor* for January, 1908, and various monographs and articles by Nägeli, Wendland, Thieme, Nachmanson, and Heitmüller. The scope of this paper does not permit notice of other important works

<sup>23</sup> Leyden, 1902; Appendix, 1904; "Nova addenda," in *Mélanges Nicole*, Geneva, 1905.

<sup>24</sup> Deissmann, "Die Sprache der griechischen Bibel," in *Theologische Rundschau*, 1906, p. 223.

<sup>25</sup> Vollständiges griechisch-deutsches Handwörterbuch zu den Schriften des Neuen Testaments und der übrigen urchristlichen Literatur, 1908-.

on the Koinê and on modern Greek from Dieterich, Hatzidakis, Thumb, Mayser, Krumbacher, Kretschmer, Psichari, and others.

On Deissmann's instructive article on "New Testament Philology" in the *Expositor* for January, 1908, one may venture two criticisms. First, Deissmann has not sufficiently emphasized the suggestiveness of E. A. Abbott's *Johannine Grammar* (1906).<sup>26</sup> This is little wonder; Abbott's grammar was antiquated the moment it came from the press, for his investigation has been pursued altogether from the old classical standpoint, and with too little attention to Hellenistic Greek. But he has been a pioneer in the careful study of the language of individual writers of the New Testament. Deissmann admits the "great need of critical studies of the style of the separate books of the New Testament," and Moulton observes that the varieties of culture in the different books are "sufficiently marked to make it imperative on us to take each author by himself, assigning him his place on the 'grammatometer' which we may construct by the aid of the papyri."<sup>27</sup> Here is abundant scope for students of Hellenistic Greek equipped with Abbott's careful and patient scholarship; we stand as much in need of a Pauline or Lukan grammar as of a Johannine.<sup>28</sup> Such works would be of more than ephemeral value and would doubtless help to settle many troublesome questions in Pauline and Lukan criticism.

Secondly, while Deissmann has shown how the New Testament must be studied in the light of the inscriptions, papyri, and ostraca, he has made no mention of the aid to be had for forms, syntax, and meaning of words from modern popular Greek, the direct lineal descendant of the Koinê. Theoretically the advantage for the New Testament of the study of modern Greek was

<sup>26</sup> See the reviews by J. H. Moulton in *American Journal of Theology*, Jan. 1907, pp. 157-164, and by T. Nicklin in *Classical Review*, xx, p. 172.

<sup>27</sup> *The Science of Language and the Study of the New Testament*, Manchester, 1906, p. 20.

<sup>28</sup> But cf. Winer-Schmiedel, p. 3, "Eine Specialgrammatik einzelner nt. Autoren erscheint unnötig. Das Individuelle der Diction des Johannes, des Paulus etc. bewegt sich fast nur in dem Gebiete der Wörter und Phrasen (Lieblingsausdrücke) oder fällt dem rhetorischen Element anheim. Die Grammatik wird nur selten davon berührt, häufiger nur bei der Apokalypse."



known and admitted many years ago, as for instance by W. F. Moulton in his translation of Winer. It is a pity that the following words of Geldart, written in 1870, did not produce more effect: "The Greek of the present day affords a better commentary on the language of Polybius, of the Septuagint, and of the New Testament than either the writings of contemporary historians, rhetoricians, grammarians, or philosophers, who, for the most part, wrote a purely artificial Greek."<sup>29</sup> With this agree the words of J. H. Moulton: "We find in the Greek of today . . . and the folk-songs of modern Hellas, or the Gospels as translated into the vulgar tongue by Pallis, an aid to the Greek Testament study which no grammarian can afford to ignore." Psichari goes so far as to say that to estimate the Septuagint at its proper value as a philological document, one ought to translate it entirely into the most popular modern Greek.

In the interpretation of the New Testament the first slight attempt at a practical application of modern Greek has been made by A. Pallis in his *A Few Notes on the Gospels according to St. Mark and St. Matthew*,<sup>30</sup> in which, for example, he explains the *ἡμέρα ἑκκαρος* of Mark 6 21 as meaning "an empty day," "a day without work," not "a convenient day."

But New Testament students now stand in need of a complete new set of modern scientific commentaries. The authors of such commentaries must write with the monuments of colloquial contemporary Greek before them and with a considerable knowledge of modern Greek. The light from the recently discovered sources will show, for example, that the Friend of sinners and of the poor knew the circumstances of their daily life even to the market-value of sparrows, when he said, "Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing?" (Mt. 10 29), or "Are not five sparrows sold for two farthings?" (Lk. 12 6).<sup>31</sup> Modern discoveries will teach us the better to appreciate the New Testament by showing us that it is the book of humanity and for humanity just because

<sup>29</sup> The Modern Greek Language, Oxford, 1870, p. 102.

<sup>30</sup> Liverpool, 1903; see Thumb, "Die Forschungen über die hellenistische Sprache in den Jahren 1902-4," in *Archiv für Papyrusforschung*, 1906, p. 400.

<sup>31</sup> See Deissmann, *Licht vom Osten*, p. 196.

it has not despised the common language of every day.<sup>32</sup> It has helped to preserve from destruction the popular language of its own day, a language parallel to that popular Greek language of the present which scholars like Psichari, Pallis, and others are trying to reduce to written record.

Very worthy beginnings of such commentaries have already been made for some of the books of the New Testament. First should be mentioned the admirable work of George Milligan on the epistles to the Thessalonians (1908). In the same line but not all of equal merit are Lietzmann's Romans and First and Second Corinthians, Klostermann and Gressmann's Mark,<sup>33</sup> W. C. Allen's Matthew (1907), J. Armitage Robinson's Ephesians (1903, 1904), and Zahn's commentary on John (1908).

All the problems of the grammar of the New Testament and the Koinê are not yet settled, and will not be even when Moulton and Radermacher and Robertson have completed their grammars. Moulton's *Prolegomena* gives many hints of detailed investigations that are urgently needed.

The New Testament manuscripts call for fresh consideration in the light of what we now know of the Koinê. Thus we have fresh criteria to apply in order to determine provenance. Such apparently trivial phenomena as the wavering use of vowels, itacism, aspiration, psilosis, the conduct of *v*-movable, the interchange of the three orders of mutes, must be carefully estimated by the textual critic. The investigation of the great uncial manuscripts in the light of the established dialectic differences in the Koinê, especially those of pronunciation, has an important bearing on the determination of the place and even the time of their writing, and so contributes to the pressing problem of localizing the great types of text.<sup>34</sup> A scribe would be prone to betray the

<sup>32</sup> While the New Testament is predominantly colloquial language, we ought not to go so far as Deissmann in maintaining that it is *in toto* colloquial, but must recognize in authors like Paul and Luke varying degrees of literary language, though a literary language in sympathy with the vernacular.

<sup>33</sup> These four in Lietzmann's *Handbuch zum Neuen Testament*, 1906-1909.

<sup>34</sup> Conversely our uncial MSS. may assist in studying dialectic differences in the Koinê.

provincialisms of his own locality.<sup>35</sup> Our materials, however, need to be handled with caution; a given criterion may point equally to two widely different regions, for instance both to Egypt and to Asia Minor. Again a scribe of a certain environment and training, copying a manuscript of alien type, would consciously or unconsciously remove apparently trivial characteristics in his exemplar—a process which would blur the differences between local types.

The greatest need of the present day is a New Testament lexicon, but it is a herculean task. To its author *honus propter onus*. Many monographs and separate pieces of work have already appeared which will serve the purpose of such a lexicon. Among these may be mentioned Moulton and Milligan's "Lexical Notes from the Papyri," referred to above, the works of Nägeli, Mayser, Helbing, Völker, Anz, etc. The author of such a lexicon must take into account all the usages and peculiarities of the words and expressions as reflected in all available inscriptions, papyri, and ostraca, and in all extant authors of the Hellenistic period from Alexander the Great until 500 or 600 A.D., emphasizing especially the colloquial language to which for the most part the New Testament belongs. The scope of a New Testament lexicon has been often outlined by Deissmann,<sup>36</sup> and in his latest book he has defined the three chief requisites as (1) "the bringing of the New Testament vocabulary into living linguistic contact with the surrounding world," (2) "careful ascertainment of the successive phases of change in meanings," (3) "a fresh apprehension in their simplicity and vitality of the ideas of popular early Christianity,—that body of ideas which a pedantic scholastic prejudice has isolated and so has made to seem complicated, artificial, and lifeless." It is gratifying to know that the scholar who has conceived so lofty an idea of the scope of the task is himself engaged in the preparation of a New Testament lexicon.

But the task of New Testament philology is not done when we

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Thumb, *Die griechische Sprache im Zeitalter des Hellenismus*, p. 179; and "Die sprachgeschichtliche Stellung des biblischen Griechisch," in *Theologische Rundschau*, 1902, p. 97.

<sup>36</sup> *Licht vom Osten*, pp. 300–301; also *Expositor*, 1908, p. 72; *New Light on the New Testament*, p. 111.

have found the relation of our texts to the popular speech of their day and also studied them with the aid of modern Greek. We must not overlook the importance of the Byzantine literature, the study of which has in this generation received an impetus from the work of such philologists as Krumbacher, Thumb, and Dieterich, and from the establishment of the Leipzig *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* in 1892.<sup>37</sup>

In comparison with the remains of the earlier Hellenistic period and with modern Greek, the Byzantine literature, written in the "mummified Byzantine language," as Hatzidakis calls it, can rank only second in importance. It is not so natural, direct, trustworthy; we find in it too much affectation, learned censorship, and archaism. One can easily recognize this in the papyri of this later period, from which we get but little help in forms and still less in syntax. Yet the Byzantine literature is valuable lexically, as well as from the numerous direct statements made by its scholars and grammarians. What they scorn as unworthy of the language of a past golden age is to us often of special interest.

It thus appears that the New Testament language has now been rescued from its long scholastic isolation, due to theological prejudice and classical contempt, and restored to its rightful place as the greatest and most interesting monument of the Koinê. It must therefore be studied in the light of the Greek which preceded it, that of its own day, that of the Byzantine period, and modern Greek.

Further, any one familiar with the Synoptic Gospels will readily perceive that at every step the New Testament student must call in a first-hand knowledge of Palestinian Aramaic in order to make any progress towards a solution of the synoptic problem. The promise of such a method can be seen in Wellhausen's *Einleitung*. Greater results could have been attained if Wellhausen had combined with his wide knowledge of Aramaic as wide a knowledge of Hellenistic Greek. This is a field, however, which all cannot enter, as all cannot be at the same time specialists in

<sup>37</sup> For a brief survey of the literature of this period see K. Krumbacher, "Die griechische Literatur des Mittelalters" in *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, I, 8, p. 287 ff., and a detailed account in his *Geschichte der byzantinischen Literatur von Justinian bis zum Ende des oströmischen Reiches*, 1897.

Hellenistic and in Aramaic. It is a work which the theologian must do, the theologian as ever reaping the harvest thirty or a hundredfold.

The New Testament, written in "the queenliest tongue spoken on this earth," and clothed in the linguistic dress of the day, claims its due and large place in the history of the world; it is of all books in the Greek tongue the one on which the most effort after art and outward grace has been spent, and the greatest book of that wonderful language, and to its interpretation must be brought all the past results, and many not yet gained of the study of Greek philology.

PECTS OF THE RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY  
OF RUDOLPH EUCKEN

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of religion to philosophy is thus far a somewhat obligation. The influence of philosophy upon religion, of course, profound; but this influence has been always helpful or beneficent. Indeed there is some way that, take the world together, philosophy has quite aided the development of the religious consciousness forward the course of religious progress.

As to time the great and wondrous truths of experience which religion has its spring, have been rediscovered by various souls, always to the great joy of a goodly portion of the world. Never has such rediscovery failed to produce a deep impression on the living generation of men. Even the mere fact that it will bring to pass something like the results which have been obtained in a new gold-field is located. The same kind of "stamp" is apt to take place to secure a portion of this new spiritual wealth.

But no sooner does a vigorous religious movement begin than men begin to philosophize about it. They do not elaborate and systematize the truths to which it has led; they feel it incumbent upon them to explain its origin and map out its path to future greatness. This is inevitable, for man is an intellectual being, and knows in his heart that if he can arrive at an adequate understanding of the facts of experience he can use this knowledge to enlarge the sources of his well-being.

But in many instances it has been none the less lamentable for the spring of spiritual life, upon which humanity again gains, stumbles in its desert wanderings, is quite as frequently led out of sight in the battle of creeds that sets in above it. Any and so different are the speculations concerning it which

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*SOME ASPECTS OF THE RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY  
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The debt of religion to philosophy is thus far a somewhat questionable obligation. The influence of philosophy upon religion has been, of course, profound; but this influence has been by no means always helpful or beneficent. Indeed there is some reason to say that, take the world together, philosophy has quite as often hindered the development of the religious consciousness as it has set forward the course of religious progress.

From time to time the great and wondrous truths of experience, out of which religion has its spring, have been rediscovered by adventurous souls, always to the great joy of a goodly portion of mankind. Never has such rediscovery failed to produce a deep impression on the living generation of men. Even the mere rumor of it will bring to pass something like the results which follow when a new gold-field is located. The same kind of "stampede" is apt to take place to secure a portion of this new spiritual treasure. But no sooner does a vigorous religious movement come into being than men begin to philosophize about it. They must needs elaborate and systematize the truths to which it has witnessed; they feel it incumbent upon them to explain its origin and to map out its path to future greatness. This is inevitable, since man is an intellectual being, and knows in his heart that if he can arrive at an adequate understanding of the facts of experience, he can use this knowledge to enlarge the sources of his well-being. But in many instances it has been none the less lamentable; for the spring of spiritual life, upon which humanity again and again stumbles in its desert wanderings, is quite as frequently trampled out of sight in the battle of creeds that sets in above it. So many and so different are the speculations concerning it which



speedily arise, and so zealous does each school of thought become in the advocacy of its peculiar views, that presently there is no longer any water of life to quench men's thirst, but only certain theories as to the nature and properties of that water believed to have been once found.

Something even worse than this may come to pass; for, entertaining only a benevolent design to preserve and purify the spring, philosophy may yet poison it, so that it becomes a source of infection rather than of refreshment and strength. Religion has always been, by turns, the world's greatest blessing and its heaviest curse. Vice generally half recognizes, at least, its own deformity, and is seldom so threatening to man's higher life as is that contaminated stream of religious tradition and belief of which men partake under the delusion that it is supremely medicinal to their souls.

This poison which gets to be so thoroughly mingled with religious ideas and customs, comes mainly from a false philosophy. Human reason, on the whole, is still unable to cope adequately with the big problems of existence, though by narrowing its field of observation to a few of the most convenient and manageable facts it easily convinces itself that it has solved them all; and its overconfident answers to the riddles that confront us have often been fraught with very unhappy consequences to the religious life, which it has thus led seriously astray.

Nevertheless one is permitted to hope and believe that it remains for philosophy to render to religion, in the end, an inestimable service: to show men a path wherein they can walk with certain steps toward spiritual riches which hitherto they have found, too often, only by instinct or by accident. The spiritual nature of mankind holds, it may be, what are as yet undreamed-of possibilities. Certainly wonderful experiences are recorded, on testimony which it is difficult to impeach. But not often do those who have reached the high places of the spirit know very clearly by what road they arrived; and hence they are not able to point out a plain path for others to follow.

But if, at last, by means of insight and study and reflection, reason can show us the road to what a few of the greatest souls have found, and show it so convincingly that "wayfaring men,

though fools, shall not err therein," the world's religion will thereby inherit an immeasurable benefit.

It is the purpose of this paper to point out the indications of some clear gain which recent philosophy has made in this direction. That Professor Eucken has given us a final and complete exposition of the religious life it would be far too much to claim. But his is one of the broadest and sanest interpretations of existence, from the religious point of view, as yet afforded us; and we will try at a few points to set forth its promise of helpfulness to the religious life.

The standpoint which we shall occupy in this endeavor is that of the religious mind, looking out to see what probable gain and assistance is being brought to it by a friendly power. We will not assume to take the philosophic point of view; but, holding our outlook and position as religious men, it is surely legitimate for us to form some estimate of forces which appear to be marching to our relief.

The first superior feature of Eucken's philosophy to which I desire to call attention, is the balance of emphasis maintained in his thought between the three supreme realities with which religion has to deal, that is to say, God and nature and the human soul. Plant-life is nourished mainly on three elements; and though the formula by which these elements are supplied needs to be varied for different kinds of vegetation, there must be enough of all three, or plant-life languishes. The most conspicuous failure of the farmer is his neglect to furnish his growing crops with one at least of these three requisites.

So the religious life, wherever it finds natural and strong expression, always lays something like equal emphasis on three great and separate types of being: God and nature and man; and wherever religious life fails either to maintain itself or to produce good fruit, it is perhaps chiefly because one of these has been too much neglected.

That this is true ought to be fairly evident in the very statement of what religion always has been. It might be defined as man's endeavor to secure help from spiritual sources in his contest with a somewhat unfriendly world. At least that is what religion is wherever it amounts to anything as a power in human

affairs. It recognizes in nature a power so far unfriendly as to be sometimes a source of temptation and oppression. It recognizes God as at least a possible ally of the soul in its struggle for freedom and security. It recognizes the human soul as a reality great enough to be the recipient of divine favor, and as a thing separable and distinct from the background of nature against which it matches its strength.

It must be plain, then, that if any one of these three terms drops much out of notice, religion has no longer any excuse for being. Without nature, there is no sufficient reason for seeking God's help. Without God, there is no source whence help can come. Without the soul as something apart from nature, there is nothing to be helped.

There are, of course, conspicuous instances which illustrate the spiritual poverty that results when religious life shuts its eyes to one of these supreme realities. Thus Buddhism was in its origin practically an atheistic faith. Its founder taught men to expect no help whatever from the gods, but to rely solely on the power of self-denial residing in their own wills. Human nature, it is true, revenged itself upon this Eastern prince, and upon his system, by making him its deity. But it remains a faith without any real doctrine of God; and never has it built up, in the minds of the men over whom it has held sway, any robust spiritual life.

The great failure of Christianity through the larger portion of its history has come from its lack of a decent doctrine of man. Those human souls which were initiated, by the magic rites of the Church, into a fellowship of saints, have been regarded as of some consequence in the scheme of things; but for man, as man, most Christians have manifested, and do still manifest, the utmost contempt. The ruling schools of Christian philosophy, for many centuries, used the whole of existence to make it redound to the glory of God, at the expense of humanity. It became a kind of sin to think of the creature as possessing or deserving any glory whatever in the presence of his creator. The thought of man was reduced almost to its meanest and its lowest terms. The very ardor of religious passion was no doubt responsible, in large measure, for this result; for the soul which has caught a vision of Deity often displays something of that tendency to immolate

itself which draws the moth toward the flame. But for purposes of life it should be evident enough that religion can be no great help to the world without deep love and respect for what is in man.

In our own day we have seen a religious movement manifesting astonishing powers of growth,—springing up indeed with suspicious rapidity like a fungus over night,—while studiously ignoring the third of these fundamental terms. To the Christian Scientist nature is a negligible quantity. The whole of the material world is treated as a realm of shadows. This is the latest of a long line of experiments to found the spiritual life on a denial of the reality of that outward world which appears to be the soul's antagonist. Its significance for us lies mainly in the fact that it is of our day, and illustrates the constant tendency of religious thought, down to this present time, to ease its task by throwing aside one of the three elements which it is asked to weave together.

The real problem of religious philosophy is to make a system of thought in which God and man and nature stand together: none of these being merged and lost in another's larger presence. Endless examples might be given of attempts to solve this problem by evasion, and of the weakness in religion that inevitably results. Thus the great weakness of modern liberalism has been a disposition to exalt nature at the expense of man; to slight and belittle the deep facts of human consciousness in comparison with the laws that regulate the world of physical things. By yielding to this tendency the intellect can be placated, through the partial elimination of some of those mysteries in whose presence it stands baffled and uneasy; but it means the sure impoverishment of spiritual life.

Now in the thought of Eucken there appears to be intelligent appreciation of the necessity for keeping all these supreme realities before the mind's attention, and a sustained endeavor to frame a system of ideas in which no one of them shall suffer eclipse. That means much for religion, if the world should listen to and be impressed by what he has to say; because such a philosophy accords with the real genius of religion, and affords a reasonable basis for full and complete manifestation of the religious life.

More specifically, in its relation to other recent systems of

thought, Eucken's philosophy stands for a return to personality as a fact of cosmic significance. Traditional Christian theology has never rightly considered what it means that man is a person. The scientific mind of our time has largely taken it for granted that personality is an illusion; that what each one calls himself is no real entity, but a mere succession of states of consciousness. Spiritual and religious movements like New England Transcendentalism, being more or less under the influence of this great new wave of scientific interest, have rather tended to abandon the thought of personality. "The soul," said Mr. Emerson, "knows no persons." Even Dr. Hedge had doubts whether human personality were anything great enough, or important enough, to survive the shock of death. In Professor Eucken we have one able to do full justice to all that modern science has to say; one, moreover, who fully understands and appreciates the whole history of philosophic thought; and who puts man, as a person, in that place of something like equality with God and nature, to which unreflective religion instinctively assigns him.

Eucken seems to have examined with minute and patient care the rival schemes of "naturalism" and "intellectualism," to use his terms; the former of which will only allow that man's inward world is the evanescent shadow of the real outward world; while the other school is positive that man knows external nature only as a reflection of his own inner world of thought. Both of these philosophic schemes he finds defective: though for naturalism, especially, he entertains deep respect, as for a foeman worthy of his steel. His own attempt appears to be to utilize what is best in the thought of both naturalist and idealist to form a new personalistic philosophy that will answer better as an interpretation of the whole of existence. He thus supplies to the current thought of the age that missing third term which is needed to put it once more in touch with the main line of religious development. Plenty of thought in this our day concerns itself with God and with nature, as with realities of the highest rank. Not so much of it dares assume that man's existence as a spiritual being is of the same high order.

It is quite beyond the scope of our present purpose to enter into the question of personality, as between Eucken and the

reigning naturalistic school. What I am here endeavoring to point out is that when any of these fundamental facts of the religious life are overlooked, religion must suffer swift decline: that in effect the thought of man has fallen to a much lower place than that occupied by the thought of God and the thought of nature; and that Eucken's philosophy affords at least some promise of its restoration, to the consequent strengthening of those motives which underlie religious effort.

The second feature of this great German's thought which seems to me worthy of comment, as seen from the point of view we have chosen to take, is his conception of the relationship that exists between God and man and nature. As a matter of course the divine power is conceived of as being friendly, and only friendly, to human life. God as he exists for his children upon earth is, above all else, redeeming love. The old Hebraic idea of an avenging Deity, who averts his face from those with whom he is offended, means nothing to this philosopher. His views of the moral character of God are as enlightened as any one could ask.

What relation exists between God and nature, save that he is the maker and builder of nature's forms, it is perhaps no special business of ours to try to discover; but it is highly important that we should understand what relation exists between ourselves and nature. And this, in all that pertains to our higher life, Eucken conceives to be largely antagonistic.

With regard to this point I should like to say again that such a conviction seems to me vital to what has heretofore been known among men by the name of religion. That has always been concerned, mainly, with the means for procuring spiritual help amid the trials and hardships that men must bear. If there are no such trials and hardships, if the seeming opposition of nature to man's desires is merely a disguised friendliness, then this quest for divine help is practically useless. Conceivably, of course, there may be something much better than religion, as that word is commonly understood. There may be an attitude of trust, of acquiescence, and of worship, which is distinctly higher than that attitude of petition which religion for the most part adopts. Regarding that, one only need say here that the culti-

vation of such a passive attitude hardly seems likely to demand, or to sustain, much of that kind of effort which has established the world's great religious institutions. People who only want to believe that things are perfectly right, as they are, will not require much of a church to support that faith. The conviction of the religious mind has always been that, in some respects, things were alarmingly wrong, and that it remained for humanity, with God's help, to try to make them right. The difficulty of this task has always disposed men who have seriously measured themselves against it to seek the assistance of higher powers. To me it seems quite improbable that organized religion can have any future under a radically different interpretation of existence. For that reason I hold Eucken's conviction of this unfriendliness of nature to be vital to the perpetuation of such religious institutions as we have received from the past.

And now, is nature our enemy or our friend? Are we what we are because nature has wrought upon us and for us, or because we have wrought for ourselves in despite of nature, and have forced her to yield, grudgingly, to our designs? One may say that nature is our best friend, being our enemy. That however is a subsequent reflection which ought to have no influence upon our decision of the main question. Are we to yield to nature as to a kindly Providence that is working out our destiny, or are we to resist nature as a power that knows nothing of what we call the highest good? Shall we suffer the winds and the currents of natural influence to carry us whither they will, or shall we so hold our rudder and trim our sail as to go in quite a different, even in the very opposite direction?

For my part, I see not how any man who ever kept a garden can rest under the illusion that nature is altogether his friend. She will grow his cabbages and his strawberries, it is true, if a sufficiently masterful hand is exerted to extort from her this boon. But she never suffers the man to forget that she would infinitely prefer to grow something else; and that, generally, something in which he takes no kind of interest. She has a special bug, characterized by phenomenal voracity and fecundity for every species of vegetation in which he takes delight, or if for the

moment she happens to be inadequately armed, she can and does invent the appropriate pest. She will bend all her energies to the production of what are for human purposes useless weeds, and she will choke every seed that the gardener plants, if she can. Nobody can have a garden, probably nobody ever did have a garden, without maintaining a ceaseless fight. I take this to be, in a general way, typical of our relations with the visible world surrounding us.

To be sure, Emerson wrote of the Pyramids and the abbey-churches of England that

"Nature gladly gave them place,  
Adopted them into her race,  
And granted them an equal date  
With Andes and with Ararat."

But he was perfectly aware of another side of nature, and could portray that side upon occasion in terms with which this poetry does not very well agree. It is much to be doubted whether nature ever really "adopts" any work of human hands. Wherever man has toiled to make visible his thought in wood or stone, nature following after him has done her best to obliterate his monuments. It takes her a long time to effect this in some instances, but she never surrenders the task.

It may be said that to represent the outward world as being actively hostile to human interests is as false as to suppose that all its doings bear conscious reference to the service of the human race; and this is of course true. The truth appears to be that for the most part nature is indifferent to man. In her operations she mostly overlooks us, betrays entire ignorance of our presence. How should it be otherwise, nature being, after all, only a vast machine, and incapable of recognizing us either in friendliness or hostility?

Man has an ideal of his own, which he certainly never learned from the world about him. Wherever it came from,—from a higher divine source or out of his own imagination,—it is something which nature knows not of. Her life runs in one channel, ours in another groove and she cares nothing either to further or to oppose what is dearest to our hearts.



But this very indifference makes her in multifold ways our antagonist. Her vast inertia is the dead weight that we have again and again to lift. Her blind insistence upon a way that is not ours creates a current from which it is often a work of huge labor to extricate ourselves. Niagara is doubtless innocent of all intent to hurl into the abyss a swimmer who has been caught in its stream. But, none the less, that swimmer must fight Niagara with all his strength, and must soon reach some rock to which he can cling, or his doom is sealed.

It seems to me the most idle of all play-acting to pretend that this necessity to struggle against the tendencies and influences of nature is merely an illusion. All great naturalists understand perfectly that nature is a non-moral realm; and surely never was attempt more vain—one might almost say more idiotic—than the endeavor to convert naturalism into a religion. In order to worship the God of nature, you have to shut your eyes to a host of things that are utterly repugnant to the spiritual sense.

Have we, at last, freed ourselves from necessity to believe in whatever beastliness the Old Testament contains, as if that were a true rendering of the law of God for men, only to take as our Bible what is sometimes called the "book of life," that manifestation of the outward world still more replete with instances and incidents wholly shocking to our spiritual sensibilities? Whatever it may mean, and however we may interpret the fact, between our spirits and many of the ways of nature there is, as Huxley said, "everlasting war." It is of course open to us to say that this is a state of things which God has himself designed because our souls have need of just this antagonist. But the faith which girds itself for such a conflict is widely different from the mere passivism, or quietism, which expects the whole process of deliverance to be wrought out by means of natural law. Eucken calls us back from that essentially pagan notion, into which the world has partially lapsed, to the stern but heroic idea of battle, which has hitherto inspired great Christian souls.

In the third place his thought is noteworthy from a religious point of view, because he points out the chasm that opens between man and nature, or perhaps a still deeper gulf, running also through man's own being, and dividing two sides of human nature from

each other. Paul's thought of the natural and the spiritual man is based upon no broader or more vital distinction than that which, according to Eucken's view, divides the higher from the lower types of human life. This is of religious importance, because as the division between man and nature has hitherto furnished the ground of appeal to a source of heavenly help, so now, without beholding some such deep cleft running through human nature itself, we are quite likely to be left without any good foundation on which to rest a heavenly hope. That is to say, what Eucken calls "mere man," or the "petty human," the man of flesh and sense—"man born of woman," to take the Biblical phrase—while, in a way, distinct from nature, is yet so much involved with the natural order that there is difficulty in providing for him any immortal destiny. This earthly being, bound by strong ties to the material world, is by many supposed to be all the man there is; and where that supposition rules, quite naturally the idea of immortality has been generally abandoned. Unless Eucken is right in his affirmation that spiritual life is quite another kind of being, I should say the whole world must be finally driven to that same denial.

It is not possible to enter here upon any justification of Eucken's idea; but two or three of his phrases may be quoted to indicate what it is. "It is clear," he says, "that in spiritual life we have to do, not with a mere addition to a life already existent, but with an essentially new life. Psychical life, which otherwise is merely subservient to, or accompanies, the process of nature, gains, when human life is at its highest, an independence and content of its own. It is something so new and peculiar that it can be understood only as a new stage of reality, or the emergence of a depth of the world which was formerly hidden." This new life, he says, has a claim "to form a new domain of existence, as opposed to nature; to introduce new realities, and goods, and assert them in opposition to those which reign in the natural order." This would be absurd, he confesses, if the spiritual were man's possession alone. "Its cosmic ambition would be an audacious folly, were it not that it has a cosmic life behind it, by whose power it is driven forward." This spiritual life, then, emerging from the deeps of being into the heart of man, appears there a new order of creation;

as distinctly so as is man himself when compared with the animal kingdom beneath him. And being born into this world, like other preceding types of being, it can then only live by fighting its way to dominion.

The distinction between nature and man gives us a passive opposition which we are frequently required to face. The opposition of man against himself, owing to this division of his being, furnishes us with an active foe, who is capable of devilish cunning, of unending stubbornness, and unwearied industry. The tragic element, which a soft and relaxed age has been hoping to get rid of, thus comes back into life through Eucken's thought; as stern of feature as ever it stood in Greek drama, or in the theology of Calvin and Augustine. The world in which these stupendous antagonisms have their place is full of life and death contests; and for my part I believe Eucken does us good service in recalling us to that militant faith, which is the only faith that ever yet got much grip on the heart of the world. It is all very well to believe, if one can, that the red slayer is mistaken when he thinks he slays. For most of us, however, the appearance of slaughter is so wonderfully realistic that we shall prefer not to take unnecessary chances; and, at heart, we shall pretty surely despise a creed which treats life's struggle as if it were a kind of painted show.

If the man of today could be rid of his notion of some resistless power in the system of things which is sure to set right all his industrial and social and political wrongs,—a notion, I take it, which never had anything more than theoretical validity, and one that is contradicted by the whole weight of the world's experience,—this man of our time might better understand the debt he owes to those who, before him, have fought the good fight of faith. If he could be taught that the same battle which mankind has waged against venomous reptiles and savage beasts is to be continued in his own heart, we should have better assurance of the kind of man to make a "good soldier of Jesus Christ"; one who masters himself before he undertakes to master the world.

In all this Eucken's thought is new only in the sense that it presents a new balance and combination of elements that have long played their part in religious philosophy. Slight changes, however, in the arrangement of a set of ideas may produce as great

a difference in the result as is frequently effected by the slight variation of a chemical formula. We cannot shovel together, anyhow, the elements of chemistry to secure what we are after. They must be put together exactly right. The claim which I am inclined to make for Eucken is that he has combined the constituent parts of religious faith into a strong and effective union of ideas that is likely to have much influence over the thinking of the next generation of men.

One rather original contribution to the sum of these ideas he appears to have made. That is his account of the genesis of what, following the terminology of Paul, we may still call the spiritual man. Perhaps one reason why so many minds in our time have inclined to reject the spiritual man has been that they did not understand very well where he came from, and were unwilling to acknowledge him till he could furnish a better pedigree. Eucken indeed does not assume to tell us precisely where he comes from; but he sets forth the manner of his coming, in such reasonable terms, that perhaps the spiritual man may be now considered as sufficiently introduced even to high circles of academic thought. Another name for him, in Eucken's vocabulary, could be the Social man. For in a way, (though not in the political sense), Eucken is a tremendous socialist, and is never weary of pouring scorn and contempt on what he calls individualism.

There is one kind of man who lives altogether in and for himself. Other men are no more to him than so many trees, whose fruit he gathers. He may be learned or ignorant, coarse or refined, of high station or low; but always the predominant note of his character is selfishness. This is what Eucken calls "individualistic" living; and a school of thought which advocates or defends this manner of life he calls individualism. But there is another kind of man who lives mainly (and may live entirely) for others; the great object of whose thought and care is not what he can get out of existence, but the perfection of those relationships through which individuals come into possession of a common life. It is out of these social relationships, Eucken appears to think, that the higher life has its spring. Man by himself is an ignoble creature. Man among his fellows, thinking and acting for them as for himself, only then unlocks the hidden

resources of his own being and manifests a spirit that can be truly called divine.

This does not clear up the whole mystery of our spiritual life, and there is room for different theories, if we are to have a closer explanation. But it presents to us a very good natural origin of that division which we find within ourselves. It emphasizes what is far more important to us than mere speculative ideas, viz.: the great width of the chasm which really separates two orders of human life, and the utter impossibility that the two kinds of being can ever live at peace together. In the whole range of language we have no two words that come nearer to representing a polar difference than do "love" and "selfishness." No stable equilibrium of such opposite passions can ever be made. The entirely selfish man can be at peace with himself; so may the man who is altogether governed by love. But any mind into which both forces play will forever be torn by their contending might; and if one has ever fallen into those morbid states whose misery is that the mind cannot, for an instant, get away from itself, he is likely to feel that deliverance from this, even into that qualified and partial regard for things outside the self to which ordinary living has attained, is nothing short of a revolutionary change.

For myself, when I contrast the utterly selfish life with such an entirely unselfish example as we have in the mind of Christ, the difference appears to me as great as that between the lowest beginnings of organic life and its highest completed forms. Moreover, when I ask how it was that the supremely selfish being (which we may suppose the primitive man to have been) when he became conscious of his relationship to other beings like himself, found in his heart motives and desires prompting him to make the beginning of a kingdom of heaven, I seem to require some theory of divine incarnation for an answer. Until the tiger has been turned into a domestic animal, I shall never understand how, even by minute gradations, selfishness has been converted into love. It looks more like the gradual elimination of one set of motives and desires, and the substitution of others springing from a different source.

I long ago picked up a phrase in an English review which has

since grown, with me, to have no small significance. A writer of that day warned his readers against "the tendency of human nature to pulverize a fact and call it an explanation." Especially since "development" came in, the world is much disposed to think that all things are accounted for when the wide gaps between them are filled in by a multitude of short steps. Yet surely, if one has to walk it, a mile is still a mile, however it may be reduced to inches. The fact that humanity by slow degrees does rise from selfishness to love, really explains nothing of the mystery of the transformation; nor does it in any wise alter another fact of our experience, that between love and selfishness no truce can ever be made.

In this case the life of the higher nature demands the death of the lower as truly as the disruption or decay of the husk is required to set an imprisoned seed at liberty. In so far as we are ruled by selfishness, we have no place within the Kingdom of the Spirit, which is governed by a different law. If once we come to see, with Eucken, that human nature can no more endure, half-selfish and half-spiritual, than a nation could live half-slave and half-free, then we shall understand that the Master's counsels to stifle and cast out the lower self were not extreme, and that the exclamation of his apostle, "Who shall deliver me from the body of this death!" was not the mere groan of a fanatic.

In Eucken's philosophy, then, we have mankind once more occupying that central place on the wide stage of the physical creation which ancient poetry and religion assigned to human beings; and we are thereby delivered from that feeling of the littleness and the worthlessness of our life which finds so much sad expression in modern literature. We have this child of Deity, inheritor of the freedom and the creative faculty belonging to the sons of God, set to do battle with oppositions that surround his steps; made to achieve greatness only by stout courage and tireless industry.

Above all, we have man forced to hard conflict with an inward foe; incapable of peace and rest save as he stands, at least for the moment, victorious over the tempter in his own heart.

All this may be held to reflect very closely the common consciousness of what life is, and therefore we have reason to say

that religion has by no means fallen out of date. Every prophet who only professes to show how God may be man's helper through these ways of difficulty and trial can be sure of some hearing and following, according to the boldness of his promises, though his offer be little more than an empty boast. And when one does really bring the might of the Spirit to their aid, mankind will be almost ready to worship him as if he were a god.

*FROUDE; OR THE HISTORIAN AS PREACHER*

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We have had abundant evidence of late, if evidence were needed in the matter, that preaching is not of necessity confined to pulpits, nor a matter solely of the churches of the world. There are sermons which come from men of letters, as well as ministers, and from politicians who are genuine prophets. Whatever may be thought about the character of the sermons he delivers, and the nature of the texts from which he draws his inspiration, there can be no question of the fact that Theodore Roosevelt is essentially a preacher. His messages to Congress, which came with more than ministerial regularity and frequency, were essentially homiletical in form as well as hortatory in purpose, and his public addresses might well be collected under the Newmanesque title of *Political and Plain Sermons*.

In all of this there is nothing remarkable, unless it be in the fact that the individual chances to be a statesman and politician, instead of a poet, or a man of letters pure and simple. Most of us remember the question that Coleridge once put to his friend Charles Lamb, and the witty answer which he instantly received; but perhaps the repetition of it may be pardoned for the sake of those who have forgotten. "Charles," said the poet to his friend, referring to the days when he had been the minister of a Unitarian congregation,—“Charles, did you ever hear me preach?” “I never heard you do anything else,” was the ready although stuttering reply. The same might equally well be said of many another person who has either changed his profession or chosen from the first a wholly different calling. The man of letters, for example, is frequently a preacher. Carlyle was, who thundered and sent forth vivid lightnings against every form of folly and abuse that came beneath his eye. Abundant proof that the art critic and reformer often falls into the preaching habit is given



by Ruskin, who found a sermon in each stone of Venice, and a text in every letter of its long decay. The man of science indulges often in the art, and does it well, as Thomas Huxley made distinctly clear. Those of us who have visited the Wiertz Museum in Brussels, or remember Vereschagin's exhibition of his pictures, showing forth the horrors and barbarities of war, will be ready to confess that the artist also may be numbered in this class. And if men of letters, statesmen, scientists, and artists, with reformers generally, engage at times in a practice which is more especially the privilege of the minister and a function of the church, the same right may be broadly granted to one who has a clearer title to it than any of the others, and better reason for doing it both earnestly and well. I refer to the historian. In one sense it almost may be said that the historian is always preaching. He may not be aware of it himself, and he may endeavor to refrain from doing so; but the very facts which he marshals in his mind and sets down in his volumes insist on preaching for themselves. They prophesy above his head and without his leave. "History," as Dionysius long ago declared, "is philosophy teaching by example." It is hardly necessary to add that history is helped in this direction in some instances much more than in others, and, whether consciously or not, is often used to prove a point or illustrate some truth.

However all of this may be, I venture to call attention to a case in point where it was done with singular felicity and forcefulness, but with a generous freedom which has caused much misconception. There is perhaps no instance in modern times where the historian was at once so consummate and so constant, so brilliant and so bold a preacher as was Mr. Froude. In this fact alone I think, or at any rate in this fact chiefly, we discover the reason why he was often accused of carelessness and prejudice, and attacked for what he represented history as teaching. But before I go on to illustrate from his works themselves this homiletical or pulpit tendency, I wish to call attention to certain manifest and external features in the life and experience of Froude which serve upon the face of things to justify the point of view which I suggest.

There is reason enough to speak of Froude as a preacher when we remember that he belonged to a family of churchmen, and even

began life by taking orders himself. His father was rector of the church at Dartington in Devonshire and archdeacon of Totnes. He was a character in his way, this proud archdeacon, with a reputation of his own for clerical ability and worldly power. He combined in his person the authority of the churchman with the influence of the local magistrate and landholder, administering his church affairs on one day, and riding to hounds the next, the best mounted man in the field. He was a living prototype of Trollope's well-known character, Archdeacon Grantley in the "clerical series." It almost seems, indeed, that Trollope must have had in mind this Devon churchman when he drew the familiar portrait which stands out with such distinctness on the pages of *The Warden* and *Barchester Towers* and *The Last Chronicle of Barset*.

More important than the father, however, so far as early influence, lasting impression, and a guiding stimulus were concerned, was an elder brother,—the brilliant, the magnetic, the domineering, the conservative, the ascetic Hurrell Froude, who, though he died at thirty-three, left a deep mark upon the life and thought of the Church of England, leading up indeed to the great event in the middle of the 19th century which shook the Church to its very depths. Hurrell was the natural mentor of the youngest son of a large and memorable family, and he did not hesitate to make the fullest and completest use of the power which naturally belongs to an older brother. Moreover, the men who were his friends, and who became associated with him in the Oxford movement, were not without their influence. It was a very remarkable group which was gathered often at the rectory in Dartington, and the boy of twelve or fifteen years listened eagerly to the talk of Newman and Keble when they spent their holidays with his brother. The intimacy was close and confidential. Newman especially was a welcome visitor at the rectory, and he told the world in his *Letters and Correspondence* how one of his *Parochial and Plain Sermons* entitled "Scripture a Record of Human Sorrow" was suggested by the sight of blooming youth and high spirits in the Froude household which affected him suddenly with the thought of what changes were inevitably in store, and what hard discipline and trials.

When Anthony Froude went up to Oxford, therefore, he was naturally brought into close and very friendly touch with Newman. The influence of that great ecclesiastic could not fail to be distinct as well as deep. Froude followed naturally, though not without misgivings, the career marked out for him. Elected fellow of Exeter College after graduation, he took deacon's orders as was then required of all fellows, and he preached his first and only sermon proper in St. Mary's Church at Babbacombe, a few miles from his home at Dartington. Of the break that later came, of the abandonment of the clerical career, of the loss of belief, of the growth of heretical opinions and the publication of the *Nemesis of Faith*, a copy of which was publicly burned in the Hall of Exeter College, and of how he finally came to devote himself to history,—of things like these we need not speak. I have called attention to these scanty biographical details not only for the purpose of showing that Froude was from the first trained to be a preacher, but because the things he came in the end to preach through the medium of history were the very opposite of those which it was hoped that he would set forth as a churchman. In a rash and over-confident moment Hurrell Froude had told his younger brother that when Newman and Keble disagreed, then, but not till then, he might do his thinking for himself. What seemed to the young enthusiast utterly impossible in regard to his two most intimate friends was very soon to come to pass. To the astonishment and consternation of his followers and friends, Newman in 1845 slipped quietly into the Church of Rome, leaving Keble and the rest to pursue their way as rigid Church of England men. Before the unexpected actually came to pass, Anthony Froude had begun to claim his rights of independent thought, and, as often happens, there came about a strong reaction from the narrow tenets which had been impressed upon his mind. It was said of Macaulay that he wrote "his History to prove that God was always on the side of the Whigs." With an equal amount of truth, or untruth, it may be said that Froude wrote his glowing and dramatic History to prove that God was on the side of the Protestants.

The strength of his convictions, or, if you please, the vehemence of his prejudice, upon this point, is largely to be accounted for

by the way in which his beliefs took hold upon his mind. He had been trained to hold the very opposite position. To his older brother and his friends the Protestant Reformation, as it came to be worked out in England under Henry VIII, was a terrible and almost fatal error. They had no sympathy with the Puritan, none with the English martyrs in the time of Mary. "I am glad to know something of the Puritans," wrote Hurrell Froude to Keble upon one occasion, "as it gives me a greater right to hate Milton, and accounts for many of the things which disgusted me in his, not-in-my-sense-of-the-word, poetry. Also," he added, "I adore King Charles and Bishop Laud."

It was in such an atmosphere that the future author of *The History of England from the Fall of Wolsey to the Defeat of the Spanish Armada* was reared. When he began to think for himself, and read for himself, and finally to study and gather facts for himself, it was no wonder that he underwent a fierce reaction. What he came to see appeared all the more glorious and important, because he had worked his way onward toward it not without difficulty and not without pain and grievous misunderstandings and opposition. In dramatic contradiction, therefore, to what he had been brought up to believe, and had been urged by family and friends to preach in the pulpit, he set himself to proclaim in his History not the shame, but the endless glory, of the English Reformation; not the reasons for hating, but those for adoring, the Puritan; not the causes for believing that Henry VIII and Latimer and Cranmer were individuals to be reprobated and repented of, while Charles I and Laud were loved; but the very opposite of this,—namely, that Henry and his followers were the champions of English liberty and the actual saviours of the country. With the unerring eye of genius he chose for his theme the mighty drama when Protestant England under Henry and Elizabeth was clutched in a death-struggle with the Catholic forces, and from first to last we see the superior qualities of those who held to the Reformation position in religion. In the fight that goes on, the God of battles is on the side of the greater honesty and fervor of the Protestants and their devotion to truth and freedom. Froude himself has declared that Macaulay's unfairness to Cranmer, in the celebrated

review of Hallam's Constitutional History, first suggested to him the project of his work. It was thus for the purpose of contradicting falsehood, of setting the past in a truer light before his countrymen, and of saving them from the errors in which he had himself been trained, that he set to work.

Having chosen his theme and gathered with abundant pains and care a mass of original material, Froude claimed the right, which lately has been too often neglected,—partly perhaps because the spell of science rests upon our age, and partly because in large measure has the power itself been lost,—he claimed the right to make history interesting, and he believed that it was none the less true when interpreted and written as a drama. He called to his assistance the one great thing which he had gained of Newman and the Oriel atmosphere, a matchless style which never failed him, and which enabled him, as one of his fiercest and unfairest critics has confessed, when he came to certain central episodes, such as the sinking of Spain's great Armada, to rise "into a species of epic power."

"History and story," it has well been said, "are variations of the same word, and the historian who is a master of his art must be a story-teller." In this respect Froude was well calculated to meet the requirements of the "Gentle Reader," who claimed that history should be readable, and who described his feelings when he was set adrift on one of those bottomless seas of erudition called history, without human companionship, and only "writings, writings everywhere and not a page to read." The simple fact of the matter is that Froude did not write his histories merely to be referred to; he wrote them to be read. He did not design them to stand upon dusty book-shelves, but he prepared them for the hands of living men and women who wished to know about the past. To him the presentation of facts was almost as important as the facts themselves. And in this he was essentially Greek,—a lover of art as well as science, of beauty as well as accuracy. He was interested in history because of what it taught, and he was prejudiced enough to believe that it had many things to teach the coming generations. He was not warned off from his task, nor deterred from doing it well, by the modern claim "that history is a science and not a province

of literature; that the time has not yet come to draw any conclusions or to summarize any tendencies; that picturesque narrative is an offence against the spirit of truth." Far from it. He agreed rather with Professor Seeley, that "we do not so much want history explained after the manner of science as we want it portrayed and interpreted after the manner of literature." He believed, indeed, with a present-day historian of wide repute<sup>1</sup> that "the assembling of details is antiquarian; the truth of general effect alone is historical. To produce the latter is masterly; the former is mechanical investigation, and its reproduction for the laity misleads far more frequently than it guides." It is the business and the privilege of the historian, quite as much as it is the business and privilege of the preacher, to point a moral and adorn a tale; and the moral is not the less sound for being pointed gracefully and well, nor the tale less accurate and faithful for being draped in the adornment of splendid rhetoric and rich description. History is essentially a form of eloquence. It requires imagination; and it cannot make us understand until it makes us *see* things. In this respect Froude was essentially a master, and seldom if ever has he been surpassed in insight and power to depict the past. He belongs to the class of Prescott and of Parkman, of Motley and of Macaulay, men who have "displayed the romantic side of history, and have discovered the possibilities of language in rendering its records glowing and fascinating without departing from veracity." Nevertheless it was just because Froude knew and used the possibilities of the English language that he came to be so freely and frequently accused of departing from veracity.

Into the question of Froude's reliability, however, I have no wish, nor perhaps am I equipped, to enter. It ought to be said, however, that since the charges against him have been traced to their turbulent and angry source, the prejudices that once prevailed have tended silently to pass away. According to Edmund Gosse, in his *History of English Literature*,<sup>2</sup> Freeman, who was a firm high-churchman, could never forgive his brilliant

<sup>1</sup> W. M. Sloane, *Atlantic Monthly*, August, 1908, p. 280.

<sup>2</sup> *Short History of Modern English Literature*, p. 373.

rival for abandoning the party in the old Oxford days. He sat at his literary elbow like some gigantic Nemesis for more than thirty years, magnifying every fault, and exaggerating every error in his historical writings, though often falling into gross errors himself in the process. His criticisms for the most part were anonymous, but were always written with rancor and abuse. "Any stick," he once declared, "was good enough with which to belabor Froude." Freeman at his gentlest was never too refined, and at his harshest became insulting. He was introduced in public once as "the historian who has done so much to reveal to us the rude manners of our ancestors."

It must not be inferred from this, however, that Froude was free from errors, or beyond the range of criticism. He was a pioneer, and it has been truly said of him that "probably no previous historian has incorporated so much unpublished material in his work."<sup>3</sup> His authorities for the most part were in manuscript. They were written in five languages, and filled nine hundred volumes. The most precious of them were in the little village of Simancas in Spain, which he was the first to explore. He copied masses of documents which even a Spaniard would have found it difficult to read, and these copies were later given to the British Museum, where they may now be seen. I looked them through a few months since, and in the full witness they give to his industry they certainly disprove Green's description of him as an indolent man. I hold no brief for Froude's inerrancy, however, and I would not for a moment claim that he did not make mistakes, it may be serious ones. I assert, however, that his errors have been grievously exaggerated, and that the greatest of all historical writers, since history began, have not escaped a similar charge. Carlyle, for instance, was accused of misrepresenting events in the French Revolution, and all of us know how severely Bancroft suffered in the old days. Professor Sloane has called to mind an instance of the ill-deserved censure in the latter case. When New Jersey was erecting the battle monument at Trenton, and proposed on the authority of Bancroft's pages to inscribe on its base Lord George Germain's terse words about "that unhappy affair which has blasted all our hopes,"

<sup>3</sup> Dictionary of National Biography, Supplement, Vol. ii, p. 257.

it was a Boston historian who dryly remarked in a letter that this was "one of the things Bancroft thought ought to have been said, but there was no proof that it ever *was* said." The phrase so calmly dismissed as invention was promptly found by a friendly fellow-student of the historian in the pages of Parliamentary debates.

I can give a similar incident in regard to Froude, which will show at once how falsely he was sometimes judged, and how unfairly. Not long ago I was talking with a distinguished historical writer, who is also one of the most careful. The discussion turned on Froude, and he offered to give me an instance of his errors, inaccuracy and unscrupulous methods. In his sketch of *Cæsar*, he said, Froude tells us that after the battle of Pharsalia, Cæsar burned all Pompey's letters without reading them, not wishing to learn unpleasant things about his friends at home. "Now that statement," said my friend, "is a very interesting one; but there is absolutely no foundation for it. I have consulted Mommsen, and last year when I was in Rome I asked some learned men of my acquaintance if they could tell me Froude's authority. They could not, the fact being that he undoubtedly made it up out of whole cloth." As a matter of fact, however, I soon discovered the entire incident, set down as Froude related it, in the pages of Dio Cassius. My friend, to whom I wrote, replied that "one swallow does not make a summer," and that actual instances could probably be found of mistakes that Froude had fallen into. And so no doubt they could. My only contention is that justice never has been done him, and that he was loaded down unfairly from the first with a reputation for carelessness. The judgments, however, that time often renders in respects like these are as interesting as any judgments that are handed down to us in silence, and they often have all the dramatic features of what is anomalous and paradoxical. A good example of what I mean may be found in the case of Herodotus *vs.* his detractors. Macaulay, for instance, in his brilliant and interesting essay upon History, did not hesitate to pass the most sweeping judgment on the recognized father of this branch of literature. "At the distance of three and twenty centuries," he wrote, "we feel for him the same sort of pitying fondness which Fontaine and Gay are said



to have inspired in society. He has written an incomparable book. He has written something better perhaps than the best history; but he has not written a good history. He is, from the first to the last chapter, an inventor. We do not here refer," he goes on to say, "merely to those gross fictions with which he has been reproached by the critics of later times. We speak of that coloring which is equally diffused over the whole narrative, and which perpetually leaves the most sagacious reader in doubt what to reject and what to receive. The most authentic parts of his work bear the same relation to his wildest legends which Henry V bears to the Tempest."

Thus the great Macaulay on the careless and credulous Herodotus! Very steadily, however, since the words were written, the case has gone against the facile Englishman and in favor of the ancient Greek. Careful study and a wider knowledge of ancient times and people have gone, I believe, to show that much which was tossed aside as fiction in Herodotus was actual fact, while Macaulay's own history has gradually become discredited, because of its partisan judgment and its perpetual inaccuracy.

The fact of the matter is that there are two great kinds of history, and probably there always will be. The writing of history, in short, is not unlike the art of painting. In both great spheres there are distinct and opposing schools. There are the artists who make a science of detail, and there are those who make a science of *impression*, and neither school is ever wholly accurate, nor can it hope to be.

Now Froude was emphatically an impressionist and a color-schemist. He painted scenes in a vivid and expressive way, and he loved a dramatic situation. He made the most of a striking episode, and the only difference between himself and other writers lay in the fact that where others failed, or did but fairly well, he set a masterpiece before the reader's mind. Froude may have hated correcting proof, as Mr. Birrell has declared,<sup>4</sup> and he was doubtless careless in the copying of manuscript; but he had a veritable passion for digging into the records of the past, and he never wearied in his task of making real the men and women whom he found there. His History may live to be corrected, and

<sup>4</sup> Augustine Birrell, *Essays and Addresses*, p. 163.

his portraits to become retouched; but at least they are likely to live and to be remembered, which is more than can be said of the writings of many of those who delighted to abuse him.

From this digression, however, which has not been wholly vain if it has removed from our minds some portion of inherited prejudices, let us come back to our proper subject,—the preaching qualities of this historian.

Froude's theme, as we have seen, was the Protestant Reformation and the course it ran in England. His text was substantially this, that "the Reformation was the hinge on which all modern history turned." The Reformation, however, as he saw it, was no simple contest between rival creeds and dogmas; it rather was a wide revolt of the laity against the clergy, of the people against a corrupt and tyrannous form of government, of the human mind against restrictions on the native right of independent judgment. As his biographer, Mr. Herbert Paul, reminds us, Froude believed "the Church of Rome to have been the enemy of human freedom under British independence," and in his opinion the "reformers alike in England, in France, and in Germany were fighting for truth, honesty, and private judgment, against priestcraft and ecclesiastical tyranny." He knew too well, from what he had himself been taught, that "the reformers had been calumniated," and it seemed to him that "their services were in danger of being forgotten, and that the modern attempt to ignore the Reformation was not only unhistorical but disingenuous." In this belief he was very far from being alone. Visitors to Oxford will remember that one of the most beautiful of its many striking memorials is the martyrs' monument, opposite Balliol College, near the place where Cranmer, Ridley, and Latimer were burned. The monument, which was designed by Sir G. G. Scott, was erected in 1841, and was intended as a public dissent from the disparagement which had been cast by the leaders of the Oxford movement on the work and influence of the English reformers. It stands there as a witness, raised by scholars and lovers of historical justice, to the worth of men who had laid down their lives in devotion to a mighty cause. What was accomplished there in bronze and marble, Froude undertook to do in literature, and his History is equally a monument in honor of the martyrs,

and likewise of the countless men and women, known and unknown, who bore the brunt of the mighty battle for freedom of thought and for national religious independence.

It would be idle to undertake to claim for Froude what he never undertook to claim for himself,—an absence of prejudice. “I do not pretend,” he wrote long after his *History* had become a classic, “to be impartial. I believe the Reformation to have been the greatest incident in English history; the root and source of the expansive force which has spread the Anglo-Saxon race over the globe and imprinted the English genius and character on the constitution of mankind.” In this respect again he meets in the fullest way the demands of the Gentle Reader. “I have had enough of this,” says Mr. Crothers, in his inimitable way, as regards one of our modern scientific historians who has no sympathy and ventures to express no judgments. “I have had enough of this,” referring to the Civil War in England. “What I want to know is, what it is all about, and which side on the whole has the right of it. Which side are you on? Are you a Roundhead or a Cavalier? Are your sympathies with the Whigs or the Tories? . . . It’s all in confidence; speak out as one gentleman to another under a friendly roof! What do you think about it? No matter if you make a mistake or two, I’ll forget most that you say anyway. All that I care for is to get the gist of the matter.”

Now that is just what Froude did. He spoke out. He said what he thought, and he gave the gist of the entire matter in graphic and most forceful words. He saw distinctly that the question which was fought out after the fall of Wolsey and finally settled by the defeat of Philip’s Great Armada was the question whether England should be bond or free, stagnant or progressive, decadent or resurgent. In the great struggle which ensued before that question was finally settled, men took opposite sides, and took them with a will. Some of the best men of that day, or of any day, took the wrong side, while certain other men whose influence and character never had been rightly weighed, distinctly took the right side. So Froude at least believed. And he not only said so, but he set himself to prove it, and very happily the events of history were on his side. The facts bore out his

theory, and the right men and the nobler principles secured the victory which has never since been lost. There can be no doubt that he went too far in acting as the champion of Henry VIII. He would have accomplished more in this direction, as John Fiske well declared, "if he had not tried to do so much." It was a mighty thing, however, to accomplish anything at all, and whether the better and the truer view was suggested to him by Carlyle or not is a matter of very little consequence. The fact remains that what Carlyle himself accomplished in so great a way for Cromwell, his friend and disciple accomplished in a smaller way for a much less noble and attractive character. It was impossible to whitewash Henry completely; but it was much, at least, to set him in a whiter and a clearer light.

We have seen what Froude's text was, and what the general subject of his long discourse. It now remains to consider how he developed and carried through his theme, and what the special truths were that he took delight in emphasizing.

1. Chief among such truths was the value and the surpassing might of vigorous and independent manhood. Like Carlyle, to whom the early volumes of the *History* were referred for criticism and advice, Froude dearly loved to deal with men, and more especially with men of action,—men who did things and engaged in great heroic feats. These were the kind of men which his native Devonshire had produced in great abundance, and in youth he had been fed upon the tales of what they mightily accomplished. Moreover, he freely accepted the dictum, and worked upon it, that "history is the quintessence of many biographies." He believed that history is essentially a drama and that to be written successfully it must be written in dramatic fashion. A drama, however, depends upon the movements and positions, the beliefs and undertakings, of its actors. It peoples the stage with living men and actual women. In accomplishing this Froude was assisted by his marvellous imaginative powers. He was possessed of insight; that is of historical insight. He had the faculty, without which true history never can be written, of living in the age with which he dealt. He touched elbows with the people of past times and succeeded to a wonderful degree in seeing with their eyes and thinking their thoughts. He was with a boat-

man in his wherry on the Thames that summer afternoon when the "thunder cloud drew down over London, and the storm broke which destroyed St. Paul's." Amidst the roar of the thunder he saw a jagged line of lightning "touch for an instant the highest point of the proud cathedral. Pale tongues of fire flickered out into a coronet of light, and very soon the whole spire, the envy of the Christian world, from the tower wall to the summit, was a gigantic pyramid of flame."

At another time, with three hundred knights and gentlemen, he had been admitted to the hall of Fotheringay Castle to witness the execution of the unfortunate Mary Stuart. He sees her as she descends the great staircase to the hall, leaning on the arm of an officer of the guard. "The tables and forms had been removed," he notices, "and a great wood fire was blazing in the chimney. The Queen of Scots as she swept in seemed as if coming to take part in some solemn pageant. Not a muscle of her face could be seen to quiver. She ascended the scaffold with absolute composure, looked round her smiling, and sat down."

At still another time, he was with the monks in the chapel of the Charter-house when they prepared themselves with unobtrusive nobleness to die. Not less beautiful "they seemed to him in their resolution, not less deserving the remembrance of mankind, than those three hundred who in the summer morning sat combing their golden hair in the passes of Thermopylae." He could not "regret their cause, as there is no cause for which any man can more nobly suffer than to witness that it is better for him to die than to speak words which he does not mean."

There are those among historians who make it clear that what they care for most is the idle gossip of history,—the trivial events, the passing superstitions, the thoughts and sayings of the stable, the kitchen, and the court. Others, again, and among them the greatest and most searching writers, are interested more especially in social and industrial conditions and the slow development of thought. But Froude, in the first chapter of the first of his twelve long volumes, made it reasonably clear that his chief concern was to be with the sturdy men of his native land and the deeds they sturdily performed in fighting for religious freedom. In this respect he

reached a climax when he came to tell the story of the mighty naval duel between Spain and England, in which Drake, and Hawkins, and Sir Walter Raleigh sailed forth to destroy the clumsy but almost countless vessels of the cruel Philip. It was just the kind of theme that suited best the genius of this brilliant descriptive writer, for Froude was a sailor from his youth, and loved the sea as he loved nothing else, unless it were his native Devonshire.

It was not by chance that an older brother made himself one of the foremost naval authorities in England, for the Froudes were a boating family, and the opportunity was near at hand, as the River Dart flowed near the door of the quiet rectory, while the sea was not far off. Even the ritualistic Hurrell could not resist its charm, and he complained in his diary that the thought of it distracted him beyond measure in his prayers. "Do you remember," he wrote Keble, "the southwesterly waves roaring round 'the Prawle' after our stern, and the little crisp breakers that we went through when you cruised with us off Dartmouth harbor?" This passion for the sea, however, was strongest of all with the youngest of the brothers, and he once wrote to a friend that his "highest realization of human felicity would be to wander round the world in a hundred-ton schooner."

With passionate fervor, therefore, as well as intimate knowledge of the elements with which he dealt, he wrote the graphic story of the famous sea-fight, and through it all you feel the breezes as they blew across the swaying decks and fanned the cheeks of those mighty men who sailed from Plymouth Harbor to fight the battle of their Queen. It was no wonder that when the story had been told the historian felt his task was finished. It was the crowning feat of sixteenth-century manhood; or, as he himself expressed it, "It was the sermon which completed the conversion of the English nation and transformed the Catholics into Anglicans."

2. But if Froude believed above all things else in manhood and preached the need and value of strong and resolute and fearless and liberty-loving men, he also believed in a power that is superior to men and women and orders their affairs. Although his faith in early life had undergone a shock, and, guided by the teachings of Carlyle he lost his hold on dogmatic religion, he

never ceased to believe in the presence of a Higher Power which guides men in their work.

"Justice and truth," he once declared, "alone endure and live. Injustice and falsehood may be long-lived; but doomsday comes to them at last, in French Revolutions and other terrible ways." To him there was, if men would only listen, "a Voice forever sounding across the centuries the laws of right and wrong." It came to be his task as an historian to interpret the accents of that voice, and to spell the words it spoke in a mighty human crisis. "Religion," he explained in one connection, and the words are very strikingly a preacher's words,—*"Religion is the attitude of reverence in which noble-minded people instinctively place themselves towards the Unknown Power which made man and his dwelling-place. It is the natural accompaniment of their lives, the sanctification of their actions and their acquirements. It is what gives to man in the midst of the rest of creation his special elevation and dignity. Accompanying our race as it has done from the cradle of civilization, it has grown with our growth, it has expanded with the expansion of knowledge, subject only to the condition that when errors have been incorporated into religious systems, they have been exceptionally tenacious of their ground. Rituals and creeds have become so priceless when once accepted that it has been held sacrilege to touch them. They have been guarded by superstition and sealed against change by anathema. The eternal nature of the Object of our reverence has been attributed to the forms under which it has been adored, and, unable notwithstanding to escape the changes which the development of knowledge imposes upon it, religion has advanced, not by easy and natural transitions, but by successive revolutions, violent leaps, spasmodic and passionate convulsions. Piety, the twin brother of science, tends at such times to be the guardian of error. Love of truth is forced into unnatural hostility with the virtue which is only second to it, and then come those trying periods of human history, when devotion and intelligence appear to be opposed, and the metal of which men and nations are composed is submitted to a crucial test. Those who adhere at all costs to truth, who cling to her though she lead them into the wilderness, find beyond it a promised land where all that they sacrificed is restored to them."*<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Volume xii, pp. 535-6.

3. As these words suggest, with the emphasis they lay upon the dangerous tenacity of ritual and creed, the religion which Froude believed in and proclaimed was a religion of toleration and kindness. History taught him, and he used the facts of history to proclaim, the dangers of departing from that "pure religion" and undefiled of trust and love, of reverence and mercy, which was set forth in the gospels. "Such a creed," he declared in one connection, "had it remained as it came from its Founder, would have changed the aspect of the earth. . . . It would not have quarrelled over words and forms. It would have accepted the righteous act whether the doer of it preferred Paul or Cephas. In that Religion hate would have no place, for love, which is hate's opposite, was its principle; nor could any cruel passion have found its sanction where each emotion was required to resolve itself into charity.

"But the rules of life as delivered in the Gospel were too simple and too difficult. . . . God gave the Gospel, the father of lies invented theology. . . . By their fruits ye shall know them. Through Christ came charity and mercy. From theology came strife and hatred, and that fatal root of bitterness which the Lord spoke Himself in the mournful prophecy, that He had not come to send peace on earth, but a sword. When His name and His words had been preached for fifteen centuries, there were none found who could tolerate difference of opinion on the operation of Baptism, or on the nature of His presence in the Eucharist; none, or at least none but the hard-hearted children of the world. The more religious any man was the more eager was he to put away by fire and sword all those whose convictions differed from his own. The Reformation was the beginning of a new order of things."<sup>6</sup>

Those are biting and sarcastic words; and they are the words of a man whose heart and conscience were aflame with the tragic facts of intolerance and bigotry, and who wished to proclaim these facts from the pulpit page of history.

4. Again, however, and even more conspicuously, he believed in freedom,—freedom of thought, freedom of action, and freedom of religious worship. He believed in the thorough-going separation of church and state, and was never tired of laying

<sup>6</sup>Volume ix, pp. 301-3.



emphasis upon the obstacles and dangers of every form of ecclesiastical dictation. It is in this connection, much more, so far as I have found, than in any other, that he throws aside all possible disguise and preaches with persistent fervor. There can be no better instances of this than occur in the descriptive passages which tell of the martyrs' deaths at Oxford. What, for instance, could flavor more distinctly of the pulpit than the following: "Latimer was then introduced—eighty years old now—dressed in an old thread-bare gown of Bristol frieze, a handkerchief on his head with a night-cap over it, and over that again another cap, with two broad flaps buttoned under the chin. A leather belt was round his waist, to which a Testament was attached; his spectacles, without a case, hung from his neck. So stood the greatest man perhaps then living in the world, a prisoner on his trial, waiting to be condemned to death by men professing to be the ministers of God. As it was in the day of the prophets, so it was in the Son of man's day; as it was in the days of the Son of man, so was it in the Reformers' day; as it was in the days of the Reformers, so will it be to the end, so long and so far as a class of men are permitted to hold power, who call themselves the commissioned and authoritative teachers of truth."<sup>7</sup>

The same characteristics vividly appear when the death of Cranmer is described. Biblical allusions came almost as easily and naturally to Froude's mind as they came to the mind of Ruskin, and he used them with the preacher's freedom. "So perished Cranmer. He was brought out, with the eyes of his soul blinded, to make sport for his enemies, and in his death he brought upon them a wider destruction than he had effected by his teaching while alive. Had they been contented to accept the recantation, they would have left the Archbishop to die broken-hearted, pointed at by the finger of pitying scorn; and the Reformation would have been disgraced in its champion. They were tempted, by an evil spirit of revenge, into an act unsanctioned even by their own bloody laws; and they gave him an opportunity of redeeming his fame, and of writing his name in the roll of martyrs. The worth of a man must be measured by his life, not by his

<sup>7</sup> Volume vi, p. 383.

failures under a single and peculiar trial. The Apostle, though forewarned, denied his Master on the first alarm of danger; yet the Master who knew his nature in its strength and its infirmity, chose him for the rock on which He would build His Church."<sup>a</sup>

I could give other instances where, between his graceful periods and sweeping sentences, we catch clear echoes of the pulpit. But I content myself with these.

And so we leave this prince among the men who have aided history in the truths it cannot help but preach. Often hasty in his judgments, mistaken doubtless in certain of his statements, and swayed by prejudices which he took small pains to hide, he none the less was always brilliant, stimulating, and instructive in his treatment of the things concerning which he wrote. It has well been said of him that "Whether for felicity of diction or for vividness of presentation, he belongs indisputably to the company of the Immortals." Because he considered the presentation of facts almost as important as the facts themselves, and gave in smooth and interesting words the substance of some dull and dry original, it has been assumed of him unfairly that he was careless in his methods and indifferent to "the accidents of truth." But the principle which he laid down for himself at the outset of his work, and the ideal to which he struggled to be true, lacked nothing either in soundness or in height. "It is not," he wrote at the close of the first volume of the *History*, after clearing the ground for his discourse, "it is not for the historian to balance advantages. His duty is with facts."

<sup>a</sup> Volume vi, pp. 429-30.

### THE "STANDARD BIBLE DICTIONARY"<sup>1</sup>

This dictionary has been prepared because Hastings's Dictionary of the Bible and the Encyclopaedia Biblica have been found too "discursive" for handy use. It is intended for educated ministers, who "have not always the leisure to enter into a discursive presentation of critical research"; for Sunday-school teachers and workers; and for intelligent laymen interested in Bible study. To serve such readers, the dictionary should be accurate but not technical; "it should be up to the day in its information, but not so discursive as to burden its pages with the pedantry of undigested facts."

There is undoubtedly a place for a dictionary of the Bible in one volume—otherwise we should not have been blessed with three of them in one year, not to mention the resuscitation of another. Whether such a work can be made to serve the needs of so varied a constituency may, however, be doubted. The educated minister who wants seriously to study a subject will often find this dictionary insufficient in itself, and, through the absence of any systematic indication of the literature, useless as a guide to further inquiry. The ordinary Sunday-school teacher or "intelligent layman," on the other hand, will find it too big and repellently learned. Suppose, for example, that such a reader consults the article on Greek and Roman Idolatry; he will be edified to learn that "the old sacred tree-trunks . . . and stones, usually of meteoric origin, were called ζάρα [*sic*], and these ζάρα [*sic*] continued to be the real cult object," etc.; also that a sacred stone set up under a sacred tree "was called a βάλανος by the Greeks." The layman who, asking for bread, is given a stone like this may be tempted to murmur "pedantry," while those who can read the Greek, after tacitly correcting the mis-

<sup>1</sup>A Standard Bible Dictionary, designed as a comprehensive guide to the Scriptures, embracing their languages, literature, history, biography, manners and customs, and their theology. Edited by M. W. Jacobus, E. E. Nourse, and A. C. Zenos, in association with American, British, and German scholars. Large 8vo, pp. 920. New York: Funk & Wagnalls Company. 1909.

prints, will justly complain that no references to Greek authors are given in support of assertions about the names of sacred stones which seem to have no warrant in usage.

In the Standard Dictionary, as in the new Hastings, the one-volume minister has been more in the mind of the authors and editors than the layman. A dictionary specially adapted to Sunday-school teachers and ordinary readers of the Bible is still to be made.

Taking the work as a short cut to information for busy ministers, it is to be said at once that it will answer this purpose very well. The selection of entry-titles is a combination of the dictionary and the encyclopaedia principles, such subjects as Agriculture, Artisan Life, Trade and Commerce, Dress and Ornaments, Burial and Burial Customs, Law, Crimes and Punishments, Marriage and Divorce, Family, etc., being treated in comprehensive articles with references from the natural dictionary entries. The concordance basis results in some omissions. Thus the emperors Tiberius and Claudius are included, but there is no article on Nero because his name does not happen to occur in the New Testament; though in the New Testament history Nero is a much more important figure than either of the others, and is more frequently referred to. The concordance is not, however, responsible for the absence of "Caesar," under which head a reader of Acts 25 would look for an answer to the question who the emperor was to whom Paul appealed.

There are more serious faults of omission than these. The religions of the Greek and Roman world in the first century of the Christian era are of at least as much importance to the understanding of the New Testament as Semitic religion to that of the Old Testament. There is promise in the preface of an article on the subject; but all that we find is one—mainly irrelevant—on Greek and Roman Idolatry. The reader will look in vain for an article on Judaism at the beginning of the Christian era. To make the matter worse, the article Pharisees is almost wholly given up to the external history of the sect, with no account of their teachings; the few sentences on their religious character are altogether unsatisfactory. The articles on Biblical theology (with a few exceptions, such as Eschatology) entirely ignore con-

temporary Jewish thought. A striking example is the article on God (by W. D. Mackenzie): after setting forth the Old Testament "doctrine" of God—with no reference even to the later development, as represented, for example, in Daniel—the author proceeds: "When we pass to the N T we find ourselves in a new world made for us by a new religion. The change is due to the creative personality of Jesus Christ." Biblical ethics is also a subject which would seem to fall properly within the scope of a Bible dictionary. Suppose an inquirer to ask, What are the standards and motives of moral conduct in the Old Testament or the New, and how are the latter related to Jewish teaching? why should he not find information on this point in the dictionary as well as, say, on Sacrifice or on Magic? Here, again, the lack of a connected treatment is not made good under special topics: there is no article on Retribution; Reward is a barren list of Hebrew and Greek words; Sin and Righteousness are theological disquisitions. It is the signal fault of Bible dictionaries—not peculiar to this one—that they conscientiously tithe the mint, anise, and cumin of antiquities to the comparative neglect of weightier matters; and the disproportion is the more serious the smaller the scale of the work. In the present volume there are also many articles which are mere gleanings from the concordance (see, e.g., Favor, Light, Path, Prince, etc.), of no discernible use unless to the student of the Hebrew or Greek text, who presumably keeps concordances of his own.

The authors are chiefly Americans, but there are several well-known foreign contributors. Nowack writes on various archaeological subjects; Guthe furnishes the long article on Palestine, and on Marriage and Divorce; v. Dobschütz on the New Testament Text; Lake on the New Testament Canon; Driver on Chronicles and on Jeremiah; König on the Old Testament Canon and on Isaiah; James Denney on Jesus Christ and on Paul; Doctor Post, of Beirut, on Diseases and Remedies, etc. Among the American contributors special mention may be made of articles by McCurdy on Egypt, Assyria, Babylonia, Israel, Semitic Religion; by J. R. S. Sterrett on Asia Minor, and on many subjects in the field of New Testament geography and Greek and Roman history and antiquities; Paton on Jerusalem and on the

Old Testament Text; W. D. Mackenzie on subjects in Biblical theology (from the theological rather than the historical point of view). A large part of the articles have been written by the three editors: Jacobus has dealt chiefly with the New Testament literature and kindred subjects; Nourse furnishes most of the articles on the books of the Old Testament and many on biographical and archaeological subjects; Zenos's astounding versatility is displayed in a vast number of articles in the most diverse fields.

In general the articles display competent scholarship; some of them are by men of acknowledged mastery in their domain. Some, however, bear the mark of hasty compilation, and are afflicted with a corresponding inaccuracy. For example, on page 88, we are told that the Apocalypse of Baruch was discovered and published in a Latin translation in 1866, "and later in a more primitive Syriac text in 1871," the fact being that Ceriani's Latin of 1866 was his own translation of the Syriac manuscript which he edited in 1871; on page 868 it is asserted that in later Judaism two tithes were paid "of the product of both soil and cattle." Novel or eccentric opinions are sometimes incautiously accepted, as when Klostermann's unhappy conceit that *Aceldama* (Ἀκελδαμαχ), Acts 1 19, is the transliteration of an Aramaic word meaning 'field of sleep' (cemetery), not 'field of blood' (Mt. 27 8 Acts 1 19), is given as the true explanation of the name.

An example of another kind is the article on the Phasisees (see especially p. 667 B): "They recognized God not only as a law-giver, but also as loving Israel, and along with their *hatakōth* they developed a theory of the 'evil impulse' . . . and a code of morality, known as the 'Two Ways,' which appears later in the Didache." "With Him [Jesus], God was the Father, to be obeyed through love; according to the Pharisees, God was primarily the Law-giver, to be obeyed through fear (Gal. 2 3-5, 5 1, 6 13; Rom. 8 14; 2 John 1 7)." The reader will find it instructive to look up these references, especially those in Galatians; it may occur to him to ask why the Christian opposition to Paul's antinomianism should be alleged to show how the Pharisees thought of God.

If there had been an article on Father in Heaven—why is there not?—or if the article on the Lord's Prayer had been less superficial, it would have appeared that the conception of God as the heavenly Father was by no means specifically Christian; if in the article Prayer any notice had been taken of Jewish custom, it would be plain that the Jew who repeated Deut. 6 4 ff.—“Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart,” etc.—before his morning and evening prayers, taking upon himself thus “the yoke of the Kingdom of Heaven” before “the yoke of the commandments”—that is, acknowledging the constitutive obligation of religion before its specific duties—was not unmindful of the fact that the essence of the religious relation of man to God is love; if ethics had found any place in the dictionary, it would probably have been noted that the rabbis insistently taught that God should not be served with the thought of reward, nor with any self-regarding motive, but “for his own sake.”

There are many well-made and generally well-chosen illustrations in line and in half-tone; the collection of modern Palestinian agricultural implements, household utensils, musical instruments, etc., at Hartford Seminary has been largely drawn upon. For the benefit of a second edition it may be pointed out that the specimen of Samaritan script on page 28 is upside down; to most users of the dictionary it is doubtless as profitable that way as any other.

The editors of the one-volume Hastings decline as hopeless the attempt to indicate the English pronunciation of Old Testament names; in the volume before us the pronunciations are given on the authority of the Standard Dictionary. It must be understood, however, that these pronunciations frequently do not represent usage, but arbitrary rules or perilous analogies; thus, the reader may have his choice among three ways of pronouncing Ittai—every possible way except the obviously right one.

The transliteration of Hebrew words (“slightly (!) different from that in general use”) aims “to enable the English reader to understand, as easily as possible, how the Hebrew words should be pronounced.” We should be surprised if the “English reader” could make head or tail out of this perversely complicated system; it may be some consolation in his defeat to know that he has

escaped learning how to mispronounce Hebrew horribly. Like the American Revisers, whose self-styled Standard American Edition with its "Jehovah" it follows, the Dictionary seems to have a leaning "to gods whom they know not, to new gods that came newly up." The article Jehovah explains that the Hebrew name is written *y'hōwāh*, "but properly *yāhweh*." This new god is not the invention of the printer's devil, for the name occurs repeatedly (see, e.g., pp. 296, 389, 390, 571 f.), and an attempt is even made to do it into Hebrew characters, which, however, gets no nearer to it than *Yohweh*. The latter is at least an imaginable Hebrew form: according to one popular interpretation of Jahveh, "He who brings into existence," *Johveh* would be "the god who is brought into existence"—by dictionary makers!

The publisher's part of the work is excellently done; the print is good, and typographical devices to facilitate reference are skillfully employed. A few misprints have escaped the corrector's eye: *Baba Megilla*, *Baba Sabbath*, etc. (p. 600 and elsewhere); Sybil-line Oracles (p. 41); Gambinius (p. 156). *Mēhōl* (circumciser, p. 136) and *hōbhrē shāmayim* (p. 71, "the Hebrew word for astrologers") are probably not the fault of the proof-reader.

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